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“NOTHING EXCEPT A BATTLE LOST CAN BE HALF AS MELANCHOLY AS A BATTLE WON.”




In recent years, the international community has become increasingly involved in a
variety of security-related tasks in war-torn societies. Due to political constraints
during the Cold War, the involvement of the international community in security
matters – with the UN as the primary actor – had largely been limited to monitoring
cease-fires and conducting disarmament negotiations. With the end of the Cold War,
the international community was spurred on by a greater willingness to intervene in
the internal matters of another state and a new-found belief in the potential of such
interventions. Since 1990, changes have also occurred in the pattern of conflicts: the
number of conflicts has risen and conflicts are almost exclusively internal wars,
subsequently drawing in the civilian population to a greater extent.1 The fact that
conflicts were becoming ever more civilian reinforced a growing consensus and
feeling of moral obligation and the concomitant realisation that peacekeeping should
address civilian security aspects, as well as military ones.2
Today, providing international security assistance is a common tool in
international conflict management and might be considered the essence of ‘third-
generation’ peacekeeping. In some ways, the international community was faced with
an extensive peace and even state building role without developing a comprehensive
understanding of the tasks it took on and the links between them. Having started down
that track and having assumed a virtually binding moral and political stance, the
international community will increasingly feel responsible for maintaining or
reinstalling security, such as it is currently doing in several war-torn societies. In
addition to a growing scope of activity, the number of actors involved has grown
extensively, bringing with it huge demands for co-ordination. The present study of
what I have termed “international security assistance” is thus a first attempt at
presenting this new phenomenon in a systematic manner.
The aim of the current study is to introduce the concept of international
security assistance, its components, its provision, and its role in war-torn societies.
Thus, the present thesis chooses a functional approach, concentrating on the tasks
                                                
1 Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg (1999) “Armed Conflict, 1989-98,” Journal of Peace
Research 36(5), pp. 593-606.
2 The growing feeling of moral obligation is a result of both media pressure and a redefinition of the
concept of security as described below.
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executed and their effect on the security situation in a war-torn society. Although the
motivations and sabre rattling among contributors of international security assistance
are a constant underlying factor in the assessment of the assistance provided, they are
not the main point of focus in the context of this study. The general reluctance to use
military or security instruments in the course of providing international security
assistance is alleviated through the organisational context and the claim of
representing the international community and a set of universal values.3
The provision of international security assistance is in line with a trend
towards more emphasis on humanitarian values and a more normative and proactive
stance.4 This entails that a wide spectrum of tools, ranging from diplomatic pressure
to military intervention, are becoming acceptable instruments for addressing human
rights violations and similar grievances. Similarly, international security assistance
draws on a fundamentally humanitarian rationale and involves a variety of tools along
the continuum. Hopefully, the present study can contribute to an improved
understanding of the tasks that the international community takes on and the means it
employs to execute them in the course of enhancing security in a former conflict area.
What Is International Security Assistance?
Having reached a peace agreement, one all too often assumes that the melancholy of
battle has indeed come to an end. Instead, the struggle between the former warring
parties continues when the agreement is being put into practice, and the legacy of the
preceding war lingers on. In an atmosphere of destruction and distrust, it seems
obvious that support to peace processes would make a considerable difference
between success and failure. Following the same train of thought, the international
community has increasingly become involved in the implementation of peace
agreements in the course of the last decade. The efforts in Angola, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Cambodia, East Timor, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Kosovo,
Namibia, Mozambique, and the West Bank and Gaza are but a few examples.
                                                
3 Section I: Analytical Framework and Conceptual Development  will define the term international
community in greater detail by introducing a typology of actors.
4 See for example Thomas G. Weiss (2000) “The Politics of Humanitarian Ideas,” Security Dialogue 31
(1), pp. 11-23; Kofi A. Annan (1999b) “Two concepts of sovereignty,” The Economist, 18 September
1999; Kofi A. Annan (1999a) “Walking the International Tightrope,” The New York Times, 19 January




At the same time, the end of the Cold War has been traumatic for the United
Nations. Without the Cold War restrictions on decision-making and with more
internal conflicts that called for an international response, the United Nations
experienced a new lease on life. In an attempt to meet increased expectations, the UN
obviously overextended itself, taking on a wide range of peacekeeping tasks that it
was not prepared for institutionally or financially. As a result, the organisation was
struggling to redefine its role in international conflict management and how to share
responsibility with other organisations. Likewise, the process towards understanding
which type of assistance to peace processes is indeed beneficial, has been
cumbersome. The present study seeks to illustrate one area in which external actors
can support the implementation of peace agreements, namely through the delivery of
international security assistance. It is important to understand that the phenomenon of
international security assistance was a product of changes at the level of the
international system rather than a result of, for instance, a policy initiative in one of
the member’s capital.
The rationale for studying international security assistance to war-torn
societies arises with the realisation that the real job of building lasting peace starts
only after a peace agreement has been signed, i.e. in its implementation phase. The
study analyses how the international community can contribute to enhancing security
in a former conflict area in the wake of a peace agreement. The assumption is made
that through such assistance the international community will support or even
accelerate the transition from war to peace. Thus, although I am fully aware of the
central importance of political development and economic reconstruction in a post-
settlement society, the focus here is on the security dimension of peace
implementation. 5 There are several reasons for focusing on international security
assistance, apart from the fact that it is an understudied field. In this context, security
is understood as a precondition for other peace building and reconstruction efforts.6
                                                
5 Throughout the analysis below, the study takes into account that interference in the security sector of
a war-torn country is affected by and itself affects the political and economic interests of the parties
involved.
6 The delivery of international security assistance in post-conflict regeneration builds on an
understanding of a state as more than merely an arena for social interaction. It has a specific role in the
organisation of how society interacts and a responsibility towards its population. International security
assistance primarily addresses the aspect of state-building that concerns the resurrection of the state’s
monopoly on violence, reflecting the liberal notion that a state is obligated to protect society and
maintain law and order. At the same time, the concept of international security assistance underlines
the need to place the state as a formal institutional framework within a context of legitimacy. In that
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More generally, increased security lies at the heart of the confidence-building process
which is the basis for building lasting peace. In a way, security is the key to a new
“social contract” between the population and its government, in which the population
is willing to surrender the responsibility for its physical safety into government hands.
This is the natural state of individual to government relations in most peaceful
societies where the citizens are not subject to extraordinary threats to their security.
Thus, members of society must agree to abide by certain ground-rules of social
behaviour and must trust the other members to do the same. The same links appear at
the level of parties to the conflict. Parties to civil strife incur substantial risks when
relying on a former opponent for the fulfilment of their security needs.7
Accordingly, building confidence and promoting legitimacy are principal
challenges that face the implementation of various peace agreements. Confidence-
building measures can only be successful if there is also a sense among the population
that the system in which they are asked to confide is politically legitimate and is
willing to fulfil their security needs. Political legitimacy is to a large extent a matter of
expectations and performance, where the population’s perception of performance is
conditioned by the degree to which security and stability are provided. As will
become clear throughout, the organisation and activities of the security sector are
critical in this context. In a post-settlement situation, the gap between expectations
and performance, where security is not guaranteed, provides the opening for
international involvement.
Suppositions and Some Additional Definitions
On the above basis, I have arrived at the following supposition:
By providing financial, technical, and political support to processes of
demilitarisation and military and civilian security sector reform, international
security assistance can fill a vital gap and thereby facilitate the transition
from war to peace.
By financial support I mean aid money and materiel to promote physical
reconstruction, equipment etc. Other examples range from cash to fund the
                                                                                                                                           
way, the power of the state is limited by its subjugation to democratic norms and respect for human
rights.
7 Walters points out how this is in contrast to interstate conflict in which the states involved have a
fallback position within their own territory in case the peace process should go awry. Barbara F.
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destruction of excess military equipment, to furniture for court houses or training
academies to food distributed in quartering areas. Technical support includes training
of military and police forces and other security sector staff, as well as direct assistance
in demilitarisation processes, such as patrolling a cease-fire line or monitoring
demobilisation or restructuring a military organisation. Political support is a more
diffuse concept and refers to the legitimisation of local actors and actions, in
particular identifying and morally supporting those that further the peace process or
act in compliance with the goals of the peace agreement. Moreover, political support
has a normative element in that it involves developing certain values and rules for
social interaction, such as respect for human rights.
This study looks at post-settlement situations that follow a civil war or
predominantly internal conflict in which the final goal is the coexistence of the former
opponents in a common state. In other words, the aim is that of one legitimate
government and of power-sharing between former warring parties. As a state’s
monopoly on violence is a central function of a state, the responsibility for security
will also be in the hands of one party. Given the fact that hostilities have only just
ended, it will require considerable trust to convince the parties not to retain alternative
security arrangements. The question is how the international community can
contribute to engendering sufficient confidence to move forward and render the peace
process self-sustaining. In the end, the goal of the present study is to improve the
understanding of the opportunities and limitations of external attempts to enhance
security in post-settlement societies and thereby to consolidate the peace process.
At this stage, I will clarify only a few terms, as more in-depth discussions of
the concepts of peace implementation and international security assistance follow in
Section I: Analytical Framework and Conceptual Development. The notion of “peace
implementation” is linked directly to the peace agreement and is thus the starting-
point and the dominant determinant of the international presence and involvement in
the peace process. It is thus a more descriptive alternative for the range of peace
support activities that follow in the wake of an agreement.
The concept of “international security assistance” as developed in my analysis
must be distinguished from earlier applications. The traditional Cold War era term
denoted various military and counter-insurgency train-and-equip programmes that
                                                                                                                                           




aimed at shoring up pro-Western regimes throughout the world against Communism.
Instead, “international security assistance” will be defined as all kinds of international
assistance delivered by the international community in the aftermath of the conclusion
of a peace agreement with a view to enhancing the security situation in the area of
concern, and thereby contributing to the continuation of the peace implementation
process. The definition underlines how the focus is directed towards tasks rather than
actors throughout the analyses. By choosing a functional perspective, the project
seeks to identify and study a wide range of actors and tasks, including non-traditional
types of assistance as well as actors that one usually does not associate with security
matters, but that nevertheless play an essential role in enhancing security in societies
emerging from internal wars. This perspective enhances our understanding of the grey
areas between traditional military and civilian tasks for the international community
and gives new impetus to the search for international capacities to improve security in
societies emerging from violent conflicts.
I have chosen to mainly use the term “post-settlement” rather than “post-
conflict” for two reasons. First, the level of violence in the wake of a peace agreement
is variable and there are a number of cases, if not most, in which violence did not
cease immediately with the formal signing of the agreement. The degree to which that
was the case in the two case studies included here will become clear in the discussions
of the respective implementation processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Angola.8
Second, aside from the cases studied in depth here, there are several peace processes,
such as the one following the Oslo Accords in the West Bank and Gaza, that were not
initiated after a full-scale war. If this study is to have relevance for peace processes
more generally, it cannot exclude cases such as the implementation of the Oslo
Accords by presupposing conflict. Despite these reservations, the term “post-conflict”
does appear in this study as a generic term denoting the time period following rather
than that prior to the agreement.
Possibly one of the most difficult questions is defining what I mean by
“peace.” One can speak of negative and positive peace, where the former refers to the
absence of open armed conflict and the latter to the consolidation of peace through
reconciliation and reconstruction. In a more demanding definition, one might describe
                                                
8 The implementation processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Angola are discussed in Chapters 5 of




a situation as peaceful when the large majority of conflicts within a society are
managed through non-violent mechanisms. At the risk of being accused of moral
relativism, one can nonetheless claim that, in the end, peace is a very subjective
concept, according to which there is peace when the majority of the population
believes that there is.9
Throughout the study I will use the expressions “international community,”
“third-party actors,” and “external actors” interchangeably to describe the host of
interested actors involved in the peace process, including organisations and other
international bodies, states, and individuals, but excluding the parties to the conflict.
When speaking more specifically of actors present in the theatre of operation, I will
also use the term “international presence.”10
The term “security” itself requires narrowing down. Although security has
traditionally been related to a sovereign territorial state, the concept has been
expanded both in scope and level. Thus, a definition of national security now often
includes environmental or economic security along with military security against
external threats. While it does address security needs at various levels, the present
study limits its scope in that it focuses on the traditional ‘hard-core’ concept of
security and neglects more tangential aspects.
With respect to the level of security, the question ‘whose security?’ is
frequently asked in this context. The traditional notion that focused on military
security at the level of the state has been expanded as a result of several interrelated
developments. It has undergone a transformation in parallel with the concept of
sovereignty. Deng’s view of “sovereignty as responsibility”11 translates into security
terms by placing more emphasis on the state’s responsibility for its citizens’
security. 12 As a result, a growing number of states are classified as ‘weak’ and unable
to fulfil their obligations towards their citizens. The shift towards internal conflicts
has contributed to directing attention towards the threats to the security of individuals.
                                                
9 A notable exception is when that group in the population that does not perceive the situation as
peaceful coincides with an ethnic, religious or other minority.
10 See also the typology of actors included in Section I: Analytical Framework and Conceptual
Development. It contains a list of different types of actors and their roles in providing international
security assistance.
11 See Francis M. Deng et al (1996) Sovereignty as Responsibility. Conflict Management in Africa (The
Brookings Institution: Washington D.C.); Francis M. Deng (1995) “Reconciling Sovereignty with
Responsibility: A Basis for International Humanitarian Action,” in John W. Harbeson and Donald
Rothchild (eds) Africa in World Politics (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado), pp. 295-310.
12 The concept of “human security” in part springs from this trend. See for example Astri Suhrke
(1999) “Human Security and the Interests of States,” Security Dialogue 30(3), pp. 265-76.
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A useful distinction can be made between national security, on the one hand, and law
and order or personal security, on the other. The immediate aftermath of a peace
agreement often reveals the extent to which the conflict has been a hybrid of an
internal and an interstate confrontation. In the same way, security issues concern the
relationship between the parties, as well as the general safety of the population. Both
components of security will always be significant for the transition from war to peace,
regardless of whether the emphasis is on the protection of the state or that of the
individual citizen.
In accordance with the two ‘recipients,’ the study of security, then, includes
two types of security namely military and civilian security. 13 One should keep in
mind, however, that security is not an absolute and objective concept agreed upon by
all parties. Many peace processes are burdened by parties with irreconcilable security
demands or contradictory long-term and short-term security needs. The role of the
international community lies not only in urging the parties diplomatically and
otherwise, to accept a common security agenda for the peace process, but also in
offering assistance and guidance in closing the security gaps, whether they are in the
military or the civilian security realm.
The definition of a peace settlement used in this study is “any written mutually
agreeable arrangements between parties that at least temporarily resolve or remove
from contention one or more, but not necessarily all, of the issues underlying the
dispute.”14 It is a wide definition, which also includes open-ended agreements, such as
declarations of principles for subsequent negotiations towards a final peace treaty.
This definition is an attempt to avoid the obvious dilemma that “one could never be
sure that the most recent settlement was the last.”15 Moreover, describing the peace
settlement as the end point of a civil war would require defining what constitutes a
civil war. This definition is in line with an overall emphasis on a large degree of
continuity of conflict and conflict elements from the pre-settlement into the post-
settlement transition period.
                                                
13 See for a general discussion on the concept of security: David A. Baldwin (1997) “The Concept of
Security,” Review of International Studies 23(1), pp. 5-26.
14 William J. Dixon (1996) “Third Party Techniques for preventing conflict escalation and promoting
peaceful settlement,” International Organization, p. 657.




I have chosen a case study research design as the most suitable method to
conceptualise international security assistance and analyse its role in war-torn
societies. According to Yin, “the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the
desire to understand complex social phenomena.”16 Here, the case study approach was
chosen, as it is instrumental in explaining the how and why of international security
assistance. An advantage of using case studies is that they deliberately take account of
the context of the phenomenon to be studied, as it might be difficult to distinguish
between the two when studying real-life situations.17
Case study research is often criticised for its “lack of rigor.”18 This is doubly
true when comparing two cases. Therefore, developing a theoretical structure within
which the case studies are to be conducted is an essential tool in case study research.
Accordingly, I analyse the two case studies on the basis of a common analytical
framework established in Section I. The framework not only provides the theoretical
underpinnings, but also lends structure to the study to optimise the basis for
comparison between the two case studies. Yin points out that conclusions drawn from
case studies are “generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or
universes,” i.e. “analytical generalization.”19 Similarly, the analysis of the cases in the
present study will validate the concept of international security assistance as it is
developed here rather than providing conclusions for all peace processes.
The two case studies are the delivery of international security assistance to,
first, the implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the
period December 1995 to December 1998 and, second, the implementation of the
Lusaka Protocol in Angola in the period November 1994 to November 1998. The two
cases are alike enough to be comparable, but diverge enough to give fruitful and novel
insights.
There are several reasons for selecting Bosnia-Herzegovina as a case study.
First, it fulfils Yin’s conditions for a single case study choice in that it is both unique
and critical.20  Second, the operation is of particular relevance to Western observers,
as it is taking place in the middle of Europe. Third, “the mission in Bosnia is without
                                                
16 Robert K. Yin (1994) Case Study Research. Design and Methods (Sage Publications: Thousand
Oaks, California), p. 3.
17 Yin (1994), p. 13.
18 Yin (1994), p. 9.
19 Yin (1994), p. 10.
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doubt the largest international mobilisation of military, civilian and economic
resources since the occupation of Germany in the immediate aftermath of the Second
World War.”21 Arguably, the level of commitment and the amount of assistance that
are forthcoming are as good as it gets in peace operations. In the aftermath of the
international assistance to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, standards for
levels of involvement and for success have been completely redefined. Studying
Bosnia-Herzegovina not only enlightens us on current practice, but also foreshadows
future patterns of involvement.
The question then becomes whether the theoretical framework holds true in a
second more traditional case. Therefore, it is interesting to analyse a case that, while it
enjoyed less attention than Bosnia-Herzegovina, was a typical United Nations
operation, as we had known them until then. It is important to keep in mind that the
prevailing mindset at the time of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III’s
inception was fundamentally different from the Bosnian case. While attention paid to
the Angolan conflict had fluctuated over the years, in 1994 UNAVEM III was a fairly
typical United Nations peace mission and a large one in Africa at that. UNAVEM III
in Angola is also comparable to other international operations in Southern Africa,
such as the assistance provided to the peace process in Mozambique. Despite their
differences, the two case studies are similar in that they represent extensive
international efforts in two different parts of the world, in which international security
assistance was provided.
Furthermore, the case studies are similar in that they both reflect an attempt by
the international community to make up for prior failure. Both the United Nations
Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) and the United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR) are less than bright chapters in the book of international efforts
to maintain or bring about peace. Another parallel between the two cases is the role of
the United States as one of the most dominating players in each peace process. At the
same time, it reveals a major difference in the country’s level of commitment in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Angola respectively. The cases also correspond with respect
to the period of time studied. Thus, although the time period is not identical, the peace
processes are to a large extent concurrent.
                                                                                                                                           
20 See Yin (1994), p. 38-40, 45f.
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The major difference between the case studies is the degree of international
attention directed towards them. Accordingly, the implementation of the Dayton
Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina brought with it much heavier baggage for the
members of the international community involved than was true of the peace process
in Angola. Should significant parallels emerge, the differences between the cases
actually serve to strengthen the validity of the conclusions rather than undermining it.
In addition, the cases diverge with regard to the regional organisational structures
engaged in providing security assistance. Whereas there were a number of regional
institutions with varying resource bases in the European theatre, the institutions
relevant for Sub-Saharan Africa were overall too weak to play a major role. This is
important for the comparison of the two cases, as the Angolan situation featured one
predominant organisation, i.e. the United Nations, and the Bosnian setting featured a
number of large and some powerful organisations, in addition to the United Nations.
Actors and their motivations are of secondary concern in the present context,
therefore it is all the more important to acknowledge some basic parameters at the
outset.
Sources
The choice and availability of sources for the present research has three-fold
implications (1) for the validity of each case in itself, (2) for the comparability of the
cases, and (3) for the validity of the conclusions. According to Yin, one of the
advantages of case study research “is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence
– documents, artefacts, interviews, and observation.”22 The use of a variety of sources
strengthens the inferences drawn from the studies and alleviates the danger of internal
invalidity. 23 I have used articles in newspapers and journals, public documents and
statements, organisational assessments/reports, and interviews. Interview partners for
both case studies are listed in the bibliographies. I have chosen to refrain from quoting
them directly in the text, but build on their assessments and insights. Many of the
written sources were retrieved from the internet, such as from official websites,
electronic archives etc. As I have focused on international efforts rather than on the
                                                                                                                                           
21 International Crisis Group (1998c) To Build a Peace: Recommendations for the Madrid Peace
Implementation Council Meeting (ICG Bosnia Project Report, 15 December 1998;
http://www.cris…org/bosnia/reports/bh43rep.htm), p. 7.
22 Yin (1994), p. 8.
23 Yin (1994), p. 35.
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dynamics of the conflict itself, sources at international organisations have been
central. Similarly, local newspapers and interviews have been less relevant. When
using sources from international organisations, I have kept in mind that they of course
have to be qualified with respect to their need to justify the actions of a given
organisation and might not be sufficiently critical. This is especially true of, for
example, United Nations or OSCE reports.
Sources for the two case studies differ in that there are far more evaluative
articles and reports on the implementation of the Dayton Agreement than with respect
to the Lusaka Protocol. Literature in the Angolan case tends to be descriptive rather
than prescriptive. Therefore, I rely more on my own assessments, as well as those of
practitioners and other experts on Angola.
For both cases, it is important to remember that the peace processes were
ongoing. While the Lusaka process has finally collapsed in Angola, the Dayton
process continues in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That means of course that most sources
were written concurrently with the ongoing processes or with the time period studied.
Naturally, I cannot deny knowledge of events subsequent to the end of the periods
studied in both cases, such as the collapse of the Lusaka process and the renewed
wavering of commitment in Bosnia-Herzegovina or the involvement of the
international community in Kosovo, which will have grave implications for future
international security assistance. Still, I have attempted to distinguish between those
later events that reflect actions taken before the end of the period studied and those
that fall entirely outside of the time brackets. Whereas the former are important for
the assessment of international security assistance in the case studies, the latter should
be largely disregarded.
Final Introductory Remarks
The thesis consists of four main sections, plus a concluding section. Section I is an
analytical framework in which the concept of international security assistance is
developed. It also includes initial thoughts on peace implementation and deliberations
on legitimacy and sovereignty, in order to map out the context for international
security assistance. Moreover, it introduces different types of international security
assistance in both the military and civilian security sphere, as well as issues in co-
ordination. The analytical framework is intended to introduce research questions and
structure the subsequent case study analysis.
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Section II and Section III are the two case studies. International efforts to
support the implementation of the Dayton Agreement are analysed first, then attention
moves to Southern Africa and the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol in Angola.
Both studies follow the same pattern in that they build on a three-fold starting-point
which consists of security gaps in post-settlement societies, the provisions and
legitimacy of the peace agreement, and the international actors and their local
counterparts. On this basis, the provision of international security assistance to the
implementation process is studied by dividing the process into a demilitarisation
process, a long-term military reform process, as well as a process of building civilian
security. Both case studies conclude with a section that assesses the efforts of the
international community.
Section IV, then, contains a comparison of the two cases that still follows the
structures laid out in the analytical framework, but also points to common underlying
challenges that international security assistance faces in post-settlement societies.
Finally, I will draw up some more general Conclusions based on the in-depth case
studies and their comparison, complemented by basic knowledge of other cases. The
study conceptualises international security assistance by developing an understanding
of its content and role. The conclusions identify the potential scope, but also the
limitations of international security assistance in supporting and facilitating processes
of demilitarisation and security sector reform, in support of peace processes in the
wake of an agreement.
Instinctively, one is tempted to claim that war-torn societies are in need of and
should receive all the support they can get. This study hopes to differentiate to a
greater extent, in order to enable an assessment of what kind of international security
assistance is useful, essential, or counterproductive and how the process of delivery
can condition its utility and effectiveness. Finally – and perhaps most importantly – it
aims at identifying what international security assistance cannot achieve, that is where
the society in question must live up to its own share of the responsibility to
consolidate peace.





“ALL MEN DESIRE PEACE, BUT VERY FEW DESIRE THOSE THINGS THAT MAKE FOR
PEACE.”
THOMAS A KEMPIS
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SECTION I: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONCEPTUAL
DEVELOPMENT
1 Introduction
The current section serves two purposes: it develops the theoretical concept of
international security assistance, suggesting typologies of actors and most importantly
tasks. As a first step, it outlines the context for international security assistance
particularly the conditions in internal conflicts and relates the concept to the evolution
of wider peacekeeping. The second purpose is a natural continuation of the first, in
that the current section provides the analytical framework that will structure the case
study analyses in Sections II and III. The study of international security assistance to
peace implementation processes has five major components: (1) elements that
typically introduce insecurity in an immediate post-settlement society; (2) traits of the
peace agreement that form the starting-point for the peace implementation process;
(3) third-party actors that provide international security assistance; (4) types of
security assistance supplied; and finally (5) key issues in co-ordination and co-
operation among and between third-party actors and the parties to the conflict.
2 Basic Thoughts on International Security Assistance
Understanding the context of peace implementation is an important precondition for
conceptualising international security assistance to peace processes. First, it involves
insight into the changing nature and scope of peace support operations and how peace
implementation fits into the existing terminology. On that basis, it will be possible to
define international security assistance more clearly and discuss its function in peace
processes. Most importantly, understanding the context entails recognising the
changing concept of sovereignty and its implications for legitimate third-party
intervention in seemingly intractable internal conflicts, as well as the specific
challenges of legitimacy and consent.
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2.1 Peace Support Operations and the Concept of Peace Implementation
A general strengthening of international peacekeeping and peace building is taking
place, in part triggered by a changing geopolitical environment. In addition to a
quantitative change in the number of operations after the Cold War, peacekeeping has
evolved qualitatively into a concept referred to as second generation peacekeeping,
wider peacekeeping, and most recently, peace support operations.
The change reflects the recognition that a political settlement that aims at
ending the underlying conflict, not simply avoiding its aggravation, is the starting
point for “the new peacekeeping.”24 As Ratner observed, peace support operations
“aim primarily at assisting a state or a group of states in executing an agreed political
solution to a conflict.”25 The political dimension is most prominent in the concept of
post-conflict peace building defined by former UN Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”26 This implies
that the new peacekeeping is not limited to an exclusively military mandate, but can
have a substantial non-military mandate and composition. The goal is no longer
limited to preserving a cease-fire, but to consolidate state structures through social
and political reorganisation, reflected in a web of military and non-military functions,
such as monitoring elections, supervising local administration, promoting and
protecting human rights, supervising law and order, deploying international police
forces, conducting demobilisation and reintegration programmes for former
                                                
24 Steven Ratner (1995) The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold
War (Macmillan: Basingstoke), p. 25. There are clear parallels between preventive deployment and
peace implementation in that the former aims at preventing the eruption of conflict and the latter at
preventing a recurrence of conflict.
25 Ratner (1995); p. 22. Shashi Tharoor (1995) “Foreword,” in Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes
(eds) Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (Macmillan: Basingstoke), p. xvi.
26 Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) An Agenda for Peace (United Nations: New York, NY), p.10. It is
important to distinguish between peacekeeping, peace building, and peacemaking . According to
Boutros-Ghali peacemaking involved “actions to bring hostile parties to agreement,” while
peacekeeping was defined as “the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent
of the parties [...] that expands the possibility for both the prevention of conflict and the making of
peace.” Peacemaking already has a generally accepted and distinct meaning, namely the diplomatic
process of bringing the sides in a conflict together toward a settlement, both before and after the
signature of a potential peace agreement. As Ratner argued, the established definitions are hostage to
older forms of peacekeeping which envisaged a two phase strategy of peacekeeping to “freeze” the
conflict by peacekeeping missions supervising cease-fire agreements, until peacemaking efforts or
diplomatic interventions and other instruments would eventually, if ever, provide a political solution to
the conflict. Ratner argues that this dichotomous view proves anachronistic in light of modern
peacekeeping operations which combine elements of peacekeeping and peace building, as well as
preventive diplomacy to avoid the spread of conflict.
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combatants, assisting in the establishment of civilian police forces, in economic
rehabilitation or the repatriation of refugees, providing demining assistance,
humanitarian relief, etc. With the increased list of tasks a wider range of actors
emerged; a development that is sometimes termed the increased breadth and depth of
non-traditional peacekeeping. 27 In addition to the traditional UN and local
counterparts, actors now also include guerrilla movements, domestic political parties,
regional and sub-regional organisations, non-governmental organisations, civilian
components of the peacekeeping mission, international financial institutions, private
foundations, foreign investors, academic institutions etc. Clearly, the need for co-
ordination among actors has increased proportionately with the increase in numbers
and will have significant consequences for the delivery of security assistance.
The term peace implementation has been proposed as a more descriptive
alternative for the web of peacekeeping, peace making, and peace building efforts that
follow in the wake of an agreement between the warring parties and look toward
consolidating a fragile peace.28 The present study uses this term in order to avoid
confusion with peace building processes that take place outside the framework of a
peace agreement.
Gradually, one has come to realise that the conclusion of a formal peace
agreement is not the end all be all for a peace process. In part, the eventual success of
a peace agreement depends on its ability to “anticipate and devise means to cope with
the issues of the future.”29 Inevitable changes in the interests and objectives of the
parties to the agreement, as well as alterations in the balance of power among the
parties, will lead to adjustments in the parties’ assessment of the agreement. A peace
agreement will never address all the issues of contention and always be at least
partially ambiguous. As a result, it is open to conflicting interpretations and to the
disruptive acts by rejectionists or ‘spoilers’ of the peace process.30 In many ways, the
peace agreement reflects a compromise between resolving as many issues as possible
and putting an end to bloodshed. The compromise will be hostage to the realisation
that issues left for future negotiations can easily become a stumbling block for the
implementation of the agreement. In the worst case scenario, these issues can cause a
                                                
27 Daniel and Hayes (1995), p. xx.
28 Ratner (1995), p. 21.
29 Kalevi Holsti (1991) Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order (Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge), p. 353.
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vicious circle of self-destruction when an escalating spiral of alleged violations and
recriminations is coupled with poorly devised monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms.31
2.2 Conceptualising International Security Assistance
International security assistance refers to
all kinds of assistance offered and/or delivered by the international community in
the aftermath of the conclusion of a peace agreement with a view to enhancing the
security situation in the area of concern, and thereby contributing to the
continuation of the peace implementation process.
I suggest that the concept of international security assistance is preferable to the
established peacekeeping terminology in that it reaches across the civil-military
divide, while maintaining its focus on security. In that way, it can provide a more
comprehensive approach and one that illustrates the grey zone between traditional
civilian and traditional military tasks in peace support. This allows for a complex
analysis that takes account of different levels of security, both short- and long-term
measures, and a variety of actors. With its emphasis on building lasting structures that
are conducive to peaceful coexistence after civil wars, it also underlines the auxiliary,
rather than executive function of the international community in peace processes. The
result is a curious mixture of heavy international involvement and local responsibility.
Examples of international security assistance may include peacekeeping
forces, peace enforcing forces, international military/police observers, civilian human
rights observers, international assistance to establishing a local police force, an
internal security force and/or an army. It also involves assistance to demobilising
local combatants and other armed elements as well as assistance to effect the
disarmament of informal militias and armed political groups. International security
assistance can also serve to enhance security co-operation between the two parties, for
example by integrating the two parties into common security arrangements such as
sub-regional defence and security organisations.
                                                                                                                                           
30 Term suggested by Stephen J. Stedman (1997) “Spoiler Problems in the Peace Processes,”
International Security 22(2), pp. 5-53.
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Whereas a peace implementation process takes the conclusion of a written
peace agreement between the parties to the conflict as its starting-point, the end point
of the implementation process is difficult to define, unless a resumption of hostilities
triggers the collapse of the agreement. In an attempt to subdivide the implementation
phase, Ball and Halevy have broadly defined a transitional and a consolidation phase
that follow an agreement. In the transitional phase the establishment of a legitimate
government, the introduction of reforms of political institutions and of the security
sector, and economic and social recovery will be central tasks. The subsequent
consolidation phase features a continuation and deepening of the reform and recovery
process.32 International security assistance will find its predominant application in the
transitional phase and be of less relevance in the consolidation phase which focuses
on long-term economic and social development. How long each phase lasts will vary
in different conflicts. In addition, one may have reached the consolidation phase
within one area of peace implementation while still contributing to the transitional
phase in another.
The effectiveness of international security assistance is far from easy to
evaluate and any assessment will be conditioned by the time frame in which the
progress of peace implementation is reviewed.33 Nonetheless, it is possible to single
out five traits of successful security assistance. Thus, international security assistance
has been effective in furthering the peace process, when it has
(1) fulfilled specific provisions of the peace agreement;
(2) increased security on the ground in the perception of the population;
(3) executed a comprehensive reform of the security sector;
(4) given rise to security co-operation between the parties to the conflict;
(5) promoted the integration of the post-conflict state(s) into a regional security
network.
As we move down the list and as the peace process progresses, the role of
international security assistance will change dramatically, as will the reception of the
intervening actors by the parties. Note that the function of the criteria in this study is
                                                                                                                                           
31 Fen Osler Hampson (1996) Nurturing Peace: Why Settlements Succeed or Fail (United States
Institute for Peace: Washington D.C.), pp. 3-4.
32 Nicole Ball with Tammy Halevy (1996) Making Peace Work: The Role of the International
Development Community (Policy Essay No. 18, Overseas Development Council: Washington D.C.), p.
29.
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more descriptive than prescriptive, in that they serve to highlight important issues
rather than as a direct test of the case studies.
2.3 Sovereignty and the Challenge of Legitimate Intervention
One of the international community’s guiding principles since World War II has been
the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states and the
territorial integrity of sovereign governments. When the principle has been set aside
to allow for intervention by an external force, it has either been with the consent of
the sovereign government or warranted by a general threat to peace and stability, such
as is stipulated in the UN Charter. In recent years, the concept of sovereignty has been
challenged in two ways: first, there is the simple fact that the early 1990s witnessed a
rising number of internal conflicts that spilled over into neighbouring countries.
Second, the concept of sovereignty has increasingly been tied to the notion that a
sovereign state has certain responsibilities towards its population. When it cannot
fulfil these responsibilities, its sovereignty is challenged. Key factors in the
assessment of the state are its ability to provide security for its territory and
population and to maintain a monopoly on violence. The responsibility of the state is
most specifically reflected in the call for respect for human rights. And yet, “[s]tate
sovereignty and its corollary, the principle of non-intervention, are still among the
most important building blocks of international society, despite the challenges posed
by the principle of universal human rights.”34 Still, there are a number of weak states
that either do not have the means or the legitimacy to exercise effective control over
its territory.
A collapsed state might be the result when a weak state is unable to provide
security for opposition groups and the general population. I. William Zartman was
one of the first to conceptualise the notion of collapsed states comprehensively. He
suggests that it is appropriate to speak of a collapsed state in a situation in which “the
structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and
                                                                                                                                           
33 See Diehl et al’s excellent – and somewhat sobering – study on long-term effectiveness of UN
operations. Paul F. Diehl et al (1996) “UN intervention and recurring conflict,”  International
Organization 50 (4), pp. 683-700.
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must be reconstituted in some form, old or new.”35 Collapsed states differ
fundamentally from post-settlement situations, in that post-settlement situations
presuppose the existence of an authority that has invited in the international efforts.
Still, there are some interesting similarities between the two. Zartman identifies three
central functions of a state and the implications that the occurrence of collapse has for
these. He argues that by failing to fulfil its central functions, the government loses its
right to rule:
(1) sovereign authority/source of identity and area of political control; collapse results
in a loss of authority to confer meaning on people’s social action;
(2) institution/organisation of decision-making; in a collapsed state decision-making
structures will be paralysed and inoperative;
(3) security guarantor/territory; the state in collapse proves incapable of providing
security. 36
Whereas the state as a framework for social activity and for effective
government is crucial, it is the third function that is of the greatest concern in the
current context. Particularly, the effective and reliable provision of law and order and
civilian security for each individual is a major part of a government’s legitimacy. 37
The argument continues that when the state loses its sovereign power over its
territory, it can no longer invoke the principle of inviolability of its borders and the
non-interference in its internal affairs. Particularly in Africa, the validity of
sovereignty as an inalienable right has been called into question. As a result, the
threshold for intervention in Africa and elsewhere has been significantly lowered in
recent years. Deng writes that “[s]overeignty as responsibility means that national
governments are duty bound to ensure minimum standards of security and social welfare
for their citizens.”38 The international community enters the picture with security
                                                                                                                                           
34 Espen Barth Eide, Annika S. Hansen and Brynjar Lia (1999) Security Sector Reform as a
Development Issue (Room Doc #7, OECD/DAC Task Force for International Peace and Development,
Paris, 2-3 June 1999), p. 15.
35 I. William Zartman (ed)(1995a) Collapsed States The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate
Authority (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado), p.1. See also Jeffrey Herbst (1996)
“Responding to State Failure in Africa,” International Security 21(3), pp. 120-44.
36 Zartman (1995a), p. 5.
37 Zartman (1995a), p. 6.
38 Francis M. Deng et al (1996) Sovereignty as Responsibility. Conflict Management in Africa (The
Brookings Institution: Washington D.C.), p. 211. For an in-depth discussion of the concept of
sovereignty and the responsibility that it entails for a given state, see Deng et al (1996) or Francis M.
Deng (1995) “Reconciling Sovereignty with Responsibility: A Basis for International Humanitarian
Action,” in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds) Africa in World Politics (Westview Press:
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assistance to support the local government’s own efforts at building “a system of law
and order that enjoys broad-based support and therefore legitimacy.”39
Although it is usually not subject to total collapse, the post-settlement state in
civil wars is challenged in several ways. It is weak with respect to the degree of
effective control it exercises over its territory, its economy is usually dysfunctional,
and it often has to incorporate competing ethnic claims to power. As a result of the
war, the state’s legitimacy has to be consolidated and it is as yet unwilling or unable
to protect its population.
The security gap is especially significant in the wake of a civil war, when
parties feel exposed and are hypersensitive to violations of the peace agreement. At
the same time, fledgling government institutions have not yet proven capable of
“effective protection” or “neutral enforcement.”40 Ironically, conflicts frequently erupt
in transitional phases of economic and political reform, further destabilising the
government at a time when it needs clear legitimacy to pull off far-reaching changes.
Therefore, it is critical to keep in mind that today’s conflicts occur against the
backdrop of Africa’s massive and sustained economic crisis, due in large part to
mismanagement and corruption, and the legacy of the communist political and
economic system in the Balkans and Eastern Europe more generally.41 Therefore, a
major task for the international community is to strengthen the state’s security
apparatus to the degree that it can trump alternative providers of security. 42 In the
peace process, the international community will have to handle alternative power
                                                                                                                                           
Boulder, Colorado), pp. 295-310; Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) “Empowering the United Nations,”
Foreign Affairs 71 (Winter 1992/3), p. 99.
39 Deng et al (1996), p. 212.
40 Barbara F. Walters (1997) “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International
Organization 51(3), p. 338f.; 340; Barbara F. Walters (1999) “Designing Transitions from Civil War.
Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace,” International Security 24(1), p. 134.
John W. Harbeson (1995) “Africa in World Politics: Amid Renewal, Deepening Crisis,” in Harbeson
and Rothchild (eds), pp. 14ff. This phenomenon can be witnessed far and wide in Africa in cases as
different as The Comoros and Uganda.
41 In some ways, this aspect resembles theories on state formation and the debate on the link between
economic growth and democracy and the call for a strong state issued by development theorists, such
as Huntington. For a short overview over the debate, see Hillel Frisch and Menachem Hofnung (1997)
“State Formation and International Aid: The Emergence of the Palestinian Authority,” World
Development 25(8), pp. 1243-6. See also Paris on the limits of engineering and the dangers of
liberalism in unstable societies. Roland Paris (1997) “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal
Internationalism,” International Security  22(2), pp. 54-89.
42 Naturally, this presupposes that the local authorities are considered legitimate and are building a
system of governance that is in accordance with democratic principles. Alternative power centres are
obviously an element of multiparty, democratic society, except when they are supported by separate
security structures that undermine the state’s monopoly on violence.
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holders in the political, military, and economic sphere that aim at disrupting the
process.43
More generally, Barbara Walters’ study on critical barriers to civil war
settlement strongly emphasises the decisive role of sustained international
engagement in peace processes. In a climate of distrust which is the invariable
consequence of a civil war, Walters points out that “[o]nly when an outside force
steps in to guarantee the terms do commitments to disarm and share political power
become believable.”44 In practical terms, third parties can facilitate conflict resolution
by restructuring issues, proposing alternatives and “peace packages” as well as
offering incentives like economic and military aid, security guarantees, and
threatening penalties and sanctions. Third-party intervention will alter the overall
equation to accommodate the parties’ perceptions of costs, risks, and benefits
associated with the implementation process versus a stalemate and/or resumption of
hostilities.45 Much evidence suggests that conflicts that “enjoy high levels of third
party assistance and support during the entire course of the peacemaking and peace
building process are arguably more likely to succeed than those that do not.”46
Walters goes on to define three conditions that international security assistance must
fulfil to provide an effective guarantee: (1) the international community should have a
“self-interest in upholding its promise;” (2) it should be willing and able to use the
necessary force to ensure implementation; and (3) it should “be able to signal
resolve.”47 Rothchild and Lake also point to the danger of irresolute engagement and
lack of credibility and argue that “[e]xternal intervention that the warring parties fear
will soon fade may be worse than no intervention at all.”48
The implementation process may be particularly difficult in civil wars and
internal conflicts that reflect a variety of conflicting and overlapping tensions which
                                                
43 This is especially difficult, when elites in the three spheres are intermeshed. See also under ‘Local
Counterparts’ (Chapter 3.3 of Section I).
44 Walters (1997), p. 336. In a comparison of different factors that contribute to a successful outcome,
Walters’ study concludes that “high costs [such as the effects of war, battle deaths etc.] were a
necessary condition for negotiations to begin, but security guarantees (to a greater extent) and military
stalemate (to a lesser extent) were then necessary for these talks to succeed.” Walters (1997), p. 358.
45 Walters (1997), p. 340.
46 Hampson (1996), p. 13.
47 Walters (1997), p. 340f. The authorising body and the legitimacy it carries also play an important
role in this context.
48 David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (1996) “Containing Fear. The Origins and Management of
Ethnic Conflict,” International Security 21(2), p. 42.
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are seldom settled by negotiations.49 Despite the fact that most current wars are
technically internal, they reach across borders and might instead be termed ‘trans-
state’ conflicts. The situation is often aggravated by the fact that ethnic intrastate
conflicts easily spill across borders and draw in outside actors intent on exploiting the
internal situation for their own end.50 Furthermore, there is evidence that the
negotiation process functions best under conditions of equality and when each of the
parties has some kind of mutual veto over the outcome. This gives way to a non-zero-
sum-formula which both parties can present to their home constituencies as a victory
rather than an ignominious defeat. Finally, internal conflicts appear extremely hard to
resolve, since unlike the parties to inter-state conflicts, disputants in internal conflicts
are not separated by international borders, but must find a formula for coexistence. In
particular, they cannot “retain separate, independent armed forces” that would
function as “important fall-back defenses at a time when no neutral police force and
no legitimate government exist to help them enforce the peace.”51
In juxtaposing borders and peoples, the creation of minorities within a state is
inevitable and the ensuing competition for scarce resources often plays an important
part in triggering conflicts. This is particularly true when ethnic and economic
disadvantages align and the state’s government has either not made allowances for the
situation at all or has made allowances that are not credible.52 Preventing ethnic
conflict from erupting is similar to shoring up a peace process to avoid a relapse into
conflict. Lake and Rothchild identify three strategic dilemmas, “information failures,
problems of credible commitment, and incentive to use force preemptively,” that can
trigger violence. International security assistance can alleviate these challenges by
increasing transparency and providing a security guarantee.
                                                
49 A study by Roy Licklider shows that of 57 civil wars in the period 1945-1993, only 17 were settled
through negotiations. Negotiated settlements of civil wars are more likely to collapse than
“settlements” achieved in the wake of a military victory on the battlefield. See Roy Licklider (1995)
“The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” American Political Science
Review 89 (3), pp. 681-90; Walters (1997), p. 335.
50 Hampson (1996), p. 4. Particularly in the African context in which the cross-border implications of
conflicts are daunting, the term ‘transstate conflicts’ has been suggested as an alternative to purely
inter-state and purely internal conflicts. The Central African region is a case in point, as the domino
effect of instability running through Rwanda, Burundi, Congo/Zaïre, Congo/Brazzaville, the Central
African Republic, Uganda, and Angola clearly shows. Similarly, a positive development in
Congo/Zaïre will have positive spill-over effects on stability in the region. The Economist, 24 May
1997, p. 37f.
51 Walters (1997), p. 337f.; Lake and Rothchild (1996), p. 71.
52 Lake and Rothchild (1996), pp. 43, 45; Willie Breytenbach and Pál Dunay (1995) “Crisis Prevention
and Conflict Management in Southern Africa in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Hans-Joachim Spanger and
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2.4 The Relevance of Legitimacy and Consent for International Security
Assistance
Legitimacy is a key issue that underlies the study. It is closely linked to the overall
aim of assessing the effectiveness of international security assistance, as legitimacy
and effectiveness are mutually enforcing. Accordingly, an effective operation is in
most cases also regarded as a legitimate one and the more legitimacy an operation
enjoys the more effective it tends to be. In a peace process effectiveness and
legitimacy have a multi-faceted relationship in which the legitimacy of the
intervention, of the peace agreement, of the parties to the agreement, and of the
proposed final outcome are critical for lasting peace. Moreover, legitimacy is
analysed in terms of central concepts of peacekeeping such as consent, impartiality,
and credibility, and reflects the role external actors play in implementing the peace
agreement.53 It is also important to distinguish between legitimacy in the eyes of the
conflict area’s population at large and legitimacy in the eyes of the international
community. Whereas lack of the former affects the effectiveness of the operation due
to a lack of local support and a lack of willingness to carry the peace process further,
the latter impacts the scope of the international presence, reflected in the selection of
tasks and the manner in which external actors go about their peace implementation
business.
Though it is important to be aware of the separate legitimacy of each, the
peace agreement, the parties to the agreement, and the outcome stipulated in the
agreement, the three correlate closely and the lack of legitimacy of one undermines
that of the other aspects. Local support must be further differentiated into the general
population, armed elements, and the local or national leaders.54 Although the peace
agreement is not viewed as distinct from the government as one of the signatories or
from the desired final outcome in the population’s perception, the leadership and
actual parties to the agreement can have divergent views about the degree to which
they support the outcome versus the agreement as a whole. In general, the greater the
perceived legitimacy among both the population and its leadership, the greater the
                                                                                                                                           
Peter Vale (eds) Bridges to the Future. Prospects for Peace and Security in Southern Africa (Westview
Press: Boulder, Colorado), p. 91.
53 Dobbie understands legitimacy, impartiality, and credibility as the building blocs of consent. Charles
Dobbie (1994) “A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping,” Survival 36 (3), p. 132.
54 This distinction reflects one that Dobbie makes between tactical and operational consent.
Section I Analytical Framework and Conceptual Development
32
chances for lasting peace and an autonomous peace process. In contrast, an agreement
and its concomitant outcome which are regarded as imposed and are not in
accordance with the views of the people has little chance of successful
implementation.
Despite the fact that the distribution of authority may be unclear, with the
implications that has for the leaders’ sovereignty and legitimacy, if there is a peace
agreement, there must also be signatories. In the same way, the perceived legitimacy
is complicated by the fact that along with the general population and its defined
leadership, most post-conflict situations feature a set of opposition movements and
other less clearly defined actors whose support can be crucial to the success of the
peace process. Furthermore, peace implementation is a dynamic process that changes
over time and in which the perceived legitimacy can also grow or diminish as
implementation proceeds. By providing international security assistance, third-party
actors enhance the legitimacy of the peace process by displaying a commitment to the
agreement, its provisions, and its aims, and by demonstrating their acceptance of the
parties’ leadership as legitimate partners in implementation. Moreover, international
security assistance counteracts rejectionist movements’ ability to derail the peace
process by building up the government’s capacity to deal effectively with these threats
without violating basic human rights. A dilemma arises when the parties’ leaders turn
out to be the spoilers that continue to gain by sustained instability. 55 Both the
legitimacy and the effectiveness of the third-party effort will suffer, if the external
actors are unable to differentiate between spoilers and forces of peace in the process
of implementation.
The step from legitimacy to consent 56 is a small one. Consent rests on the
conceptual foundations of national sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention
in the internal affairs of other states. In the context of peace support operations,
consent is the line that divides peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Whereas
peacekeeping operations presuppose the consent of the parties or countries on whose
territory the operation is to take place, the presence of foreign troops in a peace
enforcement mission is legitimated on humanitarian grounds as well as on the
traditional grounds of “threats to international peace and security” but does not have
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prior approval of the host country. 57 As the world moves away from a strict adherence
to the principle of non-intervention and peace support operations encompass an
increasing range of tasks, rather than being a question of ‘have or have not,’ consent
has become a matter of degrees. Not only does consent usually change over time, it
also varies among actors within the parties to the conflict. Nonetheless, there is broad
agreement that a basic distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement
based on whether or not the parties to the conflict consent to the international
presence is meaningful and necessary, as they entail different political and military
risks, follow different sets of rules, and require different planning and different force
levels.58
The issue of consent is particularly important in a discussion of international
security assistance. When the international community gets involved in the highly
sensitive issues of security reform, it goes to the heart of a state’s sovereignty by
affecting its coercive means. Particularly, in countries that inherited a non-democratic
system of governance, the security sector has been a crucial “support structure of
oppression,”59 and any external involvement will fundamentally change the balance of
power. Therefore, the more intrusive international security assistance is, the more
dependent third-party actors will be on nurturing and sustaining the consent of the
parties.60
Dobbie distinguishes between tactical consent in the field and operational
consent in the theatre. In peace implementation, operational consent is implied in the
signing of the peace agreement as a general framework of consent and with provisions
for international security assistance. Although tactical consent is less tangible and
more changeable, it is invariably significant on the ground. In Dobbie’s definition,
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consent resembles the description of legitimacy above, in that it “equates more
realistically to a general public attitude that tolerates a peacekeeping presence and
represents a quorum of co-operation.”61 Given the comprehensive, ambitious, and
long-term involvement considered in this study, a minimum of support from the host
authorities is essential to success; particularly since the responsibility for pushing the
peace process forward will be entirely in the parties’ hands, when international
assistance has been scaled down. 62
Consent simultaneously adds to and builds on the perceived impartial
character of an operation. Impartiality is an important if elusive precondition for
third-party intervention and greatly enhances the chances of a successful operation. It
is not an absolute concept and in practice often takes the form of even-handedness.63
Where each participating state is unable to refrain entirely from taking sides,
impartiality must be the product of the presence of multiple states with a variety of
allegiances and interests. In fact, there is a greater chance that the supporting
participants are regarded as impartial the more actors participate and the more remote
the operation becomes from any national government’s interests. In that way, the
participation of a large number of actors and the blessing of an international
organisation tend to increase legitimacy due to the symbolic effect of the community
of states acting in accord. Dixon also underlines the importance of formal institutions
as “conflict management agents” for the legitimacy of the implementation process and
thus its effectiveness.64
Credibility is also a significant concept for the provision of security assistance
and the assessment of its effectiveness. As the aim of the assistance generally is to
enhance security in the conflict area, the credibility of the assistance and the
international presence is almost measurable for the local population. Be it with regard
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to personal safety, “cultural safety,”65 war crimes, or human rights, citizens have a
clear perception of whether or not their security is in fact guaranteed. Credibility is
the concept that most closely interacts with performance and effectiveness. The two
can either mutually reinforce or undermine each other. Exaggerated expectations
often accelerate the downward spiral.
Aside from effectiveness, credibility is linked to whether or not the supporting
participants display a willingness to use political, economic or military force to back
up a mandate and a willingness for sustained engagement. The involvement of great
powers and their concomitant resources increase credibility. 66 In many ways,
credibility is also a question of whether the mandate given to the intervening actors is
matched with appropriate and sufficient means to fulfil it. Looking beyond a specific
operation, the credibility of the international community in future missions is also at
stake.67
Both impartiality and credibility affect the host country’s willingness to
consent to the delivery of international security assistance, in that the more credible
and the more impartial the external actors are perceived to be, the more likely it is that
consent will be forthcoming. Whether internal or external, it is important for the
analysis to identify the actors whose perception is key to successful peace
implementation and how the factors introduced above adversely or favourably affect
legitimacy and effectiveness.
Building a security apparatus is in essence a political issue and a question of
governance, reflected in the need for civilian control over the security forces.68 While
security assistance primarily targets structural issues and behavioural issues that are
directly linked to the security organisation, the political context is pivotal. Most
frequently, efforts to influence the political context introduce power-sharing
arrangements that distribute political power and control over territory. Devising
arrangements that are acceptable to the parties, supportive of the peace process and
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self-sustainable in the long run, is a major challenge that falls outside the scope of this
study. Clearly given the highly political nature of external intervention in issues of
security, the political context of implementation will be taken into account as the
backdrop for international security assistance, among other things because it affects
the cost-benefit-analysis of potential spoilers, but it will not be analysed
systematically in the present study. 69
In the following the concept of international security assistance is developed
by discussing central aspects of the specific post-settlement context in which it is to
be provided, namely the degree of insecurity in a given war-torn society, the
provisions of the peace agreement, and the third-party actors involved. Then, the
concept is further defined by devising a typology of tasks that make up international
security assistance.
3 Components of the Study of International Security Assistance
3.1 Insecurity in a Post-Settlement Society
The starting-point of our analysis is the post-settlement society in which a given peace
agreement is to be implemented. Identifying elements that introduce insecurity and
gaps that the authorities are unwilling or unable to fill, enables us to pin-point
possible military and security-related tasks for third-party actors that arise in the peace
implementation process. Gaps and tasks fall into two groups: military security and the
provision of law and order. These, in turn, create the setting for other types of
insecurity that, for example, arise with a large number of displaced.
A fundamental characteristic of a post-settlement society is the prevalence of a
culture of violence. A culture of violence has an aggravating affect on most of the
                                                
69 Walters is emphatic in her conclusions that security assistance can be a temporary solution only and
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aspects described below and is particularly reflected in the absence of non-violent
conflict management mechanisms both in individual and in national disputes. The
culture of violence prevails as long as the population senses that its personal safety is
threatened and as long as it does not trust the authorities to provide security
effectively. Thus, threats to stability and security in the post-settlement phase emerge
as direct results of a weakened state.
In the course of the armed conflict, security forces at various levels have also
experienced a surge of power compared to the civilian population that they are
unwilling to abandon now. 70 This power can be political, military or economic in
nature and can place security forces in the group of spoilers. Similarly, an obvious
trait of society that affects both national and personal security is the amount of open
fighting and the level of violence, the presence of armed forces, and the existence of a
formal cease-fire.
In the immediate post-settlement stage, society is also characterised by a high
degree of proliferation of weapons, floating uncontrollably both within and across the
borders of the conflict area, and by the existence of territorial disputes. In terms of
military security, the proliferation of arms is reflected in what Ball and Halevy term a
“bloated security establishment [...] that remains a major political force.”71 This is true
of guerrilla movements that create their own power structures, as well as of
government forces. While the size and organisation of the military is often
impenetrable for all but a few, the post-conflict government is taxed with the need to
restructure the military in order to meet an altered but undiminished demand for
national security. After all, in conflicts where the open confrontation has been halted
by a peace agreement and where, as a result, there is no clear winner, the definition of
national security and of the threats to national security are very much a product of the
recent conflict. Recognising the hybrid state of an immediate post-civil war situation,
where characteristics of both inter-state and internal conflict intermingle, and
recognising all levels of security, ‘external-internal,’ military or civilian, is pivotal. As
suggested above, the parties’ security perceptions are a critical factor in the
implementation phase, as distrust is a prevalent feature of the relationship between the
parties.
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National security works both outwardly and inwardly. States do not operate in
a vacuum and international recognition is a critical factor for the level of security in a
post-settlement society. Given that the peace agreement was supported or even
brokered by outside actors, its immediate outcome and the resulting constellation of
power are presumably accepted likewise, for example reflected in an offer of
membership in international organisations to post-conflict states.
In turn, military security is influenced by the regional power and security
constellations and the perceived security threats and demands of the various parties to
the conflict. Perceived threats to national security tend to mirror a given society’s
points of vulnerability, which in an immediate post-conflict situation are especially
sensitive to pressure and disruptions, both from external actors and from the
conflicting parties. The degree to which the war affected neighbouring states’ security
perceptions, be it through arms or peoples flows, will also be critical to their degree of
involvement in the implementation of a peace agreement.
Both individual and national security in a post-settlement society are further
undermined by the large number of former combatants that usually accompany the
large number of uncontrolled arms. The threat to personal safety is obvious, but
regionally or nationally demobilised soldiers also affect security by forming or
retaining paramilitary organisations or getting involved in Mafia activities, all of
which contribute to insecurity in a society. Another alternative for demobilised
soldiers is to join the regular police, which sadly often results in lack of impartiality
and harassment, excess equipment, and inappropriate doctrines in the police force.
These groups have not yet managed the transition from a conflict to a post-settlement
society and pose a threat to security and stability. Other military remnants of an
armed-conflict are an enormous number of landmines that both inhibit the freedom of
movement and economic reconstruction and seriously impinge personal safety.
With respect to individual security, the culture of violence engenders
heightened concern for personal security and just retribution among the civilian
population. A police force under civilian control is either lacking in the first instance
or is split siding with one of the warring factions and often under the rule of the armed
forces and/or under strict political control. In fact, post-settlement societies are often
characterised by a blurred distinction between various kinds of security forces,
Section I Analytical Framework and Conceptual Development
39
between the military and the police.72 In the wake of civil wars, there are several
opposing military organisations, as well as other security forces, that all need to be
reorganised and collected in one set of coercive tools for the state. Human rights are
violated, be it by design or due to a lack of training, weakening the reliability and
credibility of the police force that is crucial to the citizens’ perception of their
personal security. The continuation of executive security, i.e. law enforcement by the
police, is judicial security with an independent and impartial judicial branch and
prison system that both have to be in accordance with internationally recognised
standards. The three components of civilian security, often described as the Triad, are
closely interlinked and are all essential to the rule of law. If one element is
dysfunctional, it discredits the entire legal system.
Aside from material destruction, the aftermath of ethnic conflicts is marked by
increased tensions and conscious delineations between members of different
ethnicities that linger on and are reinforced in a large community of displaced
persons. Tensions also arise with the resettlement of displaced persons into areas or
close to areas dominated by an ethnic group other than the one attempting the settling.
It has been argued that ethnic conflict cannot be resolved, only contained or managed.
As a result, the definition of power-sharing arrangements and distribution of territory
in the peace agreement are of critical importance.73
3.2 The Peace Agreement
As a peace agreement is the result of tough negotiations and its outcome reflects the
balance of power between the parties, it will often contain numerous ambiguities and
leave out core issues, in order to ensure the parties’ signatures. Unfortunately,
ambiguities in the peace agreement enable the parties to insist on their own
interpretations of the agreement. Furthermore, there might be no implicit
understanding by the parties as to the final security situation towards which the peace
agreement is a first step. The conclusion of a peace agreement often “engenders
enormous expectations” with respect to its scope and time frame, that are grossly
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misplaced. At best, the peace agreement provides a framework for ending hostilities
and a guide to handling the immediate and most urgent issues of the post-settlement
society. Dixon’s definition74 presented in the Introduction of this study focuses on the
functional aspect of a peaceful settlement in the sense that the elimination of one or
several disputed issues is the main criteria, but it remains unclear what the long-term
perspective of an agreement may be. In most cases, further negotiations are needed to
address the problems of implementing the agreement’s provision and dealing with
sensitive issues left untouched by the agreement.75
Time tables laid out in agreements never seem to be realistic; although there
are no definite answers as to whether delays in the implementation of a peace
agreement, as opposed to strict observation of a pre-determined time table, has in fact
been detrimental to the peace process. Also, few peace agreements and “action plans”
take into account that conditions on the ground will change in the course of
implementation, rendering agreed policies or procedures unsuitable at later stages.
And yet, there is little doubt that the existence of a written peace agreement of
some sort immensely enhances the prospects for achieving a peaceful solution to the
conflict, compared to a situation in which a cease-fire is the only formal agreement
between the parties. Kalevi Holsti suggests a number of criteria which an agreement
must meet in order to be durable. These include:
• provisions for a system of governance that embodies certain norms of acceptable
behaviour;
• legitimacy, in the sense that shared principles of justice are integrated into the
peace agreement;
• an assimilation process that fosters the realisation that “the gains of living within
the system [...] outweigh the potential advantage of seeking to destroy or dominate
it;”
• a deterrent system powerful enough to prevent defections;
• conflict resolution procedures and institutions, and power-sharing arrangements;
• consensus on war, that is the recognition that war is a fundamental problem;
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• procedures for peaceful change, including “methods and procedures for reviewing
settlement terms [...] adjusting commitments and responsibilities;”
• anticipation of future issues that can develop into potential sources of conflict.76
Thus, the actual design of a peace agreement has a number of important
consequences for the subsequent implementation phase. As Hampson has noted, some
peace settlements may fail because they “are simply badly designed.”77 In the present
context, it is important to what extent the peace agreement defines a framework, or in
some cases specific terms, for the involvement of third-party actors in the peace
process and the delivery of international security assistance.
The peace settlement usually contains a heavy proportion of security
arrangements and security related provisions, ranging from demobilisation,
disarmament, the establishment of civilian police and internal security forces to the
creation of buffer zones, safe passages, rules of security co-operation, joint patrols etc.
While the parties have formally agreed to these provisions and arrangements, they
nevertheless constitute a compromise formula for both parties and will in most cases
face strong challenges from rejectionist groups as well as the parties’ own
constituencies. In most internal conflicts, a multitude of militias and other armed
factions still exists despite the conclusion of a peace agreement. Many of them have
not been made an official party to the agreement, and may be difficult to identify.78
Whereas such opposition will have an ideological component, it is marked to a
greater extent by the fundamentally conflicting security and threat perceptions among
the disputant parties. Whether the peace process is perceived as a zero-sum-game is
closely tied to how the security arrangements, covered by the agreement, fulfil the
parties’ security needs and to what degree the arrangements run counter to the
mainstream security perceptions among the two parties’ supporting constituencies.
Thus, the task of disinterested third parties is to address the clash of security
perceptions by offering security assistance in forms and through channels which allay
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fears, build confidence and eliminate the zero-sum-game perception of security
among the parties.
While some forms of security assistance can be offered and delivered without
the existence of a peace agreement, for example traditional peacekeeping missions
and military observers monitoring a cease-fire agreement, most security assistance
does specifically require the consent of the parties. While a few third-party actors may
be willing to offer and deliver security assistance to consolidate a cease-fire, and
promote negotiations towards a peace agreement, the international community is
frequently hesitant to offer extensive assistance in the absence of a peace agreement.
Thus, the peace agreement usually determines roles for external actors and can
specify co-ordinating mechanisms where international bodies, donors, or
organisations offering security assistance, are involved.
Aside from the agreement’s formal provisions, there may be room for
discretion and informal supplements in the field of security assistance. In that way,
some international security assistance might be an implicit, but perhaps not always a
formalised part of the peace deal, when it was signed. There can be a whole range of
other informal agreements, understandings or mere expectations accompanying the
signing of the peace agreement. It is thus necessary to identify not only the security
assistance delivered as a part of the formal agreements, but also how the more
informal elements of the peace agreement were dealt with and how perhaps the lack
of fulfilment of these informal understandings affected the implementation of security
provisions.
3.3 Third-Party Actors as Providers of International Security Assistance
The concept of “international community” has been gaining ground in line with an
overall trend towards emphasising global structures at the expense of national
sovereignty. The progressing integration among states and the general acceptance of
concepts, such as “collective security,” bear witness to the strengthening of the
international community as an actor in the international system. International security
assistance can also be seen as a continuation of the development towards more pro-
active collective security. In order to make the notion of international community
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more workable, this passage presents a typology of actors as providers of international
security assistance.
Several analysts have urged donor countries and multilateral lending
institutions involved in a peace process taking place after civil wars to devote more
attention to the restructuring and monitoring of the activities of the security sector, in
particular towards elements that traditionally seek to elude civilian-political control,
such as various paramilitary forces and political-military intelligence. Similarly,
international organisations, NGOs and donor countries have been strongly advised to
channel more of their assistance towards the establishment of public order institutions,
national police forces and the judiciary, in order to create long-term conditions for a
stable security environment.79 Although assistance to security sector reform is
indispensable in the wake of a peace agreement, third-party actors committed to the
peace process often display considerable reluctance to involve themselves in security
sector reform beyond minuscule and negligible contributions in the form of offering
human rights training for police and security forces. This reflects the widespread
concern in the donor community that their assistance can easily be discredited by
negative press coverage, if human rights abuses or terrorist acts are perpetrated by the
recipients. Thus, the delivery of security assistance, as opposed to humanitarian and
development assistance in the course of a peace process, is encumbered by numerous
restrictions and impediments which profoundly influence its effectiveness.
There are nevertheless a number of potential third-party actors in a peace
process which may commit themselves to the delivery of international security
assistance. William Dixon has defined potential “third-party intermediaries” in a
conflict resolution process as “nation-states or coalitions of states; transnational or
sub-national organisations; ad-hoc commissions; individuals; or any actor with
international standing.”80 A number of these intermediaries will be committed to
supporting the peace process after a conclusion of a peace agreement, especially if
they were involved in the negotiations prior to the peace accord. The broader notion,
“the international community” is frequently used to denote outside and supposedly
disinterested third-party actors, representing international law and humanity. 81
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However, in the field of international security assistance, a narrower and more
operational definition is needed. The following typology describes the actors likely to
be involved in the delivery of international security assistance:
· The UN Secretariate, including the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
(DPKO); Civilian Police Unit (UNCivPol), which trains and monitors the
establishment of local police forces; and the Office for the Co-ordination of
Humanitarian  Affairs (OCHA, formerly DHA); as well as other UN agencies,
such as UNDP, UNHCR, UNCHR etc;
· Regional and sub-regional organisations with security and defence components,
such as NATO, the OAU, the OSCE, and SADC and to a lesser extent the EU;82
· Ad-hoc coalitions of states, that join forces to form a specific non-UN operation;
· “Friends of the peace process,” with a special interest in the settlement and whose
personal and historical ties to the parties as well as international standing may
give them influence and leverage that the UN and regional organisations lack;83
· Donor countries and individual states;
· NGOs, offering demining assistance and observers in the field of civilian security,
particularly human rights;
· World Bank, financing demining programmes, employment schemes for former
combatants, etc.84
International Organisations
Whether they be sub-regional, regional or global, all international organisations share
a set of constraints that fall into three broad categories: (1) decision-making; (2) co-
ordination; and (3) funding. Ironically, it may be argued that the difficulty in decision-
making indicates the organisation’s relevance and weight. For example, authorisation
                                                                                                                                           
affairs, defence and justice, multilateral political institutions such as the UN, regional organisations
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bilateral and multilateral development agencies such as UNDP, USAID, as well as international
financial institutions such as IMF and the World Bank, in addition to development oriented NGOs),
international religious organisations, human rights organisations and international political parties.”
Ball and Halevy (1996).
82 The regional dimension has gained prominence and is also reflected in region-wide approaches, such
as the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.
83 Ratner (1995), p. 84.
84 International financial institutions (IFIs) like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
had long been unwilling to offer significant financial aid to tasks, such as the financing, equipping and
training of police and internal security forces. However, a reassessment has taken place and IFIs are
becoming increasingly involved in providing international security assistance. World Bank (1997) A
Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction  (World Bank, May 1997).
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of peace support operations is not taken lightly by any of the members of the UN
Security Council, as they are very well aware of the significance of legitimisation by
the UN. After all, the United Nations remain the only global conflict management
organisation with a corresponding unique moral standing. Another aspect is the
simple fact that these constraints are not unique to the UN. Far from it, any
international organisation struggles to establish a consensus among its members. It is
the price that has to be paid for co-operative action among democratic states.
Co-ordination between different agencies within the UN system has clearly
improved, but given the number of agencies and the scope of their activity this will be
a continuous challenge.85 In recent years, the spotlight has increasingly been directed
towards the challenge of civil-military co-operation and a common recognition has
emerged that a comprehensive approach to peacekeeping is required. Arguably, it is
one of the areas in which most progress has been made. Although co-operation
remains sketchy and uneven, there is clearly a better understanding between military
and civilian actors with respect to their respective philosophies or doctrines,
organisational structures, and needs. Civil-military co-operation is especially
important in the delivery of international security assistance, where military and
civilian security issues are interdependent.
Financial constraints are among the most severe limitation of international
security assistance.86 More specifically, lack of financing can have two effects. First,
it can place limitations on the activity of the international presence, forcing it to select
certain tasks or concentrate on different regions rather than pursuing a comprehensive
approach. This can trigger a vicious circle as progress in a peacekeeping operation
becomes delayed and requires more funds than anticipated. Second, it can lead to the
complete abandonment of an operation when sources of funding dry up. In practice,
lack of funding is far less dramatic for UN-led peacekeeping operations which have
traditionally run on, regardless of budget deficits. In contrast, the work of some of the
UN specialised agencies, such as UNHCR, UNDP or the WFP, has been severely
impaired when appeals have not been met by contributions. Similarly, regional and
sub-regional organisations, such as the OAU and SADC, have been crippled in their
                                                
85 Anthony McDermott (1997) “The UN and NGOs: Humanitarian Intervention in Future Conflicts,” in
Anthony McDermott (ed) Humanitarian Force (PRIO-Report 4/1997, Peace Research Institute Oslo:
Oslo), p. 72f.
86 Financial constraints include funding for programmes that form part of the peace support effort, but
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attempts to initiate effective peacekeeping operations due to a lack of funds.
Obviously, the more comprehensive and the more forceful the peace support
operation is, the more cost-intensive it will be. At the same time, a muscular and
larger peacekeeping force may well be more cost-effective in the long run than half-
hearted peacekeeping efforts with lighter and smaller forces that are incapable of
implementing their mandates effectively.
Sub-national Organisations and Actors
Sub-national organisations are primarily NGOs and are concentrated in the field of
human rights and democratisation. In recent years, business interests have also gained
a more prominent position among the group of sub-national actors. In the realm of
security assistance, the trend towards privatised security and the flourishing arms
trade are the most central aspects. Most importantly, the involvement of private
interests in the field of security is a challenge for the international community, as
these actors often rely on sustained tensions for their profit. As a result, they form a
powerful group within the rejectionists or spoilers who will aim at derailing the peace
process.87
Similar interests come to the fore among local counterparts. Luckham writes
that “[m]any of these conflicts have seen the rise of warlords, or military
entrepreneurs with a considerable stake in their accumulated investments (in
combatants and materiel) and in continued conflict.” Therefore, it is critical that “rival
military forces can be integrated and brought under some form of government
control.”88
                                                
87 For the increasing role of economic interests involved in current conflicts, see Mats Berdal and
David Keen (1997) “Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications,”
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 26(3), pp. 1-24. For more lengthy discussions of the role
of private security companies, see David Shearer (1998b) “Outsourcing War,“ Foreign Policy (Fall
1998), pp. 68-80; David Shearer (1998a) Private Armies and Military Intervention (Adelphi Paper No.
316, International Institute for Strategic Studies: Oxford University Press: Oxford); Kevin A. O’Brien
(1998) “Military-Advisory Groups and African Security: Privatized Peacekeeping?” International
Peacekeeping 5(3), pp. 78-105; and Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds)(1999) Peace, Profit or
Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-torn African Societies (Institute for Security Studies:
Pretoria).
88 Luckham (1995), p. 52.
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Individual States
Individual states can play three different roles in a peace implementation process: (1)
as neighbours; (2) as regional great powers; and (3) as friends of the peace process.89
The roles are not mutually exclusive and states may play all three at the same time.
Whereas neighbours are affected by virtue of their geographic location and proximity
to the conflict, regional great powers engage in conflict management as part of a
larger strategy of creating stability beyond their territorial borders. Friends of the
peace process may be involved due to personal ties among the leaders, due to special
trading relations or dependencies, or due to ethnic ties with one of the parties to the
conflict.
The multitude of actors that in one or another way represents the international
community illustrates the complexities of analysing the role and effectiveness of
peace implementation assistance. A web of interests underlies each third-party actor’s
rationale for participating in the peace process or refraining from doing so. Costs and
resources are an important concern for the delivery of security assistance and
naturally play into states’ interest in participating, particularly where the benefit may
appear a less tangible advantage such as regional peace and stability. Some
participants’ interests may stem from a state’s or organisation’s desire to promote
one’s international prestige and credibility as an ally. Or it may mirror individual
countries’ allegiance to regional alliances and international obligations, in particular
small countries’ constant struggle to sustain a preferred status among the great
powers. To a lesser degree than elsewhere third-party involvement in security
assistance will be a result of media pressure or pressure from lobbying groups.
Finally, certain actors’ involvement may stem from historical ties, ethnic allegiances,
or ideological affinities.
At the same time, these interests are not constant over time, and actors can
have very different perception of the final goal of the peace process. In most cases,
there is a marked difference between the interests of small countries and regional
great powers with regards to involvement in security assistance. Small countries may
more easily obtain the necessary legitimacy and consent from the parties, as compared
to regional great powers with direct national interests tied to the outcome of the peace
process. They nevertheless lack the resources of a great power to support the
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implementation process in the security field. Thus, an individual state’s or
organisation’s commitment may also be heavily dependent on the behaviour and
commitment of other actors, especially those of leading organisations and powerful
states. Obviously, the delivery and co-ordination of international security assistance in
a post-settlement peace process is hostage to overlapping and conflicting interests
which not only makes co-ordination and co-operation extremely important, but which
also underlines the impediments which co-ordination will have to overcome.
For all third-party actors, the autonomy of the peace process, that is a conflict
management process sustained merely by diplomatic means is the shared objective.
The gravest challenge lies in finding the balance between sustained outside
engagement and self-sufficiency. With both challenges in mind, one might ask what
military and security tasks are appropriate for the international community to take on,
whether there are basic patterns of behaviour in post-settlement security assistance,
and whether there are basic rules for or conditions under which different external
actors are willing to participate.
3.4 Types of International Security Assistance
The following typology displays the range of tasks that can compose international
security assistance rendered in peace implementation. Whether or not certain tasks
present themselves to the third-party actors, depends in part on the degree of
disintegration of the society in question and on whether the agreement terminated a
full-scale war or a conflict of lower intensity. Thus the necessity for all tasks sketched
out here does not arise in all post-settlement situations. The crucial areas for external
involvement correspond with areas of social breakdown and address the needs that
arise with the failure of indigenous security structures. It is important to keep in mind
that even purely military activities have political implications in an implementation
process. This is especially true of military and civilian security sector reform which
entails changing the conditions for and the content of the state’s prime instrument of
power. Some tasks may benefit from their ambiguous definition in the agreement, but
their execution then largely depends on the personal characteristics of the
implementers. Continuous negotiations and what Berdal refers to as “’hearts and
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minds’ activities”90 are inevitable in an implementation process, the quality and
preparation of the staff involved can therefore be of pivotal importance.
In general, international security assistance is meant to contribute to an overall
demilitarisation which in turn counteracts the culture of violence that marks a post-
settlement society. 91 Objectives for military measures have been described as
minimising instability in the region by limiting availability of weapons and by
keeping soldiers busy short-term and freeing up scarce economic resources long-
term.92 Specific tasks range from establishing and monitoring a cease-fire, including
the establishment of a buffer zone, the transfer of territory, the removal of foreign
troops, demobilisation, disarmament, negotiations of arms limitations, and reform of
the security sector, including both national security and police forces.
A cease-fire is either established before an agreement is signed or is activated
with the signing and an important military task then becomes maintaining the
cessation of hostilities in cases where the agreement ends full-scale war. As indicated
in the discussion of impartiality, it is important to evenly punish use of sporadic force
in violation of the cease-fire. Upholding a cease-fire often encompasses the
separation of forces, i.e. that opposing force are quartered and withdrawn from
contested territory, and the establishment of a buffer zone. In turn, establishing a
buffer zone involves the removal of troops as well as a transfer of territories.
Frequently, the scope and the clarity of military arrangements in the settlement
depends on the influence of military contributors on the explicit instructions.
Regardless of the conflict’s prior intensity, the removal of foreign forces is
often an important element. Apart from monitoring, pulling out forces usually
involves limited activity from external actors and is instead undertaken by the party to
the conflict that has functioned as a type of occupying power. Outside of the limited
group of actors that was involved in negotiating and signing the agreement, there can
be foreign forces, private security forces or guerrilla groups that do not consider
themselves represented in the agreement or not subject to it. These groups or actors
                                                
90 Berdal (1993), p. 24.
91 Boutros-Ghali underlines how demilitarisation is central to “heightening the sense of security” in a
post-conflict society. Boutros-Ghali (1992), p. 33.
92 Mats Berdal has taken up the range of security related tasks in peacekeeping and peace enforcement
missions in several of his publications. The list of tasks is equally valuable for peace implementation
and the following section uses his thoughts as a starting-point for charting types of security assistance
in post-conflict situations. Berdal (1993); Berdal (1996). See also Ball and Halevy (1996), p. 30-40, 53.
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seriously endanger long-term stability, unless they are removed from contested
territory or otherwise dealt with in the implementation process.
Be they regular or irregular forces, the demobilisation and reintegration of
former combatants is crucial. Demobilisation is a task that has a military starting-
point but develops into a civilian measure when armies are demobilised and returned
to civilian life, and thus become the responsibility of those third-party and other
external actors engaged in the repatriation of displaced persons, social integration, and
in promoting economic development.93 This points to the critical context for
demobilisation and reintegration which is both a precondition for and itself affects
progress in the peace process.94
Another issue arising with demobilisation that requires both security and
civilian assistance is the return of Prisoners of War. Despite the clear guidelines of the
Geneva conventions, the issue of prisoners of war manifests itself anew in every war
or violent conflict. Psychologically, the return of POWs implies a willingness to ‘let
bygones be bygones’ and enhances the confidence-building process.
External actors frequently take on the task of disarmament and stock piling, as
the flow of arms is often difficult to control in the immediate post-conflict stage.
Usually the initial disarmament stage is so extensive that it is placed in the hands of
an external military force.95 Disarmament and stock piling reflect an effort to exercise
some control over the parties’ military capability and thus their incentives to engage
in renewed fighting. Easy availability may make it easier for one side to derail the
process, if developments do not live up to expectations.96 The caveat of disarmament
is that the disarmament process cannot aim at complete disarmament, but must settle
for disarming evenly, in order to maintain a factual balance between the parties, on
the one hand, and retain the parties’ co-operation, on the other. In order to accelerate
the disarmament process, weapon buy back schemes have been attempted usually
with limited success.97 A tricky issue on the borderline between military and civilian
tasks is demining. Though essentially a military activity, demining is crucial to
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95 Oakley and Dziedzic (1996), p. 1f.
96 Christopher Smith (1996) “Light Weapons and the International Arms Trade,” in Smith et al (1996)
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progress on the civilian front of peace implementation and post-conflict
reconstruction. Aside from the removal of mines, demining entails training, building
local capacity, and awareness programmes which are the domain of civilian actors.98
Also, in the pursuit of long-term stability the negotiation of arms limitations is
central. Although they may not be addressed in the agreement itself, arms limitations
are an issue of prime importance, in that they determine the conditions for future
military activity. Usually, arms limitations are at least covered by a call for future
agreements and further negotiations - which is where third-party actors re-enter the
picture. With regard to talks on arms limitations, international security assistance
plays a facilitating role by providing fora and/or mediators to assist in the
negotiations. Unfortunately, rather than reducing the arms in the conflict area,
international security assistance has also taken the form of supplying weapons to one
or more of the parties to the conflict and the international arms trade remains a
powerful force during and after conflicts. In civil wars, arms limitations are only a
reflection of an overarching need to find a manner in which former adversaries can
coexist in security terms and to provide access to power-sharing or conflict
management mechanisms in the political sphere.
This brings us to the reform of the security sector which aims at establishing or
consolidating the rule of law and is a critical step towards long-term security. A study
done for the OECD highlights that countries in which a conflict has been settled
through a peace agreement
“often embark on a very difficult path of re-definition of the basic features of the
state. This new ‘social contract’ has to be established amidst post-conflict stress,
poverty, power competition and often very contrasting visions for the future. [...]
Therefore, well-managed reform of the security sector is very much a key to
successful peace settlements. Failure to address it may either lead to a relapse into
fighting or to the institutionalisation of authoritarian practices, which in turn may be
the foundation of new societal conflicts.”99
The rule of law entails that citizens consider the system legitimate and are
willing to use it to obtain just and effective redress to their grievances. In turn, that
implies that using the civilian security sector, including the police, courts, and prisons,
is preferable to taking the law into one’s own hands and that it “can replace and
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marginalise any alternative organisations of the same sort.”100 The security sector
encompasses both the national armed forces and the police and the distinction
between the two is often unclear in post-settlement societies, where “the actual
responsibilities of the police have been expanded into new, usually more sinister,
areas.”101 Accordingly, the reform undertakes to clearly separate external from
internal security forces and to instil in both redefined doctrines and missions.102
Furthermore, it is of paramount importance that forces are placed under civilian
control and that an educational, training, and selection system is developed that
reflects the altered doctrines and security perceptions and the enhanced democratic
structures. In this context, international security assistance that increases public
security is concerned with the professionalisation or establishment of a civilian police
force. External support entails both monitoring the local police and providing
assistance in training-related aspects and the development of rules and procedures.103
With respect to selection, there is a link to the demobilisation process, in that
integration into the police force frequently provides an employment option for former
soldiers.104
The final product should be a police force, a judiciary, and a penal system that
is credible, effective, impartial, and independent of political influences, yet under
civilian and democratic control. All components of the triad need to act in accordance
with fundamental human rights, which are especially exposed in the security sector,
where members of security forces are often behind human rights violations. At the
same time, the protection of human rights is imperative in the process of fostering a
sense of security in the population and to provide a new moral basis and code of
conduct for a society that is emerging from a violent conflict in which ‘anything
goes.’ International organisations, NGOs and donor countries have been strongly
advised to channelled more of their assistance towards the establishment of public
order institutions, national police forces and the judiciary, in order to create long-term
conditions for a stable security environment.105
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3.5 Co-ordination and Co-operation
At the same time as operations in post-settlement societies become more frequent and
more extensive, incorporating a steadily growing range of tasks in the civilian and in
the military domain, budgets are shrinking. As demands rise, the need for co-
ordination between various actors and organisations involved in peace
implementation becomes increasingly clear. Ball and Halevy point to the window of
opportunity that exists in the fluid state of an immediate post-settlement situation and
that opens for the possibility of effecting real change, if the actions and programmes
of various agents can be co-ordinated.106 Fundamentally, co-ordination aims at
preventing overlap and gaps at the operational level and at enabling the international
community to speak with one voice at the strategic level.
What then does co-ordination among third-party actors involve? It entails
decision-making procedures and a certain chain-of-command, as well as potential
incentives and disincentives inherent in the co-ordination structure. Decision-making
takes place in two forms in the implementation process. First, when initial tasks
and/or financial contributions are to be distributed among actors. That includes
deciding who should do what and whether tasks should be undertaken jointly or
should be divided up, giving each participant a more or less clearly defined area of
authority. Second, on-going decisions have to be made throughout the operation and
will require wholly different procedures than those used in the start-up phase.
Particularly for the second form of decision-making it is essential that structures or
mechanisms be put in place that promote effective and efficient co-ordination. Power
and influence that individual actors can have on decision-making procedures can be
both direct and indirect, formal and informal.
And yet, the widespread calls for co-operation belie the inherent difficulties of
co-ordinating a diverse range of actors, particularly in international organisations that
are, after all, made up of member states. Dorinda Dallmeyer notes that “[c]ollective
intervention presumes the existence of consensus, or at least minimal ideological
convergence” which in practice translates into the smallest common denominator.107
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Co-operation among different actors that provide international security
assistance struggles with practical concerns such as the “interoperability of equipment
and communication systems,”108 cultural and language differences, applying
established chain-of-command structures, intelligence and information gathering,
disciplinary mechanisms, and Rules of Engagement. In contrast to the purely civilian
field, organisations engaged in providing international security assistance are usually
fewer in number and have the benefit of military structures and a well-defined chain
of command. Among the providers of international security assistance, there are
significant differences between those involved in external security (military tasks) and
those working in internal security (police-related tasks), not the least of which is the
degree to which the actors interact with the civilian side of an operation.
The relationship between civilian and military agencies has always been
troubled and Berdal suggested in the early 1990s that insufficient attention was being
paid to cultivating civilian-military relations,109 particularly where they need to work
closely together in peace support operations. In fact, the co-ordination between
civilian and military actors is implicit in the operation in that international security
assistance aims at providing a secure environment in which civilian implementation
can prosper. Many practitioners have voiced scepticism towards the involvement of a
mushrooming number of international organisations and non-governmental
organisations in general and military-civilian co-operation in particular, due to the
widely differing logistical requirements, financing mechanisms, staffing,
organisational philosophy, and chain-of-commands of different organisations. Both
military and civilian actors fear compromising their work by co-operating with the
other and display little respect for the other’s sphere of interest. On the security side,
there is a particular apprehension on behalf of military actors who fear that their
impartiality is at risk due to the perceived political character of civilian peace
implementation. Despite the misgivings and practical difficulties, it is clear that the
lack of co-ordination between civilian and military deployment can result in a threat
to the operation’s credibility and effectiveness, when military and civilian actors are
unwilling to support each other. This is particularly true with respect to tasks such as
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enhancing public security where there needs to be close co-ordination between the
military and civilian police.110
For various reasons, it has been pointed out that a peace implementation
mission should ideally build on the structures and personnel that already exists on the
ground, i.e. those actors that were already in place during the armed conflict.111
Employing the experienced personnel means enhanced understanding of cultural and
other conditions on the ground and established links to significant local actors. The
co-ordination with local actors is crucial in ensuring the appropriateness of peace
implementation measures, the manner in which security assistance is rendered, and
thereby the effectiveness of the assistance. Furthermore, the degree to which security
assistance is receptive to local impulses impacts the perceived legitimacy of an
operation, adding credibility and increasing the likelihood of consent on the ground.
The overriding goal of peace implementation is the autonomy of the peace process, in
other words that it is continued by the local population after the down-scaling and/or
retreat of third-party actors. Co-ordination between local actors and the third-party
presence is particularly important when the time comes to leave, to transfer
responsibilities, and to terminate the operation. 112 Therefore, it is necessary to locate
the leaders or the section of the population which is to ensure the continued
implementation of and adherence to the agreement at local levels.
But the co-operation with local actors is critical from the very start of the
operation and faces a number of challenges. Most importantly, the international
community needs to identify the appropriate local actors with which to co-ordinate
their activities. Often they meet corrupt government officials, excessive government
control, and limited capabilities. In fact, the capacity to receive is often most limited
where help is needed the most. Ball and Halevy remark that due to the perceived
insufficient capacity and time pressure of an immediate post-conflict stage, third-party
actors have had a tendency to bypass local actors in the name of effectiveness in the
short-term and in that way have undermined the long-term process of building
capacity to carry the reconstruction on local shoulders.113
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4 The Concept of International Security Assistance
In the present section, I have conceptualised international security assistance and
created a tool for analysis that can serve to structure the approach to various case
studies – beyond the two cases included in this study. The concept builds on a
traditional understanding of security and covers a wide range of aspects of peace
processes. Through the provision of international security assistance, security in the
post-conflict area is to be strengthened and favourable conditions supplied under
which peace implementation can proceed. While it is a theoretical contribution to the
study of international politics, it reflects how international security assistance as a
conflict management tool has become a core function of contemporary security
arrangements, be they under UN, EU or NATO flag.
The war-torn society and the peace agreement itself form the joint starting-
point for peace implementation by determining the preconditions for the peace
process and particularly for external assistance. To a large extent, the degree of
insecurity in the society and the specific provisions of the agreement govern the
composition of international security assistance, with regard to participants and tasks.
The other major determinant is of course the national interest of individual
participants in the delivery of international security assistance. In addition to the more
complex security picture, the implementation of a peace agreement has been marked
by blurring distinctions between areas of responsibility of military and civilian third-
party actors and has forced more - if reluctant - interaction between the two.
Accordingly, co-ordination not only takes place among the security providers but
between them and the actors involved in civilian peace implementation. Only when
military and civilian actors co-ordinate the variety of programmes that they are
conducting as part of the peace implementation operation, will all the pieces in the
puzzle fall into place to form a complete and peaceful picture. A major challenge to
international security assistance will be in the intersection between military and
civilian tasks, namely security tasks that are essential to enhancing security in the
post-conflict area such as demining and most importantly the civilian security sector
reform.
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SECTION II: IMPLEMENTING THE DAYTON AGREEMENT
“On paper, we have peace [...]. To make it work is our next and our greatest challenge.”
Richard Holbrooke, US Assistant Secretary of State, December 1995114
1 Introduction
It has become clear that new tasks for peacekeepers have emerged in their deployment
under more complex circumstances in recent years. Due to the increased number and
scope of tasks and due to the increased number of actors involved in providing post-
conflict assistance, the evaluation of these comprehensive efforts has moved to centre
stage. In particular, the role of security assistance in consolidating a peace process has
moved into the limelight. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a case in point,
where the measures outlined in the Dayton Agreement were comprehensive and
profound. It was a unique attempt to fuse the various third-party efforts into a
meaningful whole.115  They also involved large sums of money and the reputation of
more than one international organisation was on the line. The agreement reflected that
security was an elementary pre-condition for consolidating peace.116 The issue is how
the international community contributed to successful peace implementation by
providing security assistance. The first case study analyses the assistance provided in
the implementation of the Dayton Agreement from December 1995 to December
1998.
More specifically, the case study begins by describing the triple starting-point
for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. First, there is the security setting in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Chapter 2 of this section identifies points of breakdown at which
the international community could intervene with assistance to enhance the security
situation in the post-conflict area and thus allow the peace process to proceed.
Second, the Dayton Agreement itself was a starting-point and is the subject of Chapter
3. The general structure of the agreement is discussed, as well as its legitimacy and
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the distribution of authority, specific tasks, and co-ordinating mechanisms. Third,
Chapter 4 presents the constellation of third-party actors that emerged in the early
stages of the peace implementation process. The main analysis of the implementation
process takes place in Chapters 5 and 6. The progress that was achieved with or
despite international security assistance by late 1998 is reviewed and the role of
individual sub-categories of assistance is assessed for their respective contribution to
the role of international security assistance as a whole. Chapter 6 singles out a few
additional issues of co-ordination, which were not specifically addressed within the
context of the implementation process. In conclusion, an attempt is made to evaluate
the function of international security assistance in the implementation process and the
international community’s role in providing it, as well as to point out key areas of
opportunities and limitations that affected the delivery and impact of international
security assistance.
2 Insecurity in Post-Conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina
The following chapter describes the security setting in the immediate aftermath of the
war in which the implementation process began.  Note that by late 1998 the situation
had evolved reflecting progress and setbacks of the implementation process. The
security situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the months that followed the signing of
the Dayton Agreement was highly volatile. In order to assess the challenges, it is
helpful to identify what could threaten security in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the wake of
the war, there were security functions that the Bosnian government was incapable of
providing and that the international community had to take on temporarily or that
required outside assistance to re-establish. A security threat arose from the fact that no
change of leadership had taken place and that the same people that waged the war
were waging the peace. Thus, the political leadership included a number of
nationalists that would have a crucial hand in bringing about multi-ethnic coexistence.
Throughout the peace process from 1995-8, the nationalist leaderships were the single
greatest impediment to the fulfilment of Dayton’s aims.
In accordance with the distinction between sets of tasks or remedies that
reoccurs throughout the study, the threats to security in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be
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categorised as (1) military threats, ranging from open fighting to disputed territorial
issues to a large number of land mines; (2) threats to law and order, such as the
inadequacy of local police forces, war criminals, and human rights; and (3) other
threats to security, for example displacement of large groups of people, material
destruction, and unstable political conditions. Similarly, security encompasses two
levels, namely military and civilian or individual security.
2.1 Military Threats
Since the cease-fire of October 5, 1995, the degree of open fighting was relatively low
in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina. There tended to be pockets where the level of
violence was higher, however, such as around Mostar, Brcko, and Doboj. These
pockets shared a location close to the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), as was the
case for Brcko and Doboj, or a location where the two federation ‘partners’ met, as in
Mostar.117
Despite the fact that a number of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s external security
questions appeared to be solved through the definition and recognition of a uniform
and sovereign territory, the hot spots reflected that in reality each of the entities, as
well as the two ethnic groups merged in the Federation, had serious security concerns.
Dayton acknowledged the absence of a common security perception and arranged for
the continued existence of two external security forces, that is a Federation and a
Bosnian Serb military force. Distrust and the fact that no clear winner emerged from
the war, increased each side’s desire to be in control of their own security and
underlined each side’s sensitivity to future security issues. At the same time, the
perceived threats to national security were very much a product of the recent
conflict.118
Similarly, issues for the security of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole were two-
fold: on the one hand, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s external security perception was very
sensitive to developments in the neighbouring states of Croatia and rump-Yugoslavia.
                                                
117 In Dayton’s second year, Brcko also emerged as the point of tension between competing Bosnian
Serb factions under President Biljana Plavšic and Momcilo Krajišnik/Radovan Karadžic in their
respective headquarters in Banja Luka and Pale. However, this was not clear in the immediate post-war
situation.
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On the other hand, it was susceptible to the influence of the international community.
Accordingly, the recognition of the state on the basis of international law carried
weight and was a significant positive factor for security and stability in the post-
settlement state. This was particularly true of the Bosnian Muslims which did not
have a powerful neighbour to back them up, but had to rely on a uniform Bosnia-
Herzegovina as their sovereign state. In contrast, the Bosnian Croat and the Bosnian
Serb leaders were arguably negatively influenced by their related neighbouring states
with regard to the integration of the three ethnic groups into a multi-ethnic Bosnia-
Herzegovina.119 The influence strengthened secessionist tendencies that undermined
the country’s unity. Outside actors also influenced the legitimisation of the peace
agreement and its subsequent implementation, which was demonstrated by the
international community’s willingness to enforce Dayton’s provisions through
external security assistance.
A destabilising factor in all three ethnic groups was their nationalist
leadership. Whereas the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs opposed integration in
a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina and instead displayed separatist agendas, the Bosnian
Muslims pursued greater centralisation and a strengthening of the state ‘Bosnia and
Herzegovina.’120 In the aftermath of Dayton – inspired by recent gains on the
battlefield and at the negotiating table, some elements among the Bosnian Muslims
had not yet relinquished the idea of increasing their territory through a strike against
the Republika Srpska. In contrast, the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats were
interested in maintaining the status quo which granted the former 49% of Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s territory for only 30% of the country’s population and the latter the de
facto independence of Herzegovina including control over major trading routes and
extensive economic assistance from Croatia proper.121
The regional dynamic was also reflected in another military threat to security,
namely the high degree of proliferation of weapons. Tito had built arsenals with large
quantities of weapons in anticipation of a Soviet attack, and the Yugoslav People’s
                                                                                                                                           
118 In mid-1997, the external or inter-entity security situation was complicated by the rising tensions
within the Bosnian Serb leadership and the concomitant split in the Bosnian Serb military.
119 It is important to keep in mind throughout that the leadership in neither of the three groups was a
uniform actor, but consisted of rivalling groups and interests.
120 Colin Woodard (1996) “Bosnia’s Uneasy Peace: One-Year Report Card Shows Gains, Failures,”
Christian Science Monitor, 15 September 1997; International Crisis Group (1997c) A Peace, or Just a
Cease-Fire? The Military Equation in Post-Dayton Bosnia  (ICG Bosnia Project Report, 15 December
1997).
121 International Crisis Group (1997c).
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Army (JNA) was among the largest and best-equipped forces in Europe. The arsenals
were spread out throughout the territory of Yugoslavia, likewise in pre-war Bosnia,
and the weapons were made available to the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) and various
paramilitary groups during the war.122 As a result, as in most societies emerging from
an armed conflict, weapons of all shapes and sizes were in abundance within Bosnian
territory but also beyond the borders of the conflict area. This was the result of a
generally highly mobilised society and of ‘regulated’ and lucrative black market
activity, both during and after the war. With respect to the general population, the
degree of confidence in the peace process played a major role in whether they would
be willing to surrender their arms. In the Balkans the situation was exacerbated by a
history of carrying arms, as illustrated by recent clashes in Albania.
The large number of weapons was accompanied by the above-mentioned
highly mobilised society in which the majority of men in the region joined the armed
forces to fight for their side in the war. In fact, it was the numerical superiority of
Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims that gave them the edge in the final stages of
the war. The Bosnian Muslim Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ARBiH) had been
assembled in an ad hoc manner with little organisation, co-ordination, no centralised
command structure and a limited general staff. 123 It consisted of a large assortment of
irregular formations, often with Mafia origins and managed in a war lord style.
Although the Bosnian Muslim side was certainly the most plagued by lack of co-
ordination, similar groupings that conducted their operations fairly independently
sprung up under all three banners. The lack of structure rendered the demobilisation
and disarmament task particularly challenging for the international community with a
large portion of the irregulars melting away into obscurity.
Another result of the involvement of all levels of society in the war effort was
not only that the economy lost valuable manpower, but also that security forces were
inflated in size and experienced a surge of power compared to the civilian population.
Regardless of their occupational background, men at war enjoyed benefits derived
from the power of the gun that they were unwilling to abandon when the open conflict
                                                
122 International Crisis Group (1997c).
123 Bruno Lezzi (1996) “Die demokratische Kontrolle der Streitkräfte in Bosnien-Herzegovina,” in
Calic (1996b), p. 49.
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ended.124 A case in point was General Ratko Mladic, Commander of the Bosnian Serb
Army from 1992, who – in co-operation with the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan
Karadžic – transformed his military power into true popularity and political influence
in the immediate aftermath of the Dayton Agreement. The same was true of a number
of military officers at lower levels that gained real decision-making power through
war. Many successfully moved into civilian positions of power and represented a
critical element of insecurity in the fledgling political institutions. A further threat to
military security arose from those that established significant power bases outside the
institutional structures. Both groups of rejectionists, within and outside of institutional
structures, were unlikely to be conciliatory, as their positions of power relied upon a
continued atmosphere of hostility and instability in which strong-arm politics were
more acceptable to a population that considered itself threatened.
Although the armed forces in the immediate post-war situation ultimately
reflected the situation in the final stages of the war, Serb, Croat, and Muslim military
forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina were undergoing a major change, in direct response to
the provisions of the peace agreement and in response to the need for a peace time
organisation. Due to their inflated numbers, the forces faced a reduction in size
through extensive demobilisation and a reassessment of their structure, which in the
immediate post-conflict situation comprised three armies within the territory of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Returning to the power surge in the military, in organisational
restructuring change was typically perceived as a threat and further undermined
military leaders willingness to abandon positions of power.
A hidden remnant of the war was the considerable number of land mines in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.125 In contrast to early estimates of 3.5 million mines, as of early
1998 estimates had been adjusted down to figures of 750,000 to 1 million mines in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, spread out in 19,000 recorded minefields. Land mines inhibited,
and continue to inhibit, freedom of movement, economic reconstruction, and a return
to normality. Impatience or simply hunger regularly led to premature use of
agricultural land and subsequent injuries. In addition, land mines had been placed
more deliberately in deserted homes, in the hope that these “booby traps” might
                                                
124 Nicole Ball with Tammy Halevy (1996) Making Peace Work: The Role of the International
Development Community (Policy Essay No. 18, Overseas Development Council: Washington D.C.), p.
23, 38.
125 Although they predominantly affected civilian conditions and civilian security, land mines were a
threat that derived from a military source.
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prevent the return of rightful owners. Regardless of motive or precise location, land
mines seriously impinged personal safety.
2.2 Threats to Law and Order
Throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, the greatest threat to law and order arose with the
absence of an effective police force guided by democratic principles and a
malfunctioning judicial system. Local police forces incorporated a large number of
former combatants that had been idle since the cease-fire and now joined the police
force, as the most natural form of employment. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the police
force initially swelled to 50,000 policemen compared with an estimated need of about
15-20,000. Apart from the excess size of the police force, a particular problem was
that the attitudes of pre-war policemen returning to their former positions were
coloured by wartime experiences and affinities. As a result, any attempts to address
insecurity caused by the police force, faced the challenge of reforming attitudes and
perceptions that were the product of both pre-war policing traditions and the recent
impressions of war.
Attitudes coloured by war not only prevailed among security agents, but also
predisposed the general population towards a heightened concern for personal
security. Comprehensive confidence-measures were required to prevent outbreaks of
violence, both among and between ethnic groups. Matters were not helped by the
Bosnian police force being split into different sides that each pledged allegiance to
one of the warring factions. As many of the former combatants had joined the police
force, it was likely that some of the formal military hierarchy had been transferred to
an informal power structure in the police forces. Some have described the conversion
as exchanging one uniform for another - the mindset remained the same. Accordingly,
although the police force was placed under civilian control with the Dayton
Agreement, it was in reality heavily influenced by the previous and existing armed
forces. Similar to other immediate post-settlement situations, the distinction between
external and internal security forces, between the military and the police, was blurred
throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the authorities
that exercised civilian control often profited from an atmosphere of fear and used the
police force to that end.
Another severe element of insecurity was introduced by the formation of
paramilitary groups or special police forces. These groups were most frequently
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formed at a local or regional level, reflecting the decentralised power structure of pre-
war Bosnia. Frequently, the paramilitary groups encompassed former soldiers that had
not yet managed the transition from a conflict to a post-conflict society and, by virtue
of their mindset, posed a threat to security and stability. Again, the threat was
exacerbated by the role of the civilian authorities in using special forces to pursue
political ends by stirring up ethnic hatred.
The inadequacy of the police became apparent in their inability to combat
widespread abuses and the police forces’ own frequent violations of human rights. In
Bosnia-Herzegovina, violations took place by design, such as the systematic
intimidation of journalists or ethnic minorities as well as due to a lack of doctrinal
understanding of ‘good’ policing. Regardless of their cause, human rights violations
weakened the reliability and credibility of all the police forces in the territory that led
to the citizens’ perception of the police as a threat rather than a guarantor of their
personal security.
Similarly, the issue of war criminals was critical in the immediate post-conflict
situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It had a dual impact on security in the wake of the
Dayton Agreement. First, war criminals retained much of their power and took on
demagogic roles in which they whipped up ethnic hatred and in that way increased
insecurity. Second, the presence of war criminals in office impeded the development
of a separate institutional identity. Instead, political institutions were perceived as
identical with the personalities that headed them, thus undermining the legitimacy of
the political system.
Finally, the lack of law and order also allowed more economic-minded former
combatants to turn to Mafia and black market activities which in itself would only
harm the reconstruction of the national economy were it not for the high degree of
crime that is inevitable in connection with Mafia enterprises.
The continuation of executive security, i.e. law enforcement by the police, is
judicial security and a just and effective penal system. Thus, the establishment of
local police forces and the introduction of democratic principles of policing would
have to be reflected in the other institutions of the so-called “triad.” Bosnia-
Herzegovina has old legal traditions, although they were weighed down by both the
recent war and the prior communist experience. As the International Crisis Group
points out, “[t]he rule of law and the due process of law were hardly compatible with
the unquestionable power of only one political party, which had a grip on all walks of
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life. Paradoxically, the judiciary was also very well organised, institutionally well
structured and staffed, judges were professionally well trained, highly qualified and
well paid.”126 This had changed in the course of the war. In the immediate wake of the
Dayton Agreement, the Bosnian judicial system suffered from a lack of qualified
personnel, due to the brain drain during the war, and was closely tied to the political
leadership, as well as to criminal networks. On top of that, significant material
damage had been done during the war, ranging from the destruction of buildings to
that of legal materials. As a result, the legal system was clearly in existence, but
malfunctioning for a variety of structural and contextual reasons.
2.3 Other Threats to Security
All of the above contributed to a generally unstable and insecure environment in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. As Patrick Moore points out, “Bosnia has precious little
tradition of multiparty democracy, free elections, or an independent media, and it is
just emerging from nearly four years of savage warfare.”127 In other words, Bosnians
were emerging from a mindset in which ‘all is fair’ and had to readjust to a society in
which peacetime levels of law and order prevail. With war memories still fresh, the
threshold to violence as a means for conflict resolution was very low and the potential
for confidence-building limited due to a high level of distrust. In addition, the absence
of democratic traditions and an inadequate judicial system also implied the absence of
non-violent conflict management mechanisms both in individual and national
disputes.
At least formally, the sovereign Bosnian state that emerged from the Dayton
Agreement was unitary and aimed at multi-ethnic coexistence in which power was to
be shared through political mechanisms. Still, the Dayton Agreement also devolved
considerable power to the Entity level, placing the fledging Bosnian state on an
insecure footing. In addition, it was clear from the outset that the enormous number of
displaced persons was a major destabilising factor in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s post-
conflict society. Although the major border issues had been resolved with the
                                                
126 International Crisis Group (1999a) Rule over Law: Obstacles to the Development of an Independent
Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina  (ICG Bosnia Project, 5 July 1999;
http://www.int…org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh49rep.htm), II.13.
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definition of the federal state’s territory and the delineation of the two entities, some
territorial or border disputes persisted, among them Brcko and the Posavina corridor.
All the territorial disputes had features in common that related to the return of
refugees specifically and to the population’s ethnic composition more generally: (1)
the mix had changed in the course of the war; (2) the future with regard to returning
refugees was uncertain; and (3) there was a danger that repatriation would be used as
a political tool to continue the war by other means. This tool took advantage of the
increased tensions and conscious delineation between members of different ethnic
groups that had resulted from the war. Despite the formal aims of Dayton, the real
Bosnian state was divided into three ethnically relatively homogeneous areas. The less
exposure one ethnic group had to another, the greater the possibility that groundless
stereotypes would be built up and sustained by hearsay, thus further alienating one
ethnic group from another.128 Similarly, the effective distinction of three ethnic
groups into three fairly separate and defined territories within Bosnia-Herzegovina
contributed to the tension rather than diffusing it.129
Although not a direct threat to security in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
large-scale material destruction provided the backdrop for efforts to resurrect a
peaceful society. Mainly, this affected economic development, reconstruction of
infrastructure, and freedom of movement. The fact that 60% of the housing stock was
destroyed by the time the war came to an end, coupled with the large number of
refugees awaiting return was a major debilitating factor for a normalisation process
among the population and had an implicit but significant impact on the population’s
perception of security.
To a large extent, the leverage of international security assistance lay in
identifying each of the three former warring parties centres of gravity or points of
vulnerability, which in the immediate post-settlement situation were especially
sensitive to pressure and disruptions. The centres of gravity were both an opportunity
                                                                                                                                           
127 Patrick Moore (1996b) “Potential Shortfalls of the Dayton Agreement,” Transition 2(2), p. 38.
128 David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (1996) “Containing Fear. The Origins and Management of
Ethnic Conflict,” International Security 21(2), p. 63. More generally, Lake and Rothchild identify three
“strategic dilemmas” that can cause an eruption of violence in ethnic conflicts and thus pose a threat to
security. In a post-conflict situation in which it takes little to tip the scales, the danger of renewed open
conflict is significantly heightened. The catalyst strategic dilemmas are “information failure, problems
of credible commitment, and incentives to use force preemptively.” Lake and Rothchild (1996), p. 44f.
129 Radha Kumar makes the case against the division of ethnic communities into separate states. He
argues that history has shown the limited success of attempted partitions and the implications for
external involvement in securing such divisions. Radha Kumar (1997) “The Troubled History of
Partition,” Foreign Affairs  76(1), p. 22-34.
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and a challenge, as they were the weak links in the chain of security. Aside from
financial support to promote economic development and reconstruction, the major
centre of gravity for all three ethnic groups was their military capabilities. Given the
uncertain outcome of the war in which no clear victor had emerged, all the parties
were anxious to at least establish a military balance, if not to gain a military upper
hand in case the war resumed. In addition, control of Brcko was a crucial pawn in the
power game between the Federation and the Republika Srpska, as the town and
surrounding areas had critical strategic implications for the territorial balance between
the two entities. For Bosnia-Herzegovina’s unity, the major vulnerable point was the
touch-and-go relationship between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims in the
Federation. Schear points out that “[a]s the Serb threat eased, centrifugal forces in the
Federation were harder to contain.”130 While contrasting security perceptions among
the three ethnic groups might render an approach by the international community
difficult, all parties were in the same boat with respect to the fact that they were under
legal obligations to pursue certain principles which they had signed on to in the
Dayton Agreement. All of these vulnerable points came to play a significant role in
the choice of carrots and sticks used by the international community to ensure
compliance with the Dayton Agreement.
                                                
130 Schear (1996), p. 99; Marie Janine Calic (1996a) Das Abkommen von Dayton. Chancen und Risiken
des Friedensprozesses im ehemaligen Jugoslawien (SWP-AP2948, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik:
Ebenhausen), p. 6; Norbert Mappes-Niedeck (1996) “Konfliktpotentiale in der bosnischen Föderation,”
in Calic (1996b), p. 115.
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3 The Dayton Peace Agreement
The main issue in this introductory chapter on the Dayton Agreement is the tone that
the agreement set for the implementation phase that followed and to identify the
security tasks placed in the hands of the international community. Accordingly, the
chapter addresses questions of how clearly different subject areas were defined, how
detailed various parts of the agreement were and how they related to one another, and
how the relationships between the multitude of actors and newly created bodies were
defined. The chapter consists of two sections: First, a general review covers the basic
structure of the Dayton Agreement, the declared goals, the relationship between the
military and the civilian sides of the agreement, and the legitimacy of the agreement
as a whole, particularly in the light of the parties’ self-interest. Second, a more
detailed section on Dayton’s security provisions follows, including the delineation of
authority, the tasks, and the co-ordination mechanisms within the security field. It
describes the preconditions the agreement laid for the implementation of military
aspects and the reform of the civilian security sector, in particular the police forces.
Box 2.1: Summary of Threats to Security
(1) Military threats
· Open fighting and territorial disputes in hot spots, e.g. Mostar, Brcko, Doboj;
· influence of Serbia and Croatia proper;
· high proliferation of weapons, high degree of mobilisation, widespread land mines;
· inflation of power and state of flux in the security establishment.
(2) Threats to law and order:
· Ineffective local police forces that do not abide by democratic principles of policing;
· malfunctioning justice system;
· frequent human rights violations;
· existence of paramilitary formations;
· black market and Mafia activity.
(3) Other threats:
· Large number of refugees and displaced persons;
· political instability and continued promotion of nationalist agendas;
· material destruction, especially destruction of infrastructure.
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3.1 General Review of the Agreement
3.1.1 Structure of the Agreement
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) consisted of two major elements: the General
Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), that itself built on earlier agreements
reached in the pre-Dayton peace process, and a set of annexes that defined the
particulars of various areas within the peace process.131 In addition, the Dayton
Agreement included a follow-up component for the negotiation of further agreements
on long-term disarmament. Within a broader context, the Agreement was a
constituent part of the complex mandate for external actors involved in promoting
peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was also provided by the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) carrying the military responsibility, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)
covering civilian implementation, and finally, the UN Security Council authorising
the UN bodies in Bosnia-Herzegovina and endorsing both the High Representative
and IFOR. 132
In the introductory Art. I of the GFAP the parties were asked to follow
generally accepted principles of international interaction, such as the UN Charter, and
to “fully respect sovereign equality of one another.” At the same time, no threats were
to be made “against the territorial integrity or political independence” of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Towards the end of the GFAP in Art. X, it became clear that this call
was especially directed towards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and
Bosnia-Herzegovina who would have to recognise each other as independent states
within the determined borders. Croatia’s recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina took
place with the Washington Agreement that established the wartime alliance between
the two countries in March 1994. In addition, as a signatory to the GFAP, Croatia was
bound by the territorial delineation made in that document. In the articles following
                                                
131 To be exact there are “11 articles, 11 annexes, numerous appendixes, letters, and declarations, and
more than 100 maps.” Moore (1996b), p. 37. The annexes covered military aspects (1A), regional
stability (1B), the inter-entity boundary line (2), elections (3), a constitution for Bosnia and
Herzegovina (4), arbitration (5), human rights (6), refugees and displaced persons (7), the preservation
of national monuments (8), public corporations (9), the High Representative (10), and the IPTF (11).
132 The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) replaced the International Conference on Former
Yugoslavia (ICFY) and consisted of the organisations, agencies and governments that met in London in
December 1995. A steering board made up of the EU presidency, the European Commission, the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Political Eight (the Group of Seven plus Russia)
reported to the PIC.
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Art. I of the GFAP, the structure of the full agreement and an overview over the
content of each annex was presented, including the compulsory general promise of
compliance by the signing parties.
All the annexes dealing with civilian aspects were structured similarly. They
began by listing the signatories to that specific document which in most cases were
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, the Federation and the Serb
Republic. Generally, the range of signatories reflected the nature of the issue at stake.
After presenting the general area of responsibility and application, as well as basic
guidelines for that area, the annexes defined an executing body usually a commission
that was to consist of local representatives of the two entities (in a 2:1 ratio in favour
of the Federation) and a significant number of external representatives.
Unless otherwise decided before the end of the period, this distribution of
power was to continue for five years, after which all offices were to be transferred to
representatives of the central government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, assuming that the
country would then be unified enough to put aside ethnically motivated appointments
and that local authorities would be able to shoulder their responsibility after five years
of outside coaxing. Until that point in time, however, external actors retained the
upper hand with the final decision-making vote. Reflecting Bosnia-Herzegovina’s
formal sovereignty, the dissemination of information was placed in the hands of ‘the
Parties.’  Particularly with regard to human rights and the repatriation of refugees, the
parties’ control over information was a potentially dangerous source of instability.
3.1.2 Dayton’s Functional Split
The network of mandates and mandating bodies reflected the basic split into a
military and a civilian component that complemented each other. Whereas the
military pillar was covered in Annexes 1A, 1B and 2, the civilian provisions were laid
out in Annexes 3 through 11. Although one may argue that the functional split was a
result of the specific terms of the agreement, it appears more likely that Dayton was
composed precisely as it was in order to bring about a clear separation between
military and civilian peace implementation. The civilian side has been described as
“riddled with flaws,”133 and relied heavily on the main third-party actors’ economic or
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other self-interest in co-operating. Woodward attributes this deficiency to the fact that
“the Dayton accord is not a political settlement.”134 In contrast, the military section
dealt with a more apolitical subject matter that enabled military experts to formulate
an “extensive and detailed”135 document that provided a clear mandate with teeth.
The recurrent discrepancy between the civilian and the military side of Dayton
was also reflected in the timetables determined for each side. Whereas the military
stipulations operated on a scale of thirty, sixty, or ninety days, the civilian aspects
were much more vague and generally included no deadlines at all. Admittedly, it was
much more difficult and in some cases certainly meaningless to set a deadline for
political, social, and economic development which was affected by numerous
intangible factors. Ironically, the elections – the one element of civilian
implementation with a clearly defined deadline – were a case in point. Although they
were held in accordance with the deadline, most argue that they should not have been
because of the practical and psychological difficulties that emerged in the course of
the first few months of the peace process and that rendered free and democratic
elections impossible. Accordingly, instead of proving the civilian implementers’
ability to meet a deadline against all odds, the elections became the prime example of
the need for a flexible timetable.
Despite the functional division of labour that formed the starting-point, the
military actors came to realise that, in reality, they were insolubly tied to the
fulfilment of civilian goals. After successfully carrying out those provisions with
distinct timetables, they were faced with tasks that were much more similar in
character to the civilian activities and required the same degree of flexibility. Much of
the discussion about IFOR/SFOR’s role had its origin in the absence of specific goals
– apart from increasing general security and stability – and timetables – apart from the
proposed exit date – that followed the successful implementation of Dayton’s military
provisions. In general, it had to be the implementers’ objective to put themselves out
of work. When the military had done that, they found that they could not simply go
home, but had to wait for the civilian actors to reach the same level. Until they did,
the two sides of the peace process were too inextricably tied to engage in separate
assessments of their performance.
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3.1.3 Goals of the Agreement
The Dayton Agreement established “structures and processes [...] with the stated
intent to establish a lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to promote stability
in the region of former Yugoslavia as a whole.”136 Retaining a uniform Bosnian state
was a further goal of the agreement. The means to do so reflected the functional split
and took the shape of a two-pronged approach in which first military security was to
be established and then a civilian peace was to be built.137 The underlying moral and
political concepts of the agreement were criticised with regard to the ethnic solutions
that transformed a formally multi-ethnic society into one divided along ethnic lines
and virtually confirmed the ethnic cleansing of the war. Naturally, the “forced
population transfers really simplified implementation,” but the attempt to create a
united Bosnian state was rendered superficial, as it sub-divided the country into two
distinct and - it appeared - irreconcilable entities.138 The territorial distribution of 51%
to 49% was in favour of the Federation. In part, pursuing a united Bosnia-
Herzegovina was a result of the unwillingness of the international community to
shoulder both the costs and the political responsibility of dividing Bosnia-
Herzegovina and of redrawing borders.139 In reality, there were two diametrically
opposed views of the agreement. Whereas some perceived it as a cover for effective
partition, others regarded the Dayton Agreement as the starting-point for a workable
integration of former enemies into a single state.140
The question of partition or integration concerned the relationship between
entities, as well as within the Federation which was often described as the weak link
in the chain.141 Contentions are inevitable in any society or political system. The issue
is rather whether the mechanisms for a peaceful settlement of differences are used or
whether attempts to manage disagreements merely result in deadlock or even
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hostilities due to a lack of co-operation. Although the pre-war state of Bosnia, as part
of Yugoslavia, was no multi-ethnic paradise, it was characterised by peaceful
coexistence, until the latent divisions were extorted and politicised by nationalist
leaders.142
In general, each party saw their goals partially but not wholly fulfilled in the
Dayton Agreement and the constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina and each was likely
to co-operate only as long as the implementation process continued to serve those
goals.143 Kumar and Holbrooke warned of giving in to the nationalist agendas, as
Holbrooke argued that “partition would leave the region in a perpetuated state of
unresolved tension, keep the international community involved longer and at greater
cost, and risk igniting other boundary disputes in the region.”144
A fundamental strategic dilemma was the de facto recognition of ethnic
cleansing or division as the agreement’s starting-point, while simultaneously
advocating and pursuing a peace characterised by multi-ethnic coexistence and the
unity of the Bosnian state. Schlotter describes this as an attempt to merge
‘Realpolitik’ with basic principles.145 Daalder argues that “Dayton was possible
precisely because it remained ambiguous on the core issue of Bosnia’s identity.”146
Furthermore, Susan Woodward has identified four inherently contradictory strategies
that underlay the Dayton Agreement. (1) The virtually unconditional support for
Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic contradicted the professed military
impartiality. (2) In continuation of the first contradiction, the international
community’s attitude towards the Federation and the vivid promotion of its unity was
also at odds with the demonisation of the Republika Srpska. Thus, while there were
real attempts at community-building through a variety of assistance programmes in
the Federation, the United States’ view that the war was in part caused by a prevailing
military imbalance in favour of the Bosnian Serbs and that the Bosnian Serbs would
therefore have to be kept at bay as they were the dangerous element in the equation of
the peace process. (3) Similarly, the trade and co-operation that was essential to inter-
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entity reconciliation was undermined by the international community’s military
balance thinking. (4) Finally, there was also a misfit between the timeline inherent in
peace building tasks, such as security sector reform and building political institutions,
and the pre-set exit strategy. 147 These contradictory strategies were clearly weak
points of the agreement and in the constellation of actors that would impact the
success of implementation.
3.1.4 Legitimacy and Self-Interest
The perceived legitimacy of the peace agreement and particularly the issues of
consent of the parties, impartiality of the international community, and credibility of
both, were major factors for the success of the peace process. Whereas credibility was
to emerge over time in the behaviour of the parties and of the international community
in the implementation process, consent and impartiality were addressed in the formal
structures of the Dayton Agreement. In Woodward’s words, “[i]ts virtue is to
legitimize an international military intervention force and civilian administration [...]
with consent, leaving intact international norms of sovereignty.”148
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Box 3.1: The Basics on the Dayton Agreement
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) consisted of two major elements the General Framework
Agreement for Peace (GFAP), that itself built on earlier agreements reached in the pre-Dayton peace
process, and a set of annexes that defined the particulars of various areas within the peace process.
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A fundamental strategic dilemma was the de facto recognition of ethnic cleansing or division as the
agreement’s starting-point, while simultaneously advocating and pursuing a peace characterised by
multi-ethnic coexistence and the unity of the Bosnian state.
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The consent necessary to increase the legitimacy of the Dayton Agreement
was given in a fundamental sense in that the Agreement was signed by the three
reigning Presidents. It reflected the existence of a balance of power at the time of
signing. As a balance is a precarious condition by nature and the parties, in Schlotter’s
words “felt exhausted but not defeated,”149 more profound consent would emerge with
credibility in the course of the implementation process. The Dayton Agreement also
ended the fighting before any of the parties had achieved their political goals.150 Their
credibility was now conditioned by the degree to which they could either abandon
their former goals or transform them into goals that were not threatening to the other
parties and were consistent with the peace process. The defeat of one of the parties in
a conflict usually leads to that party changing its political leadership. As none of the
parties were defeated, all political leaders continued in their war-time positions.151
A peace agreement is always a compromise between getting the parties to sign
and stop open warfare and trying to find a comprehensive and detailed solution to
potential future snares. Dayton was no exception to this general evaluation. It
represented the smallest common denominator that could be agreed upon militarily
and thanks to the military contributors to the agreement, the provisions in this field
were clear and well-defined. In contrast, compromises were made with regard to the
civilian aspects and the trickiest territorial questions were left for a later date. Thus,
the signature of the contesting parties was ensured, but the basis from which to build
civilian implementation was miserable. As a result, the fundamental consent intended
to endorse the agreement and enhance its legitimacy was erratic and unreliable.
Observers tended to agree that the Dayton Agreement played into the hands of
the nationalist leaders and their goals and that this seriously threatened the peace
process. As Schear puts it, the “nationalist leaderships remain fundamentally at odds
over the terms and conditions of multi-ethnic coexistence.”152 The threat that the
nationalist leaders posed to long-term peace lay in their aims of ethnic division and
the implicit legitimisation of these aims through the international community’s
condonation of the negotiating partners. The reconciliation that took place between
the international negotiators and the nationalist signatories and former aggressors also
went against the widely held belief that “there can be no lasting solution without
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addressing the root causes of the war.”153 The fact that the international community
merely looked on while the nationalist leaders continued to pursue partition
undermined the credibility and impartiality of external actors and thus decreased their
legitimacy. 154
One should also keep in mind who signed the agreement on behalf of the
parties to the conflict. As both the Bosnian Croat and the Bosnian Serb delegations
refused to sign the Dayton Agreement, their military and political backers in the
neighbouring capitals of Zagreb and Belgrade did the honours. In fact, the indictment
of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžic was an ingenious move that robbed his
political power by barring him from going abroad for fear of being arrested. In that
way, authority was transferred to Slobodan Miloševic, President of Serbia, who
signed an agreement that the Bosnian Serbs would not have ceded to.155 Thus, it was
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman that signed on behalf of the Bosnian Croats, and
President Miloševic that signed for the Bosnian Serbs, as well as in their own rights as
presidents of the neighbouring countries that were to respect the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only the Bosnian Muslims were in fact
represented by their home-grown leader, Alija Izetbegovic. Obviously, the degree to
which these individuals truly represented the population varied. In fact, Schlotter
maintains that at times the aims of the Bosnian parties and their representatives in
neighbouring Croatia and Serbia were contradictory. 156 According to Daalder, “each
of the parties feels that the final agreement was to some extent imposed upon
them.”157 It is interesting that the agreement was in effect an international agreement,
signed by heads of independent states to end an internal conflict. More generally, the
signatories and the parties that they represented should never be viewed as uniform
actors and the role of factors that opposed the peace process was a critical and an
illusive one. The factional split in the Republika Srpska at the political level and the
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close ties between different centres of power in society, such as between political,
military, and gang leaders, were clear examples of the complex make-up of each
party.
And yet, the Agreement was aware of the existence of the Parties’ security
needs and took them into account where appropriate, such as in Art. I of the
Agreement on Regional Stabilization that ensured that any measures taken under this
agreement would be “consistent with the Parties’ respective security.” 158 Naturally,
this was balanced by other demands of the peace process, but the validity of the
Parties’ security interests was recognised. Many of the details on military balance and
military security were also left to the arms control negotiations, so that specific
decisions in that realm remained to be agreed upon. In that way the security concerns
of all parties were at least included in the peace agreement.
From a legal perspective, consent was explicitly addressed in the agreement in
referral to both the peace process and the presence of international third-party actors.
Beyond the fundamental inherent consent that was given through the signing of the
agreement, the parties were obligated through the Dayton Agreement to actively
support the implementation and to pursue peace. While Dayton was quite clear on the
obligations it imposed on the parties, it did not include provisions that allowed them
to withdraw that consent.159
The authors of the Dayton Agreement also sought to alleviate problems that
might arise with respect to the third-parties’ impartiality by tying the presence of the
implementation force to the agreement and not to the parties. Further, there was a
tendency to use the agreement to legitimise actions and as proof of complete
impartiality. Similarly, parties officially paid lip service to the agreement, while
interpreting it in accordance with their own goals.160 However, the attempts to
confirm the impartiality through provisions of the Agreement were counteracted by
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the clear “moral indictment and political judgement on war guilt”161 that emerged
between the lines of the document. Although a thorough treatment of guilt and
innocence was essential to a new start after the war, the allocation of collective guilt
on a people has been unsuccessful throughout history. As Brigadier General Gregsen
pointed out, when moving into a former or current conflict area, you must “be careful
whom you empower and careful whom you call your enemy.”162
3.2 Security and Security-Related Arrangements
This section draws up the legal framework and the fundamental rules for the
implementation of the Dayton Agreement’s security arrangements. It includes a
discussion of the mandate and authority the third-party actors were bestowed with in
the execution of their tasks, as well as a description of those tasks and the co-
ordination mechanisms determined by the agreement.
3.2.1 Authority over Security Implementation
Military tasks and obligations of the Parties were laid out in Annex 1 in the
“Agreement on the Military Aspects of Air Peace Settlement.” In Art. 1, the annex
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Box 3.2: Legitimacy of the Agreement
The consent necessary to increase the legitimacy of the Dayton Agreement was given in a
fundamental sense in that the Agreement was signed by the three reigning Presidents. Still, each of
the parties felt that the final agreement was to some extent imposed upon them.
Observers tended to agree that the Dayton Agreement played into the hands of the nationalist leaders
and their goals and that this seriously threatened the peace process. The credibility of the leadership
was conditioned by the degree to which they could either abandon their former wartime goals or
transform them into goals that were not threatening to the peace process.
The Dayton Agreement also tried to avoid concerns about the third parties’ impartiality by tying the
presence of the implementation force to the Agreement and not to the parties.
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determined the length of the Implementation Force (IFOR) operation as
approximately one year. IFOR was defined as “a force to assist in implementation of
the territorial and other militarily related provisions of the agreement.” Its task was
also to “help ensure compliance” in the course of which IFOR could “use the
necessary force” as was stressed on several occasions in Annex 1. In addition, IFOR
was to operate under NATO’s Rules of Engagement that allowed for the use of force
where “necessary to accomplish its mission and to protect itself.”163 Furthermore,
IFOR had full control over air and surface movements.164 In addition to the NATO
presence, Art. 1 opened for the participation of other countries’ forces that “may assist
in implementing military aspects of this Annex.”  This was of course the arrangement
that allowed for the participation of the Partnership for Peace countries. Although
IFOR was formally limited in its privileges and immunities by the Constitution of
Bosnia-Herzegovina that remained the sovereign body of law, the NATO
commander’s powers were likened to those of a governor rather than a
peacekeeper.165 Preisinger considered this the great opportunity of the Dayton
Agreement, arguing that only by employing the full range of powers granted to the
international community would peace be implemented.166 However, one might also
argue that extensive international involvement and pressure disempowered the parties
and restrained them from interacting, confronting each other, resolving issues, and
reaching lasting solutions.
For the military tasks the clearly defined starting-point of the timeline was the
moment when authority was transferred from the UN forces to IFOR. Thereafter, the
NATO-led force had sole operational and – in the form of North Atlantic Council
(NAC) – political authority over its force and the implementation clock began ticking.
There was a clear separation of authority between the military and the civilian
implementation bodies. Accordingly, “IFOR’s enforcement capacities were detached
from the charge of compliance with civilian aspects of the agreement. Similarly, the
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military component was not subject to civilian authority in any significant manner.”167
Although the OHR could not interfere in military implementation, he was in theory
able to use civilian measures, such as sanctions authorised by the OHR, to force
military compliance.168
The authority that the implementation bodies had over the peace process also
extended to the parties themselves. By signing the Dayton Agreement, the parties
obligated themselves to endorse the peace process and to co-operate with the
implementing bodies. Whether or not a violation of these obligations had taken place,
was determined by the commander of IFOR who would then also decide on the
force’s action to bring about compliance.169 In the early days of Dayton, there was a
fear that the extensive powers of the NATO commander could bring him into conflict
with local authorities,170 but it appeared that Bosnians of whatever faith picked their
battles with each other rather than with the international community.
In the hierarchical structure of the peace implementation network in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) fell under the
authority of the OHR and was to report both to him and to the Commander of IFOR
(COMIFOR) periodically. In addition, the Commissioner of IPTF had the option to
inform IFOR in cases of non-compliance by the parties. Moreover, the IPTF
Commissioner or one of his representatives participated in the Joint Civilian
Commissions (JCCs) and the Joint Military Commissions (JMCs). In relation to their
local counterparts, both IFOR and the IPTF faced the parties’ political authorities that
were under the obligation to “cooperate fully” and to grant unimpeded freedom of
movement and of inspection. Allocating the responsibility for police reform to the
political authorities assumed civilian control over security forces. To what degree that
control was in fact effective, would emerge in the implementation process. In the
same way, civilian authorities were left with the obligation “to disarm and disband all
armed civilian groups within 30 days,”171 but what the relationship between political
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The human rights system established in the Dayton Agreement also had
extensive powers. A Human Rights Commission was to be established that consisted
of an Ombudsman and a Human Rights Chamber. Both elements were authorised to
investigate any matter brought before them and were to be granted full access to all
documents in the course of their investigation. Whereas the Ombudsman merely
offered his conclusions as an issued statement, the Chamber had the power to make
final and binding decisions to be implemented by the parties.
3.2.2 Tasks Set Out by Dayton
The major security tasks can be summarised in the role that IFOR and IPTF were to
play in creating a situation that fostered trust and confidence. In addition to the typical
military tasks, IFOR was asked to assist IPTF in monitoring until indigenous bodies
were functioning.173 In accordance with the Dayton Agreement, IFOR’s main tasks
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Figure 3.1 Simplified Overview over the Authority and Co-ordination Structures
Section II Implementing the Dayton Agreement
84
were to “monitor and help ensure compliance by all Parties with this Annex [...]
including, in particular, withdrawal and re-deployment of Forces [...] and the
establishment of Zones of Separation” and “to establish liaison arrangements with
local civilian and military authorities and other international organisations.” The
Agreement also defined supporting tasks for IFOR and called on the force “to help
secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace
settlement.” These tasks included enhancing the conditions of freedom of movement
and thereby “assist[ing UNHCR and other international] organisations in the
accomplishment of humanitarian missions,” as well as civilian populations on the
move. A key supporting task in connection with freedom of movement was IFOR’s
charge “to monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles.”174 In addition to the
tasks laid out in the Dayton Agreement, NAC had the option to introduce additional
provisions at a later stage.175
Underlining IFOR’s ‘assistance’ rather than execution character, Annex 1
attributed a number of tasks to the parties, the compliance with which was up to IFOR
to decide and actively promote or punish in the case of non-compliance. Observing
the cessation of hostilities barred the former warring parties from firing weapons and
other explosive devises, from placing more mines, and from patrolling. More
generally they too were to contribute to a safe and secure environment, by abstaining
from the above activities and from own retaliation for non-compliance, and by
“maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies” that were to follow Western policing
and human rights standards. Furthermore, armed civilian groups were to be disarmed
and disbanded within 30 days. While the role of IFOR almost appeared a soft one, the
force was given the authority to use all necessary means, including the use of force,
which was instrumental in persuading the parties to live up to their commitments.
IFOR represented a credible security guarantee, at the same time as it had sufficient
capacity and will to enforce compliance.
Further, the articles covered cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of foreign
forces, re-deployment of forces, notifications, deployment of the implementation
force, withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the Joint Military Commission, prisoner
exchanges, and co-operation. There were no provisions in the Dayton Agreement that
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explicitly addressed military reform or IFOR’s role in bringing it about, apart from
IFOR’s responsibility to supervise withdrawal and re-deployment.
In this context the issue of war criminals is an interesting one. NAC “agreed
that IFOR personnel should detain any PIFWC with whom they came into contact in
the execution of their assigned tasks.”176 However, the formulation was sufficiently
vague to relieve IFOR from having to actively pursue war criminals. When an attempt
was finally made to arrest two war criminals in July 1997, SFOR was able to claim
that the force had come upon the indictees in the execution of its duties and that there
had been no change in policy. 177 War Criminals reappeared throughout the text of the
Dayton Agreement; they were banned from all co-ordination fora and not accepted as
partners in the implementation process.178
The drawing of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) and the subsequent
removal of foreign forces was one of IFOR’s earliest scheduled tasks laid out in
Annex 2. Reflecting another stalling manoeuvre that enabled the Presidents to sign the
Dayton Agreement, the Annex also deferred binding arbitration on Brcko, but
established a commission in which both entities were represented equally. Although a
deadline was set for the decision to be made within a year, final arbitration had not
occurred in the first three years following the agreement was signed, that is by late
1998.179 Annex 2 stated quite clearly that the IEBL could only be altered by a
COMIFOR decision and with the agreement of both parties. The danger of moving
populations into border areas and thus achieving a de facto adjustment of the border
was not recognised.
The return of refugees and displaced persons was directly addressed in Annex
7. Although not directly involved, the providers of international security assistance
were called upon to assist with issues that related to physical security and to the living
conditions of the returnees. Despite the assurance of the Parties in Art. I, 2, problems
with the return of refugees were anticipated from the outset. The Dayton Agreement
called for a warm welcome and active support by the parties, including the
prosecution of violations and violators. Art. I, 3(e) was particularly important for
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external security assistance, as it specifically referred to violators among military,
paramilitary, or police forces. Art. II, 1 demanded that the “Parties undertake to create
in their territories the political, economic, and social conditions conducive to the
voluntary return and harmonious reintegration of refugees and displaced persons.”
Obviously, this was far easier said than done even where there was the political will to
receive. Art. II, 2 aimed at facilitating demobilisation and military restructuring by
encouraging the release of soldiers that wished to return home.
Another area in which international security forces, i.e. IPTF and IFOR/SFOR,
had a tangential but nonetheless important role to play was with respect to human
rights.180 The provisions in the Agreement that referred to the protection of human
rights, focused on the creation of a Human Rights Commission and on its structure
and mandate. The desire for long-term self-sufficiency was reflected in the
stipulations on the transfer of authority into purely Bosnian hands and the reliance on
lower level courts and other instances, typical of international human rights law. Still,
the first ombudsman was to be appointed by OSCE and would not be a citizen of
Bosnia-Herzegovina or of neighbouring states in the first five-year-term. 181 Security
also relied on the population seeking peaceful remedies for their grievances and
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Box 3.3: Security Tasks Outlined in the Agreement I. - IFOR (Annex 1A)
IFOR was defined as “a force to assist in implementation of the territorial and other military related
provisions of the agreement.” Its task was also to “help ensure compliance” in the course of which
IFOR could “use the necessary force.”
IFOR’s main tasks were to “monitor and help ensure compliance by all Parties with this Annex [...]
including, in particular, withdrawal and re-deployment of Forces [...] and the establishment of Zones of
Separation” and “to establish liaison arrangements with local civilian and military authorities and other
international organisations.” The Agreement also defined supporting tasks for IFOR which called on
the force “to help secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace
settlement.”
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moving away from lynch justice. Unfortunately, much of the dissemination of
information was placed in the hands of the signatories and there were warranted fears
that the information passed on to the general population would be distorted and that
redressing violations though the Human Rights Commission would be discouraged.
The presence of the International Police Task Force (IPTF), laid out in Annex
11, was closely tied to the protection of human rights. The demand that the Parties
ensure a secure environment was reiterated and linked to the need to maintain
“civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally
recognised standards and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and
fundamental freedoms.”182 The role of IPTF, then, was defined as assisting the Parties
in meeting their obligations. Although IPTF was autonomous and had an extensive
mandate that allowed near unlimited access, the Dayton Agreement emphasised the
need to respect “the laws and customs of the host country.”183 To what degree the
customs were even identifiable and not used as an excuse for abuses of power,
remained to be seen.
The IPTF Assistance Program, as outlined in Art. III, addressed the internal
security deficit at three levels: (1) the police level with active duty and training; (2)
the court level at which police activity was followed-up; and (3) the political
authorities that would provide the context for the maintenance of law and order. The
contextual conditions indicate the importance of the complete triad of police, judicial,
and penal institutions. Thus, the objectives of IPTF were to ensure that
internationally-accepted standards of policing and of human rights were followed by
the local police, as well as in the criminal justice system. In addition, IPTF was to
assist in enhancing freedom of movement for the civilian population and in staging
free elections. IPTF planned to achieve its objectives by (1) monitoring, observing
and inspecting law enforcement facilities, (2) advising and training law enforcement
personnel, (3) facilitating the parties’ law enforcement activities, (4) assessing threats
to public order and advising on possible responses, (5) advising the government on
the organisation of a law enforcement system, and (6) accompanying local police. 184
More specifically, Annex 11, Art. VII offered a definition of “law enforcement
                                                
182 Annex 11 Agreement on International Police Task Force, Art. I, 1,2.
183 Annex 11 Agreement on International Police Task Force, Art. II, 1,5.
184 In describing the police component in Annex 11 on the IPTF, the Dayton Agreement defined “law
enforcement agencies” as “those with a mandate including law enforcement, criminal investigations,
Section II Implementing the Dayton Agreement
88
agencies” that included bodies undertaking “detention or judicial activities.” Thus,
supervising a judicial reform and a reform of the penal system was implicit, but not a
recognised part of IPTF’s initial tasks.
Creating a secure environment was anticipated to be a particular challenge
during the elections. Although political development otherwise formed the backdrop
rather than the subject of security assistance, Annex 3, Art. I, demanded secure
conditions on the ground. According to the Agreement, no IFOR presence was called
for unless the parties could not live up to their side of the bargain and did not provide
free access to media, freedom from persecution and intimidation etc.
In order to ensure the availability of non-violent conflict management
mechanisms in the future, Annex 5 called for the establishment of a body for
arbitration. The system was to encompass Bosnia-Herzegovina, FRY, and Croatia, but
the provisions were otherwise very vague as to its constitution and manner of
operation.
                                                                                                                                           
public and state security, or detention or judicial activities.” Annex 11 Agreement on International
Police Task Force Art. VII.
Box 3.4 Security Tasks Outlined in the Agreement II. – IPTF (Annex 11)
Parties were required to ensure a secure environment by maintaining “civilian law enforcement
agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognised standards and with respect for
internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The role of the IPTF was to
assist the Parties in meeting these obligations.
The IPTF Assistance Program (Art. III) addressed the internal security deficit at three levels:
(1) the police level with active duty and training;
(2) the court level at which police activity was followed-up; and
(3) the political authorities that would provide the context for police activity.
The deficits were to be overcome by
(1) monitoring, observing and inspecting law enforcement facilities;
(2) advising and training law enforcement personnel;
(3) facilitating the parties’ law enforcement activities;
(4) assessing threats to public order and advising on possible responses;
(5) advising the government on the organisation of a law enforcement system; and
(6) accompanying local police.
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Naturally, the Agreement on Regional Stabilization (Annex 1B) drew a wider
circle of affected parties, including the FRY and Croatia in addition to Bosnia-
Herzegovina and its constituent entities.185 The provisions for regional stability were
as yet vague as they would be subject to further negotiations in which specific
obligations would be determined. Accordingly, regional Confidence and Security
Building Measures (CSBMs) were to be negotiated under Art. II and limits on arms
imports under Art. III. Under Art. IV longer-term negotiations of arms reductions and
armament levels were to take place at a sub-regional level. Finally, Art. V aimed at
the integration of a wide range of countries into a regional security network. Although
an explicit definition of the two levels was absent, it was understood that sub-regional
in the context of Art. IV referred to Croatia, FRY, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
group of regional actors was purposely undefined in order to open for widespread
participation. The arms control provisions of the Dayton Agreement were another
example of how “[t]he substance of the GFAP, and the institutions it created and
mobilised to implement this programme, attest to the intent to create mutually
supporting stabilisation processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the FRY and the
Balkans as a whole.”186
The gauge for arms control negotiations took “population size, current military
armament holdings, defense needs, and relative force levels in the region” into
account.187 McCausland stresses the novelty of including arms control measures in a
peace agreement. He points to the sometimes overlooked difference between arms
control and disarmament and to how that distinction becomes particularly blurred in
the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina where efforts aimed at regional stability were moved
forward through both harmony of interest, the mark of arms control, and the external
pressures typical of disarmament.188 Whereas the pressure exercised by the
international community on the parties was obvious, the ‘harmony of interest’ was
less so. However, in a situation where outright hostilities had ceased and a tentative
development towards peace was underway, the parties had something to gain from
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187 Moore (1996), p. 42; Dayton Agreement, Annex 1B, Article IV (2).
188 Jeffrey D. McCausland (1997) “Arms Control and the Dayton Accords,” European Security 6(2), p.
18f., 24.
Section II Implementing the Dayton Agreement
90
insight into each other’s military capability, from being subject to equal constraints,
and from having a say in the determination of those constraints.
The Dayton Agreement also allowed the entities to enter into special relations
and agreements with neighbouring states and organisations, as long as they did not
threaten the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina in any way and were
consistent with the Bosnian constitution.
3.2.3 Co-ordination Mechanisms
Just as the tasks outlined in the Dayton Agreement reflected the theoretical blue print
for action, the mechanisms for co-ordination and the depiction of actors in the
following chapter reflect co-ordination in theory. Co-ordination took place at several
levels. The highest level at which strategic decisions on the initial distribution of tasks
among international organisations, governments, and NGOs were made is described
in the following chapter on third-party actors. At a tactical level, a structure was
created that reflected the assessment of necessary competency and mandates in the
field. The tactical level is presented in the current chapter in which Dayton’s
provisions on co-ordination mechanisms are described. At an operational level, co-
operation patterns emerged in the course of implementation. These are discussed in
Chapters 5 and 6 on implementation and co-ordination respectively.
Although the agreement set up a number of co-ordinating bodies and joint
commissions, mirroring the need for equal representation, the final say remained with
the IFOR commander (see also Figure 3.1). All “military complaints, questions, or
problems” were to be submitted to the Joint Military Commission (JMC) which
“serve[d] as the central body for all the Parties to this Annex.” Chaired by the IFOR
Commander, the body also included military and civilian representatives of each Party
as well as the High Representative and was intended to “function as a consultative
Box 3.5: Security Tasks Outlined in the Agreement III. – Arms Control (Annex 1B)
Art. II CSBMs among Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims.
Art. III Limitations on arms imports.
Art. IV Arms limitations among Croatia, FRY, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Art. V Regional security network which covers the entire Balkans.
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body.” Although the IFOR Commander welcomed and heard advice from any
member of the Commission and mutual agreement was the aim of decision-making,
the final say still rested with the Force Commander.189
With regard to the relationship between the civilian and the military
authorities, Annex 10 on the role and authority of the High Representative stated
plainly that despite his/her otherwise extensive competence the “High Representative
has no authority over the IFOR and shall not in any way interfere in the conduct of
military operations or the IFOR chain of command.” On the one hand, the clause
expressed the needs of military effectiveness. On the other hand, it underlined the
clear dividing line between civilian and military enforcement powers. 190
Similarly, the enforcement powers of the High Representative in the civilian
field were determined in Art. V which granted the “High Representative [...] the final
authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian
implementation of the peace settlement.” Accordingly, the High Representative was
placed in a pivotal position in the implementation process. His position was
strengthened by the absence of a time limit on his mandate. Through Joint Civilian
Commissions (JCCs) that he established at local levels throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina, he was the major point of contact for local demands. The office was
defined in a way that left much room for an able person to effectively tie the external
assistance to local developments. At the same time, the lack of authority in relation to
other external bodies safeguarded the implementation process against an incapable
office holder. Generally the High Representative faced stiff demands as he had to
create his organisation from scratch, had no prior structures to fall back on, and had
no affiliation to a specific international organisation that could have backed him up.191
The High Representative was also called on to give guidance to the Commissioner of
the IPTF. Similarly, the police commissioner could notify both the High
Representative and the COMIFOR in cases where parties refused to co-operate.192 In
that way, the IPTF – otherwise a ‘mere’ monitoring and training body – was
significantly strengthened by access to both the highest military and civilian authority.
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Another important co-ordinating mechanism described in the Agreement was
the Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees which treated and decided
property claims. This body was also to be constituted of mixed representation with an
external upper hand during a transitional period after which the government of
Bosnia-Herzegovina was to take over. The commission called for widespread
assistance either in the form of expertise from international agencies and NGOs or
through financial contributions to a fund that would cover compensation for property
claims that could not be met by the Bosnian government. Here, as elsewhere in the
Dayton Agreement, the attempt was made to weave in the Constitution of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a legal framework that could fill the gap in between specific
provisions, such as in the Annex on Refugees and Displaced Persons. Referring to a
more or less indigenous legal framework, was intended to foster local support and
acceptance for the decisions reached through the framework and to enhance the
autonomy and responsibility of the Bosnian legal system in the long run.
3.3 Conclusions on the Dayton Agreement
· Already upon the first reading of the Dayton Agreement, it was apparent that the
military provisions would be easier to implement than the civilian ones. The much
criticised disparity in timelines for the two components was inevitable, given the
difference in nature of military and civilian peace implementation tasks. Although
the issue of civil-military co-operation was more or less ignored, the need for
military support in the civilian sector was recognised, leaving a back door open
for increased co-ordination at a later stage.
· Whereas the military side relied on NATO’s command structure into which non-
NATO participants could be integrated, the civilian side established a set of co-
ordination mechanisms so complex that they were in danger of being debilitating
rather than facilitating.
· Further uncertainties lay in the widely diverging implicit and explicit
interpretation of the Agreement’s aims, among both the parties and among
members of the international community.
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· In the Agreement two types of security emerged that required two types of
security forces: IFOR to address military security and IPTF to assist in
establishing somewhat more extensive civilian security. The division between the
two was and remained porous throughout the implementation process. In addition
to the arms control provisions, these were the primary security tasks that emerged
from the Dayton Agreement.
4 Third-Party Actors Providing International Security
Assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina
In recent years more emphasis has been placed on international security assistance in
peace implementation and the actors that provide it. The international assistance
programme in Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the largest ever initiated with regard to
the number and types of actors involved. Accordingly, Bosnia-Herzegovina was
witnessing the engagement of virtually all of the major European regional
organisations: NATO, EU/WEU, the Council of Europe, and OSCE, in addition to the
UN. Practitioners welcomed the range of participants and underlined the necessity of
a joint effort as a major lesson from the Dayton process in Bosnia-Herzegovina.193
There were also a large number of NGOs on the ground, which played a role where
military and civilian tasks crossed paths, such as in elections or in repatriation, and
where security was auxiliary rather than an aim in itself. They were particularly
involved in the promotion of human rights. Bosnia-Herzegovina was also a prime
example of a peace support operation that built on both a military and a police
component provided by two separate actors in the security field.
In many ways the constellation of actors was a product of pre-agreement
involvement. Thus, the United States opposed any carrying role for the UN in military
security and used the leverage gained through their central role in the conclusion of
the Dayton Agreement to limit UN involvement.194 Arguably, the moment of
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settlement was ‘ripe’ anyhow, but the strong US pressure and promise of post-conflict
presence certainly pushed the parties to agree. The United States with the support of
the Contact Group and the EU virtually imposed the agreement on the parties,
exercising massive pressure and offering economic incentives.195 As a result of the
long list of failed negotiations during the war which were due to divergent
perspectives and opinions among major players, the international community was in
the process of learning that cohesion and will were indispensable to the
implementation of the agreement.196
Similarly, the future of the peace process and the perception that peace was
indeed possible depended to a large extent on the presence of the United States as part
of the implementation force.197 The US were intent on avoiding anything that could
prompt ‘mission creep’ and clearly drew a dividing line between the military and the
civilian activities.198 Whereas the US position on military implementation was made
very clear and was put into practice in IFOR, the rest of the post-conflict peace
building and peace implementation tasks were up for grabs in the international
community. The result was an at times overlapping web of authorisation and capacity
on the civilian side with a High Representative to oversee all civilian implementation.
On the surface, all external actors pursued the same goals, namely the lasting
peace and a uniform Bosnian state, prescribed by the Dayton Agreement. After
Dayton’s ‘Year One’ there was a rush of critical reviews that struck at the very heart
of the agreement and triggered a re-evaluation of its provisions and its aims. This
critical period lasted until the Spring of 1997, when the international community
reiterated its firm commitment to the agreement. Whereas alternative outcomes, such
as the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, were floated during the first year and
particularly in the critical review period, such back-up plans all but vanished from the
agenda of the international community – if not from the agenda of the parties.
Although every participating country surely had its domestic dynamic, the
contributors in Bosnia-Herzegovina were marked by surprisingly few of such
motivations. Instead, three major motivations led the international community on (1)
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containment of the conflict; (2) provision of humanitarian support; and (3) good
offices in future negotiations.199
Tying their presence and impartiality to the agreement rather than the parties,
decreased the significance of great power presence for strict neutrality. Still, while the
international security assistance delivered to Bosnia-Herzegovina was completely
dependent on the heavy presence of US forces with respect to pure number, image,
and military equipment,200 it was always important to secure widespread support,
particularly from Russia.
In addition to the greater neutrality derived from a coalition, individual states
also sought to mitigate the ethical concerns inherent in aiding security forces in cash
or kind by operating through large international organisations, such as NATO and the
EU. Due to the fact that the aims of individual participants were less discernible this
way, the edge was taken off what could be perceived as delivering arms or rebuilding
a military force. There are a few exceptions to this pattern, notably with regard to the
traditional concept of security assistance, where a government might want to publicly
state its support for one of the parties, or in the case of arms trade conducted by
private companies. The attitude of the international community has changed
somewhat in this respect. In the course of the peace process, a greater recognition of
the need to bring the state’s security apparatus in order emerged, although a certain
stigma remained attached to international security assistance.
The involvement of third-party actors in international security assistance in the
form of troop contributions to a peacekeeping force has become more and more
dependent upon a clearly defined timetable for withdrawal. Few governments are
willing to commit troops for an indefinite period and will require a tentative
estimation of the length of deployment up front. Similarly, in Bosnia-Herzegovina the
US and the West were accused of being more interested in an “end date” rather than
an “end state.”201 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were two prevalent views on
deadlines for withdrawal that were, among other places, reflected in the US
administration’s view of their involvement. On the one hand, the argument went that
only by setting a clear deadline after which aid would no longer be forthcoming, a
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sincere and rapid push for peace would take place. The Pentagon, for one, supported
rapid withdrawal.202 On the other hand, it was argued that, by setting a clear deadline,
the international community would merely freeze the conflict, encouraging the parties
to revert to violence again after the departure of the international presence. Within the
United States, the necessity of sustained external engagement was supported by the
State Department which regarded the operation in a larger European context. Aside
from risking that the good achieved was undone, failure in Bosnia-Herzegovina would
imply a tremendous loss of prestige for the United States, as well as for a number of
other actors involved. The local parties most hurt by a hasty withdrawal of NATO and
US forces would be the local forces of peace.203
There was widespread concern that the maintenance of peace could become
dependent on the permanent presence of outside actors, that acted as security
guarantees and the gravest challenge lay in finding the balance between sustained
outside engagement and self-sufficiency. In 1997, Deputy High Representative
Steiner expressed the view that a balance had not yet been attained in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and continued engagement remained the only option. 204 Another
dimension was the type and more particularly the forcefulness of the implementation
efforts. While strengthening the hand of external actors might engender greater
dependency, it has also been argued that assertiveness was a critical precondition for
fulfilling the provisions of the Dayton Agreement.205 The irony was that a more
careful and less assertive approach could prolong the international presence. In that
way, two central concerns on the international agenda, namely the fear of casualties
and of long-term deployment, were at odds with one another.
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4.1 External Actors
4.1.1 NATO and PfP Countries
IFOR’s mandate was described in United Nations Security Council Resolution
(SCRes) 1031 which authorised NATO to implement the military aspects of the
Dayton Agreement as described in Annex 1A. SFOR then succeeded IFOR with the
main task of providing the stability necessary to consolidate the peace. Both IFOR
and SFOR operated under the UN Charter, Chapter VII. It is important to distinguish
between IFOR and SFOR; the forces, their tasks, and their mandate. As their
respective names suggest, “[t]he role of IFOR (Operation Joint Endeavour) was to
implement the peace[, while t]he role of SFOR (Operation Joint Guard) is to stabilise
the peace.”206
To the extent that one can discuss NATO as a uniform actor with uniform
interests, NATO’s rationale for participating was the search for a post-Cold War
raison d’être. At the same time, and perhaps more importantly, the organisation was
putting meat on the bones of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Although, according to
their founding documents, both the UN and NATO pursue international peace and
security, they performed different functions and a more explicit division of labour
Box 4.1: Third-Party Actors: The Setting
The United States had a prominent position among the group of third-party actors. Through their
engagement in the negotiation and formulation of the Dayton Agreement, they determined
IFOR/SFOR’s role. At the same time, the execution of the military mandate was entirely dependent on
the US contribution.
A driving factor behind IFOR/SFOR’s mandate was the US anxiety about ‘mission creep.’ As a result,
both the United States and the West were accused of being more interested in the ‘end date’ than the
‘end state.’
More generally, the international community’s motivations were the containment of the conflict and the
provision of humanitarian support. Individual states’ reluctance to be associated with financing a certain
security measure led them to seek anonymity in the collective measures of international organisations.
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appeared to be emerging. Thus, NATO arrived on the scene after the apparent failure
of the UN whose presence as the major implementation force in the immediate wake
of UNPROFOR would have been ineffective and incredible.
Looking forward at the beginning of NATO’s mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
in March 1996, Solana summed up the challenges, expectations, and implications
NATO faced in the following manner:
“The NATO-led Implementation Force for Bosnia marks a major step towards a
lasting and durable peace in the region. It will also have a profound effect on the
future course of European security and on NATO’s role within it. In putting together
a unique 60,000-strong multinational force, drawn from over 30 countries, the
Alliance has provided a model for future operations and demonstrated the practical
value of PfP. Moreover, the Implementation Force (IFOR) experience will facilitate
intensified bilateral dialogue on enlargement which NATO will conduct with
interested Partners throughout 1996. It will also inject new momentum into NATO-
Russia relations. Concrete co-operation in Operation Joint Endeavour will show
Russian decision-makers and the wider public that the Alliance is sincere in its efforts
to forge a close relationship with their country.”207
In addition to seeing “the first full-scale test of the PfP agreements” and non-
Art. 5 operations, it was clear that the success or failure of NATO in Bosnia-
Herzegovina would have grave implications for the assessment of Europe’s
independent security role.208 In this way, PfP-co-operation was a political as well as a
military exercise and the failure of IFOR/SFOR to firmly establish peace in the
Balkans would have consequences for NATO more generally and for NATO
enlargement and the PfP-relationship more specifically. Accordingly, though
individual security concerns in Bosnia-Herzegovina played a role for the shape of the
force and for the willingness of different states to participate, there were much larger
issues at stake.
Despite the promising establishment of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)
whose chief aim was to improve NATO’s ability to conduct peace support operations,
in 1996 Solana issued a word of warning due to NATO’s lack of experience in the
area of peacekeeping and their rationale as a defence organisation. 209 This was
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especially true with respect to practical issues such as in logistics where no working
NATO-concept was in place and in practice a patchwork of national and multinational
solutions was used.210 Still, in contrast to UNPROFOR, the peacekeeping force
saddled with an extensive mandate, coupled with limited means and resources and
incoherent international backing, the NATO-led implementation force enjoyed the
benefit of a clear mandate and chain of command and established military apparatus
that enabled it to take tough and decisive action where necessary. As Hunter puts it,
“the robust professional image that NATO’s troops projected in the area [was fitting
for the] Balkan attitude that ‘might is right’.”211 In addition to operational advantages
in the course of the mission, the single command was essential to the rapid
deployment of the IFOR. 212 Both the mandate and the capabilities greatly enhanced
the force’s credibility in the eyes of the parties. From the first it was essential that
IFOR demonstrated their willingness to carry out their mandate with whatever means
necessary, while at the same time making clear that they expected the parties
themselves to actively pursue peace.
Another advantage of NATO over the UN emerged with respect to costs and
resources. Establishing and deploying IFOR and SFOR were enormously extensive
undertakings that would have been difficult to finance in any structure looser than that
of NATO. Member states had primary funding responsibility, but NATO covered
common costs through its Military Budget and the NATO Security Investment
Programme. Each nation paid for its own troops, but not for common expenses. By
introducing a functional division, the UN was relieved of shouldering the entire
financial burden alone; a condition which had often stifled UN efforts in the past.
The NATO-led IFOR had an approximate strength of 60,000 - of which
19,000 were US troops - and was made up of a wide range of participating
countries.213 The composition of IFOR reflected NATO’s political and military
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structural transformations that allowed 18 non-NATO countries to be integrated.
IFOR consisted of contingents from 34 countries. In addition to the 16 NATO-
member states, there were 14 participants from PfP-countries – Albania, Austria,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Sweden, and Ukraine – and Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Malaysia,
the final four participants. Slovenia and Ireland joined the multinational force in
SFOR, raising the number of non-NATO participants to 20 countries. Maybe not
surprisingly the majority of forces in SFOR were provided by member states, with
29,000 from NATO countries – of which 8,000 were US troops – and only 6,000 from
others. In February 1998, SFOR’s mandate was made more flexible with regard to the
length of the force’s deployment. SFOR was to continue its current mission at its
current strength at least until after the elections in September of 1998. Following the
elections, SFOR remained in place, but conducted semi-annual assessments of force
levels and mission. At the end of the period studied in December 1998, SFOR had
been reduced to approximately 32,000.
As a result of a mid-term assessment, the Multinational Specialized Unit
(MSU) was established within SFOR in the Spring of 1998. The creation of the MSU
was a result of US pressure and it was intended as a ‘third force’ that could address
the tasks that appeared to fall between the military and the civilian security chairs.
The MSU was “to support local authorities in responding to civil disorder”214 and its
mandate essentially coincided with SFOR’s, with respect to support for civilian
implementation and promoting freedom of movement. It consisted of about 350
troops typically from national police forces, such as the French Gendarmerie or the
Spanish Guardia Civil, and became operational in August 1998. There was some
disagreement about what exactly the force’s mission should be. As it merely executed
the same tasks that SFOR had implemented before, the MSU did not represent any
particular strengthening of SFOR as a whole.215 It also proved impossible to fulfil the
role of a ‘third force,’ as there was no political backing for a mandate to maintain law
and order, which had been the implicit hope at its inception.
The PfP-countries’ rationale for participating was fairly obvious. Besides
practical concerns of increasing interoperability and proving their worth to their
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prospective alliance partners, they were also hoping that “close co-operation with the
West [would] create faits accomplis and accelerate accession to NATO.”216 They












   national
command
Due to the political sensitivity of Russia’s relations with NATO, a special
solution was found for the integration of the Russian contribution in IFOR. Russia
was directly subordinate to Col. General Leontiy Shevtsov, who was also the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) deputy in the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE), and under the operational control of the SACEUR. At the
tactical level, the Russian brigade was part of the US-led Multinational Division
(North). In this way, Russia nominally retained national command, while in practice
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Figure 4.1 Russian Integration into NATO Command Structure in IFOR/SFOR
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being a partner in IFOR and SFOR that was equivalent to all the other non-NATO
countries.218
France’s high profile in IFOR/SFOR was also a continuation of her leading
role during UNPROFOR. Despite French hopes that the WEU might rise to the
occasion during the war, they had to realise that NATO was still the only security
option in Europe and that it was therefore necessary to forge closer ties and become
more integrated into NATO’s structure.219 At the same time, France’s participation
could serve to reconcile a European security identity with NATO reform. 220 What
politics had not been able to do for the improvement of NATO-French relations,
practical co-operation in IFOR/SFOR could achieve.
As mentioned above, the United States were the most heavily involved in
determining the format for the military force, as well as being the country with the
highest profile. With regard to the format, the United States insisted on a NATO-led
force that could include PfP-countries and other states. Within IFOR and SFOR, the
United States of course had the dominant position which was due to its late but
significant political or strategic leadership in the immediate post-conflict situation and
was both cause and effect of the allocation of resources, personnel, and heavy duty
equipment to this cause. In the words of Steiner, “[f]or the people in Bosnia,
[‘international community’] means America.” Another reason for the strong position
of the US was a result of the lack of a power centre in Europe and the withdrawal of
Russia.221 Accordingly, there was widespread agreement that a continued military
presence under US leadership was essential to consolidate the peace.222
Despite the fact that the high degree of US involvement displayed the
continued validity of transatlantic ties,223 the perspectives of the EU and the United
States on the peace process and its desired outcome diverged substantially. The US
scaled down its goals to the prevention of renewed fighting, leaving the long-term
political solution to the parties’ themselves. In contrast, the emphasis of the European
Union lay on regional stability which, in turn, required a certain political outcome.224
This was of course not surprising in light of the geographical proximity of the EU to
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the area of conflict. Given the disparity of aims between the European Union and the
United States, transatlantic relations became a central issue in the peace
implementation process. Quite likely, an element of competition was also involved,
particular from the European point of view, in which Europe was intent on proving its
ability to develop a coherent common foreign policy and to conduct crisis
management self-sufficiently. 225
In short, the participating countries had great expectations to IFOR from the
outset which, in turn, increased the Bosnian population’s expectations of the force’s
ability and enhanced IFOR’s leverage and credibility in implementing the tasks
assigned to them in the Dayton Agreement. Again, Solana reflected the euphoria
about NATO’s venturing into a new role, when he claimed that “[w]ithout the
Alliance, there would be no IFOR and no hope for ending the conflict.”226 Precisely
because of the high expectations, fluctuations in NATO-commitment had the potential
to be extremely damaging to the peace process.
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Box 4.2: NATO and PfP
NATO’s rationale for participating:
· to set the tone for future European security;
· to provide a model for future operations, especially with respect to the practical value of PfP-co-
operation; and
· to facilitate the dialogue on enlargement and improve relations with Russia.
The NATO-led force benefited from having a single and more stringent command, as well as from
having a clearly defined mandate and the appropriate capabilities. High expectations were tied to the
force’s performance and credibility from the outset, due to its capabilities and its professed willingness
to use them.
IFOR: 60,000 of which 19,000 from the US;
34 participating countries.
SFOR: 35,000 of which 8,000 from the US and 6,000 from non-NATO members;
36 participating countries.
Contrasting goals among the US and the EU became clear early on. Whereas the US aimed at
preventing renewed fighting, leaving the long-term political solution to the parties themselves, the EU
emphasised regional stability, which, in turn, required a certain political outcome.
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4.1.2 The United Nations and Their Agencies
The UN were kept out of the military operation and might even have been glad to do
so, given the criticism the organisation faced in the wake of UNPROFOR. Taylor
states that “[t]he effect of Dayton on the UN presence in the former Yugoslavia was
profound. Not only was the UN involvement drastically scaled back, but it was
fragmented both geographically and functionally.”227 Aside from the activities of its
fairly independent major agencies UNHCR and UNDP, the UN was left with the
responsibility for IPTF. Riddled with problems of finding a sufficient number of
adequate staff and facing the monumental task of overseeing the re-establishment of
law and order, the UN’s means were in no proportion to its charge. At the same time,
the functional division of labour that emerged in the extensive peace support
operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina heralded a new approach to so-called ‘wider
peacekeeping’ in which the role of the UN in particular was adjusted to the presence
of other actors and their willingness to take on certain tasks.
In surrounding areas the UN had a military presence in the traditional
peacekeeping missions UNTAES, UNPREDEP, and UNMOP in Croatia and
Macedonia. But the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) was purely
civilian comprising the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a civilian overseer,
the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) that co-ordinated all
efforts of the UN, including the UNHCR and UNDP, and provided political
facilitation for the work of the IPTF.
The IPTF reflected a continuation UNCivPol’s policy and their experience
from previous civilian police operations, which bestowed the international observer
force with a limited mandate. The decision was based on a realistic assessment of
their resources, their staff, and their legitimate capacity. Although they were often
accused of inactivity in the face of crime and human rights violations, training and
monitoring a police force without own active duties was a slow but in the long-run
more sustainable process. However, the IPTF also struggled with the misplaced
popular perception that they were the knight in shining armour come to manifest law
and order and with the subsequent inevitable disappointment in their performance.
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The UNHCR was the lead humanitarian agency during the war and was
involved in the delivery of international security assistance in the sense that it co-
operated with SFOR, and formerly with IFOR, on repatriation issues, especially with
regard to the security implications of planned returns and the safety of actual
returnees.228 The Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)229 at UN headquarters
in New York was also involved in security as a result of its responsibility for
humanitarian demining and long-term demining efforts. In that capacity, DHA co-
ordinated and recorded all demining efforts including those of IFOR and SFOR.
4.1.3 The EU/WEU, the Contact Group, and the OSCE
In 1995, the European Union and the Western European Union were not credible
alternatives for an independent peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.230
Although the WEU provided support for police forces and was part of the operation
enforcing the weapons embargo at sea until October 1996, the EU was assigned the
major responsibility for reconstruction and was therefore chiefly involved with
respect to financing; playing a political and economic role rather than a military one.
There were also some three hundred members of the European Commission
Monitoring Mission (ECMM) that had remained in the country following their
wartime engagement. Still, no particular attempt was made to identify areas and tasks
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Box 4.3: UN Agencies
The functional division of labour that emerged in the extensive peace support operation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina heralded a new approach to ‘wider peacekeeping’ in which the role of the UN in particular
was adjusted to the presence of other actors and their willingness to take on certain tasks.
UNCivPol/IPTF: Monitoring the establishment of local police forces and the introduction of democratic
principles of policing.
UNHCR: Repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons.
DHA: Co-ordinating all demining efforts.
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not taken on by other actors and that the EU might contribute with, which resulted in
a limited and auxiliary EU presence, rather than a proactive one.231 The limited role of
the EU was also due to the shaky foundations of its common security policy, or as
Mihalka puts it, “Europe has too many chiefs.”232 As the basis of a common policy
consisted of both the institutional structures and the political will of the member
states, any initiatives in the field of security policy would be futile, unless backed by
all members or if the balance was upset by external actors.233 Moreover, they would
be unsuccessful until the EU established a mechanism to effectively execute decisions
taken through co-ordination. 234
The interest of European countries was that which came closest to a genuine
interest in regional peace and stability. Although it was unlikely that a renewed war
would spread, Europe was heavily affected by refugee flows and the burden of misery
in their midst by virtue of their proximity. Despite the fact that it was seldom
expressed openly, Europe was also aware of the implications for the positioning of
Islam in European societies. In this context, Bosnia-Herzegovina represented a grand
failure to develop a strategy to deal with the specific ethnic issues.235 In a similar vein,
the EU’s experiences in former Yugoslavia had been almost traumatic for an
organisation that prided itself on being an integrated community of many nations and
ethnicities and that had to find out that it was incapable of handling breaches to its
basic philosophy. 236
Obviously, European participation in the NATO-led force was a continuation
of UNPROFOR involvement and participation in the Contact Group,237 consisting of
France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, and in the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). At the
same time, NATO-members were quite simply subject to membership obligations that
could hardly be refused at NATO’s first actual use. Following the failure of their own
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efforts, there was a convenience for European NATO-members in being part of a US-
led NATO force rather than having to go it alone, having recognised the limitations of
their powers in the negotiation process. Standing together under the NATO-banner
also undermined any national allegiances individual states might have found hard to
suppress, such as the much discussed German-Croat relations. Ironically, the
participation of Russia in IFOR/SFOR had a confidence-building effect on the Serbs,
mitigating the Serb perception of potential hostility in the international community
through the presence of a traditional ally.
The “resource-starved” Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) was handed a comprehensive list of tasks including elections, arms control,
and human rights - the latter in co-operation with the Council of Europe.238 As
Hottelet commented, “[t]he OSCE has never had such a broad mandate. How well it
performs may determine its role in the future.”239 As it turned out the OSCE was
firmly established as a ‘regular’ among the international organisations contributing to
peacekeeping operations, as a result of its comprehensive engagement in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and despite its obvious organisational problems in the execution of its
mandate. The OSCE was given the responsible for staging elections, where the back-
up by both security forces, i.e. IPTF and IFOR/SFOR was critical. From the outset it
was clear that the freedom from intimidation guaranteed in the Dayton Agreement
would prove impossible without co-operation between OSCE personnel and
international security assistance. Even with co-operation it was a task unlikely to
succeed fully.240 In this and other tasks, the OSCE was dependent upon co-ordination
with other actors and organisations, as the organisation itself had “no power to impose
political or economic sanctions.”241
The management of the sub-regional arms control and stabilisation
negotiations, gave the OSCE a direct hand in providing a secure environment. Their
heavy involvement in this area reflected the European interest in the bigger picture of
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regional stability. The required application of the Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) principles of transparency, co-operation, and stable force levels indicated the
desire to incorporate the Balkans into a wider European security structure.242
In addition to the larger international organisations, such as the EU and the
OSCE, a considerable number of NGOs were active in the implementation of the
Dayton Peace Agreement. The predominant areas in which NGOs played a role and
that were tied to the provision of security were human rights monitoring, demining,
and towards the end of the period studied also judicial reform.
4.1.4 Friends of the Peace Process
It is a truth universally acknowledged that organisations are no more than the sum of
their member states. Similarly, whereas the costs and benefits for international
institutions are more intangible, individual participants often have their own agenda
for participation that involves very specific benefits. As the organised international
community, be it in the form of IFOR/SFOR or the UN or OSCE, encompassed such
a wide variety of participating countries, the list of Friends of the Peace Process
(FPPs) is expectedly short. Nonetheless, one might single out fellow Muslim
countries, in particular Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as Russia and the United States
as FPPs. Both of the latter actors became involved in the conflict at a very late stage
and only when it “had become embedded as a critical test of international
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Box 4.4: EU and OSCE
The role of the EU in the security field was mostly limited to their participation in the Contact Group. In
part, the limited role was a product of the organisation’s difficulties in developing a common security
policy and in establishing a mechanism to effectively execute it. Still, the interest of European
countries came the closest to a genuine interest in regional peace and stability due to its proximity to
the conflict area.
The “resource-starved” OSCE was responsible for a number of tasks including staging, elections,
leading arms control negotiations, and promoting human rights – the latter in co-operation with the
Council of Europe.
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diplomacy.”243 Other external actors that significantly affected the implementation
process were of course Croatia and the FRY which maintained close ties with their
respective ethnic brothers throughout the period studied. Their influence is discussed
in the context of implementation in Chapter 5.
Russia had a series of critical concerns that contributed to its attitude towards
peace implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In its involvement, Russia walked a
thin line between, on the one hand, international assertion and great power ambitions
that – given Russia’s military weakness at the time – could only be realised through
co-operation with the West, and traditional hostility towards the West, on the other.
First, from the early days of the war Russia’s attitude towards the dissolution of
Yugoslavia was conditioned by its own domestic struggles. Because of the many
parallels, Russia was forced to tread carefully and to pursue a “balanced and objective
policy.”244 Second, Russia claimed historic ties to Serbia. Although there were clear
antagonisms and traditional fears of Russian domination of Eastern Europe on the side
of the Serbs, there was certainly an affinity between the two in the face of the West,
an affinity that was viewed by Russia as part of her “search for strategic partners.”245
Third, for Russia the participation in IFOR and SFOR was a “major step towards
evolving NATO-Russia co-operative relationship.”246 Still, participation took place
entirely on US terms and “Russia [...] accepted the role as a junior partner to the
United States in European security.”247 In practice, the Russian contribution consisted
of an engineering brigade in the US sector with 1,500 troops. In addition, Russia
provided 100 police monitors to IPTF.
Although the country had limited influence in reality, Europe and the United
States realised the political importance of supporting Russia in her great power role.
Hoppe observed that “Russia’s policy in the region is regarded as an indicator of its
willingness to co-operate with the West.”248 Even more so, the West promoted
Russian involvement among other things as “a test case of strategic partnership with
NATO.”249 At the same time, the West was eager not to antagonise Russia and thus
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jeopardise future co-operation with her.250 The United States in particular were
relieved not to have shoulder the burden of being a great power single-handedly and it
was argued that they gained leverage from a close relationship with Russia.251
Russia’s engagement in IFOR/SFOR took place against the backdrop of co-operation
in the Contact Group. Although she had voiced reservations early on, there was no
delay in co-operation when Russia’s involvement began in the wake of failed
European efforts. Still, even Russia with historical ties to the Serbs and the legacy of a
superpower gradually lost influence similar to the way the Europeans did.252
In part due to the scepticism displayed towards Muslim countries, the West led
by the US strongly opposed Iran getting too heavily involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In the final throes of the war, news papers frequently argued that the increasing
international engagement was brought on by the fear of the spread of “Islamic
fundamentalism” in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that Bosnia might function as a
springboard for terrorist influences in Europe. Despite some differentiated accounts in
Western media, the fear of fundamentalism clearly displayed the West’s difficulties in
distinguishing between fundamentalism and the largely secular Muslim communities
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, as Susan Woodward points out any
radicalisation of the general population and an increase in tension was more likely to
be triggered by other factors, than the presence and financial support of a fellow-
Muslim country. She argues that “Western concerns about Iranian ambitions, or a
West Bank/Gaza hothouse, could be self-fulfilling in the social conditions of cities
overwhelmed by displaced peasants and an urban underclass.”253 And yet,
fundamentalism in other countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, or in North Africa, has
been more likely to spread in the educated lower middle-classes rather than among
peasants. In fact, there were few tendencies towards fundamentalism in Bosnia-
Herzegovina aside from those that might spring out of an association based on a
perceived common fate. And yet, American fears of radicalisation in a Muslim state
sandwiched between Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia were a deciding factor in the
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US insistence on a united Bosnian state including the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian
Serbs.254
The support that was forthcoming mainly arrived from Iran and other Arab
Afghan countries. High-ranking officials in the Bosnian Muslim leadership fostered
these ties, in part due to religious affinity – mostly in the eyes of the donors, but in
part also due to the fact that fellow Muslim countries had been the only source of
financial and military support during the war. As sources diversified, so did
affiliations. The vast amount of assistance that entered the country from Western
agencies and governments certainly contributed to decreasing the Muslim influence in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Opinions of the United States as a separate FPP outside of its role in NATO
might differ. Still, they were heavily involved diplomatically, both in the negotiations
towards the Dayton Agreement and in the subsequent implementation phase. In the
pursuit of peace, the United States sent Special Representatives and high level
officials to the region to exercise pressure on the parties and force compliance with
the agreement.255 The dominant role of the US was a clear example of the need for
strategic leadership in the execution and co-ordination of comprehensive post-
settlement peace support operations, in addition to the fact that the position of the
United States had been a co-determinant of international policy throughout the war.
The signing of the Dayton Agreement and the deployment of military forces to
implement it, were entirely dependent on the United States’ political commitment to
see the peace process through and their willingness to participate in IFOR and later in
SFOR with a substantial number of troops.256 Hannay underlines that “Bosnia was
one of those crises which needed continued and co-ordinated effort from both sides of
the Atlantic.”257 Similarly, the implementation process faltered in late 1996 and early
1997 and did not manage to regain momentum until “the US Administration
concluded [in April 1997] that only a more aggressive effort could lead to successful
implementation of the DPA.”258 In part this was due to President Clinton’s reluctance
to draw the Bosnia-issue into the 1996 American presidential elections. As a result,
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major decisions, such as the possibility of an IFOR follow-on force, were put off.259
Thus, it took a confirmation of the US’ commitment to the Dayton Agreement and to
their presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina and an escalation of their diplomatic activity to
bring the peace process back on track in early 1997. Despite the “psychological
boost” that the peace process gained in 1998 from the US endorsement of a continued
role for SFOR, 260 the danger of losing momentum appeared to be looming once again
at the end of 1998. In part, this was due to the situation unfolding in Kosovo, which
was clearly stealing international attention – if not yet resources – from Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The implications of fluctuating international – and especially US –
commitment were grave, as the parties’ who gradually identified the vulnerable points
of the international presence would undoubtedly try to take advantage of even a
momentary lapse in assertiveness. Thus, weakened strategic leadership has the power
to undo the hard-earned stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Aside from the extensive diplomatic initiatives, the United States played a part
as a Friend of the Peace Process through its Train and Equip programme which began
in September 1996 and provided both equipment and training to the Federation armed
force. The programme was not part of the Dayton Agreement or of NATO’s tasks, but
was a US-sponsored effort by a private US company called Military Professional
Resources Inc. (MPRI), with more or less covert links into the US administration.
Since the Washington Agreement of 1994, the United States, in co-operation with
Germany, had been actively building the Federation, recognising the need to
strengthen the Croat-Muslim link, which was described as the single greatest threat to
peace.261 The Train and Equip programme was regarded as a “firm promise to the
Bosnian government as well as a condition of deploying US troops with the NATO-
led Implementation Force (IFOR).”262 The official aim was to establish a military
balance by strengthening the Federation, but Sharp argues that “[t]he US rationale for
Train and Equip is two-fold: that the best way to deter war is to build up the
Federation armies within the June 1996 limits, and that it is better for the US to do so
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than Iran.”263 At first sight it was almost ironic that despite American attempts to
exclude Muslim influences emanating from Iran through Train and Equip, the US
received the most extensive support for the programme from a number of Muslim
countries, such as the UAE and Egypt. In addition, some Bosnian Muslim soldiers
began training in Turkey. 264 However, a closer look reveals a continuation of
American policy prior to the Dayton Agreement, when the United States chose to
overlook Iranian and Saudi financing of illegal arms trade to the Bosnian Muslims in
order to circumvent breaking the sanctions imposed on the area. In contrast, the Train
and Equip programme was not welcomed by the Europeans – that “questioned the
wisdom of any military build-up so soon after the war”265 – or the Russians who
decided to provide arms to Serbia as a countermeasure.266 The Train and Equip
programme and rival arms deliveries also fell under the OSCE’s arms negotiations
and the organisation managed to retain control of arms imports under the
organisation’s mandate for negotiating arms control regulations and verifying
compliance.
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4.2 Local Counterparts
At this stage, it becomes important to distinguish between the various actors that
made up the international community's counterparts. Narrowly defined, the Parties to
the Agreement were the signatories, i.e. Slobodan Miloševic, Alija Izetbegovic, and
Franjo Tudjman. Drawing the circle a little wider, the signatories represented the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia. With
respect to the peace implementation process in the fledging state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, only one of the signatories was directly involved. Despite the role they
played in practice, both Miloševic and Tudjman defined their roles as ‘bystanders’ by
signing the Dayton Agreement that drew clear dividing lines between their territories
and that of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, as they were signatories to the agreement
their impact on the level of security in the post-conflict society must be taken into
account. Who else, then, did ‘the Parties to the Agreement’ consist of?
Box 4.5: Friends of the Peace Process
In its involvement, Russia walked a thin line between, on the one hand, international assertion and
great power ambitions that could only be realised through co-operation with the West and traditional
hostility towards the West, on the other. The West, in turn, was eager not to antagonise Russia and
thus jeopardise future co-operation with Russia.
The West led by the United States was strongly opposed to Iran getting too heavily involved in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The support that was forthcoming mainly arrived from Iran and other Arab Afghan
countries. High-ranking officials in the Bosnia Muslim leadership fostered these ties, mainly because
fellow Muslim countries had been the only source of financial and military support during the war.
The dominant role of the United States was a clear example of the need for strategic leadership in the
execution and co-ordination of comprehensive post-settlement peace support operations. Thus, the
US was a driving force behind the signing of the Dayton Agreement and also behind the renewed
momentum that invigorated the peace process in 1997/8. In the same way, potential diminishing
attention in the future can seriously weaken stability. Moreover, the US played a part as a FPP through
its Train and Equip programme which provided both equipment and training to the Federation armed
force.  From the US’ perspective the aim was to “level the battle field” between the Federation and the
Republika Srpska. In contrast, the Europeans “questioned the wisdom of any military build-up so soon
after the war.”
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At the highest political level in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the newly created
Presidency and its three members that headed the federal government were designated
as one of the central actors. With the establishment of the Presidency, the parties
accepted central elements of a sovereign state in the Dayton Agreement that were
significant regardless of the institution’s political efficiency. While being a political
necessity, the quota system formed the main limitation of the Presidency, as in other
political bodies at lower levels. It assigned the members of the Presidency a role as a
representative of their respective ethnic groups, leaving little room for allegiance to
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole. On top of that, it has been argued that the political
leaders regarded the Dayton Agreement as little more than a piece of paper and
interpreted it as it suited their respective parties.267 For the rejectionists among the
three warring parties, the agreement was only a truce while they continued to pursue
their wartime goals by other means.268 While the rejectionists among the Bosnian
Serbs pursued an independent ethnic Serb entity, the hard-liners in the Bosnian Croat
ranks aimed at maintaining the para-state of Herceg-Bosna. Both groups also saw the
distant possibility of joining their neighbouring ‘big brothers.’ The Muslim goal of
coexistence among other things rested on their inherent advantage in the 51:49
formula in Inter-Entity territorial relations.
In terms of support and international recognition, the Bosnian Muslims
appeared to have come closest to the fulfilment of their goals. Not only was Bosnian
Muslim leader Izetbegovic the only local signatory to the peace agreement, but the
Bosnian Muslims were also widely judged to be the predominant victims of the war.
As a result, the Muslim party SDA had no intention of giving up its “internationally
recognised position as the legitimate government.”269 Instead, they pursued a
democratic structure that allowed for majority decisions rather than quota systems, as
quotas would merely impair the political control that the Muslim section of the
population would otherwise have by virtue of its numbers.270 It is what John Stuart
Mill would call “tyranny of the majority.” In fact, Mappes-Niedeck argues that the
proportional distribution of population size was the secret behind the ideological
positions of the parties. The Bosnian Muslims pursued ‘multiculturalism’ due to their
numerical superiority; the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs now fighting for
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ethnic purity would have pursued the same course, had the relations been different.271
Naturally, there was no viable alternative strategy for the Bosnian Muslims, as they
unlike the other ethnic groups had no neighbouring brother with whom to join forces.
Feeling greatly empowered by the outcome of the Dayton Agreement and the
moral high ground attributed them by the international community, the Bosniacs were
also said to be waiting for the international community to withdraw so that fighting
could pick up where the battle was left off. Until the day of a withdrawal, they
remained under the US thumb due to the federation-wide Train and Equip
programme. Then the question would be whether they could “resist the temptation to
try out their new toys?”272
The Republika Srpska was marked by an internal split and power struggle
between the hard-liners under Karadžic and the more co-operative Biljana Plavšic.
Although Plavšic was no less nationalistic, she was more prepared to comply with the
implementation of the Dayton Agreement in order to alleviate the dismal economic
conditions in the Republika Srpska.
At a lower political level were influential local leaders, such as mayors, true to
Bosnia’s traditions of local power centres.273 If they put their mind to opposing the
peace process, these were potentially the most damaging players in the game. With a
direct connection to the general local population and quite often a monopoly over
local sources of information, propaganda was very effective. IFOR/SFOR faced the
challenge of monitoring such non-military activity that had a significant negative
effect on the security situation. Unfortunately, local political leaders found an easy
target for their propaganda in much of the local population that tended towards civil
apathy. And yet, the decentralised history of power in Bosnia-Herzegovina was also
an opportunity in that local forces of peace, be it the political leaderships or the local
force commanders in SFOR/IFOR that could influence developments by forging ties
with the local power holders, had much shorter inroads to the people.
In the security sector, there were the three military leaders of each of the
armed forces, two of which were to be fused into one federation force in accordance
with the Dayton Agreement. In the implementation of the security provisions of the
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Dayton Agreement, it was the military leadership that worked most closely with
IFOR/SFOR.
Less manageable were former military leaders and lower level officers in their
old or new occupations, i.e. in the police or paramilitary formations. For many pre-
war police officers, the war meant changing into another, military uniform. Similarly,
the Dayton Agreement simply meant switching back. As they actively participated in
the war, it was difficult for them to lay aside ethnic hatred. Unfortunately, many took
off uniforms and participated in lynch mobs and raids. The result was a situation in
which the distinction between combatants and non-combatants was blurred274 and the
ones responsible for law and order were the ones pivotal in undermining it and thus
long-term peace. General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Bosnian Serb army, was a
prominent example of a former military leader that was not successfully reintegrated
and instead longed for former glory. Despite widespread accusation, it was still
unclear to what degree former military heroes continued to pull the political strings
behind the scenes. However, it was certain that most former military leaders were
unwilling to relinquish their position of power and unwilling to return to civilian life
which meant coming face to face with the horrors committed as acts of war.
Finally, the general population obviously made up a large part of the local
counterparts. Their co-operation would be decisive for the success of international
security assistance. It is increasingly recognised that winning ‘hearts and minds’ is
central in any theatre of operation. On the one hand, it meant that, as Eide points out,
the “majority of the inhabitants of Bosnia [must] believe in peace - that is, they must
believe that there will be peace in Bosnia in the long run and that they adapt their
individual dispositions accordingly.”275 It would be a critical implicit task for the
third-party actors to demonstrate to the general population that peace was indeed in
the process of being consolidated. On the other hand, it entailed convincing the
general population that the course pursued by the international community was indeed
the most promising path to peace.
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4.3 Conclusions on Third-Party Actors
· A division of labour was attempted that spread the responsibility for security
assistance and for tasks that required security support, among several major
international organisations. That obviously involved a co-ordination challenge that
will be addressed in Chapters 5 and 6.
· The security assistance programme in Bosnia-Herzegovina was an example of a
peace support operation that built on a military and a police component provided
by two separate actors. Despite the ambition to clearly define IFOR/SFOR’s and
IPTF’s tasks distinct from one another, it soon became apparent that their spheres
of activity could not be completely separate and that co-ordination between the
two would become inevitable and desirable.
· The UN took on specialised tasks, rather than the superordinate co-ordination and
execution responsibility. Given the organisation’s frequent funding and resource
difficulties, the new type of engagement appeared to be a fruitful alternative. The
OSCE was facing the challenge of a whole range of comprehensive tasks and how
the organisation performed would impact its future role in peace support
operations.
Box 4.6: Local Counterparts
The Parties to the Agreement were the signatories, i.e. Slobodan Miloševic, Alija Izetbegovic, and
Franjo Tudjman. Within Bosnia-Herzegovina, the head of the Federal government, the three-
member Presidency, was designated as the central actor. Among the ethnic groups, Bosnian
Muslims appeared to have come closest to fulfilling their goals, having achieved a unified Bosnia-
Herzegovina and claiming the moral high ground. The Republika Srpska was subject to a power
struggle between hard-liners and more co-operative forces and the Bosnian Croats did not receive
their own territorial unit along the lines of the Republika Srpska.
Lower level nationalist politicians could potentially be the most damaging due to the fact that they
were more removed from international pressure and had more direct influence on their communities.
Getting military staff of each of the local armed forces on board would be critical for progress in the
security sector reform.
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5 Implementing the Agreement and Delivering Security
Assistance
The typology developed in the Analytical Framework lists the following activities:
monitoring a cease-fire, supervising the removal of foreign forces, demilitarisation -
including demobilisation, disarmament and stock piling, negotiating arms limitations,
and reform of the security sector. Further, one must ask who takes on the tasks, how
they are executed, and what needs to be added to the typology to meet Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s security concerns. The tasks that were placed on the international
community’s agenda in the Dayton Agreement arose with the threats to military and
civilian security presented in Chapter 2. Thus, indigenous authorities were incapable
of providing security with respect to military threats, threats to law and order, and
other areas, such as repatriation, elections, etc. in the immediate wake of the
agreement. In the same way, the tasks that made up international security assistance
were intended to counter threats in the three areas.
Not surprisingly, the Peace Implementation Council described IFOR and
SFOR as “the greatest single contributor to sub-regional security since the signing of
the Peace Agreement and [they] will continue to be [just that] in the short and
medium term.”276 Part of NATO’s success in comparison to UNPROFOR is due to
the fact that the semi-civilian tasks that broke UNPROFOR’s back, were kept out of
NATO’s mandate and instead passed on to civilian organisations.277 IFOR was
fortunate enough to receive a list of specific tasks that needed to be executed.
Following the principle of “firm, fair, friendly,” the military force managed to build
trust among the local population in the execution of these tasks.
A full-scale war, such as the one that had raged in Bosnia-Herzegovina
implied the existence of several opposing organised armed forces that needed to be
transferred into a peace-time state by a range of demilitarisation activities. The
situation in which IFOR was to execute the tasks was characterised by a large number
of arms and land mines, illusive warlords, and a general absence of law and order.278
Despite early evaluations in which the force was described as “eerily reminiscent of
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the failed United Nations peace-keeping mission,”279 the International Crisis Group
reports that after six months IFOR had completed 80% of its mandate, leaving twenty
exceedingly difficult percent.280 A major remaining task was that of creating a
situation in which trust and confidence among the former warring parties could grow.
That included typical military tasks as well as supporting the civilian police monitors
until indigenous political structures were in place.281 In fact, confidence and
demilitarisation are mutually dependent, in that two major activities demobilisation
and disarmament are reliant upon an element of voluntariness while trust is
simultaneously fostered through progress. As Schlotter points out, ending the fighting
was a necessary but not sufficient precondition for consolidating peace.282
Although the purely military tasks could be regarded as impartial, one must
keep in mind that even these activities had political implications. This is particularly
true when those affected do not have access to the big picture that puts an individual
act committed against them into perspective. Both when IFOR pursued security in the
former conflict area and supported other agencies in their implementation of civilian
provisions, the force executed a large degree of discretion. Discretion increased as
time goes by and as the more clearly defined tasks were completed. The “hearts and
minds activities,”283 as Berdal refers to them, thus became more important in the
course of the implementation process, as the military commanders’ role transformed
into one of a good will ambassador and mediator.
5.1 Demilitarisation and Military Reform
Demilitarisation had to be the first step in the implementation process, as it added to a
“heightened sense of security”284 and prepared the ground for long-term measures to
preserve the peace. Once the initial disassembly of the war machine was concluded,
the structures would have to be consolidated through military reform.
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5.1.1 Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
The immediate first step that in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina was taken already
before the signing of the agreement was the establishment of a cease-fire. Arguably, a
number of cease-fire agreements were reached in the course of the war. This one may
have survived because a more comprehensive settlement was reached shortly
afterwards and because there was a momentary balance of power that arose from
recent Bosnian Muslim successes and from the successful Croatian Krajina campaign.
Once the peace agreement had been signed and as the implementation process
progressed, ‘supervising the cease-fire’ translated into a more general mandate to
suppress random violence throughout the country not just along the borderlines. At
the same time, the transfer of territory and separation of forces served to consolidate
the lines drawn in the cease-fire - which was by definition temporary - into permanent
structures. The international recognition of these geographical boundaries was part of
the Dayton Agreement in which any attack on the described borders was rendered a
breach of international law. In this way, the agreement imposed a legal framework
that enhanced the impression of impartiality and legitimacy by presupposing that
since the Dayton Agreement had been accepted through signature, the borders
established between the formerly warring parties had to be accepted likewise.
Both the transfer of territory and the separation of forces took place according
to schedule and proceeded without any major incidents. Aside from the events that
took place on the outskirts of Sarajevo, the separation of forces was completed by
mid-January 1996, the transfer of territory by mid-March, and the transition of forces
and weapons to approved sites by the end of June.285 Despite the clear initial military
success, SFOR continued to patrol the Zone of Separation (ZOS) - two years after the
initial separation of forces. In addition, improving freedom of movement both within
and between entities was a long-standing task for SFOR that in large part consisted of
removing hundreds of checkpoints and roadblocks and of reconstructing and repairing
roads and bridges.286 As implementation progressed, ensuring freedom of movement
steadily moved into the realm of the IPTF, as human rights violations and intimidation
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– among others by the local police forces – formed the main obstacle to full freedom
of movement. With respect to the practical problems of inter-entity traffic, the lack of
freedom of movement was a serious problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina as it reinforced
the separating tendencies that were implicit in the Dayton Agreement.287
The rapid separation of forces and IFOR and SFOR’s complete success in
preventing outbreaks of violence was a crucial achievement in the course of the
implementation process. The force’s accomplishments were sometimes discounted,
but none of the later achievements in the military and the civilian components could
have been obtained without the early military progress. In the same way, the fact that
freedom of movement was largely guaranteed at the end of the period studied was a
tangible achievement for the general population in the transition from war to peace.
The unresolved status of Brcko and the Posavina-corridor which both have
great strategic value to both entities was an open sore in the complete success of
territorial transfer.288 Interestingly, the PIC later tied the outcome of the arbitration to
the degree of compliance of the parties. There were however clear international legal
concerns with respect to the ethical implications of such a move.289 Brcko appeared to
be a test case for an even more comprehensive engagement of the international
community, in an attempt to establish the protectorship that was politically
unacceptable to establish over Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole. In Brcko a new media
centre was opened, multi-ethnic institutions were established – such as the multi-
ethnic police force, freedom of movement was pursued with more vigour, and SFOR
took on the protection of returning refugees. Although criticism was directed at the
authors of the Dayton Agreement that left the tricky territorial questions aside,
developments seem to indicate that even hot spots, such as Brcko could be pacified
with an iron international hand. And yet, the opposite was also true. The delicate
balance of local self-sufficiency and sustained outside engagement was in danger of
tipping in the ‘wrong’ direction, where tensions were merely being suppressed until
the international community retreated.
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When the Dayton Agreement called for all foreign troops to be withdrawn, the
demand covered all those forces that were on the scene in support of the armies of the
three Bosnian factions, such as “advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers and
personnel from neighbouring and other states.”290 As the official Serb perspective on
the war had been the need for the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to assist
the Bosnian Serbs in the struggle against their oppressors and to prevent the secession
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a significant number of Serbs proper were present in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Further, Croatia openly supported the Bosnian Croats. In addition, the
Bosnian Muslims were supported by a few thousand Mujahideen that had arrived
from Arab countries, Afghanistan, and Iran. 291 In part, this was because the sanctions
barred any delivery of arms to the warring parties. Therefore, countries desirous to
assist the Bosnian Muslims circumvented the sanctions by sending reinforcements
that arrived in Bosnia with a few weapons in their personal possession. All foreign
forces were officially withdrawn by the deadline of January 31, 1996, although
NATO admitted to some unorganised individuals that remained.292
There was disagreement about how many of the Mujahideen married locally,
became Bosnian citizens and stayed, and how many left shortly after the end of the
war, but a likely figure is about 150-200.293 Those that did stay tried to gain support
for a more fundamentalist brand of Islam. Their efforts fell on fertile ground due to
the general disappointment with the scepticism displayed by the West and were
silently condoned by the Muslim authorities which sought to solidify their basis of
                                                
290 Leurdijk (1996), p. 111.
291 The reported number of Mujahideen differs widely in different sources. Tibi suggests approximately
four thousand. Tibi (1997), p. 26.
292 Leurdijk (1996), p. 111.
293 Tibi for one claims that very few have left. Tibi (1997), p. 27.
Box 5.1: Brcko
Brcko appeared to be a test case for an even more comprehensive engagement of the international
community, in an attempt to establish the protectorship that was impossible to establish over Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a whole. More than anywhere else in Bosnia-Herzegovina the international
community exercised pressure to achieve true multi-ethnic integration in various institutions. It almost
appeared as if the international community wished to spite those that declared that the unresolved
issue of Brcko would break the back of the peace process.
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power by strengthening the sense of ethnic community.294 Still, there was a tendency
to exaggerate the Mujahideen-factor in the war and in the subsequent reconstruction
phase. This was due to a lack of familiarity with Muslim cultural background among
large parts of both IFOR and SFOR. It is unlikely that the more fundamentalist
Muslims were particularly well-received in the mostly secular Bosnia, aside from the
general religious radicalisation that marked all three factions in the wake of the war.
Similarly, it was unclear if all Serbian and Croatian supporters left or some
were assimilated into local political positions of power. The International Crisis
Group argues that armed units that were wholly financed by Croatia and the FRY
persisted and that they should be classified as foreign forces. Close military co-
operation between the neighbouring states and their ethnic brothers and sisters within
Bosnia-Herzegovina also begged the question of how independent the armed forces in
Bosnia were.
Withdrawal and demobilisation were particularly important with regard to
legitimacy and confidence, as the peace process was likely to be considered more
legitimate when there were fewer disturbing influences from ‘outside’ and the process
was regarded to a greater degree as home-grown. This may have been less applicable
to the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs, where there was a greater identification
with the supporting external powers, i.e. Serbia and Croatia proper. For the largely
secular Bosnian Muslims – for lack of a better term, the brothers-in-arms came from
further afield and were considered more of a foreign element.
To a large extent, disarmament proceeded as planned, although – similar to
other early military successes – monitoring compliance through site inspections and
confiscation of weapons continued. In spite of a controversy about numbers which
delayed the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the zone of separation, the withdrawal
of forces from the zone and from transferred territories was completed on time.295
Another issue of contention was that the location of stock piles which were placed in
a way that they were inaccessible as targets for any IFOR destruction attempts, but
easily accessible in case of renewed fighting. Similarly many private individuals
chose to bury weapons in their own backyards rather than surrender them to the
authorities.
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And yet, joint actions undertaken by SFOR and the IPTF, such as at the police
station at Banja Luka, demonstrate their ability to be tough when necessary and –
without violence – confiscate illegal weapons.296 Aside from the practical necessity of
disarmament, the reduction and control of the number and types of weapons was a
crucial confidence-building measure. Not only did one curb specific attempts to abuse
human rights, but disarmament simply resulted in an enhanced sense of security
among the general population. The occupation of the police station in Banja Luka in
August 1997 is a case in point for the need for impartiality. Also with regard to
disarmament, it was essential that the weakening of the opposing sides took place
evenly and that the force of SFOR was available to and would respond to concerns
from all sides, including requests from Bosnian Serbs, such as from both President
Biljana Plavšic and member of the Presidency Momcilo Krajišnik.
Following an Entity initiative supported by SFOR, an amnesty for the
collection of illegal weapons in private hands, covering mines, ordinance, and warlike
material, was declared by the Standing Committee on Military Matters in February
1998. The execution of the amnesty is in the hands of the Entity armed and police
forces and will be monitored by SFOR. 297 The disarmament process was difficult to
assess, as the number of hidden small arms was unclear. The amnesty both took
advantage of the increase in confidence and was a confidence-building measure in
itself. The degree to which the population was indeed willing to relinquish their
weapons and trust the local police with their personal security was an indicator of the
extent to which the people believed in the viability of the peace process.298
Reintegration was the greatest challenge in the process from disarmament to
demobilisation and reintegration, as it was the least controllable and to a large degree
depended on non-security factors, such as the reconstruction of the economy.
Woodward warned of a vicious circle in that reintegration presupposed a working
economy and a working economy was contingent upon reintegration. 299 One year into
the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, it was estimated that there were
approximately 250,000 demobilised soldiers with no money, no clothes other than the
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uniform they were wearing, and no social or economic net to break their fall.300
Unless checked, the danger that arose from demobilisation without a concomitant
reintegration process would increase in the course of the peace process. Former
combatants were likely to regard the initial post-conflict stage as transitional and have
expectations as to their future reintegration into society and the work force. With
limited economic progress and high unemployment rates three years after the Dayton
Agreement, peace appeared less of an opportunity and more of disappointment and
frustration. The subsequent restlessness among demobilised soldiers should not be
underestimated as a destabilising factor. Coupled with both the occupation and the
income that criminal activity could provide, there was a significant danger of tensions
becoming self-sustaining.
Demobilisation revealed a discrepancy between internal and external views of
former combatants. Whereas they were considered war heroes among much of the
local population, the same men were branded war criminals in the eyes of the
international community – until proven innocent. Confidence-building was very much
a question of convincing people that there was a future and a future in which non-
violent means could bring about desired results. Simultaneously, for onlookers the
demobilisation of former combatants symbolised the end of open hostilities, the
referral to non-violent means of conflict management, and the transformation of the
war machine into a reduced peace time organisation. Where reintegration was
connected to repatriation, it was part of UNHCR’s mandate which was difficult to
fulfil throughout due to a lack of co-operation from the parties. Despite difficulties of
reintegration, demobilisation was significant in that it was the first step towards
military reform and symbolised that the war was indeed over.
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5.1.2 Military Reform
The security reform necessary for military forces was primarily a matter of
transforming the war machine into a peace time organisation. Military reform in
Bosnia-Herzegovina incorporated the following inter-linked processes: (1) a
reorganisation process, i.e. general force reduction and integration into a joint
Federation force; (2) a vetting process in which the military force was purged of
unwanted elements; (3) a re-education process that aimed at promoting multi-ethnic
coexistence; and (4) the process of placing the military under civilian control. As the
training component of the Train and Equip programme contributed to several of the
military reform processes, its role will be discussed at the end of the current section.
(1) Reorganisation : The aim of reorganising the three armies was to transfer
them from a highly mobilised and high readiness state to a viable peace-time
organisation. Such a reform of military structure and staffing was absolutely
necessary for a transition to lasting peace and was demanded in the Dayton
Agreement. In addition, the agreement placed limitations on where forces could be
Box 5.2: Demilitarisation
The situation in which IFOR was to execute the tasks was characterised by a large number of arms
and land mines, illusive warlords, and a general absence of law and order.
The rapid separation of forces and IFOR/SFOR’s complete success in preventing outbreaks of
violence was a crucial achievement in the course of the implementation process. The force’s
accomplishments were sometimes discounted, but none of the later achievements in the military and
the civilian components could have been obtained without the early military progress.
Unless checked, the danger that arose from demobilisation without a concomitant reintegration
process would increase in the course of the peace process. With limited economic progress and high
unemployment rates three years after the Dayton Agreement, peace appeared less of an opportunity
and more of disappointment and frustration to demobilised soldiers.
For onlookers the demobilisation of former combatants symbolised the end of open hostilities, the
referral to non-violent means of conflict management, and the transformation of the war machine into
a reduced peace time organisation. Despite difficulties of reintegration, demobilisation was significant
in that it was the first step towards military reform and symbolised that the war was indeed over.
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stationed and could move to via the CSBMs negotiated in the Vienna Agreement (see
Section 5.1.3).301 In the Federation, the separate Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim
armies were to be merged into a joint military force with a Federation Defence
Ministry, Joint Command, and Joint Staff. 302 Although the climate among military
officers of both ethnic groups was much improved in late 1997, actual integration was
virtually non-existent and the Federation remained incapable of conducting joint
operations. Instead, “Bosnia still effectively has three military forces representing the
three recent wartime protagonists.”303
As part of the demobilisation and force reduction process, the separation of
military and police forces took place in the early days of the implementation process.
In this effort, the military force was reduced by in effect transferring a number of
former combatants into the police force. This was almost inevitable in a society
emerging from war where the majority of the male population was part of the military
forces, but merely transposed the reduction problem into the sphere of civilian
security and the establishment of local police forces. Final reduction numbers for the
military forces within Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the Croatian and Serb military
forces were agreed upon by the parties within the framework of the arms control
negotiations and were complied with by the October 1997 deadline.304 Despite some
progress in this area, military spending remained high, diverting funds from other
peace implementation efforts, such as reconstruction. 305 In late 1998, it was clear that
the maintenance of a force as large as that in the Federation would not be sustainable
in the long run and further reductions would have to take place.
(2) Vetting: Monitoring human rights in the armed forces was a clear gap in
accountability, which IFOR was later called upon to fill by putting their doctrines and
guidelines into practice and taking on a monitoring function. In this context, it was
suggested that IFOR receive powers of investigation similar to those of the IPTF
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through agreements with the Bosnian military forces.306 The Dayton Agreement
clearly demanded that indicted war criminals be removed from office. In practice,
however, the list of indicted war criminals was relatively short, in comparison to the
group of officers and others that may have been guilty of minor war crimes and
should therefore be a target for vetting. With extensive demobilisation the force
would automatically be rid of a number of undesirables, but the process would not be
systematic. A more structured vetting of the officer corps therefore had to involve
long-term investigation and examination processes.
(3) Re-education: In late 1998, SFOR was engaged in monitoring training and
movement activities by the two entity armies. The Dayton Agreement set strict
guidelines for the development of new doctrines that covered a wide range of issues,
with particular emphasis on multi-ethnic coexistence and non-violent conflict
management mechanisms. Both within the Federation and between the Entities
relations among officers were improving. Military staff from both entities was invited
to international security courses conducted by NATO for Bosnian military and
civilian defence officials, including staff from the Standing Committee on Military
Matters (SCMM).307 A limited number of officers participated in these courses in
Germany beginning in the Summer of 1997 which covered issues such as European
security structures and international organisations and were supplemented by NATO’s
regularly scheduled “European Security Co-operation Course.”308 They revealed the
professional approach characteristic of military officers of all ethnic groups. As a
Bosnian Muslim officer remarked, “[w]hen our leaders tell us fight, we fight. When
they tell us to work together, we work together.”309 Generally, the officers of different
ethnic groups had little exposure to one another, even in the Federation, where the
force structure was not ethnically integrated below the battalion level.
(4) Civilian Control: Various declarations of loyalty or, in contrast, lack of
allegiance to the political leadership bore witness to the difficulties in placing the
military under civilian control. In a war situation where military commanders made
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decisions on life and death, they would be hard pressed to simply submit to political
leaders that had agreed to an outcome in the peace agreement that might not be
militarily not acceptable. At the same time, military leaders rightfully have a
disproportionately larger say in political affairs in an immediate post-conflict situation
due to the instability of the surroundings.310 A sharpened sense of the security needs
lead political power-holders to maintain the military’s inflated position until they can
be sure that their security needs are met. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the struggle for
establishing and maintaining civilian control was also undermined by the widespread
transfer of former military officers into civilian positions of power. Still, the Defence
Law of the Federation included the political neutrality of the force as one of its
commitments.311
A major step towards the establishment of civilian control was taken with the
activation of the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) which had its first
full meeting in September of 1997. In order to improve co-ordination among local
authorities, in May of 1997 the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) urged that the
Standing Committee on Military Matters designed in the Dayton Agreement be
activated as the central body for co-operation, emphasising that it could serve as a
channel of communication with the international community and ensure that Bosnia-
Herzegovina find its place within the European security structure.312 The SCMM was
the constitutional mechanism through which the Presidency co-ordinated military
activities and institutionalised the Presidency members’ civilian command authority
over the armed forces. By late 1998, both Bosnian political and military leaders from
all ethnic groups were present at the meetings, as well as representatives from SFOR
and the OSCE. It provided a way to encourage transparency between the entity
armies, build mutual confidence and create a basis for future co-operation. The
SCMM was also intended to be the major focal point in future arms control
negotiations, in particular those negotiations in which the interests of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a whole were to be represented.313
A fundamental problem with civilian control over the military forces was the
dysfunctional political superstructure established in the Dayton Agreement.
Separating defence and foreign policy and placing the former into entity and the latter
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into federal hands was bound to entail substantial discontinuity and friction.
Moreover, the Bosnian-Croat armed forces (HVO) and the Bosnian Serb army (VRS)
were heavily influenced by neighbouring capitals. All in all, neither structure nor
content pointed to a fruitful starting-point for co-operation. 314
The Federation force was paid particular attention through the US-sponsored
Train and Equip programme that officially aimed at establishing a military balance
and at promoting the merger of the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim armed forces
by restructuring and re-equipping the newly-formed Federation force.315 The
programme underwent some change since its inception in 1994, having been
conceived of as a way to circumvent the arms embargo. The Train and Equip
programme then officially began in September 1996 with a 13-month contract to
MPRI. In 1998, the focus increasingly shifted away from the equipment element to
the long-term benefits of training.
The downside of the programme was that it served the military build-up of the
Federation in the face of the Bosnian Serb military and at times severely undermined
the confidence-building and rapprochement process between the two entities.
Furthermore, commentators frequently claimed that Train and Equip was a badly
disguised preparation for renewed war after the departure of the international
community’s military presence. In a more positive light, the programme aimed at
assisting the establishment of new educational, training, and selection procedures that
reflected altered doctrines and security perceptions. In particular, it hoped to
accelerate the integration of Bosniac and Bosnian Croat forces to a joint force. The
depiction of the programme as an incitement and preparation for renewed conflict was
not the whole truth. In fact, the training component actually aimed at “creat[ing] a
coherent military establishment that has a monopoly on, and effective civilian control
over, the use of military force.”316 The aim was to consolidate joint institutions and
promote co-operation between the two ethnic groups. This was clearly no easy task,
given the overall record of Croat-Muslim relations in the Federation, but co-operation
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among officers initially appeared to be growing.317 In the end however, the
programme was wholly unsuccessful in integrating the two forces and its most
redeeming qualities must therefore be regarded as somewhat irrelevant. In 1997, it
was suggested that the Train and Equip programme be extended to the Republika
Srpska, in an effort to increase confidence and transparency. The Republika Srpska
responded by acquiescing to arms deliveries, but claimed not to require the training
component of the programme.318
Three years after the Dayton Agreement it did not appear to be the military
establishment that was the major obstacle in the peace process. Despite the fact that
practical co-operation in the shape of joint exercises was modest, a clear shift in
attitude towards co-operation with the other ethnic groups had taken place. The fact
that the military officers were perhaps more co-operative than expected did not
diminish the relevance of the military reform process in the course of implementation.
Military reform was a long-term process whose outcome was uncertain. Thus, while
restructuring was completed and force reductions decided upon, the reconciliation
process was ongoing and depended on the success of confidence-building and
stability. What is clear is that the international community, or more specifically the
doctrinal and training assistance provided by IFOR/SFOR, played a critical role as a
catalyst and bridge-builder, by providing a neutral setting for rapprochement and
impartial ‘observers’ to the reform process. The presence of an external military force,
i.e. SFOR, was a moderating factor that diffused minor tensions and prevented them
from escalating and thus enabled continued improvement of relations among the three
ethnic groups and their respective military forces.
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5.1.3 Arms Limitations Negotiations and Regional Security
A major step towards fulfilling the parties’ security needs lay in reaching an
agreement on long-term regional security structure and co-operation. 319 The goal of
the arms negotiations was to establish a long-term security framework which in turn
had to be designed to “prevent perception of security vacuum [...]; promote
confidence and cooperation [...]; integrate Bosnia in [the] Euro-Atlantic community,
including its arms control and security structures.” The arms control regime was
therefore to be part of a broader regional strategy that aimed at drawing Bosnia-
Herzegovina closer into European structures and giving them a stake in peace and
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Box 5.3: Military Reform
Reorganisation: The aim of reorganising the three armies was to transfer them from a highly
mobilised and high readiness state to a viable peacetime organisation. In the effort to merge the
forces within the Federation, the climate among military officers of both ethnic groups improved, but
actual integration was virtually non-existent and the Federation remained incapable of conducting joint
operations. Despite some progress in the area of force reduction and reorganisation, military
spending remained high and funds continued to be diverted from other peace implementation efforts,
such as reconstruction.
Vetting: With extensive demobilisation the force would automatically be rid of a number of war
criminals and other unqualified staff, but the process was not systematic. A more structured vetting of
the officer corps involved long-term investigation and examination processes.
Reeducation: Although contact among officers of different ethnic groups was limited, military officers
displayed a professional attitude and openness towards multi-ethnic co-operation.
Civilian Control: The SCMM was activated in September 1997, as the constitutional mechanism
through which the Presidency controls the armed forces. It was effective in promoting transparency
and confidence and served as a forum for co-operation across entity borders. Still, it remained
subordinate to the political climate more generally. As a result, progress in decision-making was
limited.
The aim of the training component of the Train and Equip programme of creating a “coherent military
establishment” in the Federation was not fulfilled. Still the programme contributed to increased
transparency between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.
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stability.320 This was reflected by the three levels of arms control in the Dayton
Agreement between entities; between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and FRY; and in
a wider regional context including states such as Slovenia, Bulgaria, Austria, and
Turkey. 321 Preisinger suggests that the wider regional agreement would also serve to
secure agreement within the Contact Group.322 In a similar vein, the Peace
Implementation Council pointed to the benefits of a comprehensive approach and
stressed that the more participants there were, the better the outcome for regional
stability and security would be.323 The approach of the international community
resembled traditional thinking on European integration: concentric circles that had
relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and FRY as a centre, then had the
cloak of European security around the centre, and finally, membership in the global
community, i.e. the UN, as the outermost circle. Although co-operation in the Balkans
could only be generated from within the countries in the region, the spill-over effects
in the wider region, including Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria that responded to the call
for greater transparency and co-operation, were undeniable.324
The task of negotiating arms limitations to enhance regional security increased
in importance with the gradual reduction of the international military presence.325
Regional co-operation and integration were desired outcomes as long as they did not
go too far and threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-
Herzegovina.326 In the same way, too close ties or ‘security co-operation’ with
neighbouring Serbia and Croatia was discouraged and made subject to political
control in the Dayton Agreement. The International Committee underlined the mutual
dependence in the region and the necessity to promote democratic processes in
Croatia and Serbia in order to shore up under the fragile stability in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.327 Although Dayton allowed for agreements on special relations with
Bosnia’s neighbouring states, the agreements reached early on were not consistent
with the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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An agreement on confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) under
Art. II was reached early on in January of 1996. Its main objective was transparency
as a precondition for successful confidence-building. At the time of signing, the so-
called Vienna Agreement comprised fifteen measures, including among others
exchange of military information, deployment restrictions and exercises in certain
geographic areas, notification of the disbandment of special operations forces, and a
programme of military contacts and co-operation. Compliance was smooth and the
agreement was added to throughout the arms control negotiations. It was the first
major step towards military stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it is impressive that
there was sufficient confidence to reach the agreement only a few weeks after the
Dayton Agreement.328
In contrast to the Art. II agreement, negotiations on Art. IV limitations were
much harder and proceeded more slowly.329 As is usually the case with negotiations
among parties that do not trust each other, the regional security negotiations under the
auspices of the OSCE were often tedious and characterised by the parties holding
back information, misinforming, or presenting half-truths. As accurate information
was a key to assessing military power relationships and balances, the lack of co-
operation by the parties in that respect severely hampered progress. The agreement
that was reached in June 1996 was very similar to the CFE framework. As the parties
were unable to agree on new force levels, one had to resort to the default ratios of
5:2:2 set by the Dayton Agreement.330 The Florence Agreement covered tanks,
artillery larger than 75mm, armoured combat vehicles, as well as combat air-crafts
and helicopters.
The Dayton Agreement did not specify goals for a future sustainable security
level, but simply called for negotiations to regulate the arms flow and level. This is an
example of an issue that was consciously left out of the primary negotiations towards
Dayton, as it was a typical problem that had to evolve with the confidence-building
process in the post-conflict period. Similarly, McCausland underlines that arms
control negotiations are an intensely political process in which all gains and
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concessions have implications for foreign policy. 331 In spite of two stabilisation
agreements that were concluded under the auspices of the OSCE and were being
implemented, reductions of heavy weapons were insufficient and needed to be
accelerated. According to the Bonn Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council,
implementation was proceeding well, but the need for a continued development
towards transparency and stability remained.332 A complicating factor was of course
that foreign and defence policy were conducted at two different levels. Whereas
foreign policy was conducted by the Bosnian Presidency, defence issues were the
prerogative of the Entities.
By January of 1997, both the FRY and Croatia had met their reduction
requirements, while the Republika Srpska and the Federation had not. Whereas the
Republika Srpska had at least produced a plan for reduction though it had not yet been
implemented, the Federation had not even set up a plan for reduction at that time. The
difficulties in the Republika Srpska were largely due to technical issues and their
insistence that part of their “destruction liability” should be excluded. In part, the
Bosnian Serb attempt to minimise actual reductions was due to their dissatisfaction
with the assistance forthcoming to the Federation through the Train and Equip
programme. In the Federation the problems were due to discord in Croat-Muslim
relations and disagreement on who among the Federation partners owned which
equipment.333 As became apparent in the Section 5.1.2, any future progress would be
conditioned by the level of co-operation between the two groups and their military
staff.334 All four parties, that is FRY, Croatia, Republika Srpska and the Federation,
had met their reduction liabilities by the October 31, 1997 deadline. In fact, the total
reductions went beyond those required by the agreement with the former three
arriving at or close to their ceilings and the Federation, that due to its lower starting-
point had very few reductions to make, substantially below its limit.
Despite the progress in implementation a major limitation of success was the
fact that the agreements excluded many of those weapons that played a major role in
the war. An early assessment of the agreement’s potential weaknesses pointed to the
absence of provisions for an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance within the
set fourteen month period. In simply adopting the CFE framework, one had neglected
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the fact that the arms control agreements of the end of the Cold War came about in a
climate of co-operation and that the parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina might not be
equally prepared to comply. Furthermore, the CFE signatories were allowed two years
for ratification and three years for implementation, in contrast to the joint
implementation period of 16 months set for FRY, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Throughout the reduction process funding was a major concern. The parties claimed
that they were unable to pay for the required reductions. The international community
– with the exception of the United States which made significant funds available –
was long trapped by their reluctance to finance direct security measures.335 In mid-
1997, however, the European Union made a contribution to the Republika Srpska that
reactivated the destruction process. The financial aspect also meant that the high
levels of military expenditure in the Federation and the Republika Srpska would
continue to tie up large funds that thus could not be directed towards economic
recovery and reconstruction. 336
SFOR actively supported the OSCE in the execution of their tasks by
providing information and data on holdings and logistical support to the removal of
weapons to reduction sites. The exchange of information was not always
straightforward due to the fact that SFOR’s and the OSCE’s counts were not
necessarily comparable. In addition, the parties themselves often did not have
sufficient insight into the types and numbers of weapons in their holdings and were
thus unable to provide accurate information. SFOR was further used to force
compliance by threatening bans on access to equipment in cantonment sites and on
training exercises. Throughout the force retained control over training and troop
movements and assisted the OSCE with weapon counts. Throughout 1998,
inspections took place on a weekly basis and the OSCE trained inspections teams
“from all countries.”337
In late 1998, the fear of a dangerous strengthening of the Federation appeared
to be unfounded. Even though the weapons provided through Train and Equip were
“superior in quality and condition to most of the Bosnia Serb arsenal,” the Bosnian
Serbs continued to outgun the Federation by a long shot. The International Crisis
Group described the Federation Army as having “no air force, very little air defence,
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limited mobility and insufficient logistical capability to sustain an operation beyond
two or three days.”  Moreover, the arms now in the Federation’s possession were still
well below the limits set by the Florence Agreement and all new deliveries were
reported to IFOR/SFOR who monitored the location and deployment of the
equipment.338
In late 1998, tensions in the region rose significantly with the gradually
worsening situation in Kosovo. Although the situation was understandably not
conducive to reaching an agreement on regional stability, it clearly underscored the
necessity of such an agreement.
All in all, the arms control process was successful in establishing an arms
control regime in the region and in enforcing it. Although both the OSCE and SFOR
admitted that the existence of undeclared weapons was very likely, these arms were
not estimated to be in good working order. Further, one came to realise that the
material component was but one of many factors that play into a country’s war
readiness and fighting capability. Other factors, such as morale, economic resources,
and politics, would be more decisive in starting a war than mere military capability.339
Similarly, in addition to the tangible reductions in weapons and manpower, the
agreements and the negotiation process led to increased transparency and, as a result,
to relieved tensions and greater understanding among the parties. As in military
reform the success of the arms control regime could only be ascertained in the long
run, when parties would decide not to increase their holdings and mobilise in a
moment of crisis, but instead enter into negotiations. And yet, it became clear
throughout the negotiations that talks without the mediating and moderating influence
of the OSCE and the international community would have been unfeasible and that
compliance without international pressure would not have occurred. It is therefore far
from certain that the parties in that moment of crisis would indeed resort to talks or to
the easier option of a military response.
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5.2 Law and Order
The inclusion of law and order as a substantial component of international security
assistance reflects the changing nature of security and security threats.340 Typical of
post-civil war societies, the initial threat of open war in Bosnia-Herzegovina soon
passed and transformed into a threat to individual security through human rights
violations, crime, and disagreements on property. 341 The importance of trustworthy
local police forces cannot be overestimated. At its meeting in November 1996, the
Peace Implementation Council stressed that building an independent judiciary and
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Box 5.4: Arms Control and Regional Stability
CSBMs: Vienna Agreement reached in January 1996, compliance ongoing.
Arms reductions: Florence Agreement reached in June 1996, full compliance by deadline (31
October 1997).
Regional integration: Negotiations were ongoing in late 1998. Although an agreement seemed
distant at the time, the dialogue in itself was beneficial to the peace process.
The need to establish self-sustaining security co-operation within Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the
wider region would become more important with the gradual withdrawal of the third-party military
presence. Thus, the ongoing CSBMs served transparency and increased confidence among the
parties; the arms and personnel reductions established clearly defined and visible force levels; and
placed all parties under equal constraints.
Given the fact that arms control was never built into a peace agreement before and that prior
international arms control regimes came about in an atmosphere of compromise rather than in the
immediate aftermath of a war, the agreements and the full compliance – even in excess of the
reductions agreed upon – were impressive.
The international community facilitated the dialogue and acted as an independent arbitrator in
contentions. There are factors other than military capabilities that will be of at least equal importance
with respect to triggering a return to fighting, but open talks on armament levels were essential to
building confidence and consolidating the peace process. Without international security assistance in
this area, progress would not have come about.
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democratic police had to be a major focus and one of the key tasks in peace
implementation. 342 It reinforced its conviction in December 1997, when the PIC
suggested that more emphasis be placed on IPTF’s capacity “to train Bosnian police
to address more effectively key public security issues, such as refugee returns,
organised crime, drugs, corruption, and terrorism.” By late 1998, focus had shifted to
include judicial reform and the PIC identified the consolidation of the rule of law as a
key priority in its Madrid Declaration.343
5.2.1 IPTF: Composition and Mandate
IPTF initially aimed at a force strength of approximately fifteen hundred, but
gradually increased its staff to 2,027 monitors from 33 countries as of March 1998,
120 of which were specifically charged with monitoring human rights violations by
the UN Security Council.344 On different occasions, such as during elections or in the
forefront of the arbitration decision in Brcko, IPTF was temporarily expanded to meet
the potential heightened security challenges. Unfortunately, there was a widely
diverging level of quality of staff among the seconded police officers, many of whom
failed basic testing of language and driving skills. As the credibility of IPTF derived
from the quality of its staff members, selection procedures were crucial. Despite the
fact that multi-nationality was certainly a strength of the force and should continue to
be emphasised, the disparate capabilities weakened IPTF. After initial problems,
however, many of these bumps were evened out and more strict selection criteria
applied. Further, IPTF attempted to exploit the strengths of certain national
contingents and to weaken the impact of low standards of other police officers. As
UNCivPol regularly points out, in contrast to the availability of military forces, few
countries have excess police officers waiting to be deployed. And even though
international evaluation groups underlined that the operational effectiveness was
impaired, due to the fact that full equipment arrived long after the UN police force
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did,345 the problem for IPTF was not one of financing or resources and equipment, but
simply of finding sufficient numbers of high quality staff. 346
A peace implementation operation consists of walking a thin line between
effective monitoring and continued local co-operation. This was true of IFOR/SFOR
but much more so of IPTF with no enforcement mandate or capability. Their reliance
on the local police forces’ willingness to co-operate must be kept in mind when
assessing proposals for an extended range of tasks for IPTF. Given IPTF’s
supervisory mandate, NATO had the effective monopoly on internal use of force.347
IPTF’s mandate reflected a basic policy decision at UN headquarters that an actual
policing function by an international police force would merely relieve parties of their
responsibility and run into practical problems in the actual prosecution and sentencing
of the arrested criminals. Legitimacy and credibility were also always tied to the time
commitment of the outside involvement and the civilian police monitors would not be
served by an excessive mandate.
The key to IPTF’s effectiveness was the co-ordination with IFOR and
particularly with SFOR. Ironically, while promoting the clear distinction between
local civilian and military security forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international
community relied on the co-operation between the two and on military support in grey
zones of police activity to achieve the goals set for its security assistance. The fear
that calling in military support might escalate rather than defuse a tense situation, 348
appeared to have been unfounded. In practice, SFOR provided IPTF with technical
assistance on checkpoints and with information, surveillance and physical protection.
Thus, the police and the military force could not be viewed in isolation from each
other as they worked hand in hand to improve the overall security environment.
Naturally, this also implied that IPTF’s credibility could be considerably undermined,
should SFOR at any point in the future decide to provide less backing in a security
situation where the need to apply pressure was still prevalent. Although the challenge
of developing a close working relationship with IFOR at senior levels was met early
on, among other implementation agencies, IPTF was placed below IFOR, UNHCR,
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OHR in the hierarchy, in terms of mandate, size, and influence and experienced some
difficulty in being heard.349
In the course of SFOR’s support to IPTF, the two conducted an increasing
number of joint inspections of police stations “to ensure that local police only
maintain the equipment necessary for policing in their areas.”350 In the course of the
inspections, an extensive scope and number of illegal weapons was confiscated. In
this context, another key area of co-operation between SFOR and IPTF became
dismantling Special Police Forces. SFOR in co-operation with the OHR and IPTF
announced a new policy for the control and restructuring of specialist police.351 This
was indicative of how some tasks that were initially within the military realm, such as
disbanding paramilitary groups or monitoring checkpoints, took on a civilian
character in the course of implementation.
5.2.2 Reform of the Civilian Security Sector
In the Dayton Agreement, civilian security sector reform emphasised the
establishment of local police forces and to a lesser extent reform of the judicial
system. Whereas all attention was centred around the police during the first two years
of the Dayton process, judicial reform, as a critical element of the rule of law,
increasingly came into focus in the course of 1998.
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Box 5.5: Law and Order – IPTF’s Mandate
IPTF’s mandate followed the pattern established in prior UNCivPol operations in that it had a pure
monitoring function rather than executive capabilities. Despite criticism of ineffectiveness, IPTF’s
strength lay in their clearly defined mandate and their advisory rather than enforcement approach.
Without violating their mandate, the IPTF was reinforced by IFOR and especially by SFOR. Typically,
IPTF and SFOR co-operated on inspections of police stations, dismantling of para-military formations,
and monitoring checkpoints, where SFOR provided a strong arm for the moral authority of the IPTF.
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The reform of the police was to go through two major phases. In early 1998,
the first phase of establishing and inaugurating police forces was about to be
concluded. In this phase, IPTF’s tasks were largely two-fold, in that the international
police force supervised a structural and a behavioural reform process.352 Whereas the
former was a question of reducing and reorganising the police forces in Bosnia-
Herzegovina by restructuring and vetting, the latter involved introducing new
doctrines, as well as training and monitoring the protection of human rights. The
subsequent phase built on the efforts of phase one and aimed at consolidating the
forces through extensive monitoring of police activity, increasing minority
representation, and developing specialist police.
(1) Structural Reform : The Dayton Agreement established two separate police
forces for each entity. 353 As of March 1996, in the wake of demobilisation, the
Bosnian police force was inflated and totalled 54,000 police officers. The target size
for the Republika Srpska was 8,500 and for the Federation 11,500, i.e. a reduction to a
total of 20,000 police officers.354 In addition to the inflated official police force, there
were Special Police Forces, hidden reserves, and party militias that had to be
disbanded.355 A significant number were excluded by vetting the police force of
violators of human rights and war criminals by IPTF. In the second half of year one
human rights violations actually increased and there continued to be a need for more
transparency and publicity. It was suggested, for example, that IPTF publish
restructuring plans and processes356 Although IPTF was accused of making too little
headway with respect to reductions and the expulsion of unwanted elements,
particularly in the initial stages of implementation, 357 the international police monitors
viewed vetting as a steadily progressing long-term process in which, eventually, all
police officers would be certified by IPTF.358 Only by taking a long-term perspective
could a truly credible and reliable police force be created that followed democratic
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principles and respects human rights. IPTF’s role was to enhance accountability
through increased patrolling and reporting and by exercising pressure in the selection
and evaluation of police officers. Decertification was later used as a means to exercise
pressure, but even though it was a powerful tool, IPTF had no enforcement
mechanisms to ensure the application of its decisions.
The generally uneven pace of reconstruction and normalisation between the
two entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina was also reflected in the establishment and
restructuring of civilian police forces. Whereas much effort and aid money went into
the Federation and the reform of that entity’s civilian police force, restructuring was
only just being initiated among Bosnian Serb police following an agreement in
September 1997, almost two years after the Dayton Agreement.359 In part this was due
to a lack of funding, as the salary structure only allowed for low wages which in turn
encouraged police officers to acquire additional income through criminal activity.
Reform in the Republika Srpska was hampered by unco-operative leaders and the split
in both military and police security forces with regard to the support for the two main
political factions that emerged. It would be too easy to blame the lack of progress on
the political split alone, but as the definition of a uniform police force under civilian
control depended on their perception of themselves as part of one common force,
competing allegiances were clearly extremely damaging. The split obviously delayed
the restructuring process in Republika Srpska which lagged behind that taking place
in the Federation and which appeared to have no effective overseer.360 Due to a
loophole in the Dayton Agreement, the Bosnian Serb police also included paramilitary
elements for state security and anti-terrorism that were clearly tied to political power
structures.361 In contrast, the international community lauded the Republika Srpska
police for its “professional work” leading up to and during the November 1997
elections.362
By early 1998, police forces in eight out of ten cantons had been established in
the Federation and local police were showing increasing willingness to work with
IPTF, expressed among other things in co-location plans for IPTF and local police
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forces.363 The rationale behind co-location was to avoid parallel local and IPTF
organisations and to promote as close a co-operation as possible.364 Still, the multi-
ethnic composition of the Federation police left much to be desired. Delays in
carrying out the outstanding restructuring in the Federation were mainly due to the
lack of co-operation from the Bosnian Croats who delayed processes of minority
integration and power-sharing. All too often, police forces were marked by an
unofficial chain of command that ran separately along ethnic dividing lines.365
(2) Behavioural Reform: Aside from a clear understanding of who they served
and why, the local police force were in need of new doctrines and training. Naturally,
the political context played an important part in progress. Changes at the political
level were essential as an ideological fall back for the restructured police force, and
greatly facilitated the work of the IPTF. In contrast, it was the political authorities’
condonation of abuses that undermined behavioural reform.366 The acceptance and
active promotion of international standards relied upon a political decision to change
basic concepts of policing.367 Plans for reforming the ideological basis of the police
force were being developed by the local authorities under the guidance of IPTF.368
The introduction of international standards of policing was a key undertaking and the
standards had to be reflected in police training. 369 IPTF conducted courses on the role
of a police officer in society and on basic policing skills, which the majority of
inaugurated police officers in both entities completed. Moreover, it assisted in
developing or rehabilitating police academies and in preparing curricula.370
Aside from the general need for an effective and reliable police force to
combat crime in a society, it was the protection of human rights and the issue of war
criminals that were the pervasive elements in all aspects of civilian security reform in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The threat to law and order and personal security was the major
impediment to the development of civil society and economic recovery. 371 In addition
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to the complacency that authorities displayed in dealing with human rights abuses,
they condoned violence on ethnic and political grounds and were frequently
responsible for violations themselves.372 Realising that a police force in an immediate
post-conflict situation was likely to require assistance, the reasoning behind the
deployment of the IPTF was the need to “enhance the security environment and
develop effective local law enforcement capabilities and respect for human rights.”373
For instance, with its contribution to IPTF, Germany considered itself co-responsible
for the “promotion and consolidation of a peaceful development,” recognising that
“only through the creation of safe living conditions will the people gain confidence in
a peaceful development, will reconstruction and reconciliation be possible.”374 In
order to contribute to the acceleration of minority returns, a designated priority area
for 1998, IPTF increased its co-operation with UNHCR and the local police.375
With respect to effectiveness then, the ultimate recourse for IPTF was
reporting non-compliance and consulting with appropriate bodies on future responses.
This was described as an insufficient substitute for the actual power to sanction and to
provide a deterrence to crime.376 Human Rights Watch recommended the course
frequently chosen in the human rights field in the absence of effective enforcement
mechanisms namely publicity, involving the media in condemning abuses.377 Human
Rights Watch also suggested that IPTF develop a closer working relationship or
formalised agreement with the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, but given the
limited mandate of the international police force, IPTF had limited means and perhaps
willingness to enforce any of the suggestions. It must be kept in mind that the IPTF
rightfully had no law enforcement mandate of its own and instead was merely charged
with overseeing local police activity. Thus, IPTF encouraged and monitored
investigations by the local police, but “undert[ook] independent investigations only as
a last resort.”378 Any suggestions for a more proactive IPTF role did not take into
account their lack of legal right to make arrests and the absence of international
follow-up institutions, i.e. courts and prisons. In part the strength of IPTF and the
                                                
372 Peace Implementation Council (1997a), para. 55, High Representative (1997).
373 Bureau of Public Affairs (1996).
374 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations (1996) Press Release No. 23/96 (17 April
1996).
375 S/1998/227, p. 5f.
376 Schlotter (1997), p. 24; International Crisis Group (1996b).
377 Human Rights Watch (1996).
378 S/1998/227, p. 6.
Section II Implementing the Dayton Agreement
147
respect paid it by the parties and the local police forces lay in their clearly defined
mandate and their advisory rather than enforcement approach.
In spite of the progress that was achieved, with regard to the decrease in the
number of illegal checkpoints and of harassment incidents, the local police forces
remained the dominant violators of human rights and made ethnically motivated
arrests. Police behaviour was conditioned by a number of factors, such as a general
level of tension and specific local conditions, and did not change overnight. In
assessing the mission, it would be wrong to expect more rapid progress than has taken
place in the restructuring and establishment of local police forces in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. IPTF’s assistance was a task that could provide direction and incentives,
but was most dependent on an indigenous structural development that had to run its
course and could only be influenced to a very limited degree. IPTF could contribute to
the protection of human rights through supervision and monitoring, but could only
accelerate the installation of a democratic police force. Similarly, it was dependent on
local co-operation from the political authorities. In April 1997, the Republika Srpska
authorities had not submitted a list of officers to be vetted, over one year after the
police forces’ installation and the issuance of the Commissioner’s Guidance.379 From
the start, IPTF recognised its limitations and the need for a long-term approach. It
seemed unfazed by international criticism of lack of progress and determination and
invited SFOR support where it was necessary for the immediate fulfilment of its
mandate, but bid its time with respect to the completion of the reform process of the
local police. And yet, although the indigenous evolution and the internalisation of
values could not be forced, the international community might have done more to
prevent local authorities from actively undermining the reform process.
Just as several other activities in the security field, the reform of local police
was plagued by funding difficulties.380 This affected staffing and equipment of the
IPTF and of local police forces and the maintenance of training facilities and police
schools. The Peace Implementation Council called on the international community to
provide more personnel, funds and equipment to the Police Development
Programme.381 The impact achieved by late 1998 would only be sustained through the
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consolidation of long-term institutional structures that communicated the shift in
attitude towards co-operation, multi-ethnic coexistence, and democratic policing
principles to future generations of police officers.
Following the initial stage of structural and behavioural reform of the police
forces, the emphasis shifted to the reform of the judicial system. In December 1998,
the Peace Implementation Council described the establishment of the rule of law as “a
prerequisite for a lasting peace, and for a self-sustaining economy capable of
attracting and retaining international domestic investors.”382 Aside from consolidating
the rule of law more generally, specific goals were the establishment of an
independent and impartial judiciary, respect for human rights and legal security. The
effort was urgently needed, as Bosnia-Herzegovina did not have a functioning legal
system, but was late in coming. Major tasks included addressing the rampant crime
situation and the backlog of cases that had accumulated during the war, with minimal
resources. The political context in which judicial reform was to take place was
marked by a lack of democratic traditions and considerable political pressure. Courts
were weak and highly politicised and the judicial system was in practice subordinate
to the police.383 The political backdrop also translated into structural features in that
two separate legal systems existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, the state’s
prerogative of providing the legal framework for its citizens was devolved to lower
levels, such as the Entities and Cantons that operated fairly autonomously. In fact, the
International Crisis Group commented that “law enforcement institutions protect local
power structures rather than the rule of law.”384
The reform of the judicial system was under the direction of the High
Representative in co-operation with the United Nations’ bodies IPTF and Judicial
System Assessment Programme (JSAP), the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and non-
governmental organisations, such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) and
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). Similar
to police reform, the reform of the judicial system encompassed a restructuring and a
training component. In addition to meeting almost banal demands, such as housing,
furniture and materials, scheduled structural changes included a reorganisation of
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courts and the establishment of effective enforcement mechanisms, as well as
standard procedures for the selection of judges and prosecutors.
With respect to behavioural reform progress was hampered by the fact that a
large share of the pre-war legal staff had left during the war, not to return. As a result,
much of the remaining staff was inexperienced and easily influenced by political
pressure, or prioritised ethnic loyalties rather than impartiality of their own accord.
The international community’s efforts focused on training legal staff and arranging
for access to legal materials, and monitoring court activity. The latter task fell into the
IPTF’s domain. 385 Unfortunately, the third-party efforts at security sector reform of
the judicial system were dwarfed in comparison to the influence of the political
framework that to a large extent determined day-to-day judicial activity. As a result,
none of the external actors had been able to effectively combat the intimidation of
staff and plaintiffs by late 1998.386
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Box 5.6: Law and Order – The Reform Process
Structural reform of the police: In the wake of the war, the police force had swelled to 54,000 which
then had to be reduced to 20,000. In part, the force was reduced through a systematic vetting process
which stretched over the entire period studied, but would be all the more stable. Progress was a little
slower in the Republika Srpska, in part due to funding difficulties and the political split, but cantonal
police forces were being established throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Behavioural reform of the police: Instilling respect for and protection of human rights in the local
police forces was a crucial task for the international community, as the population’s confidence in its
security was an important factor for the consolidation of peace and the development of civil society.
IPTF advanced the behavioural reform through monitoring police performance, developing police
standards, and advising on the establishment of educational institutions for police training with limited
success so far.
Reform of the judicial system: Following the initial stage of police reform, the emphasis shifted to
the reform of the judicial system. The judiciary suffered from excessive political control, lack of
qualified staff and a severe shortage of resources. The international attempts to assist in establishing
the rule of law met with stiff resistance in the political context, coloured by ethnic discrimination and
corruption. Much depended on recruiting additional qualified staff and on funding.
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5.3 Supporting Tasks
As mentioned in the presentation of the tasks stipulated in the Dayton Agreement,
IFOR was charged with a number of so-called ‘supporting tasks’ that aimed at
facilitating the civilian implementation. In the course of the implementation process,
demining, repatriation and reconstruction, elections assistance, and arresting war
criminals emerged as the chief supporting tasks. In general, the supporting tasks
assigned to IFOR and later SFOR addressed the chief sources of instability at this
stage of the implementation process. They were widespread land mines, a large
number of displaced persons, and war criminals. Elections and reconstruction were, in
turn, supportive of the ‘supporting tasks.’
5.3.1 Demining
Demining in Bosnia-Herzegovina was crucial to normalisation and reconstruction. 387
Naturally, demining activities were saddled with the same problems as demining
anywhere, particularly the fact that the pace of clearance was in no relation to the
need for cleared area, such as for agricultural needs and for freedom of movement.
A distinction was made between military and humanitarian demining where
the former described the mine lifting that was necessary for the protection or advance
of a military force and the latter referred to the clearing of mines to render an area
safe for civilian use. Although demining was thus long regarded as an essentially
military activity, a number of NGOs, such as the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA),
joined the group of deminers. Similarly, the UN defined demining needs in a long-
term and a short-term perspective that sometimes overlapped. Whereas the
Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) took care of the short-term
military demining as necessary for the operation of peace-keeping forces, the
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was responsible for co-ordinating long-
term humanitarian and emergency relief demining. The division of labour in Bosnia
resembled this pattern.
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IFOR/SFOR had a very limited approach to demining that merely aimed at
‘clearing their own path’ and lifting mines to the extent necessary for the protection of
the force. The areas in which IFOR/SFOR sporadically demined, could therefore not
be regarded as safe for civilian use. Furthermore, IFOR/SFOR identified and mapped
mine fields, based on military records obtained from the Parties, as well as on eye
witness accounts. Accurate information proved illusive, due to the fact that in the heat
of battle and with a frequently shifting front line, records were fragmentary at best,
and false at worst. IFOR/SFOR were reluctant at times to release this information on
the grounds that it was not sufficiently reliable. The Dayton Agreement had declared
that the removal of mines was the responsibility of the Parties and that the process
was to be monitored by SFOR.  Accordingly, SFOR supervised local military staff
that was not necessarily motivated to remove mines thoroughly. As a result, the UN
did not like to depend on SFOR for demining: “In any case they should be under no
illusion that SFOR [...] contributed meaningfully to date to the demining of
Bosnia.”388
Aside from mine clearance, dealing with mines required both training and
awareness programmes conducted by the UN, individual governments, NGOs and
private companies and by SFOR who carried out army training on condition of
compliance with demining obligations. The ambition was to “create a sustainable
national capacity” for detecting and clearing mines. As of the summer 1997, the
number of locals trained fell significantly short of the demand with only about 700 of
the targeted 2,000 local staff trained.
In May 1996 the United Nations Mine Action Centre (MAC), the co-
ordinating body for all demining activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, opened in Sarajevo
and later established four regional centres throughout Bosnia. The MAC was
conceived as a mere advisory body, but it soon became clear that the political
leadership was obstructive and unco-operative and that the UN would have to assume
a more pro-active role. Given the limitations of IFOR/SFOR’s mine lifting, the UN
carried the main responsibility for the co-ordination and execution of humanitarian
mine clearance. As a result of the initial confusion that was brought about by the lack
of political co-operation from the Bosnian government, demining efforts were
severely delayed and systematic mine clearance and training of local staff did not
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begin until the formal take-over by the UN in September 1996. A National Demining
Commission (NDC) was finally established in February 1997 that appeared willing
and able to eventually take on the responsibility for demining on behalf of the local
government. In late 1997, the MAC was transferred to authorities of Bosnia-
Herzegovina which then co-ordinated the distribution of tasks and funds between
entities and to central authorities. The transfer included the extensive UN
infrastructure for co-ordination, as well as all the equipment that had been assembled
and had finally been in place in the Summer of 1997. Although a Board of Donors,
consisting of external representatives from major contributors, continued to advise the
Bosnian authorities, implementation of demining programmes was in local hands
from then on. As a final legal step in this process, an agreement on co-operation was
signed between the entity governments in December 1997.389 Local MACs were to be
established by 31 March 1998.
A dual approach developed in mine clearance in Bosnia-Herzegovina: on the
one hand, the co-ordination structure was set up by the UN, and on the other hand, the
capacity to execute demining programmes was developed at a local level. Although
the Council of Ministers declared their commitment to the implementation of the
Ottawa Treaty, in its Bonn Declaration of December 1997 the PIC deplored the fact
that production and export of mines continued.390
Unfortunately, Bosnia-Herzegovina fit the world-wide pattern of underfunding
with regard to demining and its Demining Commission lacked both material and
financial support.391 The majority of funding came from the World Bank, the EU, and
individual government contributions. However, the funds made up only about 20% of
the target amount proposed by the UN for the full and sustainable execution of the
demining programmes.
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5.3.2 Repatriation and Reconstruction
The role in repatriation was a difficult one for IFOR. While it was reluctant to get too
heavily involved, the force was subject to significant pressure. One of IFOR's and
later SFOR’s earliest roles in repatriation was providing intelligence support and
assessments of the direction and the size of the flow of returning refugees. It soon
became clear that none of the parties would allow wide-scale return to their territories.
Instead, ethnic cleansing was further pursued, especially in the Republika Srpska,
where remaining Bosniac and Bosnian Croat minorities were forced to leave their
homes and the entity, but likewise in the Federation where both Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats aimed at reaching ethnic homogeneity. Within the Federation
allowing refugee returns was also used as leverage in forcing returns elsewhere.
Despite the fact that 400,000 of the 2 million displaced persons and refugees returned
in the first two years of the Dayton process, only 10,000 had turned back to ethnic
communities other than their own by July 1997.392 In fact, in late 1997 there were
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Box 5.7: Supporting Tasks – Demining
IFOR/SFOR had the responsibility for military demining, i.e. the mine lifting necessary for its
protection and advance, and the UN had the responsibility for humanitarian demining, that is
clearing mines to render an area safe for civilian use and refugee returns. The parties’ own military
demining which IFOR/SFOR supervised was sporadic and no significant pressure was brought to
bear on the parties to extend their activity.
Humanitarian demining was also intended to lie in local hands to a greater degree. However, due to
non-compliance on the part of the authorities which significantly delayed the demining operations,
the UN’s DHA took on the responsibility for co-ordinating all demining. In late 1997, local efforts
appeared to finally be moving forward with the transfer of the UN’s Mine Action Centre, including co-
ordination infrastructure and demining equipment, to the responsibility of the Bosnian National
Demining Commission (NDC). Demining was characterised by a dual approach in which the co-
ordination structures were developed by external actors and the capacity to demine was trained at a
local level.
A major problem was the lack of funding. In late 1997, a mere 20% of the UN’s targeted amount
was forthcoming.
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50,000 fewer people living in areas dominated by another ethnic group and 80,000
had been forced from their homes since the end of the war.393 In part, this was a result
of a deliberate strategy of “majoratisation” by all ethnic groups that aimed at grouping
their own communities geographically to the extent possible.394 The International
Commission belaboured the lack of returns, claiming that it “testifies to the
continuing ethnic tension and the lack of effort by all parties to recreate the multi-
ethnic Bosnia spelled out in the Dayton Accords.”395 In December 1997, there were
still 600,000 refugees abroad and 800,000 internally displaced peoples and conditions
for return had not improved significantly.396 Several towns were also plagued by
practical obstacles to returns, such as the fact that they were crowded with refugees
from other parts of the country. Some progress was made in 1998 with a total of
approximately 41,000 minority returns. Still, the figure paled in comparison with the
total number of displaced and the fact that the process had after all been ongoing for
three years.
Obviously, displaced persons and refugees were recognised as a major
destabilising factor. As none of the Parties fulfilled their obligations with respect to
the return of refugees, increased pressure to comply appeared to be necessary. The
NATO-led force was the only third-party actor in Bosnia-Herzegovina that was
explicitly authorised to “use whatever means necessary” and that had the capabilities
to exercise that power. Pressure increased after the transition to SFOR, when the
majority of purely military tasks that dominated the immediate post-Dayton period
had been taken care of. Disregarding SFOR’s reduced size, civilian agencies called on
SFOR to use its ‘excess’ capacity to assist the civilian implementation in catching up.
SFOR only responded to this request in part and managed to limit itself to the military
and security-related aspects of repatriation, such as enhancing freedom of movement
by removing illegal checkpoints, monitoring movements and moods in the areas
scheduled for receiving returnees, and indirectly through reconstruction and mine
lifting. In that way, SFOR fulfilled its mandate of enhancing the security in the
operating environment for other international agencies, in particular UNHCR,
however unsatisfactory the return process was as a whole.
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For UNHCR the repatriation programme in Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of
the largest and most complex programmes ever undertaken and the organisation
realised that its success depended upon reconstruction and rehabilitation, security
conditions, the removal of land mines, and the implementation of human rights
provisions of Dayton, and that these conditions were in part contingent upon SFOR’s
involvement and support.
Particularly with respect to the removal of illegal checkpoints, the IPTF, the
High Representative, and SFOR all reiterated their plans to enforce compliance,
following lack of co-operation in the Republika Srpska and to a lesser extent in the
Federation. Whereas IFOR was initially accused of providing inadequate support
against interference,397 SFOR appeared willing to become more proactive in this
context.398 More and more border crossings were being opened and harassment was
being clamped down on by issuing a threat of reduced funding to responsible
municipalities.399
In order to accelerate the rate of repatriation and to separate the good apples
from the bad, UNHCR initiated and co-ordinated the Open Cities programme by
which it was hoped that one would be able to identify and financially assist co-
operative municipalities in the two entities. A key element in the Open Cities
Programme was that money was not just handed to returnees, but was spread
throughout the entire municipality, giving each community member an incentive to
welcome the returnees.400 Similarly, funding to unco-operative towns would be cut.
The execution of the programme was in the hands of UNHCR and SFOR. Results
were mixed. The number of municipalities that had obtained or were seeking Open
Cities status increased relatively quickly to over 30; the majority of these were in the
Federation. 401 However, the programme experienced only limited success due to a
lack of financial resources and follow through on the part of the international
community that had no funds at pay-up time for those communities that had indeed
co-operated and accepted refugees into their midst.402 In another effort to promote
refugee return, UNHCR worked with SFOR in identifying twenty-two priority areas
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where reconstruction was accelerated and to which refugees were primarily returned.
SFOR’s role was also to assist in setting up cross-entity bus routes and visits.
Although these efforts were often obstructed, they continued.
Reconstruction aid delivered by IFOR/SFOR mostly took the form of
rebuilding bridges and main roads, as well as assisting in the reconstruction of other
infrastructure. By mid-1997, IFOR/SFOR had repaired 64 bridges and 2,500 km road.
In accordance with the Dayton Agreement, construction and maintenance of
infrastructure built for SFOR’s own purposes and operational needs and financed
through NATO’s Security Investment Programme could be deconstructed at the
military force’s discretion at departure.403 The International Committee suggested
more selective reconstruction assistance to co-operative communities, similar to the
approach by municipality that was used in refugee returns.404 However, given the
financing problems that arose in the ‘refugee-swap-scheme’ and that resulted in too
many unfulfilled promises from the international community, the credibility of an
‘infrastructure-swap-scheme’ would be relatively low.
In the link between reconstruction and repatriation, assistance that enhanced
both for quite some time lacked a basis in Bosnian property laws that could provide
the legal foundation for the return of displaced persons.405 Thus, a major issue for
repatriation was the distribution of property. The Steering Board called for the
amendment of property laws as a high priority issue and the PIC confirmed that they
considered property laws a major hindrance to the return of refugees.406 Accordingly,
the Return and Reconstruction Task Force (RRTF) created in the Fall of 1997, chaired
by the High Representative, was tasked with “creat[ing] a mechanism to address
potential effects of proposed laws, and [...] formulat[ing] recommendations for
alternatives for persons affected by the return of pre-war occupants.” Initially, the
capacity in the field was rather weak and the entity and federal authorities were asked
to second personnel to OHR regional office in order to address this weakness.407
Coupled with the property laws passed in April 1998, the context for returns improved
considerably. In the course of 1998, the creation of the RRTF then brought with it
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more “efficient structures” and the Task Force pursued “an aggressive political
approach.”408
But the most important obstacle to return, remained the hostile climate in the
recipient communities and the returnees concomitant concern for their personal
safety. In order to encourage return, the international presence, especially SFOR and
the IPTF, would have to provide a much more credible security guarantee and be
more assertive and effective in protecting returnees. SFOR as the most likely
candidate for protecting minority returnees was not willing to get involved in what it
considered a policing task, and as a result, harassment and intimidation continued. In
its December 1998 Madrid Declaration, the PIC cited three key terms of RRTF’s
action plan for the coming year - space, security, sustainability. The terms indicate the
recognition that providing security could only be a temporary measure and that the
political climate would have to improve in order for resettlement to become self-
sustaining. Until that time, support from SFOR continued to be a necessary ingredient
in the promotion of repatriation, but it remained to be seen whether the international
community could muster the political will to actively protect returnees.
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Box 5.8: Supporting Tasks – Repatriation
Intelligence: IFOR/SFOR provided UNHCR with intelligence support and assessments of the
direction and the size of the refugee flow.
Freedom of movement: IFOR/SFOR’s widespread removal of illegal checkpoints greatly enhanced
freedom of movement throughout Bosnia.
Reconstruction: Road and bridge building efforts also increased freedom of movement, as well as
improved living conditions and infrastructure for returnees.
Protection: Physical safety was the greatest concern for returning refugees and their protection was
a task not sufficiently taken on by SFOR, as the only component of the international presence with the
capacity to credibly ensure the safety of returnees.
Similarly, repatriation was delayed due to the lack of local political co-operation, where none of the
parties fulfilled their obligations under the Dayton Agreement. The co-ordination of conditionality
between UNHCR and SFOR was an attempt to combine incentives and pressure to force compliance
and accelerate the repatriation process, but met with limited success.
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5.3.3 Elections
Writing about the initial federal elections, Susan Woodward points to the central
dilemma of the elections: although they “took place on schedule [...] with minimal
violence,” “elections gave a democratic stamp of approval to the three nationalist
parties that had waged the war.”409 Elections were also plagued by widely
exaggerated expectations, such as “ousting suspected war criminals from power;
defeating the nationalist parties; and laying the groundwork for an independent media,
personal freedoms, and other requisites of civil society.”410 It was not surprising that
the actual performance fell short of this comprehensive list. Instead, all political
leaders attempted to manipulate voter registration in their favour, a fact well-known to
the OSCE, but difficult to control given that the organisation expected 3 million
voters, fifty percent of which were not where they had been registered in 1991.411
Voices calling for the elections of 1996 to be postponed grew louder, but the United
States, guided by President Clinton’s desires to demonstrate success in the peace
process in the run-up to the US Presidential elections, eventually persuaded the
international community to carry them out as planned.412 In addition to the nationalist
influences that had been strengthened by war animosities, the pre-war strategy of total
party control, a communist legacy, continued.413 Some writers belaboured the low
voter turn-out of sixty percent,414 but the fact that so many decided to cast their ballot,
despite the difficult security conditions, despite the absence of democratic traditions,
and despite the massive attempts at voter manipulation, represented a major step in
the democratisation process.
IFOR and SFOR assisted in preparing and conducting federal elections in
September 1996, local elections in September 1997, National Assembly elections in
the Republika Srpska in November 1997, and general elections in September 1998.
The forces were particularly called on to enhance the public perception of security in
order to actually make registering and voting safer, on the one hand, and to increase
the confidence of potential voters in their personal security, on the other. For elections
in September 1997, SFOR temporarily swelled its force by 4,000 and seconded some
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twenty people to OSCE’s election office. In addition to the provision of security,
IPTF’s role in election support also comprised an investigative function that looked
into complaints in the pre-election period.415
The problem of manipulation and ‘long-distance’ or ‘absentee’ voting
reoccurred in the September 1997 local elections and presented a dilemma for the
security forces under SFOR and the IPTF. Bosnian Muslims were voted into power in
communities such as Srebenica, where most Muslims had been driven out during the
war. The problem turned into one of ensuring the implementation of results; a
responsibility that lay with SFOR to enforce. SFOR also assisted in implementing the
municipal election results by providing security for elected officials, such as escorting
them to their places of work.416 In this connection, IPTF assisted by developing
security plans with the local police force. The enforcement of results eventually
proved unfeasible, in that SFOR and IPTF could not be omnipresent and the local
police forces were usually unwilling to protect elected officials from an ethnic
minority. Clearly, the electoral process did not stop at the ballot box. 417
International security assistance had a limited impact on the value and
legitimacy of elections, aside from the central task of increasing security. While
harassment and intimidation were too widespread to be prevented completely,
IFOR/SFOR successfully increased the population’s perception of security reflected
in the steadily rising voter turn-out. In addition to enhancing the security situation
IFOR/SFOR provided valuable practical support, such as bussing. Still, other factors,
such as the political climate, the range of alternatives, free and independent media,
were far more important than IFOR/SFOR patrols in determining the people’s
assessment of the political situation. The military force could contribute, but long-
term democratisation processes had to take root. These could be advanced by civilian
implementers, but were largely independent of security assistance.
Schear argues that “war-torn countries are never fertile ground for elections,”
due to hardened front lines and a repressive political climate. The same was true in
Bosnia-Herzegovina where the ‘failure’ of the elections arose with the international
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community’s inability to counteract the negative conditions.418 Similarly, although the
wisdom of legitimising nationalist leaders through elections was rightly questioned,
staging elections should also be regarded as part of the democratising learning
experience. Moreover, the emergence of less nationalist forces in politics was
obviously a longer term process that would not necessarily have been accelerated
under international protectorship, as an alternative to elections. And yet, the question
arises whether one dysfunctional element of democracy invalidates other components
in its wake. In particular, linking the election results with the demand for civilian
control over the security sector, a critical element of a democratic state, was far from
reassuring. In a similar vein, Leurdijk claims that “[t]he elections [...] were the wrong
elections at the wrong time.”419
5.3.4 War Criminals and the Media
Another threat to security and long-term stability was that of war criminals.420 Apart
from undermining confidence in and security itself, the issue of war criminals was
closely linked to both military and civilian police reform and demobilisation, and had
to be addressed before a process of democratisation could begin. 421 In contrast to war
crimes tribunals of the past, the Hague Tribunal was not a case of the victors judging
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Box 5.9: Supporting Tasks – Elections
IFOR/SFOR assistance to staging elections consisted of enhancing public security to make
registering and voting safer and to increasing potential voters’ confidence in their personal security. In
this connection, IFOR/SFOR’s actions resembled active policing; a task the force had tried to avoid
from the start.
Further, the force provided intelligence and logistical support to the OSCE. Following the elections of
September 1997, the task of assisting in the implementation of election results by protecting elected
officials in potentially hostile environments was added to SFOR’s list of responsibilities.
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the losers, but a demonstration of the international community’s will to prosecute
human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. 422 Though commendable in theory,
the international community ran a risk of failure when attempting to implement their
noble ideas and thus risked making “a mockery” of the victims’ war memories.423
Throughout assessments of the implementation process at different times and
by different agents the call remained the same that “without justice there can be no
process of reconciliation” and that “only through just retribution can the cycle of
revenge be broken.”424 Most importantly, individual prosecution was the only
alternative to assigning collective guilt. Despite the acknowledged truth of these
statements, the parties initially did nothing to comply with the provisions on war
criminals laid out in the Dayton Agreement.425 Even as of May 1997 progress was
slow and co-operation limited. In its final document from the meeting in Sintra in
May 1997, the PIC suggested a few options through which pressure might be
exercised on the parties, such as issuing travel restrictions for ‘partners in crime’
through the office of the High Representative, withholding economic aid to certain
municipalities, or a general decline in international relations.426 Most proposals had a
limited effect on the non-co-operative parties, as the international community’s lack
of resolve in the early days of the implementation process seriously damaged their
credibility and decreased their leverage later on. 427 The Bosnian Serb reluctance to
comply was due to their impression of being stuck with all the blame. The
international community was successful in exercising significant pressure on Croatia
by blocking access to international financial institutions. As of early 1998, all Croat
indictees had given themselves up and even the Serbs were beginning to turn
themselves in. The two most well-known indictees, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan
Karadžic and General Ratko Mladic, that were subject to frequent calls for arrest,
were in reality powerless. Their eventual arrest was probable, but the international
military force was likely to wait until tension was further reduced and the general
security situation had become more stable.428
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IFOR/SFOR was often accused of inactivity on the issue of arresting war
criminals. As the ICTY Deputy Prosecutor Graham Blewitt pointed out in mid-1996,
“NATO forces in Bosnia have both the mandate and the capability to act, which they
have not used to date.”429 Based on a warranted fear of upsetting the fragile security
balance, IFOR/SFOR was reluctant to get involved and pointed to other assistance
rendered the ICTY, such as logistic support for investigation teams and surveillance,
as its contribution. In late 1997 then, NATO claimed a strategy of neutralising war
criminals by other means. Rather than attacking known war criminals directly, the
approach aimed at destroying their base of power which consisted of three pillars:
money, media, and the police. It was a continuation of the policy that became visible
in the management of Karadžic and Mladic who were in fact isolated and removed
from the political scene early on without being subject to direct physical attacks by
the NATO-led force.430 Moreover, according to sources at NATO, the decision not to
actively pursue war criminals was made prior to the deployment of IFOR and was
reflected in the force’s structure and make-up.
NATO’s strategy was becoming increasingly apparent in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
While continuing its monitoring of the general security situation, SFOR became more
involved in the restructuring, training, and reform of local police forces. They backed
up the IPTF more actively, with tasks ranging from confiscating illegal weapons to
assisting in the development of training materials and doctrines. In the second half of
1997, SFOR increasingly seized media outlets that were tightly in the grasp of both
war criminals and other ‘spoilers.’431 SFOR’s more active stance followed a request
by the High Representative, whose office was also placing increasing emphasis on
media reform, and found a positive response at NAC that engaged SFOR in
suspending or curtailing the broadcasting of anti-Dayton or anti-SFOR propaganda.432
The suppression of non-co-operative and fear-mongering media was relatively
successful with the largest television station, SRT, accepting internationally
recognised standards of broadcasting and journalism that included the removal of
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direct political control over the media.433 It remained to be seen whether the political
leadership in the Republika Srpska would indeed be willing to relinquish one of its
major tools of power. On second thought, there would be no need for the leadership to
abandon the media outlet, as long as the international community was successful in
building up alternative sources of information, including broadcasting and print
media. The continued existence of fear-mongering media slowed the pace of
repatriation, while catering to the large number of displaced that provided a ready
audience for nationalist propaganda.
Cutting off the financial lifeline proved a more difficult task for a military
force to take on, but as there was more and more collaboration within the international
community and, to the extent that it did take place, co-ordination with international
financial institutions, such as the World Bank, arguably also improved. Despite the
fact that a report from the CAFAO found no evidence of corruption related to donor’s
funds, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) continued to stress the importance of
clamping down on corruption more generally in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to call for
more transparency. 434 To a large extent, it was tax revenue that was diverted and that
shored up both war criminals and nationalist political leaders. In part, the lack of
transparency was also a legacy of “socialist self-management,” in which politicians
were often closely tied to economic interests.435 Transparency and better financial
control were to be achieved through the introduction of a common currency and the
establishment and consolidation of financial institutions and procedures. Although the
common currency was successfully introduced, the Deutschmark continued as a
parallel currency, in which most criminal transactions were likely taking place. A
major source of funds for nationalist leaders and war criminals was of course criminal
and black market activity which again lay in the realm of the police. Clearly, the
leaderships in the political, the security, and the criminal sphere were closely
interwoven and co-operated to undermine the peace process. As a result, the
international community declared the fight against corruption another priority area for
1999.436
As the implementation process proceeded, a dual development took place.
While the issue of war criminals became more prevalent, the tension defused. As a
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result, it both became easier for war criminals to turn themselves in and easier for
SFOR to make arrests. This was the natural continuation of IFOR/SFOR’s earlier
attitude, namely “to fulfil the minimum expectations to stability and security, i.e.
whatever they could get away with without undermining confidence in their presence
and in their actions.”437 Still, on the part of SFOR a more proactive stance was long
overdue. In practice, the non-persecution of war criminals hampered the confidence-
building process by risking long-term stability and reconciliation in order to meet
short-term security goals, such as preventing renewed fighting. 438
5.4 Conclusions on the Implementation of the Dayton Agreement
· Demilitarisation and military reform : After their rapid and successful
implementation, the purely military tasks were in danger of being underestimated
with respect to their importance for the peace process as a whole. Without them,
none of the later consolidation processes could have occurred and conditions for
civilian implementation would not have been present.
· Law and order: The reduction and reform of local police forces was a process that
covered an extended period of time. Although progress in this area was crucial to
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Box 5.10 Supporting Tasks – War Criminals and Media
Rather than risking an increase in tensions through the arrest of war criminals, IFOR/SFOR sought to
destroy the power base of war criminals which consisted of media, money, and the police. Thus, in co-
operation with the OHR, SFOR shut down fear-mongering, nationalist media outlets and civilian
implementation agencies were cracking down on corruption through the establishment of a uniform and
transparent monetary system.
The importance of ridding Bosnia-Herzegovina of war criminals was undisputed and the process
appeared to be gaining momentum through increased political co-operation and the surrender of
indictees. Given the absence of an end date, the steady reduction of tensions and the war criminals’
gradual loss of power and status, SFOR might take a more proactive stance without risking outbreaks
of violence.
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the population’s perception of their security, rushing the reform process was likely
to backfire as it would have cut short a psychological normalisation process that
marked the true transition to a peacetime state. Despite its limited progress by late
1998, the promotion of judicial reform was an important step in this direction.
· Supporting tasks: With the exception of demining, IFOR/SFOR played a
tangential role in the supporting tasks by providing a secure environment for
civilian implementation, as was called for in the Dayton Agreement. In addition,
carrot-and-stick co-ordination was established as a fruitful approach in which
SFOR’s ‘raw power’ added pressure to the incentives offered the parties with
respect to building local capacity for demining, welcoming home returnees,
promoting moderate political forces and media sources, and handing over war
criminals.
· It is impossible to undertake a relative assessment of elements within the
international security assistance programme that singles out a specific task which
‘brought about peace.’ Instead, the implementation process showed that only a
comprehensive and co-ordinated approach by the international community would
consolidate peace.
· Three years into the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, SFOR was faced
with the same problem with which the civilian implementers had grappled since
the Agreement had been signed. As the emphasis of ‘security’ moved from
military to civilian security, many tasks took on more of a civilian character
reflected in the increasing security co-operation between IFOR/SFOR and the
IPTF in the course of implementation. Those tasks that remained were the ones
that required structural processes to take place in Bosnian society, in the local
political leadership, and in the security sector. These were processes of
rapprochement and reconciliation that international goodwill and specifically
international security assistance accelerated, but that could not simply be
executed. An exception was the arrest of war criminals which was a concrete task
that would have impacted reconciliation directly and served to consolidate the
transition from war to peace.
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6 Remaining Issues in Co-ordination and Co-operation
Chapter 5 presented the bulk of co-ordination that took place in the course of
implementation and the execution of security-related tasks. In particular, it pointed to
the growing co-operation between SFOR and IPTF and SFOR’s increasing role in
supporting civilian implementation. The current chapter picks up additional issues of
interaction between third-party actors that concern co-ordination and co-operation as
such. In the following, co-ordination between NATO, PfP, and other non-members,
changes in IFOR/SFOR’s attitude towards its civilian counterparts, the Civil Military
Task Force (CMTF), and the interplay between civilian and military agencies to
effectively exercise pressure on the local counterparts are discussed.
6.1 Co-ordination between NATO, PfP, and Other Non-members
The peace implementation process in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the international
involvement in the process has more far-reaching implications than the simple success
of the mission. Nowhere is this more true than with respect to NATO’s deployment,
the success of which will affect a whole range of major issues in international affairs.
In addition to facing a new mission of peacekeeping and potentially peace
enforcement, the NATO-led force had to adjust to its temporarily expanded
membership with the PfP-countries and other non-members. Still, throughout the
overwhelming majority of troops came from NATO member states and the integration
of ‘foreign’ troops into the command structure was not as challenging as it had
appeared at first sight.
The military component had a clear leadership in the field with the COMIFOR
and later COMSFOR who was backed up at a political or strategic level by the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) and the NAC+N. The latter was the main mechanism for
political consultation between North Atlantic Council and IFOR/SFOR’s non-NATO
contributors.439 In addition to participation in NAC+N meetings, contributing non-
NATO countries had liaison officers at SHAPE and were involved in planning
operations and generating the necessary forces through the SFOR Co-ordination
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Centre. NATO realised the need to involve contributing Partners as early and as much
as possible in military planning. 440 As a result, contributing non-NATO countries
were consulted at key junctures at NATO headquarters and given the opportunity to
express their views or associate themselves with NAC decisions.
Thus, “[n]on-NATO nations have been incorporated into the operation on the
same basis as forces from NATO member countries. They take orders from the SFOR
Commander through the multinational divisional headquarters. Several non-NATO
countries are represented in SFOR headquarters in Sarajevo which has personnel from
25 NATO and non-NATO nations.”441 In an assessment of NATO’s peace-keeping
experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is claimed that the “integration of 15 PfP and
four other non-NATO nations under a unified command and control has been a major
success” and that “IFOR’s military success derived to a large extent from performed,
proven command structures and logistic systems and from long-term contingency
planning carried out in NATO.”442 Calic argues that Dayton implementation acted as
a catalyst for structural reform in NATO, reflected in “new mechanisms of political
consultation and important new working relationships which in future should enable
[the organisation] to mount such an operation more quickly and effectively.”443
In comparison with prior UN-led peacekeeping operations, the co-operation
and co-ordination in IFOR/SFOR was spared the ‘dual key’ approach that inhibited
past operations due to interference and micro-management by national governments.
Despite the fact that command lines were much more orderly in IFOR/SFOR,
problems of operational command and control remained. Given that NATO had never
actually been deployed previously, it was not surprising that a number of other
practical difficulties arose, such as with respect to logistics, communications systems,
and the timing of deployment in relation to its back-up organisation ‘over the
horizon.’444
With respect to the military capabilities for crisis management more generally,
Solana proposed a two-fold approach. On the one hand, there was a need to
“accelerate the process of convergence” between NATO and PfP countries in order to
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prepare them for future joint operations. On the other hand, a change was necessary in
EU's military planning and outward image, such as appointing a Special
Representative for particular issues.445 A coherent and region-wide security structure
could act as a deterrent and counteract aggression and instability. In this way, Western
Europe would take on the responsibility that reflects its power in international
relations more accurately.446
6.2 Rapprochement between Military and Civilian Actors
In contrast to the relatively straightforward military arrangements, the provisions for
civilian implementation in the Dayton Agreement were unclear and mechanisms for
co-ordination among civilian actors were complex and not well thought out.
Furthermore, decision-making power was decentralised with the position of the High
Representative as a weak overall co-ordinator “with no directing power over the
various agencies providing field services under the Dayton accord.”447 In the
decentralised structure, “there was no single leading political body, no central
implementation authority, and a clear separation of enforcement powers between the
civilian and military aspects of the agreement.”448 As a result of the distinction, the
IFOR success story was initially mitigated by the lack of civilian progress that in turn
led to claims that “with respect to communication, settlement of refugees or political
power, the goal of a multi-ethnic, unified Bosnia is further from realisation after one
year than at the signing” of the Dayton Agreement.449 The involvement of large
numbers of international organisations, NGOs, and individual countries in the wake of
the Dayton Agreement, was a continuation of international engagement during the
war and was running into the same danger of co-ordination becoming an end in itself.
Previously, the international community had been accused of spending 80% of their
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time with each other and only 20% helping the parties. Although the Dayton
Agreement undertook the strategic distribution of tasks, the implementation process
revealed operational problems that seriously impaired both effectiveness and
credibility of international efforts.450
In part the discrepancy in success between the military and civilian
implementation was a result of two widely diverging timelines which went beyond the
civil-military divide and were more a question of matching goals and tasks.
Woodward warned that the “slow timeline of peace-keeping and repatriation [was]
irreconcilable to the short timeline for exit.”451 In an attempt to explain the difficulties
experienced in the early stages of civil-military co-ordination, Paasch argues that
there was no structure in place and no practical experience with co-ordination needs
as comprehensive as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result of the complicated
civilian structures and the range of agencies involved, the military scepticism towards
forging close ties with actors in the civilian field deepened.
Accordingly, the co-ordination between military and civilian security
providers got off to a bad start in early 1996 during the exodus of Bosnian Serbs from
the Sarajevo suburbs. The exodus itself has been the subject of various interpretations,
but IFOR’s lack of willingness to assist the newly and incompletely deployed IPTF in
managing that crisis has been unanimously criticised.452 Another illustrative incident
took place in Mostar in early 1996, in which IFOR refused to come to EU-
administrator Koschnick’s aid during disturbances in the city, arguing that it was not
NATO’s task to solve internal problems of the Federation. 453
However, in the course of implementation, co-operation between individual
agencies and NATO improved significantly. 454 By April 1996, IFOR had done away
with the major military threats and a gradual reorientation towards the support of
civilian implementation began; particularly with an eye towards the September 1996
elections.455 The need for civil-military co-ordination and particularly the need for the
multi-national military force to explicitly take on the support of civilian
implementation was further strengthened after the transition to SFOR. There were
several  reasons for the gradual shift in attitude among the military actors. (1) In part
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it was a function of IFOR having successfully executed its purely military charge. (2)
The achievement of IFOR’s tasks also formed the critical stable foundation for
civilian implementation to proceed. (3) Most importantly, IFOR’s reluctance had been
due to the fear of ‘mission creep’ on the side of the political decision-makers. This so
clearly marked the initial IFOR period that a number of civilian agencies considered
the transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR a setback in terms of support for their work.
As a number of SFOR officials pointed out, it was ironic that the greatly reduced
force was assigned the more general task of supporting civilian implementation which
was both time- and personnel-consuming and extensive. As a result, it was all the
more necessary to co-ordinate actions and to develop guidelines and priorities for the
use of SFOR. Still, by expanding its line of business, SFOR recovered some of the
immense momentum that had characterised IFOR in early 1996 and that was partially
lost in the vacuum that followed the initial military success. Realising how closely the
fulfilment of the two component missions were tied together, the successful civilian
implementation became more and more a part of NATO’s exit strategy. 456
Similarly, the Office of the High Representative pointed out early on that
“IFOR and the OHR have a number of issues in common.” But although both sides
realised the importance of elections and felt the pressure to perform in the face of
rising expectations among the populace, the OHR still made a clear distinction in that
the “people are looking to IFOR for security and to the OHR for social, political,
economic and infrastructure development.”457 Over a year later, Westendorp,
recognising just how closely military and civilian progress were tied together,
included “security and stability” among his strategic objectives, such as
“democratization; and economic and social reconstruction,” which were identified as
the foundations of his work as High Representative.458 The position of the High
Representative was formally strengthened through reorganisation and clarification of
his responsibilities at the PIC meeting in Bonn in December 1997 and informally
through the performance of Carl Bildt and later Carlos Westendorp.459 Clearly, the
                                                                                                                                           
455 Leurdijk (1996), p. 117.
456 The emerging relationship is usually referred to as civil-military co-operation (CIMIC). NATO’s
AJP-1 defines CIMIC as “the resources and arrangements which support the relationship between
NATO commanders and the national authorities, civil and military, and civil populations in an area
where NATO military forces are or plan to be employed. Such arrangements include co-operation with
non-governmental or international agencies, organisations and authorities.”
457 OHR (March 1996).
458 Carlos Westendorp (1997) Speech to North Atlantic Council  (Brussels, October 1997).
459 Paasch (1997), p. 18.
Section II Implementing the Dayton Agreement
171
more power the High Representative was assigned by the international community to
interfere in the affairs of the sovereign Bosnian state, the more he would have to be
formally legitimised, in order to be effective. In spite of the improvements, the
International Commission continued to stress the need to streamline the civilian
implementation machinery to provide coherence, cohesion and better co-ordination in
June 1997.460
With respect to formal mechanisms, co-ordination bodies were established
soon after the implementation process began. Unfortunately, they were not effective
in harmonising the strategies and goals of divergent actors. Weekly meetings among
the full group of main agencies were arranged to discuss matters of co-ordination and
to co-ordinate activities. However, although regular meetings appeared to be a
sensible structure in a complex implementation situation, they did not necessarily
yield results that were proportionate to the time spent in them. Steiner recalled that
“[i]n Bosnia-Herzegovina, we tried to cope with a multiplicity of institutions by
having so-called “principals’ meetings” as often as possible. That slowed everything
down – we had IFOR, IPTF, UN, OHR, UNHCR, and many others. There has to be a
homogeneous decision-making body to work through such a crisis as Bosnia was and
is.”461
Solana views the development since positively and states that “through our
close coordination with international organizations with a role in European security,
we have built up relations of trust and habits of cooperation which are paying real
dividends in the civil-military interface now under way in Bosnia.”462 Schear offers a
similar assessment and states that “[i]n practice, this a la carte arrangement has proved
less unwieldy than some had feared. Despite occasional tensions and inconsistent
coordination, functional interdependence has bred reasonably good working
relations.”463 In fact, it has been argued that co-ordination improved to such a degree
that the confrontation lines no longer ran between third-party actors, but between the
field offices and their home stations.464 Looking ahead, Schulte emphasised the need
for co-ordination in future operations. Although the possibilities of developing a
standard model for the future are somewhat limited, as specific formats will depend
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on “political circumstances at the time and the attitude and decisions of member
states,” Schulte stressed that early joint planning, “unity of approach”, “clearly
defined missions and responsibilities,” and “tightly linked military and civil planning”
were imperative for success.465 A first step in this direction was widespread
acknowledgement that in civil-military relations permanent liaison arrangements,
joint planning at an early stage, and an interdisciplinary, yet hierarchical co-ordination
structure are essential to the success of a multi-dimensional peace support
operation. 466
6.3 The Civil-Military Task Force (CMTF)
IFOR/SFOR had a two-fold system for assisting civilian implementation. As was
described throughout Chapter 5, IFOR/SFOR provided forces for protection and
logistic support, explicitly contributed to the secure environment through a
continuation of its military tasks, and engaged in reconstruction support.467 At times
when there was a special need for more comprehensive military support, such as to
the OSCE before and during the September 1997 elections, the force was augmented
and personnel directly provided to the relevant organisation. In the same way, the
work of the OSCE in the area of regional arms control and regional stability was
actively promoted by SFOR with data and logistics support. The most visible military
back-up was possibly supplied to the IPTF with whom SFOR conducted joint patrols.
The other major UN institutions whose work was directly related to security was
UNHCR. They also received information from SFOR both on movements of people,
on infrastructure and housing conditions and on progress in reconstruction. Among
other responsibilities in connection with repatriation, SFOR had the critical
responsibility of maintaining the demilitarised character of the Zone of Separation by
carefully checking anybody moving through or into the zone. This aspect of civil-
military co-operation went from being non-existent to stopgap under IFOR and from
variable to widespread under SFOR.
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In contrast, a more systematic approach and the other critical leg of
IFOR/SFOR’s relation to civilian implementation was a Civil-Military Task Force
(CMTF). The task force was established under IFOR and then located at SFOR
headquarters in Sarajevo. It consisted of approximately 350-400 advisors. Aside from
minor French and German contributions, advisors were almost exclusively US reserve
military personnel that acquired civilian experience in any one of twenty functional
areas that covered areas, such as economics and business, law, administration, culture,
engineering, agriculture, etc. A civil affairs unit was a common component of US
forces when deployed in peace support operations, such as in Somalia or in Haiti.
NATO’s civil affairs personnel were stationed at all levels of command in
IFOR/SFOR as well as in the Joint Civil Commissions (JCCs) that were established
by the OHR at regional and local levels and that assisted in a variety of aspects in
civil implementation. In addition to the more general logistics support of SFOR
mentioned above, support to the OHR under CMTF consisted mainly of technical and
engineering expertise, as well as transport and communications support.
Although the Civil Military Task Force (CMTF) was established under IFOR,
their mandate was limited in the early days of the implementation process. Initially,
the task force merely supported peacekeeping operations and small community
projects. Under SFOR, NATO’s civil affairs personnel both reflected and promoted
increased co-operation between the civilian and the military sides of peace
implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “The [...] role [of the CMTF] is to identify
needs and projects for rebuilding of civil infrastructure and institutions. They also co-
ordinate with international organisations, non-governmental organisations and
humanitarian agencies to obtain necessary materials, money, and manpower to meet
these needs.”468 NGOs, in particular, profited from the logistics expertise provided by
NATO’s civil affairs personnel. Aside from co-operation with local actors on
infrastructure and similar projects, the major tasks for CMTF corresponded with the
chief areas of co-operation between SFOR and civilian agencies, such as providing
personnel in support of OSCE’s election efforts, supporting UNHCR in planning
refugee returns, supplying logistics, operations, and training support to IPTF. For this
purpose SFOR set up a Law Enforcement Task Force that assisted in establishing
current co-operation and employment mechanisms between IPTF and local police and
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in developing the plans for the reorganisation of local police forces through
restructuring and a revision of operating procedures.
6.4 Co-operating to Force Compliance
The implementation process demonstrated how the political leadership in each ethnic
group simply continued to treat the undecided issues in accordance with their own
interpretations which of course led to stagnation in the civilian implementation
process. This was also true with respect to the security situation and public allegiance
to the uniform Bosnian state that was not pursued with equal vigour in practice. As a
result, several areas of civilian implementation were severely delayed due to the lack
of co-operation from local parties that incapacitated co-ordination bodies. The
difficulties experienced when placing the responsibility for demining in local hands
was a prime example of this. Likewise the final successful establishment of the NDC
was an indicator of an increased willingness to co-operate with the international
community and among ethnic groups that appeared to be emerging in late 1997.
The growing degree of compliance reflected the success of co-ordination
among international actors. The lack of preparation and co-ordination on the civilian
side initially allowed the parties to play various third-party actors off against each
other.469 It was soon realised that, “[d]onor co-ordination is key to effective peace-
building”470 and that the co-ordination between civilian and military players
harboured huge potential benefits with regard to exercising pressure on the parties to
comply with the Dayton Agreement. As Jane Sharp puts it, “this kind of
conditionality requires a single coherent economic and political strategy, implemented
by a central authority, visibly connected to the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR).”471
The carrot and the stick approach could only work when there was an effective stick
to wield in case the carrot failed to bring about compliance. In fact, the stick would
increase the effectiveness of the carrot.
The benefits of this dynamic were accepted by all actors and mitigated the
‘clash of cultures’ between civilian and military agents. The relative harmony also
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benefited from the fact that no significant outbreaks of violence occurred that would
have challenged IFOR/SFOR to use force. The credible threat of force to a large
extent eliminated the need to use it and facilitated the association of civilian agencies
with the military force. Accordingly, the mutual dependence and the realisation that
the military actors would not be able to withdraw without the civilian ones and that
co-ordination could in fact accelerate joint withdrawal, increase co-operation, and
mitigate cultural and organisational differences between the two. Tellingly, the level
of collaboration was particularly high in times of crises, such as when SFOR was
authorised to use force against media or when the international community joined
forces in the investigation into the shootings in Mostar.
A specific example of a body that promoted ethnic integration among Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats was the Federation Forum which was established in
mid-1996 upon a US initiative and discussed social, economic, political issues. It was
regarded as a necessary step towards more systematic Federation building which
could bring together high level representatives on a regular basis from the
international community and the Federation political leadership.472 In addition,
IFOR/SFOR established a Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) task force and
engaged in public information campaigns to enhance the public understanding of the
force’s presence and activities. Regardless of improved relations, the lack of co-
operation from locals was still the predominant check on progress.473 Despite the
tendency to co-operate across ethnic divisions in a variety of professional groups,
Bosnian politicians of all ethnic groups appeared to be obstructing the process rather
than promoting multi-ethnic coexistence.
6.5 Conclusions on Co-ordination
· NATO, PfP and others: Aside from some practical difficulties, integration and co-
ordination was perhaps surprisingly successful, keeping in mind that the operation
in Bosnia-Herzegovina was NATO’s first actual deployment and that 15 PfP and
four other countries were to be integrated. Both at strategic and at operational
levels co-ordination arrangements were found that helped streamline co-operation.
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· Civil-military rapprochement to force compliance: The clear distinction between
military and civilian timelines and mandates was replaced by a gradual realisation
that close co-operation was both desirable and inevitable. It was recognised that
the goals of the two sides were in fact the same and the date of withdrawal was
likely to be a product of their ability to co-ordinate the remaining aspects of
implementation.
· CMTF: The CMTF contributed substantially to practical co-operation and
facilitated rapprochement due to the fact that the advice was provided by
individual experts rather than ‘prestigious’ organisations. It also served to tie
NGOs into the joint implementation effort to a greater degree.
· Following the initial troublesome period in which the military and the civilian
sides were at complete odds with one another, it appeared that co-ordination
lessons were in fact being learned and translated into practical policy for daily co-
ordination needs – three years into the Dayton process. While there are a number
of proposals for early co-ordination between civilian and military implementers in
future operations, each new deployment is likely to bring its unique set of
circumstances and new lessons to be learned.
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7 Conclusions
In drawing conclusions about the peace implementation process in Bosnia-
Herzegovina more generally, two fundamental questions should be asked. First, what
was done and was it effective? Second, how was it done? The answers to these
questions build on, but go beyond the detailed partial conclusions extracted from each
element of the analysis in the previous chapters.
7.1 What Was Done: Tasks, Execution, and Limitations
“Public security is the first casualty of peace.”474
Dr. James Schear, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, September1997
The delivery of security assistance in support of the peace process in Bosnia-
Herzegovina demonstrated the crucial role of security sector reform in peace
implementation. The security gap that emerged at the end of the war was two-fold
consisting of military and civilian security. Whereas the military security gap was
rapidly filled, closing the civilian security gap proved to be a longer term process that
had to become self-sustainable. IPTF concluded its basic reform programme and
entered the observation phase in which it would become clear whether the local police
forces followed democratic principles of policing and themselves promoted these
values in the education and training of future police officers. Naturally, complete self-
sustainability implies access to sufficient financial resources to put noble ideas into
practice and it was in this area that security assistance provided by the international
community in the form of funding would be required for some time to come.
Although the approach had to be gradual, filling the gap was nonetheless
critical and failure potentially disastrous. Instead of enhancing public security and the
population’s trust in its law enforcement institutions, the unfilled security gap would
in fact act as a conflict generator and undermine the legitimacy of law and order.
Finding no recourse in local police forces and other institutions of the judicial system,
the Bosnian population was likely to take matters into its own hands, be it against
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another individual, another ethnic group, or against the government. Any of these
actions could tip the delicate balance away from peace and towards war. Moreover, as
the remaining security gap was a result of ethnic divisions, the slide into a military
confrontation was not too far off.
The police forces cannot be viewed in isolation from their political context. In
order to succeed reform of the security sector had to be reflected in a parallel political
reform process. Despite some limited progress in the area of multi-ethnic integration,
there was no reason to believe that the police forces would abstain from violating the
human rights of another ethnic group, inhibit freedom of movement and obstruct the
return of minorities, until the nationalist political leaderships ceased to propagate
ethnic hatred and displayed the willingness to co-operate with their counterparts from
other ethnic groups.
In addition to politics, parallel structures created a difficult organisational
backdrop for security sector reform and did not encourage multi-ethnicity in the
security forces. This was reflected in the fact that responsibility for security – one of a
government’s prerogatives – was distributed at different levels and security forces
were only accountable to the rather weak SCMM at the level of the central Bosnian
government. In order to strengthen security at the government level, the Peace
Implementation Council stressed the need to develop a defence dimension at the state
level, amid calls for continued military reform, particularly with respect to improved
inter-entity co-operation and reduced military expenditures.475
In line with the need for an appropriate political backdrop, an underlying
normalisation process would have to occur for the peace process to become truly
autonomous. Here is where the limitations of international security assistance lay.
While the international community could assist in the initial transition from full-
fledged war to tentative peace and promote and accelerate reconciliation and reform
in the security sector, there were structural processes of normalisation that had to take
place to consolidate peace. The normalisation process was primarily psychological
and involved the entire range of local actors, such as the political leaderships, military
and public security forces, and the general population; the same group of actors that
would have to continue the pursuit of peace after the withdrawal of the international
community. Although third-party actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not necessarily
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recognise their limitations, they were successful in triggering “virtuous circles rather
than vicious ones.”476 In that way, they acted as a catalyst for the normalisation
process. In particular, international security assistance that increased transparency
among the parties, acted as an impartial mediator, and offered economic incentives,
played a significant part in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and in the
consolidation of peace.
Perhaps the greatest obstacles to the normalisation process were so-called
‘spoilers’ of the peace process that attempted to halt or reverse the normalisation
process, due to the fact that they profited from a tense state and a generally high level
of insecurity and instability. It is important that the providers of security assistance
distinguish between moderate and extremist spoilers. Whereas the international actors
should aim to win over the former group by making it more profitable to co-operate,
the latter must be marginalised; for example by arresting war criminals or
undercutting their power base. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, rejectionism predominantly
took the form of a limited willingness to co-operate among the political leaders at the
federal, entity, and municipal level. Most of these were willing to concede to the
‘right’ – usually economic – incentives. However, a major challenge persisted, in that
the international community could not and should not attempt to compete with the
‘fringe benefits’ of tension that spoilers profit from through crime and corruption.
Other strategies would have to be devised to marginalise or win over potential
spoilers. Although spoilers in the Bosnian peace process were not the clearly
identifiable group that they have been in other peace processes, they were influential
and had to be dealt with, in order to facilitate the structural process.
Spoilers were particularly successful in undermining a sense of common fate
and common identity which was an important factor in the transition to long-term
peace and stability. Although Michael Steiner claimed that he saw a common Bosnian
identity behind the fears, others were more sceptical as there were no powers or
functions that encouraged loyalty to and identity with the Bosnian state.477 In this
connection, the media had a significant effect on the development of a sense of
common fate and also played a key role in the implementation process by affecting
the general population’s support for the peace process and for the presence of third-
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party actors.478 Recent actions limiting the ‘spoiling’ effect of the media displayed the
international community’s resolve to marginalise sources that undermined the
normalisation process and the consolidation of peace. As Mappes-Niedeck points out,
in the long run, a situation would have to emerge in which ethnicity was of secondary
importance.479
7.2 How Was It Done: Co-ordination, Compliance, and Political Will
Despite Boutros-Ghali’s attempt to systematise different types of peace support
operations, peace implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated that an
operation could never be categorised as purely one or the other. In the early days of
Dayton, the mandate provided by the Agreement was characterised as consisting of
peace enforcement under IFOR/SFOR, peacekeeping by IPTF, and post-conflict
peace building by a host of civilian agents.480 The complex picture of three missions
in one was further blurred in execution; an integrating trend that was called for by
practitioners. Accordingly, as the military force sought to distance itself form its
civilian counterpart, accusations of failure arose concerning the discrepancy between
civilian and military implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Granted, the
Agreement was much less elaborate with respect to civilian tasks than to military
ones, but the irony of the accusations of an uneven pace was that the completion of
primary military tasks was a precondition for initiating civilian activity. Only when
the fundamental security needs of the immediate post-settlement society had been
fulfilled, was it possible to begin putting into practice extensive plans for
reconstruction, repatriation, building of political structures, and economic
development. Thus, in addition to the horizontal and vertical dimensions of civil-
military relations that refer to hierarchical structures of co-ordination, there was a
chronological dimension in the organisation of tasks that pointed to ‘what needed to
come first.’
The realisation that tasks had their sequential as well as their functional place
in the implementation process was late in coming in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Instead,
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misplaced expectations of parallel civilian and military missions that would both be
completed within the first year led to massive and debilitating criticism. In the course
of Dayton’s second year, a more balanced approach and more sophisticated
understanding of the correlation between military and civilian tasks emerged.
Following the initial military success, the remaining security task assigned to the
military and to the civilian police monitors progressed at a speed which was fairly
equal to that of the other tasks in civilian implementation. Aside from the mutual
dependence of the two components in practice, a technicality determined that these
tasks simply could not be completed before significant civilian progress was made, as
SFOR’s mandate to provide a safe and secure environment for the activity of civilian
actors could by definition not run out before the civilians too were ready to leave.
As a result of the grand failure of the international community during the war,
third-party actors entered the peace implementation effort branded by what Gow
termed “the triumph of the lack of will.”481 Accordingly, an important question at the
outset was whether the international community would display sufficient political will
and cohesion of effort to see the peace process through. Although, every actor
involved was aware of the implications of failure, critical observers argued that the
decision to undertake the mission was where the collective political will of the
international community ended. To say the least, third-party actors displayed varying
political will to use those enforcement mechanisms that were available, when putting
Dayton into practice.482 All the while, practitioners and commentators agreed on the
need to “stick to basic principles,” as Steiner expressed it, when he warned against the
dangers of extensively compromising the mission’s goals and underlying values.483
Schulte agrees that “firmness is often a prerequisite to progress;”484 and Preisinger
underlines that progress was only possible with pressure and the international
community had to demonstrate its willingness to draw on the entire range of measures
available to them and to force compliance.
The counter-argument warns that too much pressure could be
counterproductive by creating a dependency that required the presence of the
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international community rather than allowing its departure.485 The International Crisis
Group for one bemoaned the increasing apathy among political leaders that could
avoid difficult decisions that sooner or later would be made by the international
community anyway. 486 At the same time, it might well be that international
determination and assertiveness would be necessary for the full implementation of the
Dayton Agreement. Thus, third-party actors found themselves in a Catch-22 situation,
where they continued to face the challenge of finding the balance between applying
pressure and cultivating and strengthening independent political decision-making
structures. What was undisputed was that despite the unanimous support for a firm
and cohesive stand, the international community effectively wasted a year and a half
on finding the resolve to force implementation. 487
Throughout one should keep in mind the dominating role of the United States
in determining the international stance and the progress of implementation.
Fluctuations in US policy and commitment were reflected in the ups and downs of the
peace process and the need for the strategic leadership of the United States was once
again underlined when a turning-point was reached in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the
Summer of 1997 and in early 1998. Following uneasiness in the Spring, the
international community began reasserting itself during the Summer, and finally took
concrete steps to force compliance on a variety of issues at the PIC Conference in
December 1997. At the time, the peace process also drew strength from the
confirmation of ‘moderate’ leaders in power through the elections in the Republika
Srpska in September 1997. Thus, during three years of implementation, the
international community became more skilful in employing the means that they did
have available for encouraging or forcing compliance. By combining their means for
exercising pressure on the parties, the military force and the civilian implementers
divined an effective tool that drew on both incentives and the threat of force. Their
collaboration served to increase the credibility of both actors which in turn rendered
their tools more effective.
In conclusion, the fact that the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
looking up in late 1998 followed the overdue realisation in the international
community that one indeed had to stand as one in tasks and responsibilities and in the
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process of their execution. The international community contributed tremendous sums
to the peace implementation process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in
comparison with other afflicted areas around the world. Similarly, funding was bound
to decrease as other crises, such as the one in Kosovo, intensified;488 particularly
when it was tempting for the international community to rest on its laurels of late
1998 and the after all remarkable achievements of three years of peace
implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Still, in the security sector the lack of funding
for reform hindered the irreversible consolidation of civil security in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Choices as to the distribution of limited funds are never easy, but
continued lawlessness effectively prevented the full transition from war to peace. The
challenge of breaking the deadlock of fear has yet to be met. Until the population
developed confidence in their personal security, there would be no peace.
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Acronyms – Bosnia-Herzegovina
ARBiH Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina
CAFAO Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe
CIMIC Civil-Military Co-operation
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
CMTF Civil-Military Task Force
COMIFOR Commander in Chief of IFOR
CSBM Confidence and Security Building Measure
DHA Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DPA Dayton Peace Agreement
DPKO Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
ECMM European Commission Monitoring Mission
FPPs Friends of the Peace Process
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GFAP General Framework Agreement for Peace
HDZ Croatian Democratic Union
HVO Bosnian-Croat armed forces/Croat Council of Defence
ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
ICFY International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
IEBL Inter-Entity Boundary Line
IFOR Implementation Force
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPTF International Police Task Force
JCC Joint Civilian Commission
JMC Joint Military Commission
JNA Yugoslav People’s Army
JSAP Judicial System Assessment Programme
MAC Mine Action Centre
MND Multi-National Division
MPRI Military Professional Resources Inc.
NAC North Atlantic Council
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NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDC National Demining Commission
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NPA Norwegian People’s Aid
PfP Partnership for Peace
PIC Peace Implementation Council
PIFWC Persons Indicted for War Crimes
OHR Office of the High Representative
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
ROEs Rules of Engagement
RRTF Return and Reconstruction Task Force
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SCMM Standing Committee on Military Matters
SCRes Security Council Resolution
SDA Party for Democratic Action
SDS Serbian Democratic Party
SFOR Stabilization Force
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General
SRT Srpska Radio Televizija
UN United Nations
UNCivPol United Nations Civilian Police
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMOP United Nations Observer Mission in Prevlaka
UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNTAES United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia
VRS Army of the Serb Republic
WEU Western European Union
ZOS Zone of Separation
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SECTION III: IMPLEMENTING THE LUSAKA PROTOCOL
1 Introduction
It has been argued that international security assistance to enhance the transition from
war to peace in the wake of a peace agreement is particularly important in the absence
of trust between the parties to the conflict. After two futile attempts to manage the
conflict in Angola, the third involvement of the international community was to be
more comprehensive and assertive. Three sets of experiences coloured the starting-
point for the Lusaka peace process: the deep cultural divisions between the parties,
thirty years of civil war, and – more immediately - the atrocities that followed the
collapse of the Bicesse peace process.489 They led to distrust and suspicion. The
divisions among the parties are addressed in greater detail in the presentation of the
local counterparts in Chapter 4 and the implications of the long civil war are
considered throughout. At this stage, it is helpful to cast a brief look back at the events
of 1991-2.
On paper the 1991 Bicesse Accords were exemplary: based on a mutually
agreed cease-fire and providing instructions for demilitarisation, military reform, and
elections to be held after a period of time that would be sufficient to give both parties
to the conflict a real and equal chance to organise politically and decide the struggle
for power by peaceful means.490 Angola after Bicesse was a striking example of the
misplaced but common belief that achieving a peace agreement is the ‘hard part.’ The
world was shocked to find that the Bicesse Accords and the elections held in the
following year did not guarantee peace in Angola. Cleary summarises the causes of
collapse and explains that “[d]eep-seated mutual suspicion, inadequate management
of the challenges of the pre-electoral period, exploitation by both the Angolan
government and UNITA of the inability of the UN observer mission to effect
compliance with the provisions of the Accords, and electoral manipulation led to
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resumption of the civil war.”491 Thus, after a brief peaceful period the war continued
with unparalleled vigour. In 1993, Harding wrote that “whatever the next step in the
peace process, violence seemed a likely form of political expression for as long as
Angola held together.”492
Although the case study is to review the Lusaka implementation process, it is
important to be aware of how scarring the experiences of attempting to implement the
Bicesse Accords were for all the actors involved. While trying to do everything ‘right’
this time around, the actual implementation process bore frequent and uncanny
resemblances to Bicesse, despite the far more extensive international presence. These
reminders could not but have affected the parties’ trust in each other, in the
international presence, and in the peace process itself. At the same time, it was the
lack of trust which was the fundamental factor that had not changed from Bicesse to
Lusaka and was one of the reasons behind the similarities. At the outset, the issues
that stood out as the main challenges in the Lusaka process were a general
demilitarisation and power-sharing. Both were directed at building trust between the
parties as an essential precondition for a successful peace process. Before analysing
the implementation process and its component tasks in detail, it is helpful to briefly
review the major phases of the Lusaka peace process from 1994 until 1998. This
facilitates placing individual international efforts into the wider context of the peace
process as a whole.
The first period was marked by uncertainty, with frequent and severe cease-
fire violations, with atrocities still fresh in the minds, and incomplete deployment of
UNAVEM III. A year went by, before concrete steps towards implementation were
taken, in particular with respect to demobilisation. In contrast to the Bicesse process,
links were established between different segments of the implementation process,
such as that demilitarisation was considered a precondition for the full legalisation of
UNITA through its conversion into a political party. The move to link security issues
with political concessions reflected the distrust that pervaded the relationship between
the parties throughout the implementation process. As a result, when demilitarisation
progressed slowly, it put a severe damper on any political rapprochement. Thus, the
year one evaluation by the UN Secretary General underlined that “[m]any of the
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factors that prevented implementation of the earlier peace accords are still very much
in evidence – distrust, continuing military activities, foot-dragging over quartering
and related activities, obstruction of freedom of movement and the restoration of
government administration, lack of respect for United Nations and other international
personnel.”493 Despite minor, temporary advances, these aspects continued to form
major obstacles throughout the entire peace process until 1998.
Following an agreement between UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and President
Jose Eduardo dos Santos on a revised time table, the peace process accelerated in the
course of 1996 with some progress in the realm of demilitarisation and the integration
of some UNITA officers into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). In December 1996,
UNITA declared that it “ha[d] quartered all members of its Armed Forces and police
[and] surrendered all its weapons to the UN Angola Verification Mission-3.”494 Both
sides appeared to be making steps towards consolidating the peace.
Thus, observers appeared more hopeful than at any previous point in the peace
process, when UNITA representatives took up their positions in the newly formed
Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) in early 1997. Leaning on
those positive assessments and on some nominal improvements with respect to the
demobilisation of UNITA, UNAVEM III began its scheduled downsizing process and
was replaced by MONUA in June 1997. The new UN observer mission was to
complete the remaining tasks by transferring the responsibility for security into local
hands. Most importantly, the transfer of key areas to state authority, which was the
crucial test of UNITA’s willingness to ‘go-all-the-way’ with the peace process, was to
be monitored. Sadly, developments throughout the year revealed UNITA leader Jonas
Savimbi’s – and the government’s – dual strategy of preparing for both war and
peace. UNITA’s willingness to co-operate decreased steadily in the course of the year
and blame was increasingly assigned to Savimbi by most international observers,
including the members of the Troika and the UN.
Although UNITA had fulfilled some of the UN’s conditions in September
1997, a clear shift in US policy took place later in the year. In an attempt to
marginalise the spoilers and bring forces of peace into the international community’s
fold, the United States moved onto the side of the ‘peacemakers,’ that is the MPLA
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government and those UNITA leaders that opted for peace.495 The end result of the
policy shift was that sanctions were finally imposed on UNITA in the fall of 1997.
UNITA also suffered a significant blow when Mobutu Sese Seko was ousted from
power in neighbouring and formerly supportive Zaïre. Although this initially led to a
more co-operative spirit on the part of UNITA, observers also claim that it triggered
the crisis that followed in late 1997, when provocative campaigns were stepped up on
both sides.496 The situation further deteriorated in the course of 1998, with a growing
number of clashes between UNITA and the government. Tellingly, the fourth
anniversary of the signing of the Lusaka Protocol drowned in a military offensive by
the government. As of late 1998, it appears that the loss of support from Zaïre and the
United States was only a temporary setback, until UNITA had filled the gaps with
other willing sources of support.
The Angolan case study is structured in the same way as the study of the
international efforts to implement the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
starting-point for the assessment of international security assistance consists of three
component parts. First, the stage is set by giving an overview over the central security
deficits in the immediate wake of the agreement in Chapter 2. Second, a review of the
Lusaka Protocol in Chapter 3 elaborates on its structure, security-related content, and
legitimacy. Finally, regional and extra-regional actors that were involved in providing
international security assistance to the Angolan peace process are presented in
Chapter 4. On this basis, a thorough analysis of the security aspects of the
implementation process itself is conducted, including demilitarisation, military and
civilian security sector reform, and other supportive security tasks (Chapter 5). Since
implementation must be regarded as a comprehensive effort, special attention must be
paid to the co-ordination of activities (Chapter 6). The case study ends with some
conclusions on the international efforts to enhance security in the implementation of
the Lusaka Protocol.
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2 Threats to Security in the Wake of the Lusaka Protocol
The purpose of identifying threats to security is to determine those aspects of security
that the state is incapable of providing for its citizens. These points of breakdown are
where the international community comes in. As Gambari points out with respect to
the role of outsiders in the reconstruction of collapsed states, “foreign intervention
means that states’ functions are being performed – whether as assistance or
interference – by another state or group of states.”497
The following section describes the situation in Angola in the immediate wake
of the Lusaka Protocol in terms of the threats to security at that time. Naturally, in the
process of implementing the Protocol, conditions changed. What is described here,
was merely the starting-point: the initial conditions under which the agreement was to
be implemented. How these conditions developed emerges in the discussion of the
implementation process. I will refrain from discussing the obvious threats to security
that open warfare implied.
2.1 Military Threats
Threats to military security arose with disputed territory, the presence of armed forces
of various allegiances, and the easy availability of arms in the conflict area.
Control over Angolan territory was divided between UNITA and the MPLA-
led government. In contrast to other cases in which territory is to be distributed among
warring parties, either as newly formed states or component parts of a state, the goals
of peace and national reconciliation in Angola implied that all territory was to be
surrendered to one of the contestants. Although the latest military strike by the
government put it into control to the degree that it accelerated the signing of the
Protocol, strongholds remained and UNITA retained enough territory to have a major
bargaining tool. In view of the scope, the depth, and duration of UNITA’s control
over certain areas, the movement was understandably reluctant to hand over territory.
For the peace process to succeed, territory would eventually have to be brought under
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uniform control, but it was clear that substantial incentives and guarantees would be
required to induce UNITA to transfer authority over its strongholds.
A cease-fire was not in place at the time of signing, but it was to take effect
two days later.498 Several factors were likely to impact the effectiveness of the cease-
fire. First, there was the size of the country and the concomitant size of the two
opposing armies. Therefore, the degree to which a cease-fire would be effective
would also depend on the degree of control that the two leaders had over UNITA and
government forces respectively. Second, Angola’s history was fraught with
ineffective cease-fires, agreements and other ups and downs of war. As a result, the
degree to which the current cease-fire would be complied with would vary. Both
factors were interrelated and there was a danger that negative trends would reinforce
each other. Realistically, one could not expect the cease-fire to hold with a complete
absence of clashes, but the overall picture to be one of absence of open armed
conflict.
Angola’s wars since independence have featured external involvement
throughout. In their study of the Angola peace processes, Saferworld argues that
external involvement rendered the conflict more destructive than it otherwise would
have been. They state that “[b]y the mid-1980s, outside interests were moving the war
along with a momentum of its own and the outcome had become crucial to the
evolution of Southern Africa as a whole.”499 Accordingly, foreign forces were also
present in the wake of the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in late 1994. Whereas
superpower presence had ceased, a more mixed assortment of foreign forces
supported the two sides in the conflict. Mercenaries had played a decisive role in the
most recent military achievements on the part of the government, prior to signing of
the Protocol. With the regime change in South Africa, that country’s heavy
involvement had also been reduced. The most influential aspect of international
involvement in the final stages of military action, was the extensive supply of arms to
the MPLA and to a slightly lesser extent UNITA. 500
In addition to the presence of foreign forces, the male population of Angola
was highly mobilised. In contrast to conflicts of shorter duration, a highly mobilised
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state had been a continuous feature of Angolan society for over thirty years and was
necessarily translated into a way of life. Because of the degree to which the fabric of
society had been destroyed, allowances would have to be made for a drawn-out
transition from war to peace. Mobilisation not only meant being integrated into a
military organisation, but implied that large sections of the population were uprooted
from their homes, due to the movement of the force they belonged to, and that
families were split up. Rather than nurturing traditional family and community ties,
mobilisation transferred loyalties over to those that could provide security and some
form of organisation in times of upheaval and insecurity. International security
assistance faced the major challenge of establishing alternative structures of identity
and of reducing the role of the military in each individual’s life.
The unclear distinction between military and civilian security in Angola makes
the evaluation of implementation and reform difficult. Formally, a delineation was
made between military and civilian security forces, with the Angolan Armed Forces
(FAA), on the one hand, and the Angolan National Police (ANP), on the other. In
addition, both sides had parallel security structures, such as the Rapid Reaction Police
(RRP) on the part of the government or UNITA’s Mining Police. Although police
forces in name, most of their activities were to some degree military in nature.
Initially, specific tasks were allocated to the military and the police forces. Also, lip
service was paid to the necessity of quartering the FAA and the Rapid Reaction Police
and of developing a reliable impartial police force. However, the dividing line
between the two forces became more and more blurred in the course of
implementation. The result was a more general sense of insecurity and instability
throughout Angola that the Angolan government scrambled to meet with whatever
means it had at its disposal, thereby undermining attempts at reform and clarification.
Much more so than in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the major challenge to internal
security was to address a source of instability that consisted of a military force, i.e.
UNITA. As a result, there was an imbalance between the police’s tasks in theory and
its opponents in practice. For all intents and purposes, the police faced an army rather
than individual criminals. Even the police’s main task of disarming the civilian
population was military in nature when it reached the scale that the operation had in
Angola. It was not without good reason that the primary responsibility for
disarmament was assigned to IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than to the
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IPTF. None of the security assistance provided by the international community could
alter the trend towards growing indistinction.
Furthermore, a massive inflow of arms had taken place over a period of thirty
years, from Cuba, countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the
United States, South Africa, and other countries in the region. Despite the fact that
UNAVEM I had successfully supervised the withdrawal of Cuban and South African
troops from Angola, large numbers of arms had remained. Since the collapse of the
Bicesse process, arms again arrived in Angola on both sides of the conflict from a
variety of sources. The result was an immense number of small arms, evenly spread
among the population, aside from the military capabilities in the hands of the parties.
As Harding put it, “[i]n the right hands, the gun confers absolute legitimacy, while
grievance is left to take care of itself.”501 Although unsophisticated weaponry was
accountable for a large number of deaths in the Angolan conflict, the trend pointed
towards the introduction and increasing spread of heavier weapons.502
Angola was – and continues to be – one of the most mine-ridden countries in
the world. As the UN Mine Action Programme stated, the “scope and complexity of
the mine threat is probably greater than in any other country and will require a well-
co-ordinated approach.”503 With a population of twelve million and estimates of over
ten million mines, there was a mine density of at least one mine per person. 504 The
extent of mine contamination was excessive in Angola, because mines were used as
part of a war strategy of disruption, and because the war had raged throughout the
entire country at one time or another.505 After more than thirty years of civil war, it
was not to be expected that the placement of land mines had been recorded by the
parties to any significant extent.
Although landmines were a military tool, there were two main civilian aspects
of landmine contamination that had significant security implications. The first and
most important was the inability of the displaced population to return to their homes.
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Return was hampered due to the fact that both housing and the roads leading forth
were heavily mined, rendering large parts of the population immobile in their exile.
Naturally, a country will not return to a stable state, unless the population has settled
and starts to plan for the future. The second civilian aspect was that landmine
contamination further impeded resettlement and the consolidation of peace. Even
those refugees that indeed managed to return home were unable to farm the land and
become self-sufficient. In that way, it was clear that land mines would have a
restraining effect on economic reconstruction and regeneration for some time to come,
offering few opportunities for the immediate peaceful future. The devastating legacy
of landmines was a critical security issue in Angola where much of the Angolan
population was even more reliant on farming than the population in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and “[s]ubsistence agriculture [had been] the traditional livelihood for
the majority of the country’s [...] citizens.”506
2.2 Threats to Law and Order
The rule of law has to do with the existence and performance of the institutions of
justice, including the police, the court system, and the penal system and threats to law
and order arise when these institutions malfunction. Gambari claims that “[e]ven in
the best of times in Africa, the maintenance of law and order as an attribute of
statehood has existed only tenuously, because the instruments of the state, such as the
judiciary, the police, and the army, have never really been sufficient to cope with the
full demands of governance.”507 This clearly held true for Angola.
The Angolan police force itself had clear para-military roots and the security
environment featured a host of internal security forces. Most of these fought alongside
the army on behalf of the government. The Angolan National Police remained heavily
armed and partial to the MPLA. Moreover, although well-equipped many policemen
were illiterate and ignorant of democratic standards of policing and human rights. In
addition, para-military forces continued to exist under the leadership of both parties.
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As cease-fire violations decreased in late 1995 and in the course of 1996, crime rates
rose. Crime became an increasing problem for the government, and the Angolan
police was completely incapable of living up to the challenge.508 According to
Saferworld, there was a danger that crime would “evolve into a state of generalised
anarchy.”509
An elaborate system of courts had been established in the course of a nation-
wide reorganisation along Marxist-Leninist lines. The network of courts was divided
both geographically and functionally and contained different kinds of people’s courts
as well as a Supreme Court and a Court of Appeals. The legal process in Angola often
involved consulting with respected leaders of different ethnic groups and with other
local residents. Despite these trappings of a court system, the “independence of the
judicial structure and process was severely circumscribed by political control of the
court system and the fact that the judges of the military tribunals [established in 1983]
were military officers whose appointment, reassignment, and removal were controlled
by the minister of defense.”510 In addition, formal legal rights were often disrespected
or not invoked, resulting in serious and frequent human rights violations. Naturally,
Angola was a country subject to civil war since independence and had little
opportunity to develop a more legitimate court system. Moreover, there were rival
systems of courts and prisons in UNITA-held territories.
Under both parties’ leadership, the penal system was if possible in a worse
state than the judicial system. According to reports by the US government and human
rights groups, conditions in Angolan prisons were life threatening, particularly due to
food scarcity, overcrowding, sanitary conditions, and lack of medical treatment.
Moreover, arbitrary arrests and abductions remained the order of the day.
Inadequacies in the judicial and the penal system were of course closely related. Thus,
“a scarcity of resources and the lack of qualified and motivated personnel in the
judicial system, limited the exercise of [the prisoners’ constitutional] rights.”511 A
corrupt and ineffective system of justice engendered an absence of trust on the part of
the population that instead sought alternative manners of redress.
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2.3 Other Threats to Security
In order to fully comprehend the immediate post-war situation in Angola, it should be
remembered that since the break down of the Bicesse process in September 1992 a
“humanitarian disaster ha[d] befallen the country which ha[d] no parallel even during
the long 30-years-war from 1961 to 1991.”512 In July 1993, the UN estimated that one
thousand people were dying each day and a total of 300,000 died between 1992 and
1994.513 Since international arms shipments from the major external players had
officially ceased, the destructiveness of the post-Bicesse war was astonishing and in
part due to more sophisticated weapon technology. The involvement of private
security companies also contributed to the fierceness of the war.514 As a result of the
renewed conflict, an estimated 30% of the population, that is 3.5 million people, were
in need of humanitarian assistance in late 1994. The situation was particularly
difficult in the interior, where large areas had been inaccessible for humanitarian aid
due to the intensity of fighting.
A large number of people was also displaced as a result of the latest fighting,
but there were also refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) that had not
returned in the course of the Bicesse process. Approximately 280,000 refugees were
spread out in camps along the borders in Zaïre, later to become the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Congo/Brazzaville, Namibia, and Zambia and had been
living there under squalid conditions for several years. In addition, there were about
one million internally displaced inside Angola.515
As mentioned above, the proliferation of landmines put a serious damper on
the prospects for economic reconstruction. Moreover, in contrast to Bosnia-
Herzegovina, where there was an economic base even though it was more or less
moribund, there was no general economic infrastructure that might form a starting-
point for regeneration in Angola. Obviously, infrastructure that served the oil,
diamond and other mining industry was the exception that confirmed the rule. The
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civil war in Angola had caused the “complete collapse of economic activity, the
denial of essential services, and massive overcrowding in the cities as people [sought]
refuge from the conflict.”516 The duration of the war and the scope of destruction
added up to a bleak starting-point for lasting peace in Angola, but also underlined the
compelling need for peace. Fituni points to the enormity of the job at hand and the
need to “creat[e] conditions for self-sustained growth and decent living standards for
society.” Still, he is weary of the fact that “the social costs of putting the state together
[in Angola] may make the program’s implementation completely unrealizable.”517
The magnitude of the psychological transition becomes apparent in Fituni’s
comment on the war’s duration: “During forty years of war, two generations of
Angolans have been born and reached maturity. They have never lived in conditions
of peace and stability and do not know what peaceful development of the state is
about.”518 One would suspect that the longer a war has been raging, the longer it
would take the population to develop confidence in the peace process. This is
especially true in Angola where the population suffered an additional blow, when it
placed overwhelming trust in the elections in the Bicesse process and was severely
burnt in the subsequent return to war.
Not surprisingly then, the population’s trust in the government was variable.
The social contract that had to be re-established, would be difficult to resurrect – or
even erect – as long as the government was unable to project its power into
geographically remote regions. Therefore, trust in the government’s ability to
guarantee the individual’s security would be very hard to build. Although one may
argue that an alternative decentralised system of government may be more appropriate
given Angola’s vast territory and regional divisions, the need for a uniform system
that covers the entire territory – whatever its other characteristics – is indisputable.
Indeed, “Angola’s legitimacy as a unitary state is unquestioned, but the internal
contradictions appear irreconcilable precisely because they have been artificially
implanted and fostered from outside. In the mid-1990s, with external forces hardly
interested in Angola’s internal feuds, the confrontation lives on by itself, because the
future of each of the warring parties depends on it.”519
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3 The Lusaka Protocol
3.1 General Review of the Agreement
3.1.1 Structure, Content, and Goals
Following negotiations between the government and UNITA that lasted over a year,
the Lusaka Protocol was initialled by the negotiators in Lusaka on October 31, 1994
and finally signed on 22 November 1994.520 From a legal point of view, the Lusaka
Protocol was detailed, comprehensive and provided a sound basis for implementation.
It drew on the Bicesse Accords, Security Council Resolutions, international statutes,
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Angolan Constitution as
its legal footing. The Bicesse Accord was emphasised throughout, underlining the fact
Box 2.1: Summary of Threats to Security
(1) Military threats: Control over territory was divided, with clear strongholds for each party. All of the territory
was to be transferred to government hands. Large armies existed on both sides of the conflict and the civilian
population of Angola was armed to the teeth. The distinction between military and civilian security forces was
blurred. There was an enormous number of landmines that hindered freedom of movement, repatriation, and
economic reconstruction and inflicted widespread bodily harm.
(2) Civilian security threats: The police was ineffective and not credible due to its involvement on one side of
the conflict, was heavily armed, and frequently committed human rights abuses. In addition, there were a
number of official and unofficial para-military groupings. Both the judicial and the prison system were
essentially defunct.
(3) Other threats: Due to long years of fighting, infrastructure had been almost completely destroyed and
economic activity was limited to the oil and diamond industries that harboured few or no economic benefits for
the general population. In the immediate wake of the Lusaka Protocol there were approximately 300,000
refugees and one million internally displaced.
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that the Lusaka Protocol merely represented a revitalisation of that same peace
process and that the Bicesse Accords were in no way invalid, despite the derailed
implementation. In this way, the legitimacy of the government and its claim to power
was maintained and strengthened, as moving away from Bicesse would have placed a
question mark behind the election results, inadvertently supporting Savimbi’s claim of
fraud and introducing additional instability at the outset of a fragile process. This was
particularly important to the international community which had identified Jonas
Savimbi as the culprit in the return to war in 1992 and which wished to underline their
commitment to the MPLA as the democratically elected government of Angola.
Moreover, the international community did not want to engage in a repetition of the
disastrous election experience and the tension it would bring, and chose not to toss the
power ball out into an open court again. To highlight this point, the institutions that
emerged from the elections were cited as one of the starting-points of the Lusaka
process.
The Protocol consisted of a brief statement of intent that listed some
cornerstones of the current process, such as the Bicesse Accords, the election results,
the desire to achieve national reconciliation, and the resolutions of the United Nations
Security Council. These cornerstones made up the constituent documents of the
Lusaka Protocol, in combination with the ten annexes.521 The desire to maximise the
operationalisation of items in order to avoid diverging interpretations during
implementation, was reflected in the fact that most of the Annexes were further sub-
divided into General Principles, Specific Principles and Modalities. By stating
indisputable general principles and then moving on to the greatest possible level of
detail the parties could agree upon, the authors of the agreement attempted to lay a
sound foundation for implementation.
Literature on the viability of peace agreements is divided on the issue of how
detailed an agreement should be. Proponents of a detailed approach argue that
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unresolved or ambiguous issues are potential time bombs in the implementation
process. In the interest of impartiality of the implementers, a sound and explicit
agreement is preferred as a neutral standard. It provides a greater degree of legitimacy
should pressure need to be exercised to force compliance. In contrast, arguing that the
implementation process is far from predictable at the time of the signing of an
agreement, others have pointed to the need for flexibility. The Lusaka Protocol is an
example of an agreement that sought to anticipate the central issues as
comprehensively as possible. Only in a few instances did the Protocol refer to
outstanding written documents to be exchanged by the government, UNITA and the
UN, in which specifics would be determined at a later date.
The goals of the agreement, as listed in the Protocol section were “lasting
peace” and “true and sincere national reconciliation” in Angola.522 Given the
emphasis placed on reconciliation, it appears that the unity of the country was an
implicit goal of the agreement. Sarcastically, one might argue that national unity was
to be preserved as that would guarantee whoever was in power access to both oil and
diamond resources. In the case of partition, the dividing lines would be likely to
separate the two sets of resources. Although one should not discount the genuine wish
for peace, the war in Angola made most observers rather cynical. As a result, the call
for peace and the normalisation of political and social life might indicate that both
sides wanted to legitimise and complete their hold on power.
The main items of the Protocol included military security issues, such as the
re-establishment of a cease-fire, demobilisation under UNAVEM III and the
integration of UNITA generals into the FAA, and civilian security issues, such as the
incorporation of former UNITA soldiers into the national police force. Furthermore, a
number of political issues were addressed, including the outstanding second round of
presidential elections and the allocation of government posts to UNITA. 523 In addition
to the electoral process, national reconciliation was linked to various other civilian
issues. Several efforts directed at liberating the media and activating it for the cause of
reconciliation were devised, such as initiating awareness campaigns “to promote the
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spirit of tolerance, coexistence and trust in Angolan society.”524 The declaration of an
amnesty early on in the process was to underline conciliatory efforts. Strengthening of
the central government through the transfer of areas under UNITA administration was
absolutely necessary to engender a sense of national unity and shared destiny. Still,
whether the desired impact would indeed take place, would depend on how
effectively the power holders governed and managed to make their power felt in
outlying areas.
The agreement included sophisticated timetables for implementation. Whereas
deadlines could be brought forward by mutual agreement, delays were implicitly
considered intolerable. In part, the strict stance on timetables was a result of the
difficulties experienced in the Bicesse process. The Lusaka Protocol bore witness to a
more thorough understanding of the interrelations between different elements of
implementation. Accordingly, the Protocol included a mechanism that stated that
“[n]o task shall be initiated before the previous one has been concluded.”525 Clearly,
there was a fundamental contradiction here. While wishing to express a firmer stance
on non-compliance and a low tolerance policy with respect to delays, the document
recognised the intricacies of implementation and the need for flexibility. In practice, it
soon became clear that the deadlines stipulated in the agreement were largely
irrelevant to the peace process.
Despite its drawbacks, observers tended to agree that, compared to the Bicesse
Accords, the Lusaka Protocol featured a number of improvements.526 First, the UN
presence was to be much larger.527 Second, the force had a more far-reaching mandate
which involved it directly in the disarmament process. Third, the time-table for the
second round of presidential elections was more flexible, which eventually led to an
indefinite postponement. Fourth, the Lusaka Protocol envisioned power-sharing
arrangements that were to serve as an incentive for UNITA to abandon its military
strategy. Finally, the agreement included provisions to promote an administrative
decentralisation process in an effort to bring local and provincial government closer to
the people.
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3.1.2 Legitimacy and Self-interest
Generally, one assumed that fundamental consent to the international presence and
support for the peace process was given through the signing of the agreement. In that
way, the UN peacekeeping force could call on the agreement as a basis for its actions.
However, consent is never static and evolves throughout the peace process. In
Angola, too, it varied with the extent that the parties felt that their objectives had been
met and were represented in the agreement. In essence, it was a question of the extent
to which the parties accepted the agreement as the appropriate mechanism for conflict
management, as well as the international actors’ assistance. This section discusses the
political positions, goals, and security perceptions of the parties in connection with the
peace agreement, as well as the parties’ relationship with the third-party actors. In this
manner, it will be easier to gauge the validity and potential of the agreement.
The Protocol was initialled by representatives of UNITA and the government
on October 31, 1994 and was subsequently approved by “the competent constitutional
authorities of the Republic of Angola and by the statutory UNITA authorities.”528
However, neither President dos Santos nor UNITA leader Savimbi signed the
agreement themselves. Savimbi was unwilling to travel to Lusaka and questioned
some of its provisions, even as the document was being signed.529 While the Security
Council chose a ‘wait and see’ approach, Amnesty International interpreted the
situation as a dubious starting-point for the peace process, claiming that “the signing
                                                
528 Lusaka Protocol. UNITA Congress approved the Lusaka Protocol in February 1995. S/1995/177,
II.4.
529 In fact, Annex 2 reflected reservations on the part of UNITA, as to the legitimacy of the resolutions.
Rather than recognising their legal bindingness, UNITA admits that “it has taken good note” of the
documents; hardly a wholehearted endorsement. Lusaka Protocol, Annex 2.
Box 3.1: Basic Features of the Lusaka Protocol
The Lusaka Protocol was declared to be a continuation of the Bicesse process with reconciliation as
its primary goal and confirmed the MPLA government in power in order to avoid instant potentially
destabilising political competition. Observers tended to agree that it was an improvement compared to
the 1991 agreement.
The Protocol was detailed and comprehensive with respect to military and civilian security issues and
underlined the linkages between different aspects of implementation.
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of the Lusaka Protocol owed more to international pressure than to the political will of
the Angolan government and UNITA to achieve peace.”530
Both parties were unhappy with the agreement.531 Towards the end of the
negotiations, the MPLA had been gaining momentum and was winning back territory.
From the time of independence, the MPLA had had the advantage of governing “the
new polity of Angola from the heart of its own ethnic regional stronghold”532 and
considered itself superior to its opponent. The recent military gains by the government
did not force UNITA to the bargaining table, but they did accelerate the negotiating
process and influenced what concessions the movement had to make.533 Although the
government was generally interested in seizing the opportunity of reaching an
agreement, it also wanted to continue its military campaign in an effort to reverse
UNITA’s military gains on the ground. UNITA on the other hand, was dissatisfied
because it did not manage to “translate its military gains into political control.”534
Accordingly, “Lusaka set the mood for what was to come,”535 namely a peace
process marked by distrust and a zero-sum perception among the parties. Similarly,
the agreement has been accused of dealing with the symptoms of the conflict rather
than its root causes. Thus, the absence of trust and of a common outlook that
originated in deep-seated divisions and that had derailed earlier attempts at peace,
were not taken into account. Naturally, these would be difficult to integrate into a
legal document even under the best of circumstances and attempts were made to
counteract distrust between the parties through the extended role of the UN. But it
was not until mid-1997 that the Secretary General pointed to “the need to bridge the
deep political, psychological and even regional divisions in the country and to foster
mutual trust which has been severely undermined by one of the longest-running
conflicts in Africa.”536 Cleary agrees when he writes that “[t]he antagonism of each
side to the ‘other,’ apparent when their diplomatic guards are down, can be
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531 See for example Alex Vines (1999a) Angola Unravels – The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace
Process (Human Rights Watch 9/1999; http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/angola/Ang1998.htm), Ch.
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535 Manning (1999), p. 209.
Section III Implementing the Lusaka Protocol
205
frightening. The challenge of overcoming deep-rooted resentments, fears and
suspicions, defining common visions, developing common values and building a
nation, still lies ahead in Angola.”537 Thus, the lack of trust would determine the
context in which the Lusaka Protocol was to be implemented.
Despite the misgivings of some observers, the two parties regularly expressed
their formal willingness and commitment. In May 1995, President dos Santos and
Jonas Savimbi declared their support for the peace process and their willingness to
resolve the outstanding issues at a meeting in the near future. Throughout the peace
process, the level of political support was reflected in the parties’ willingness to
conduct high levels meetings.538 Thus, after a series of summits in 1995, the climate
improved considerably. 539 Increasingly, however, meetings took place within the Joint
Commission and under pressure from outside actors. It was also telling that Savimbi
was absent at the two most important political benchmarks, namely the signing of the
Lusaka Protocol and the inauguration of the GURN.540 Typically, UNITA Congresses
affirmed the movement’s commitment to the peace process, but fell short of taking
practical steps, such as in connection with the formation of the FAA and the transfer
of state authority. 541 The government was equally good at paying lip service to the
Lusaka process. Thus, timetables were agreed upon without being followed up.
Sometimes it appeared that deadlines were set to please the international community
rather than to gratify either of the parties. In the end, Manning writes that “[d]espite
several periods in which significant progress was made, mutual mistrust deepened
rather than diminished with each important step taken in the process.”542
Given the level of suspicion, the existence and credibility of security
guarantees were critical issues that were only partially resolved. The UN, on the one
hand, and the parties’ commitment to rapid demilitarisation, on the other, were
theoretical security guarantees. In practice, however, the relative weakness of the
UN’s mandate and immediate delays in the military build-down deprived the
guarantees of their credibility.
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The Protocol also underlined that the parties recognised their primary
responsibility for its implementation, and that they desired the presence and the
support of the United Nations.543 This was the starting-point for a pattern of
manipulation of the international community by both parties that both understood the
international system very well. Due to the loss of support and stigmatisation that was
triggered by UNITA’s rejection of the 1992 election results, UNITA harboured little
trust in the external actors. However, UNITA also recognised that the UN presence
would put a stop to the government’s military momentum. Moreover, should things
not work out to UNITA’s satisfaction in the peace process, the UN would once again
serve as a convenient scapegoat.544 A positive aspect had been the appointment of
Alioune Blondin Beye, former Foreign Minister of Mali, as Special Representative to
the Secretary General, which Jonas Savimbi welcomed because he believed that Beye
understood ‘African’ problems better.545 Unfortunately, Beye proved not to be
authoritative enough; not because of any lack of zeal, but due to the fact that he did
not have the weight of the international community behind him. As a result, he could
not sustain the parties’ respect. Aside from the limitations on its military campaign,
the MPLA was basking in the good will of the international community, having been
recognised as the legitimate government. As the international community became
more critical of the government’s military and human rights violations, and especially
its involvement in the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville, the MPLA grew less co-
operative. Then, when the military track gained in importance in the course of 1998,
the UN presence was increasingly seen as a tiresome impediment.
At the same time, Vines argues that by 1998, “[t]he UN’s practice of ignoring
the two parties’ deceptions and depredations and its own lack of transparency had
encouraged both parties’ to regard the peace process with contempt, and both, the
Angolan government and UNITA had determined that war was their preferred
option.”546 Manning sums up that “[b]y early this year [1999] both the government
and UNITA had apparently grown weary of the fiction of observing the Lusaka
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Protocol and the accompanying tedium of justifying their actions to the international
community.”547
3.2 Security and Security-Related Arrangements
3.2.1 Tasks Set Out in the Protocol
Having presented the structure, content, and goals of the agreement more generally,
the following section elaborates on the security-related arrangements in the Lusaka
Protocol. The strict timetables for military security tasks reflected a major lesson
learned from the Bicesse process, namely the need for the demobilisation processes to
be completed before most other tasks could even be addressed. To underline the
lesson, the military security issues were divided into two Annexes, concerning the
cease-fire, demobilisation and disarmament, on the one hand, and referring to military
reform in the national forces of Angola, on the other. While all the items on the
military security agenda had detailed timetables, it was constantly underlined that no
progress would be made in other areas until the UN had certified satisfactory
completion of the quartering process. As mentioned above, hindsight begs the
question of how realistic or even how relevant the deadlines were.
Throughout the annexes, the role of the UN was indicated in connection with
the results to be achieved through the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. Annex
8, then, was dedicated to detailing the tasks that the United Nations were to take on in
                                                
547 Manning (1999), p. 211.
Box 3.2: Legitimacy of the Agreement
The greatest drawback of the Lusaka Protocol was that it paid little heed to the absence of trust
between the parties. It set the tone for the peace process in that it could not breach the gap in trust
and included only half-hearted security guarantees that could not match the parties’ security
concerns. The international community was respected only as long as there was a shred of credibility
behind its commitments to peace. After that, the relationship between the parties and the external
presence was marked by attempts to manipulate.
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the implementation of the agreement. Here, they were assigned a major role, “in
contrast to the Bicesse Accords in which [...] the UN was limited to verifying the
implementation of the cease-fire.”548 The Lusaka Protocol was similar to other peace
agreements in that it contained typical tasks in an immediate post-settlement phase,
such as monitoring a cease-fire, supervising the separation of forces and the
withdrawal of foreign forces, in particular the mercenaries involved on both sides in
the Angolan civil war. Transfer of territory is a typical component of agreements that
settle an interstate conflict. The Lusaka Protocol referred to the transition of UNITA-
held territory into government hands, as a part of the recognition and implementation
of the election results of 1992 that confirmed the MPLA in power.
Following the immediate post-settlement phase, in which troops were
positioned in a way that removed the immediate threat of renewed clashes, a more
comprehensive demilitarisation process was initiated. This included demobilisation,
disarmament, and the registration of armed forces and weapons on both sides of the
conflict. Whereas demobilised UNITA soldiers were to be integrated into the national
armed forces (FAA), into the national police force, and into Angolan society, former
combatants on the MPLA government side were primarily to be returned to civilian
life. The integration of UNITA forces into a joint armed force for Angola was a
continuation of the Bicesse process, which also included an element of military
reform, similar to the Lusaka Protocol. However, when the two sides returned to
hostilities in 1992, the UNITA staff that had been part of the FAA pulled out,
instantly reversing the results of the military integration efforts. In order to ensure that
integration would stand the test of time, the Lusaka Protocol envisioned a multi-
faceted process that involved the former opposing military staff in training
programmes and joint leadership. Absent from the Protocol were provisions for a
regional security network, which proved to be a significant shortfall, as the security in
the region was clearly interconnected and both troops and arms effortlessly crossed
borders, seriously undermining stability.
In the implementation of all of the military security provisions, the UN was to
act as the neutral holder of all information, ensuring mutual transparency. The idea
was for the UN to bridge the gap between the parties in order to overcome the lack of
trust and allow the peace process to begin.
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The list of tasks for the UN in Annex 8 was very detailed and consequently
very long. In contrast to other peacekeeping missions, the main problem in this case
was not a vague mandate but the lack of means to carry it out. The Protocol stressed
the good will of both parties and their desire to implement the provisions agreed to,
but even under the best of circumstances the UN would have required a far larger
mission than the one set up. In theory, only a limited force was necessary given the
vociferous support both parties expressed for the agreement, but in practice, the
operation was too comprehensive for the staff present to carry it out. It was
unfortunate that a so thoroughly planned process could not be implemented more
effectively. The analysis of the implementation process will reveal to what degree the
lack of security that a larger and more heavily armed force might have provided for
the parties and the population at large, affected the pace of the peace process and
indirectly the political willingness of the parties to comply with the Lusaka Protocol.
In areas related to the civilian side of security, the Lusaka Protocol was also
fairly comprehensive, covering items, such as calls for social integration programmes
for former combatants and returning refugees, that other agreements had been
criticised for lacking. The agreement implicitly recognised the links between civilian
and military security by placing the “[f]ree circulation of persons and goods” among
the specific principles in the first military annex. 549 Other typical borderline issues
between military and civilian security were the reconstruction of infrastructure and
demining, including the establishment of a demining school. 550
In addition to the Lusaka Protocol the mandate detailed in Security Council
Resolution 976(1995), provided a legal basis for security tasks to be executed in the
course of the peace process. The UN mandate for the new peacekeeping force
included five elements: (1) political, (2) military, (3) police, (4) humanitarian, and (5)
electoral. 551 The political element in the mandate gave UNAVEM III a mediating role
in the extension of state administration to all of Angolan territory and in other efforts
towards national reconciliation. The UN was also to assist in the preparation and
implementation of the second round of presidential elections and be the final instant
for their approval. 552 The mandate in the military sphere encompassed supervision and
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verification of the parties’ obligations in demilitarisation, as well as the formation of
national armed forces. In addition, the UN was given the task of co-ordinating and
supporting all humanitarian efforts with an emphasis on tasks arising in the process of
demobilisation and reintegration.
With respect to law and order and civilian security sector reform, UNAVEM
III was to oversee the dissolution of para-military groups and the neutrality of the
national police force. Specific tasks for the UN civilian police monitors included the
following:
- “to verify and monitor the neutrality of the Angolan National Police (ANP)
- to monitor and verify the collection and storage by the ANP of arms in the hands of
the Civilian Police
- to verify the quartering of the Rapid Reaction Police
- to verify the activities of the ANP in regard to security arrangements for UNITA
leaders
- to verify the process of integration of UNITA members into ANP.”553
While police performance, and implicitly promoting respect for human rights, was
an important element in the civilian police monitors’ list of tasks, the mandate
reflected the recognition that the militarisation of the police forces had to be reversed
first. The police was to be transformed into a neutral agent and public service
institution rather than an instrument of the government. Although the distinction
between internal and external security appears somewhat artificial in the Angolan
context, it is the inherent final goal of the military and civilian security sector reform.
Thus, if the transition from war to peace was to be successful in the long run, Angola
would have to have one armed force and one national police force that consisted of
and served members of both parties equally. Therefore, those UN civilian police tasks
that pointed towards meeting some of UNITA’s security concerns, that is overseeing
the incorporation of former UNITA soldiers into the ANP and provisions for the
safety of UNITA leaders, were critical.
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3.2.2 Structures of Authority over Implementation
Throughout the Lusaka Protocol it was repeatedly underlined that the responsibility
for the successful completion of the transition from war to peace lay solely in the
hands of the parties themselves. Third-party actors were asked to monitor and verify
the activity of the parties, but these measures were meant to be supportive only. In
practice, however, the international community became so heavily involved that it
inadvertently assumed that authority, regardless of the fact that the agreement had
placed the responsibility for the peace process in the hands of the parties. There was
hope that the formal ownership of the process would encourage the parties to move
ahead. At the same time, the limited role of external actors reflected the level of
commitment in the international community which was not willing to bear the
financial and human costs of a larger and more muscular operation.
An example of the supervisory function was the control and verification of the
cease-fire. Also, the UNAVEM III Force Commander was to “supervise the
establishment and management of quartering areas and the registration and
subsequent demobilization of UNITA personnel.”554 In accordance with the SCRes
976, the SRSG had the executive authority over the UNAVEM III operation. In the
area of humanitarian assistance, the co-ordination of activities was to remain in the
hands of the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Unit (UCAH). In
addition to co-ordinating the different UN bodies in this area, the unit was involved in
Box 3.3: Security Tasks in the Protocol
The dilemma of timetables reappeared in the Lusaka Protocol and its subsequent implementation.
Despite the clear benefits of strict deadlines, more often than not flexibility was critical in the peace
process. The challenge was how to stand firm, but not.
The UN’s tasks were limited to monitoring, but in a variety of military security contexts, such as in
connection with the cease-fire, the transfer of territory, the withdrawal of foreign forces, disarmament,
demobilisation, and the formation of the FAA. In civilian security, the UN was assigned the
supervision of the quartering of para-military groups, human rights monitoring, and the integration of
UNITA members into the ANP. The greatest drawback lay in the absence of back-up measures that
would allow the monitoring tasks to be translated into actual pressure.
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recruiting and co-ordinating other international agencies and NGOs. New offices were
to be established as necessary, such as the Demobilization and Reintegration Office
(DRO), which was added in recognition of the fact that the specific humanitarian
tasks tied to demobilisation and reintegration required special follow-up. Similarly,
the Central Mine Action Office under UCAH co-ordinated all activities linked to
demining between UN agencies and NGOs.555
The Joint Commission (JC), a new version of the Joint Political and Military
Commission (JPMC) of Bicesse, was to oversee the implementation of the Protocol
and illustrated the responsibility of the parties. It consisted of representatives of the
government and UNITA, was presided over by the Special Representative of the UN
Secretary General (SRSG), and included observers from the Troika, USA, Portugal,
and the Russian Federation. 556 The SRSG had a moderating role and was to act as a
mediator in cases of dissent. The commission’s tasks were to supervise the continued
implementation of the Bicesse Accords, as well as the implementation of provisions
contained in the Lusaka Protocol and relevant Security Council Resolutions.
Moreover, the commission was the instrument for determining violations of
obligations defined in these legal documents. Decisions on violations and other issues
were made by consensus, including the decision to dissolve the JC once the
agreements were considered fully implemented. It provided an arena in which the
parties could ‘battle out’ disagreements by non-violent means and that promoted a
common understanding of the most critical issues. In the end, however, the peace
process depended on the implementation of decisions rather than on verbal
commitments and the Joint Commission was eventually stalled as all other efforts to
bring about a transition from war to peace were.
Aside from the discussions in the Joint Commission, the international
community had few possibilities to exercise influence effectively. UNAVEM III had
the right to use force in self-defence, including in those instances in which the parties
might attempt to hinder UNAVEM III in the execution of its mandate.557 Similar to
the Lusaka Protocol, the starting-point was right on paper, but proved excessively
difficult to implement. The credibility of UNAVEM III’s use of force derived from its
performance on the ground and the force simply did not have the means to establish a
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credible presence and was not backed by the international commitment necessary to
use those means that it did have.
3.3 Conclusions on the Lusaka Protocol
· The Lusaka Protocol was officially a continuation of the Bicesse Accords;
validating the election results that derailed the previous peace process. In that
way, the formal legitimacy of the government was secured and initial instability
averted.
· The agreement was extremely detailed in terms of tasks, actors, and schedules.
Supervisory tasks were delegated to the international community and particularly
the UN, but the main responsibility for implementation remained with the parties.
This was intended to instil a greater sense of ownership in them, but also involved
significant risks in the case of non-compliance. At the same time, it reflected the
actual level of commitment of the international community.
· Tasks ranged from demilitarisation, including demobilisation, disarmament, and
reintegration, and military reform to a reorganisation of internal security forces
and a number of other security tasks that reached into the civilian realm, such as
repatriation and demining.
· The Joint Commission (JC) was the main implementation body and consisted of
representatives of the parties and the Troika (US, Russia, and Portugal) and was
chaired by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG).
4 Third-Party Actors Providing Security Assistance
Aside from the actors that influence the political context on the domestic Angolan
scene, a number of non-Angolan actors have been involved in the peace process
following the Lusaka Protocol. Gambari distinguishes between “African and extra-
                                                                                                                                           
557 The Blue Helmets  (1996), p. 256.
Section III Implementing the Lusaka Protocol
214
African interventions.”558 Clearly, the latter were the most decisive element in peace
implementation in Angola. In the first half of the present chapter, extra-regional actors
will be introduced, followed by a presentation of the regional bodies and individual
states that have played a role in providing international security assistance to Angola.
4.1 Extra-Regional Actors
Despite formal independence in 1975 and the supposed non-interference that was to
go with it, the conflict in Angola has featured a large degree of external involvement
from the outset, pre- as well as post-independence. Since the accords that brought
Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops in 1988, the major third-
parties enjoyed a legitimised presence.559 The accords coincided with the end of the
Cold War that entailed an end to the proxy war between the superpowers in Angola
and significantly scaled back engagement in the country. Similarly, Hamill points out
in a discussion of the development towards Bicesse that in contrast to earlier
negotiations in the time from 1975 where both the US and the Soviet Union had
continued to supply weapons to their respective clients, “both Washington and
Moscow [...] relinquishe[d] any lingering ambitions either might have harboured of a
military victory for their Angolan client.”560 The superpower withdrawal from Angola
reflected an Africa-wide trend. Gambari argues that “Africa’s growing
marginalization in the post-Cold War period may, in fact, have accelerated the process
of state collapse. [At the same time,] it may well be that the more complete the
collapse of a state, the greater will be the role of foreign intervention in its
reconstruction.”561 Accordingly, the discussion of the delivery of international
security assistance reveals a shift in the nature of superpower involvement, away from
direct military support to one of the parties and towards a supportive, rather than
proactive role in the peace process that followed the Lusaka Protocol.
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4.1.1 The United Nations
The UN’s record in Africa was mixed. Whereas the operation in Somalia had left an
excessively bitter taste in the organisation’s mouth, the experiences in Angola’s more
immediate neighbourhood, i.e. Namibia and Mozambique, gave rise to renewed hope
going into the Lusaka process. The main UN agencies in Angola were the United
Nations Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Unit (UCAH) and the United Nations
Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III). Whereas UNAVEM III represented
the peacekeeping force and thus the military side of the UN presence, UCAH was
responsible for co-ordinating all humanitarian assistance. The UN presence was
headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG).562
On 1 February 1995 the Secretary General recommended to the Security
Council that UNAVEM II be immediately replaced by UNAVEM III. Given the
difficulties that both UNAVEM I and II had had to contend with, there was significant
hesitancy among potential contributors, especially as an effective force would have to
be relatively large and require significant funds. At the same time, it would be saddled
with obvious risks, as successful implementation would again be contingent upon the
will of the signatories. Still, the UN felt a special obligation to see this process
through. Although they could only be partially faulted for the failure of the Bicesse
process, a UN peacekeeping force had been in Angola since early 1989. Despite the
fact that the peace process was in the hands of the parties, the organisation had
implicitly taken on a responsibility through its six-year presence in the country.
The military component of UNAVEM III was authorised at a strength of 7,000
troops.563 The force was organised in 22-24 self-sustained infantry units and support
troops, such as three independent engineer squadrons to accompany infantry and
assist in setting up the quartering areas, and a signals company. UNAVEM III also
included a small field hospital in Luanda, as well as a number of helicopters and a
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logistics unit. In addition to the troops, the force contained 265 military staff
personnel, 350 military observers, and 56 demining experts. It was to be deployed to
59 locations throughout the country and to stay for a one-year period. UNAVEM III
was responsible for disarmament and the quartering stage of demobilisation, as well
as civilian security sector reform and human rights monitoring. While UNAVEM III
was limited in size, given the comprehensive list of tasks it had been assigned, it was
a large force in the history of peacekeeping in Angola. It is important to keep in mind
that at the time the Lusaka Protocol was signed in late 1994, nobody could conceive
of a 60,000+ peacekeeping force under NATO command, such as was deployed in
Bosnia-Herzegovina a year later.
The Security Council suggested that the civilian police component of
UNAVEM III was to comprise 260 observers, stationed in all eighteen provinces
throughout Angola and headed by a Chief Superintendent of Police. Given Angola's
size and the number of civilian police monitors in relation to the mandate, it was clear
from the outset that they faced significant challenges. Even more so than in previous
peacekeeping missions, the unarmed civilian police component of UNAVEM III
would be entirely dependent on the willingness of the parties to co-operate. In
addition, the Angolan National Police and the Rapid Reaction Police were excessively
armed, further exacerbating the monitors' reliance on their counterparts' goodwill.
The deployment of UNAVEM III took place incrementally and lasted from
early April 1995 until late June of the following year.564 When the preparatory
segment of UNAVEM III was declared fully operational and deployed to 53 sites
throughout the country on 26 April 1995, the military component comprised 690
personnel and the civilian police component consisted of 185 monitors. Another
milestone was reached in late May, when the UN logistic battalion had been deployed
and UNAVEM III's strength had increased to 1,813.565
The Security Council resolution set the starting-date for deployment to 9 May
1995.566 It was novel for the Security Council to tie a set of conditions to the
deployment of the peacekeeping force, which were to demonstrate the parties’
commitment to the peace process. Thus, UNAVEM III was to await the consolidation
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of the cease-fire; a stipulation that delayed the deployment of the peacekeeping force.
An evaluation by Saferworld underlines that “applying the conditionality for
deployment [...] had to be balanced against another concern – the need to deploy
peacekeeping troops rapidly in order to help build up mutual confidence and keep up
the momentum of the peace process.”567
In part, the delay was also due to the choice of countries that were to provide
troops. Ideally, the Security Council had wanted the force to be made up of
predominantly African contingents. These were not immediately deployable, lacked
logistical capabilities for deployment and in part were not adequately trained. Only
Zimbabwe managed to provide a battalion in time. Other countries were disqualified
by previously having taken sides in the conflict and were therefore unacceptable to
UNITA. 568
In accordance with SCRes 1118 (1997), UNAVEM III was replaced by the
UN Follow-on Mission in Angola (MONUA) on 30 June 1997.569 Originally,
UNAVEM III’s mission should have been completed by February 1997, but because
of delays in implementation “the plan changed to phased withdrawal. Four of the six
infantry battalions, together with additional support units and some military
headquarters personnel were repatriated by June. [...] MONUA comprised of 1,500
‘rapid reaction troops’ deployed in six companies to assist 345 Civilian Police
(CIVPOL) and just eighty-five military observers.”570 The military component was to
be gradually withdrawn by the end of 1998, when MONUA would become the
unarmed observer mission originally envisioned, having transferred the maintenance
of security into the government’s hands. It was intended to “assist the Angolan parties
in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and
creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development
and rehabilitation of the country.”571 When MONUA took over, the emphasis shifted
towards the tasks of the civilian police monitors. Both the CIVPOL component and
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568 Saferworld (1996), p. 17f. As of March 1996, the following fourteen countries were providing
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the Human Rights Unit grew and were given increased logistical support. The military
component was greatly reduced and switched from trying to maintain an overall
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Figure 4-1 Overview over UN Agencies during UNAVEM III
With respect to humanitarian tasks, the United Nations Humanitarian
Assistance Co-ordination Unit (UCAH) was assigned the release of demobilised
soldiers from quartering areas and their reintegration into society. In addition, UCAH
was in charge of co-ordinating demining and repatriation. The Unit was established
during the war in April 1993 and was later expanded by the addition of regional field
advisors. When the intensity of fighting decreased, the World Food Programme
(WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund and United Nations High Commissioner
                                                
572 S/1998/17.B,C. MONUA’s mandate officially expired in February 1999, but some of the staff
remained after that date in accordance with a plan for gradual drawdown. Most notably, many of the
human rights monitors stayed. The SRSG, Diallo, left Angola on 15 March 1999, but remained in
office until December 1999 awaiting potential re-deployment.
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for Refugees (UNHCR) had begun to deliver humanitarian aid again in late 1993, and
intensified their efforts following the Lusaka cease-fire.573 Emergency relief remained
an important task for UCAH and the other actors in the humanitarian field throughout
the Lusaka peace process. In general, there were far fewer ‘cooks’ in Angola than in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which allowed the SRSG to at least formally be the clear head
of the international presence. Unfortunately, his leadership did not manage to translate
into a coherent approach on the ground, where the day to day operations by
UNAVEM III and UCAH, as the two main actors, went separate ways.
4.1.2 Friends of the Peace Process: the United States, Russia, and Portugal
The three predominant extra-regional friends of the peace process were the United
States and the Russian Federation, due to their Cold War engagement, and Portugal as
the former colonial power. In the period from 1994-8, the United States, Russia, and
Portugal formed the Troika that was to oversee the implementation of the Lusaka
Protocol. The Angolan war from 1975 until the first peace agreement in 1988 was the
archetypical proxy war of the Cold War period. Accordingly, the United States were
engaged in order to ‘fight communism’ in the guise of the MPLA government which
                                                
573 The Blue Helmets  (1996), p. 253.
Box 4.1: United Nations Agencies
The main UN agencies in Angola were UCAH and UNAVEM III. Whereas UNAVEM III represented
the peacekeeping force and thus the military side of the UN presence, UCAH was responsible for co-
ordinating all humanitarian assistance. The UN presence was headed by the SRSG.
UNAVEM III consisted of approximately 7,000 soldiers and a few hundred military and civilian police
monitors. The peacekeeping force was responsible for disarmament and the quartering stage of
demobilisation and for civilian security sector reform, including human rights monitoring. Despite
UNAVEM III’s limited size in relation to its mandate, it was a large peacekeeping force in the African
context.
Aside from straightforward humanitarian tasks, such as emergency relief, UCAH were assigned the
release of demobilised soldiers from quartering areas and their reintegration into society. In addition,
UCAH was in charge of co-ordinating demining and repatriation.
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in turn was supported by the Soviet Union. Typically, the support from both sides
prior to 1988 was in the shape of arms deliveries. In that way, the superpowers played
a fateful role in contributing to the perpetuation of the conflict. Similarly, observers
widely agree that a more substantial agreement that actually involved significant
rapprochement between the parties was possible at Bicesse, because a more co-
operative spirit characterised superpower relations and because the superpowers
showed a commitment to peace. Similarly, it became clear leading up to and
following the elections that the absence of continued superpower commitment and
pressure was a crucial factor in the breakdown of the peace process and the full
implementation of the Bicesse Accords.574
Over the years, the stance of the United States has been ambiguous and subject
to shifts in the administration. Since the collapse of the Bicesse process, the country's
interest in the Angolan conflict has declined steadily but remains strong compared to
their involvement elsewhere in Africa. Until May 1993, the US had supported UNITA
in their bid for power. At that point, they recognised the MPLA as the rightful
government, but the United States still wanted to see the rehabilitation of the rebel
leader Jonas Savimbi into a ‘peaceful politician.’575 They did exercise significant
pressure on the government to sign the Lusaka Protocol, but since then the
involvement of the United States in the implementation phase was characterised by a
lack of commitment. This was reflected in the absence of any significant intelligence
capacity, but more importantly in their unwillingness to make use of the economic
leverage that the country did have in Angola.576
Nonetheless, the United States should be counted among the Friends of the
Peace Process, due to their extensive financial involvement, and have been described
as a relatively influential actor in Angola. Despite the fact that they did not contribute
troops to UNAVEM III and MONUA, the US covered about one third of the UN’s
running costs.577 Over a period of five years from 1994-9, the United States
contributed $500 million to the peace process. Most of the support was development
and relief related and was channelled through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). Three major official goals were pursued by the
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576 Lewis (1996), p. 84; Vines (1998), p. 17; Alex Vines (1999b) “War Number Four,” The World
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United States in Angola: (1) to support resettlement and rehabilitation; (2) to
strengthen civil society and democratic institutions; and (3) to stabilise
macroeconomic conditions. In addition to the financial aid provided through USAID,
a number of American oil companies had business interests in Angola. The United
States procured 14% of their oil from Angola, which represented 70-80% of Angolan
oil exports. Private businesses invested $4 billion in the petroleum sector from 1994-
9, rendering Angola the second largest site for investment in Sub-Saharan Africa.578
Adding to that the arms deals between Angola and the United States, the US
obviously had the potential to apply significant pressure on the Angolan government –
if they chose to do so. Thus, the United States was able to influence the parties to
some extent and underlined their ‘commitment’ by a number of official visits and
mediation efforts. However, relations with both parties deteriorated in 1997 and 1998,
robbing the US of their leverage and leaving no influential external player in
Angola.579
The Soviet Union was very much the junior partner in the co-operation leading
up to the Bicesse Accords; issues were resolved in line with American rather than
with Soviet principles.580 In the time period from the signing in 1991 until the
renewed outbreak of fighting, the Soviet Union was dissolved and the successor states
had other priorities than the peace process in Angola.581 In the Lusaka process, Russia
also played a limited role, despite their official preferential position as member of the
Troika. Any leverage that Russia might have had at earlier stages of the conflict
evaporated as the conflict distanced itself further from the ideological plain that it
predominantly moved on in the period between independence and the first agreements
in 1988. Instead, the Angolan civil war increasingly focused on material goods and
the access to resources. Similar to the United States, Russia also had extensive arms
deals with the parties to the Angolan conflict and maintained ties to the region in that
way.
With the declining role of the United States and Russia, Portugal moved in to
fill the void. As the former colonial power, Portugal felt a special responsibility to
promote peace in Angola – in addition to being a major non-oil trading partner. The
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inclusion of Portugal in the Troika was an acknowledgement that it best understood
the conflict. As it also proved more flexible in its approach to the peace process, the
other Troika members often deferred decisions to Portugal. Accordingly, Portugal
hosted meetings between the parties, mediated and provided similar good offices. In
the eyes of UNITA, the country’s position was somewhat compromised by the fact
that it had traditionally provided training to the FAA and, due to the colonial heritage,
had closer ties to the MPLA. Overall, the Troika has been accused of pursuing its own
national interests rather than those of the peace process.582
4.1.3 Other International Organisations
Not many other international organisations focused on the security field in Angola.
Most were active in related fields, particularly in humanitarian assistance. Aside from
the UN and the United States, the European Union (EU) was one of the major players
in the Angolan peace process. Similar to the United States, the EU provided good
offices and substantial financial support to the peace process. Most of the funds went
towards demining and human rights, as well as emergency relief. Still, although the
EU was supportive, it lacked the clout of the United States. Portugal was obviously
the most influential member state. The EU might have fruitfully played a greater part
in the enforcement of the sanctions regime, given that several member states were
among the worst sanction busters. However, the EU proved equally ineffective in this
                                                
582 Sibanda (1999a), p. 123f.
Box 4.2: Friends of the Peace Process
The three predominant extra-regional friends of the peace process are the United States and the
Russian Federation, due to their Cold War engagement, and Portugal as the former colonial power.
Both the Russian and US interest in the Angolan conflict declined steadily, but both remained involved
because of arms sales and other private business interests. Neither country showed the political
commitment to use their economic leverage in pursuit of peace.
Portugal assumed a greater role as the United States and Russia withdrew, but its position was
compromised in the eyes of UNITA, as it had traditionally been a closer ally to the MPLA.
Section III Implementing the Lusaka Protocol
223
area as the rest of the international community. Apart from a host of smaller NGOs in
the human rights and relief fields, briefly presented below, the UN stood alone as the
organisational framework for the actual international presence in Angola.
Typically, international security assistance in the aftermath of a peace
agreement includes the exchange and monitoring of treatment of prisoners of war. In
Angola, as elsewhere this task was exercised by the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC). They were also active in non-military fields and worked closely
with the EU, among others. Also, given the close link between the population’s
perception of security and the consolidation of the peace process, compliance with
human rights standards obviously played a major part in securing public confidence in
the transition from war to peace. In the context of this study, human rights monitoring
is regarded as an essential part of both the military and civilian security sector reform.
Human Rights Watch is just one example of an NGO that was active in this area.
Another area in which NGOs took on a major share of implementation was demining.
Norwegian People’s Aid and the Halo Trust are just two examples of the actors that
provided critical support to the peace process.
Aside from direct international security assistance, a number of organisations
were involved in providing humanitarian assistance and emergency relief. As
mentioned above, the scope of the international presence in this area varied with the
intensity of fighting throughout the war, but a number of organisations were engaged
throughout. In addition to the UN agencies in the humanitarian field, organisations
funded through USAID in this area included Save the Children, World Vision,
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and others.583
4.2 Regional Actors
The peacekeeping experiences in Somalia and Rwanda produced opposite effects in
extra-regional and in regional actors. Extra-regional actors concluded that they did not
want to get involved in more of the same and that the time was now come for Africa
to take over potential future peace operations on the continent. In contrast, African
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organisations were spurred into action and displayed an enthusiasm to meet the
challenge. These two trends obviously reinforced each other and led to a host of
initiatives, such as moves towards establishing conflict management mechanisms in
the OAU and SADC. However, as Espegren has pointed out, there was a significant
gap between the formal willingness, on the one hand, and the practical willingness
and capacity to operationalise the plans for conflict management in Africa, on the
other.584 Regional security institutions have often proven too weak and too divided to
be effective and are dependent on financial and other support from outside actors.
Also, as Sibanda underlines, they are “not immune to the political and economic
‘games’ which the major powers exercise within UN missions.”585 Still, the desire to
act on a regional basis springs from the realisation that “individual security, national
security, and regional security are interdependent in Southern Africa.”586 Similarly,
when multilateral organisations decide to intervene, they are motivated by diverse
interests and objectives and often refer to “regional and subregional political and
economic development” as a justification for collective action. 587 With the much
debated ‘African Renaissance’ in mind, Ohlson and Stedman point out that a “new
Southern Africa depends on resolving Angola’s long-lived civil war.”588
4.2.1 Regional Organisations: The Organisation of African Unity and the Southern
African Development Community
As suggested above, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has displayed a clear
willingness to address the needs of conflict management, since the issue was first
taken up at the 1992 Summit in Dakar. However, success has been limited, as the
organisation faces organisational, political, and resource related hindrances to
successful peace operations under OAU auspices.
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Moreover, it appears that those actors that commanded and contributed
significant financial resources and could act authoritatively were the only welcome
and somewhat influential ones in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. The
OAU was not even mentioned in the agreement let alone called upon to provide
international security assistance to the implementation process, due to an awareness of
its organisational and most importantly resource limitations. It was therefore only
natural that the OAU, an organisation that was characterised by near financial
paralysis, would be considered a far less desirable contributor than even the United
Nations. UNAVEM III’s mandate exceeded by far the capabilities available to the
OAU and SADC, particularly keeping in mind the involvement of other members of
the UN family and the substantial co-ordination this required. Although the OAU was
likely to be perceived as a legitimate actor, they were hardly considered one that
could issue credible threats or provide tempting incentives that might induce a greater
degree of compliance on the part of the parties.589 What both the OAU and SADC
could and did do was dispatch mediators when the peace process stalled. The success
rate of these undertakings was no higher nor lower than those of other external actors
seeking to influence the peace process.
While the entire region was saddled by the consequences of the continued
unrest in Angola, the role of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
was limited by the fact that South Africa was perceived as dominating the
organisation. Given South Africa’s history of support to UNITA, SADC was not a
welcome contributor to international security assistance in the eyes of the Angolan
government.590 With respect to the Angolan civil war, SADC largely limited itself to
issuing statements and communiqués condemning the lack of compliance with the
Lusaka Protocol on both sides of the conflict and voicing support for the sanctions
regime.591 When the organisation branded Jonas Savimbi a war criminal in 1998, it
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lost the remnants of its influence on the conflicting parties.592 In the Angolan conflict,
SADC would always be saddled with conflicting loyalties that undermined its
impartiality in the conflict.
In sum, Angola appeared to resemble a pattern that was emerging in Africa in
which the sub-regional organisations were more vocal and more proactive – for better
or for worse – than the OAU. Still, SADC had a long way to go before it would have
the capacity to stage a peacekeeping operation even with substantial outside
contributions.
4.2.2 Potential Regional Great Powers: South Africa and the Democratic Republic
of Congo
Although very different in the amount of state power they wielded, South Africa, the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Zambia stood out as particularly
influential in the Angolan peace process. Involvement changed dramatically with the
regime change in both countries. The changing policies in both South Africa and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) played a pivotal role in the power relations
between UNITA and MPLA. They affected the moral backing that UNITA and
MPLA received in the Southern African region, as well as the financial and military
support available to the parties.
Angolan relations with South Africa were coloured by two major factors. First,
Angola emerged as the leader of the front-line states in the late eighties. Second, the
Apartheid regime in South Africa provided substantial support to UNITA. It has been
argued that “large scale South African air and ground attacks on Angolan government
forces in 1985, 1987, and 1988 reversed the momentum of Luanda’s offensives and
saved UNITA from almost certain defeat.”593 From that time onwards, South Africa’s
support for UNITA decreased in stages. Following the agreement on South African
and Cuban troop withdrawals, South Africa no longer intervened directly. After the
elections in 1992, even the formerly staunch UNITA supporter de Klerk “quietly
drop[ped his] commitment [...] in favour of a new partnership with a pivotal regional
state.”594 Finally, UNITA lost the remnants of South African support with the victory
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of the ANC in 1994. Still, given the prior South African bias, Angolan President dos
Santos ruled out any bilateral South African involvement.595
The fate of Angola and that of Zaïre and her successor the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) have been closely intertwined. Angola and the DRC were
closely linked due to the fact that there were “numerous ethnic groups whose
homelands had been divided by the boundary between Zaire and Angola a century
earlier. […] These ties often extended to support for antigovernment rebels.”596 While
the two countries signed several non-aggression agreements and began the
institutionalisation of joint security bodies, the reality was that Zaïre’s President
Mobutu Sese Seko could not and did not make serious efforts to undermine the
unofficial Zairean support for UNITA. In fact, “[i]t was only through a continuation
of the Angolan war that Mobutu could preserve his strategic importance.”597 In 1997,
the Angolan Government was quick to support rebel leader Laurent Kabila’s take-
over in the hope of undermining support to UNITA, particularly the logistic support
structures in southern Zaïre.598 Similarly, UNITA lost valuable allies and rear bases
through the regime changes in the DRC and in Congo/Brazzaville. Both countries
were the stage for proxy wars between the Angolan parties.599
Another country that affected the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, but
can hardly be called a regional great power, was Zambia. Throughout the war the
Zambian government officially supported the Angolan government, but did little to
cut off the support UNITA was receiving from and on Zambian territory. During the
peace process, suspicions were raised concerning substantial arms deliveries from
Zambia to UNITA. Like the DRC and other countries in the region, Zambia had a
special interest in the success of the Angolan peace process, as refugees from the
conflict were a major burden on the neighbouring countries, while the country was
simultaneously profiting from arms deals with the parties to the conflict.
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4.3 Local Counterparts
The peace process that followed the signing of the Lusaka Protocol cannot be
understood without an insight into what the conflict in Angola was all about. Angola
was marked by a high level of animosity that derived from the length and fierceness
of the war, and from a variety of personal, ethnic, racial, and ideological differences.
In fact, Harding emphasised that it is impossible to understand the level of distrust
without understanding the events of 1961-76. It was this distrust that – intensified by
the failure of the Bicesse process – made the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol
so challenging.600 Saferworld describes the Angolan conflict as “a civil war with
ethno-regional and politico-ideological dynamics, rooted in the nature of Angolan
society and the historical development of rival Angolan nationalist movements.”601
Each party to the conflict had its ethnic constituencies. The MPLA’s
traditional support base was among the Mbundu and Mesticos. Its strongholds were in
the poor neighbourhoods of Luanda and among the Lusophone, left-wing, urban élite,
many of which had been educated abroad in Portugal or Eastern Europe.602 In
contrast, UNITA originated among the Ovimbundu of the central highlands.
Originally, UNITA had campaigned for control by rural-traditional Africans or pure
blacks as opposed to the mixed race Mesticos. The cultural divisions were
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Box 4.3: Regional Organisations and Regional Great Powers
Neither the OAU nor SADC had the resources to become heavily involved in the Angolan peace
process. Their contribution was limited to good offices and mediation. In addition, SADC’s approach
to the conflict was coloured by the history of regional involvement in the Angolan civil wars, as well as
in the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
South Africa and the DRC were potential regional great powers by virtue of their close ties to the
parties and earlier engagement in Angola. Whereas South Africa scaled back its involvement, the
DRC was still the scene of a proxy war between UNITA and the MPLA.
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institutionalised and were reflected in an uneven development between different
groups of the population. 603 The conflict boiled down to a struggle between the
‘peasant based’ UNITA and the ‘outsiders and exploiters’ of the MPLA and became
increasingly uncompromising. As a result, the two parties’ respective territories were
almost entirely economically divided.604 The distance between the parties was
reflected in the degree of autonomy in UNITA-held areas and their description as a
“state within a state.”605 Despite each party’s affiliation with certain parts of the
population, both tried to solicit a wider support base. At the same time, however, “the
distance between the people with plans and those for whom the plans were laid was
daunting.” 606
The cultural differences were also reflected in the organisation of each party.
Whereas the FAA was a traditional military organisation, UNITA’s military arm,
FALA, was organised horizontally. In order to function coherently, the
decentralisation typical of a guerrilla movement had to be matched by strict doctrine
and discipline.607  Moreover, “[t]he military logic of war, which has kept Unita’s
guerrillas in the countryside and restricted the better-armed MPLA to the cities, serves
to entrench this fundamental division.”608
In part, the ambiguous and shifting policies within each party could be
explained by the existence of so-called spoilers in their midst. In general, spoilers are
a group of actors that accumulated authority during the civil war which could only be
maintained in situation of insecurity. Powerful local politicians that controlled trade
routes in the interior and wanted to keep their monopoly were just one example of
spoilers that hindered UNAVEM III’s execution of its mandate.609 Akindele points to
“the use the political elites make of these [divisive] factors in the promotion,
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advancement and protection of their personal, group and class interests, and the
misuse of these factors to stall, stunt or derail the processes of state-building and
nation-building.”610
Within both parties, military leaders were very influential and hard-line
generals were consistently among the most damaging spoilers in the Lusaka peace
process. On the MPLA side, General de Matos, Chief of Staff of the FAA, was
unhappy with the agreement and considered the war suspended rather than settled. In
early 1995, he stated that “only the total defeat of Savimbi can ensure peace [...]
strictly from the military point of view [the Lusaka Protocol] was a mistake.”611
Similarly, it was clear “on the UNITA side, [that] the interests of the leadership in
continuing the armed conflicts against the MPLA [...] still appear[ed] to outweigh the
interests in agreeing to end such conflicts.”612 Although UNITA was only marginally
weakened as a result of the adverse developments in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) in the course of 1997, the movement felt decidedly more threatened
and exposed to greater pressure from the government to make concessions. In turn,
UNITA leader Savimbi found it more difficult to justify political concessions
internally to his military leaders.613 The more prominent security concerns became on
either side, the more prominent the voice of the military community. Luckham points
out that in situations where democracy is to emerge as part of a negotiated settlement,
it is critical that the conflict can be “terminated on terms that yield a profit on [the]
investments [of military entrepreneurs].”614 As a result, she argues that bargains were,
for example, made with UNITA in the pursuit of democracy, but in spite of UNITA’s
human rights record.615
In democratic societies, a moderating influence is exercised by local civil
society. In Angola, local NGOs remained weak and entirely dependent on
international funding. Local organisations typically would have had a part to play
with respect to human rights. Although a few human rights groups were formed, such
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as the Angolan Human Rights Association and the Human Rights Committee of the
National Assembly, they were weak and ineffective throughout the peace process.616
Church councils traditionally played a marginal role in Angola, but even when the
Bishop issued direct calls for peace, they were disregarded by the parties.617
In addition to spoilers in the military and political sphere, economic interests
were a driving force in the Angolan conflict. There were two areas in which private
business interests played a major role in the conflict and subsequent peace process in
Angola. First, the peace process cannot be understood without taking into account the
issue of access to natural resources, in particular diamonds and oil. Second, the
Angolan conflict was the forerunner in a trend towards the privatisation of security.
Both aspects were closely linked in Angola as access to resources was often part of
the payment to private security companies, as well as to both parties’ military
leadership.618
In contrast to a number of other, poorer, African countries plagued by civil
war, the spoils in Angola were formidable. Oil revenues for 1997 were more than $4
billion and made up 90% of the government’s export earnings. Diamond revenues
were estimated at $850 million. 619 The diamond trade was UNITA’s major source of
revenue in the 1990s, amounting to a total of approximately $3.7 billion in the years
1992-8. UNITA controlled 60-70% of production of which only 20% were legal sales.
It was clear that the peace process hinged on who gained control over the diamonds
and on satisfying commercial interests on both sides.620 At the same time, the parties’
control of the oil and diamond business respectively, allowed them to buy virtually
unlimited amounts of arms and be free of international pressure.621
Attempts were made to control the diamond trade in order to limit the funds
that were available for arms purchases, but industry was extremely difficult to
influence due to a lack of transparency reflected in the modest share of legal sales.
Major trading partners for diamonds were Belgium, Israel, the United Kingdom, and
South Africa. The problem in Angola was that so many other actors, be they
companies or states stood to profit from the continued tensions. As long as there was
                                                
616 Saferworld (1996), p. 43. UNITA also has a human rights advocate group, the Association of
Surviving Angolans (ACAS), based in Lisbon. US Department of State (1998), p. 9.
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cash in UNITA’s and the government’s hands, there would be sources of arms
available.
The other main business interest was linked to private security companies
which generally have four main functions. They can perform services as security
guards, they can supply equipment or assist in procurement, they can train other
security forces, and finally they can engage in combat on behalf of another actor.622
Shearer suggests that as of 1998 there were over 100 private security companies in
Angola, “where the government requires strategic resource firms to provide their own
security.”623 Of these, only one, namely Executive Outcomes (EO) was actively
involved in combat. Executive Outcomes first entered the picture in early 1993 on
behalf of Sonangol, the national Angolan oil company. They were hired to assist the
government in recapturing the Soyo region which was the centre of the oil industry
and in the hands of UNITA at the time.624 The successful campaign was allegedly
rewarded by “substantial concessions in oil and diamonds.”625 Following the
campaign in Soyo, the government signed its first one-year contract with EO to retrain
5,000 troops of the 16th Regiment of the FAA and to provide equipment. This
eventually allowed the government to achieve significant gains, which in turn brought
enough pressure to bear on UNITA to encourage their signing the Lusaka Protocol. In
that way, EO functioned as a force multiplier for the FAA. 626
Another central private security company involved in Angola was an
American company called Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI).
MPRI’s ties to the US government were characterised by  “extremely close links to
the US military establishment [and MPRI was] used as the covert wing of US foreign
policy, going into regions of the world where the US government is unwilling to
become overtly involved.”627
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O’Brien underlines the problematic nature of EO’s and other security
companies’ involvement in the Angolan conflict, when he indicates that “[a]s EO
gains a larger interest in the strategic mineral holdings of Africa [...], it may become
ever richer and powerful, capable of exercising real power against any number of
states in the region.”628 In that way, private security companies and weapons suppliers
benefited from ongoing tension and introduced a business dynamic into the Angolan
conflict that became difficult to control. It was also troublesome that a government
depended on private companies to meet its obligation of providing security for its
population. In Angola, there were enough members of the political leadership that
were tied into the network of political, military, and economic spoilers. Vines submits
that “the desire for peace is missing amongst the elites, who can still profit out of
extended conflict, suggesting that Angolans will see more conflict yet before any
lasting settlement can be achieved.”629
                                                
628 O’Brien (1998), p. 87.
629 Vines (1998), p. 28.
Box 4.4: Local Counterparts
Angola was plagued by deep-seated divisions that had ethnic, cultural, and political roots. They
created an atmosphere of distrust that was not to be overcome easily. The parties were
uncompromising from the outset and their commitment to peace proved limited to lip service.
The Angolan peace process was significantly hampered by different sets of spoilers in the political,
military, and economic fields, that were all loath to lose their preferential positions attained during
the war and that stood to gain from continued high level of tensions.
The private security and business dimension of the Angolan conflict was staggering. The revenue
from oil and diamonds enabled the parties to purchase unlimited arms and liberated them from
outside pressure. Private security companies had a considerable impact on the military balance and
– in combination with business interests – bestowed an economic dynamic on the conflict that
hindered the transition from war to peace.
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4.4 Conclusions on Third-Party Actors
· The major actor in the Angolan peace process was the United Nations in the guise
of UNAVEM III, with a comprehensive role and extensive supervisory tasks.
Although the role assigned to it was a product of a genuine desire to bring about
peace in Angola, the UN presence lacked the political backing which might have
made it authoritative and effective. In some ways, the UN’s role was a result of a
vacuum into which no other player had stepped.
· Alternative predominant actors might have been the United States or a regional
organisation. However, the United States was hamstrung by its extensive private
ties into the conflict area and by the lack of political commitment. The OAU and
SADC, on the other hand, had neither the necessary political consensus nor the
resources to play a more influential role.
· Political commitment was especially critical given the deep divisions between the
parties to the conflict that needed to be overcome. The international community
would have to act decisively and credibly in order to build confidence effectively
and to be able to counteract the disruptive influence exercised by a variety of
spoilers.
5 Implementing the Lusaka Protocol and Delivering Security
Assistance
Similar to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, there are three major areas in
which international security assistance was provided in the wake of the Lusaka
Protocol in Angola: military security, civilian security, and additional areas that
indirectly impact the security environment. Throughout, the one key factor that
conditioned progress was the political willingness of the parties and the degree to
which they were co-operative. Although most public statements by the parties
consistently endorsed the peace process, the parties’ actions spoke louder.
Overall, the UN’s efforts were dwarfed in comparison with the scope and size
of the problems that were hampering progress. Observers argue that there was a
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window of opportunity early on. Had the UN, and the international community more
generally, managed to assert its authority in a post-settlement situation where ‘might
was right,’ it would have enjoyed far greater respect and had more influence on the
parties. However, when deployment of UNAVEM III proved halting and it quickly
became clear that the force suffered from significant logistical shortcomings, the
security guarantee that it might have provided became hollow. 630 In any case, it was
insufficient to counter the lack of trust and deep-seated divisions between the parties.
As a result, the fundamental unwillingness of both parties to make real concessions
for peace proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for the international community
and its attempts to accelerate the transition from war to peace.
5.1 Demilitarisation and Military Reform
5.1.1 Cease-Fire, Separation of Forces, and Transfer of Territory
The cease-fire provided in the Lusaka Protocol was to come into force just two days
after the agreement was signed, but was only finally agreed upon by UNITA leader
Jonas Savimbi and President Jose Eduardo dos Santos in February 1995.631 The UN
Security Council then issued a resolution on 8 February 1995 that called for
UNAVEM III’s deployment on 9 May 1995, on the condition that hostilities had in
fact ceased. The forces that were formerly UNAVEM II and still in place in Angola,
began deployment into the country side immediately, but were held back by hostile
action from UNITA. In late March, 527 military observers and police observers were
deployed to 38 sites outside Luanda.632 It became clear that rather than await initial
progress, the peace process depended upon the immediate deployment of infantry
troops that could provide security guarantees to the parties, in the complete absence of
trust between them.633 Throughout the Spring of 1995, clashes continued and
hostilities were occasionally directed at UN observers and NGO staff, raising “doubts
about the willingness of the parties to co-operate in good faith in the implementation
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of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.”634 In part, the clashes were due to the
government’s unwillingness to stop pressing ahead and achieving last minute military
gains, before the arrival of the peacekeepers.635 Restrictions on the international
actors’ freedom of movement were enforced by both UNITA and the FAA, by
refusing security clearances and similar measures.636
Although the number of cease-fire violations was significantly reduced in
September 1995 and the situation was described as “relatively calm,”637 violations and
clashes continued throughout the four years of this study. 638 In the first two years of
the peace process, the number of incidents decreased steadily, until the situation
throughout the country could be described as relatively stable. However, from mid-
1997 onwards this process was reversed and Angola began a steady descent into
renewed war. Given the history of violence in Angola, events fell short of being
classified as outright war, but might well have warranted that description in another –
traditionally more peaceful – country. Clashes took place between various
constellations of actors, such as bandits and police forces, government troops or
special security forces and UNITA forces in disputed areas, or between UNITA
supporters and the civilian population. 639 Meanwhile, in “1996 the concern over
cease-fire violations ha[d] largely been superseded by an upsurge in crime, banditry,
looting and cattle-rustling – often carried out by uniformed individuals and often
resulting in loss of life.”640 The US Department of State confirms that “politically and
economically motivated violence by the state security forces and common criminal
violence were often indistinguishable.”641 This description highlights the almost
anarchic traits of Angola’s ‘post-conflict’ phase.
Obviously, these violent outbursts undermined civilian confidence in the peace
process. The effect was multiplied by the fact that civilians were frequently the
preferred targets for attacks by either side. If not killed, civilians might be kidnapped
                                                                                                                                           
633 Saferworld (1996), p. vi, 17.
634 The Blue Helmets  (1996), p. 258.
635 Lewis (1996), p. 84; Cleary (1999), p. 163.
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638 Saferworld (1996), p. 1, 13; Amnesty International (1996), p. 4. A notable exception and a clear
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offensive in the Soyo region in November 1995.
639 Amnesty International (1996), p. 5; S/1998/333.III.9f. As is shown below, significant lower level
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into service as soldiers, child soldiers or sex slaves.642 Clashes were both the result of
government and UNITA leaders’ inability to control all forces at their disposal and of
strategic decisions tied to political developments in the peace process.643
UNAVEM III’s ability to affect the intensity of clashes was hampered by a
number of factors. To some extent, the intensity of fighting was irrelevant of
UNAVEM III’s presence, but was a product of provocations and responses at a low
level. The contentious behaviour of the Angolan National Police which incited violent
reactions is a case in point. UNAVEM III’s efforts to alleviate these confrontations
are discussed in the section on civilian security below. One of the few instances, when
a UNAVEM III platoon was sent to the Soyo region in late 1995, remained the
exception and was accompanied by a reservation on the part of the Secretary General
that “UNAVEM III is neither equipped nor mandated to serve as an interpositioned
disengagement force.”644 This is surprising in that the Secretary General appears to be
excluding the most fundamental task that is inherent in any peacekeeping operation.
Instead, he implicitly admitted UNAVEM III’s dependence on the parties’ tactical
consent. As a result, the level of violence reflected progress on the political front and
more particularly the demagoguery of the political leaders rather than any effort by
the international peacekeeping force. Operationally, UNAVEM III’s struggled with
“difficulties in obtaining [...] adequately trained and equipped forces, particularly
from Africa.”645 Furthermore, the bulk of UNAVEM III’s presence was concentrated
around the quartering and storage areas. This was a practical necessity, but also
limited the effect the force might have had on the anarchic conditions in large parts of
the country.
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The persistence of clashes was of course linked to how the separation of
forces was progressing. This process, described as ‘disengagement’646 in UN
terminology, was initially uneven. Especially government forces were reluctant to
withdraw from key positions in the early stages of the peace process. It was not until
March 1996 that the government provided UNAVEM III with a plan for the first
phase of the withdrawal of its forces.647 Later on, disengagement was not always a
clear-cut issue as hostilities were merely moved downwards to a lower level, at which
irregular security forces rather than the FAA remained militarily active. In other
words, although the withdrawal of the FAA was finally satisfactory, it was simply
replaced by other armed elements with more or less covert ties to the government
throughout MPLA-controlled territory. Both sides, i.e. the government and UNITA,
were accused of “aggressive patrolling”648 that undermined trust between the parties.
At the same time, particularly UNITA appeared to welcome the break in the
fighting as an opportunity to regroup and re-equip themselves following the losses
sustained shortly before the peace agreement was signed. These developments
obviously ran counter to the purpose of the Protocol. 649 The government was not
wholly innocent in this regard and accusations persisted throughout that the
government's quartering was merely a disguise for the FAA's strategic redeployment.
In some instances, UNAVEM III declared withdrawals unacceptable and urged the
government to move from forward positions to barracks.650 Government forces
promised to return to their barracks once it had been demonstrated that the
demobilisation process of UNITA had begun in earnest. In the transition period,
where not all government forces had been withdrawn and UNITA was still moving
about in large parts of Angola, clashes were foreseeable.
A significant barrier to accelerating disengagement, was the fact that the first
concrete steps towards consolidating disengagement and subsequent demobilisation
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lay entirely in the hands of the parties. They involved providing specific military
information on capabilities, plans for quartering troops, and suggestions for joint
verification mechanisms; issues that were to be decided upon by Savimbi and dos
Santos. Despite frequent and forceful demands from UNAVEM III, both sides
remained reluctant to provide military data. This undermined the peacekeeping force's
efforts at increasing transparency and building confidence. Once again the parties
badly concealed resistance to the peace process and their unwillingness to make real
concessions, highlighted the dependence of international security assistance on a
minimum of political support and the limitation of their role to that of a potential
catalyst rather than an agent of change.
In terms of the separation of forces, a disengagement process took place in
which both parties withdrew their forces to their strongholds. As neither leadership
had absolute control over the multiplicity of forces at their disposal, withdrawal could
not be entirely comprehensive nor co-ordinated. The lack of complete control also
offered a convenient excuse to the parties when they were accused of violations or
attacks. As mentioned above, decentralisation in UNITA’s horizontal structure was
counteracted by strict discipline, in order to maintain a cohesive military force.
Another key aspect was the withdrawal of foreign forces. In the negotiation
phase leading up to the Lusaka Protocol, the government achieved significant military
gains, with the help of the South African based private security company, Executive
Outcomes (EO). Naturally, UNITA was bent on their removal from Angolan territory
in the wake of the agreement and their repatriation was included in the Lusaka
Protocol. 651 By December 1995, little progress had been made and the repatriation of
foreign forces was still a major issue in negotiations in the Joint Commission. 652 As a
result of pressure from the United States, the Angolan government finally terminated
the EO contract in December 1995. On 12 January 1996, all 446 EO employees had
been repatriated.653 While initial developments indicated that most of the foreign
forces had indeed been withdrawn, the following four years were characterised by the
coming and going of military support forces. This was a continuation of patterns of
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external involvement that dated back to the colonial presence, as well as the
engagement of South African and Cuban forces in the first Angolan civil war.
The major clashes that signalled the beginning of the end of the peace process
in late 1997, were an attempt on the part of the Angolan government to seal off the
border to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in order to prevent the arrival of
both additional UNITA troops, but also Congolese and Rwandan forces in support of
UNITA that had fought together in the DRC.654 Although the UN supervised the
withdrawal, they were never in any position to prevent the arrival of forces and arms
in Angola.
At the height of its campaign in mid-1993, UNITA had controlled 80% of
Angolan territory. Even though the government managed to reduce that figure to
approximately 40% in the months preceding the Lusaka Protocol, the transfer of
territory and the restoration of government authority over the entire country remained
a key element of the Lusaka Protocol. 655 Interestingly, the Angolan civil war bore
some important characteristics of an inter-state conflict. One of the characteristics of a
state is its control over a given territory and the concomitant population, including the
responsibility of providing security in this area. In Angola, there was a discrepancy
between control over territory and control over population. Although the government
at times administrated only a minor part of the territory, it was always responsible for
the lion’s share of the population which flocked into the major cities during the wars
and their aftermath; illustrating an urbanisation process typical of conflict-ridden
societies. Although the struggle in Angola was one for power and not partition, 656 the
two main parties had clear territorial affiliations.
Accordingly, the failure to re-establish government control over UNITA-held
territory, largely due to UNITA’s refusal to hand them over, was a pivotal factor in
the steady return to war towards the end of 1998. This was due to the symbolic,
geopolitical and resource strategic implications of control over territory. As long as
UNITA retained a strategic territorial base with access to indispensable resources,
they would be able to keep their options open and continue the fight, if need be. As
Manning points out, “UNITA thus had no incentive to move on territorial integration
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until it had abandoned all reservations about the peace process.”657 Throughout the
implementation process, UNITA was aware of the crucial power that derived from
holding critical territory which was why the organisation was so reluctant to
relinquish control. It is also important to keep in mind that throughout its reign the
MPLA government never controlled the entire territory of Angola. Therefore, it was
not a question of resurrecting authority but of transferring the control that UNITA had
traditionally held in North- and South-Eastern Angola into the hands of the
movement’s fiercest opponent.658
The transfer of authority was slow to begin with, but had also not been
envisioned as one of the first items to be put into practice. In the course of 1997, the
extension of state authority finally gathered pace, with a large proportion of territory
placed in government hands.659 The transferral of Negage air base in the North of the
country and of the provincial capital Cuango – from which one of the main diamond
areas was administered – was regarded as a positive sign. It indicated that the MPLA
and UNITA had finally been able to agree on a system of financial support, that is of
diamond mine concessions, that would fund the movement’s activity as a political
party. 660 However, in early 1998 the process stopped short at the final four
municipalities that formed UNITA’s core area and that encompassed the major
diamond-mining areas. In addition, the scheduled move of UNITA’s headquarters to
Luanda which would have been an irrevocable sign of trust, never took place. It
underlines the impression of two parties in control of distinct territories, rather than a
country headed for reconciliation and national unity. This reflected the pattern of
concessions that throughout the period from 1994 to 1998 had been marked by efforts
on both sides to “consolidate and enlarge their areas of control.”661
The final step towards allowing full government authority was never taken by
Savimbi. Instead, in the run-up to increased hostilities, governing was rendered
increasingly impossible in those areas that UNITA wanted back. Some of the
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government administrators were threatened or killed by UNITA supporters or were
simply allowed no freedom of movement. Whereas the international community
decided to enforce election results by providing physical protection to elected officials
in hostile municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, its resolve in the Angolan peace
process was not as strong. It is impossible to know whether accompanying
government representatives in newly restored areas would have been feasible or
effective, given UNAVEM III’s limited manpower, mandate, and equipment.
Enforcing the extension of administration, would also have implied taking sides in the
conflict, particularly given the fact that it would have meant endorsing hand-picked
MPLA cronies in former UNITA strongholds. 662
Throughout the peace process bouts about territory continued and put the
process as a whole at risk. Despite agreements on a peaceful transfer of authority, the
government demonstrated just how much it distrusted UNITA by establishing control
over certain areas with military force, such as in September 1995 when the
government offensive for the oil-region of Soyo seriously endangered the progress
made in other areas.663 Particularly, when trying to promote the fact that from now on
conflicts were to be managed by non-violent means, a military offensive was – to say
the least – sending mixed messages to the general population, as well as to the
opponent.
The government's legitimacy and the credibility of its claim of providing
security to its population were undermined by the activities of the ANP and other
security forces in the newly transferred areas. In its report on the human rights
situation in Angola in 1997, the US Department of State wrote that “[w]hile civilian
authorities generally maintain effective control of the security forces, there were
frequent instances in which the security forces acted independently of government
authority. Members of the security forces committed numerous, serious human rights
abuses, especially in areas to which the Government recently extended its
administration.”664 In December 1997, Reimer commented that Angola remained a
divided country. 665
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Divisions could not be overcome, as long as severe limitations on freedom of
movement persisted. Throughout the four years of the peace process the lack of
freedom of movement continued to pose a serious problem. One factor was the large
number of landmines, but there were also numerous checkpoints set up by bandits or
by military and police forces on either side.666 Regardless of who maintained the
checkpoints they brought with them harassment and serious violations of human
rights. UNAVEM III faced the checkpoints powerlessly and simply had to accept
being told that they could not access areas in which the peacekeeping force was to
investigate an incident.
The security guarantee that the international community might have provided
in connection with the implementation of the cease-fire, the withdrawal of foreign
forces, and the transfer of territory was illusive for a variety of reasons. For one, the
size of the country to be patrolled in relation to the size of UNAVEM III made any
effective monitoring of the whole of Angolan territory impossible. And yet, the notion
of UN peacekeeping is not to rely on the capability derived from force, but to project
power over large areas due to the moral high ground of the task entrusted to the
mission. In theory, this means that the presence of monitors in itself should be an
incentive for compliance. Still, even under the best of circumstances UNAVEM III
and later MONUA were small in relation to their mandates. Major General Philip V.
Sibanda, UNAVEM III Force Commander from 1995-8, emphasised that force
contingents were thinly spread out throughout Angola and therefore rather isolated.
This left them both exposed to attacks and without credible and timely backup.667 In
Angola, moreover, the implications of UNAVEM III’s limited size were compounded
by the fact that UNITA and to a lesser degree the MPLA government were not
interested in following UN rules, but pursued peace in their own – often
counterproductive – way. The degree to which both sides co-operated was a major
determinant of progress.
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5.1.2 Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
Demilitarisation as an Issue of Culture
Apart from its technical aspects, such as disarmament and demobilisation discussed
below, demilitarisation is a process of re-establishing a peaceful society. It involves
reversing a culture where violence is the instinctive method of conflict management
even at the level of individuals. Realising the cultural component of demilitarisation
in Angola was a formidable task. The conflict had so many dimensions and ran deep
for a long time so that it became a way of life and peaceful existence appeared a
distant possibility at best. The population’s distrust of the peace process, the parties,
the external actors, and of each other pervaded everything.
In theory, once the level of militarisation falls below a certain level,
demilitarisation becomes a question of the rule of law. In other words, once the sheer
existence of a common set of rules is accepted and more specific rules for the content
of a system of social interaction are developed, the issue moves into the realm of
civilian security. In Angola, even the first step of replacing the power of the gun with
other non-violent methods of interacting and handling discord, was a significant
challenge, as it involved unlearning what over thirty years of conflict had argued so
Box 5.1: Demilitarisation I - Cease-fire, Separation of Forces, and Transfer of
Territory
Clashes continued throughout the peace process with varying intensity. There were instances of
military activity just short of war, as well as random violence by bandits or armed factions on either
side. The persistent high level of violence contributed to the population’s sense of insecurity and
impeded the consolidation of peace.
There were some improvements in the security situation, when forces were eventually separated and
foreign forces repatriated. The separation of forces lead into the demobilisation process which was to
ensure permanent disengagement.
The transfer of territory was a key issue in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. For the
government, it involved the affirmation of its legitimate authority, as well as access to the resources
under UNITA’s control. For UNITA, territory was the final security guarantee, as well as a source of
income. The peace process broke down when it had become apparent that there was not enough
trust between the parties for UNITA to risk exposure by handing over territory.
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convincingly. The inherent attitude towards the conflict was reinforced by the way in
which the government handled the peace process, that is the way in which it
determined and then disseminated rules for social interaction. 668 As long as aggressive
police behaviour and high levels of violence characterised everyday life, the
population would be irresolute with respect to whether or not to abide by the rules
established by the central government. And yet, despite the lack of co-operation and
the hostility displayed by representatives on both sides, the Angolan population was
ready for peace. After years of war, the population was tired of war and the
government’s support base had been weakened significantly. Reimer suggests that the
biggest gulf was no longer between different parts of the population but between the
population and their leadership, be it UNITA or MPLA. 669
Developing universal respect for human rights among the population was a
fundamental aspect of the demilitarisation process. In this area, efforts by local NGOs
and the Church were directed at teaching respect for human rights and promoting
national reconciliation. UNAVEM III had a small human rights unit that contributed
to civil education. 670 This will be discussed in greater detail in connection with
civilian security sector reform (5.2.2). Given the history of the Angolan conflict, it
was clear that a peace process such as the one following the Lusaka Protocol required
a complex set of measures and – equally important – a sustained effort and long-term
commitment to gradually engender confidence in stability and security and the peace
process. In the following the three predominant technical tasks of demilitarisation are
addressed in turn: disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration, before the attention
shifts to military reform processes.
Disarmament
Given the size of the opposing armies and the duration of the Angolan conflict, the
task of disarmament promised to be comprehensive to say the least. Therefore, it is
important to keep in mind the components of the process that were directed at
different target groups and the responsibility of different parties. On the one hand,
there was the disarmament of UNITA that involved a wide range of weapons and was
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UNITA’s own responsibility as part of the process of registering at the demobilisation
sites. On the other hand, the Angolan government was assigned the task of disarming
the civilian population that was heavily armed as a result of thirty years of civil
war.671 The military and civilian disarmament processes are discussed in turn below.
Although UNAVEM III’s mandate was more comprehensive than UNAVEM II’s had
been in the Bicesse process, and gave the peacekeepers a direct role in the
disarmament process and greater monitoring and verification responsibilities, it was
still limited to supervision. 672 It would be crucial to the success of the peace process
that the UN “summon the political and financial resources to ensure that weapons are
collected and successfully decommissioned.”673
Both the disarmament and demobilisation of UNITA proceeded in stages.
Military information on weapons and force strength was to be provided to the
international peacekeeping force by the government and by UNITA. The monitors
were then to administer this information obtained from both sides as a first step
towards establishing target rates and a measure for evaluating progress. It was not
considered necessary for one stage to be completed in full, before the next could
begin. Providing military information was an ongoing process that ran parallel to
actual reductions. Since the FAA was to be the future national armed force of both
parties and therefore did not need to be disarmed, the main focus was on UNITA’s
military disarmament. UNITA provided information unevenly, but continuously.
Unfortunately, much of the data handed over to the international authorities was not
regarded as credible. The gap between the data provided by UNITA and the UN’s
own assessments grew throughout the implementation process, until 1998, when
Jonas Savimbi’s public claims were simply ignored or discarded. In addition to
having to settle for untrustworthy information, UNAVEM III was frequently
prevented from inspecting UNITA-held territory. UNAVEM III was particularly
vulnerable to misinformation, as the force lacked an effective intelligence capacity. At
the same time, the fact that the peacekeeping force had not been provided with that
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capacity was an indication of the international community’s half-hearted
engagement.674
As disarmament and demobilisation played a central role in the context of the
implementation process, the damage done by UNITA’s dishonesty was severe,
leading both the international community and the Angolan government to distrust any
assurances given by UNITA. Initially, the organisation was given the benefit of the
doubt, a strategy on the part of the international community that allowed Savimbi to
pursue his double strategy without being seriously questioned by the third-party
presence. As the misinformation became more blatant and more manipulative in the
course of implementation, the international community finally confronted UNITA and
added pressure. It had wanted to maintain its impartiality and was weary of
condemning one side in the peace process. The notion of impartiality as it was
proclaimed in the Dayton process in which enforcement measures and criticisms were
tied to the degree of compliance with the peace agreement, had not yet been
formulated in full.675 Instead, UNAVEM III’s need to maintain its credibility as an
impartial observer precluded any condemnation of UNITA until the organisation’s
destructive behaviour had become undeniable and, ironically, UNAVEM III’s
credibility heavily undermined.676
The next step was the actual collection of arms for which the UN mandate
envisaged the establishment of eight main weapons storage locations throughout the
country and which was to be the first step towards demobilisation. 677 There were
delays in the opening of quartering areas and storage locations, due to delayed
inspection and subsequent acceptance by the parties. Spear claims that the delays
were due to the fact that the parties were already scouting out the best strategic
locations from which to relaunch the war – if necessary. 678 Some quartering and
storage areas were co-located, as a matter of necessity given UNAVEM III’s limited
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number of staff. Naturally, co-location might appear dangerous should hostilities
break out, but the opposite was also true: Soldiers might be induced to demobilise, if
they could keep their options open, i.e. remain close to their weapons. It was an
unfortunate, but effective security guarantee. In addition, the economic value of a
weapon should not be underestimated.679 Thus, external actors have to be aware of the
sacrifice that disarmament and demobilisation often entail for the soldiers that risk
losing both the power of the gun and its cash value. The same is true of UNITA as a
whole that even in the event of peace would be able to turn their military capacity into
cash.680
In the early days of the peace process, few arms were delivered to the
registration sites and most of the weapons were unserviceable. Although the number
of weapons collected grew, the majority remained of low quality and/or lacked
ammunition and included none of the heavy weaponry that UNITA was known to
possess.681 UNAVEM III did not have the capacity to hunt down hidden storages on
either side or to exercise effective control over external supply channels, but it
collected and destroyed arms when hidden stock piles were periodically discovered.
Still, the number of arms caches and their content were a mere fraction of the total of
arms at UNITA's disposal. What remained unclear was whether UNITA was retaining
capacity for offensive or defensive purposes.682 Regardless, when full-scale hostilities
were on the verge of breaking out towards the end of 1998, the movement emerged
from the fourth year of the Lusaka peace process better armed and better organised.683
The task of disarming the civilian population was assigned to the Angolan
National Police. This decision was based on the reasoning that arms in civilian hands
were a matter of law and order, rather than one of military security. 684 In contrast to
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where disarmament was in the hands of the impartial
peacekeeping force, entrusting that task to the police force in Angola had a negative
impact on the perceived credibility and impartiality of the police, as we shall see
below. The reinforcing positive circle of growing confidence and subsequently
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increased willingness to co-operate that at least in part marked the disarmament
process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was reversed into a vicious circle of coercion and
distrust in Angola. The decision to transfer that responsibility to the police is criticised
by Smith, as he claims that it “makes the future begin to look very much like the
past,”685 with reference to the failed attempt at peace implementation after Bicesse.
Unfortunately, there was no alternative actor to take on the task of disarming the
civilian population. UNAVEM III did not have the manpower to undertake that task
itself, instead it had to limit itself to monitoring the process and registering the
weapons collected by the ANP.
The disarmament of civilians by the Angolan National Police began in July of
1996 and was to consist of three stages. In the first stage, weapons were collected in
areas already under government control. The second stage extended the police activity
to the territories held by UNITA but scheduled to be handed over to government
authority. Finally, the third stage consisted of prosecution and seemed to be intended
as an incentive to surrender arms early on. As the notion of ‘stages’ indicates, the
three phases were designed to be consecutive.686 The notion of stages made sense
when viewed in connection with the demobilisation process and more particularly
with the transformation of UNITA from a military organisation to a political party.
The government tied its efforts to progress in demobilisation and pursued its
disarmament duty in fits proportionate to the number of UNITA soldiers and weapons
registered at the quartering areas.687 However, it quickly became clear that arms
would be both discovered and delivered after a phase was considered complete, and
the process of collecting weapons from the civilian population proved to be ongoing
and indiscriminate of territorial delineations. In March 1995, the Angolan Police
General Command issued a ban on the importation and trade of arms and ammunition.
However, as Kingma points out, the question was “how effective the Angolan police
currently is to implement and control this measure.”688
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The civilian disarmament which was scheduled to begin in March 1996 was
delayed due to foot-dragging by the government.689 Moreover, the success of and
even the decision of whether to attempt disarmament at all were contingent upon
which areas of the country were to be addressed. Obviously, the government was
unlikely to attempt weapons collections in areas not under its control. Since the
Angolan government did not control the entire territory or population at any point in
time, the scope of disarmament efforts was necessarily also limited. Obviously, the
delays in the transfer of territory into government hands held back the collection of
arms in UNITA-held territory, as envisioned in stages two and three. Initial progress
was slow and in February 1997, the Central Civilian Disarmament Commission
announced that it had “recovered 40,000 lethal weapons throughout Angolan
territory.”690 The government appeared less interested in disarming its ‘own’
population and became increasingly one-sided in its efforts. Tellingly, some slight
progress was made in early 1998, when the government focused its attention on the
former UNITA-held areas, which had recently been transferred into government
hands. Its lack of co-operation with MONUA further underlined how partial the
government’s efforts at disarming the civilian population were.691 Despite the
government’s manoeuvring, the overall results remained limited; never making a
serious dent in the number and availability of weapons in the conflict area. The
Angolan population was quite simply scared to volunteer its weapons and buy back
programmes suggested under MONUA in the summer of 1997 never got off the
ground due to a lack of funds.692
Keeping in mind the size of UNITA’s army – officially 60,000 at the time of
the Lusaka Protocol, as well as the size of the population – approximately eleven
million, the number of arms collected was very small. Adding to that the type and
quality of weapons, it is obvious that UNITA was not significantly weakened and that
the flow of arms among the population had in no way been curbed.693
Indeed, in 1998, armament levels were again soaring. For the first time in the
long Angolan war, UNITA was waging a conventional war against the government.
Recent arrivals of combat vehicles, tanks, and fighter aircraft from other parts of
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Africa and Europe enabled Savimbi to move out of his guerrilla war mode and lead
large-scale territorial strikes against the government. The critical regional dimension
of the flow of arms is addressed in greater detail in section 5.1.4.
Demobilisation
The political, logistical, humanitarian, and security challenges were similar to those
faced at Bicesse, but this time the UN presence was much larger. Angola also
resembled other post-settlement societies in that the challenges were matched by
limited legitimacy and a poor capacity on the receiving end to carry out the measures
or to continue programmes in the future.694
The United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Unit (UCAH) and
its Demobilisation and Reintegration Office (DRO) had the main co-ordination
responsibility for the civilian aspects of the demobilisation and subsequent
reintegration process. According to an evaluation report by Ball and Campbell,
“UCAH believed that a successful demobilization and reintegration was in fact the
primary sine qua non for an end to humanitarian assistance needs in Angola.”695
Demobilisation was a two-step process where combatants were first registered at
quartering areas and then demobilised and sent on their way with varying degrees of
support. The release of combatants moved seamlessly into the process of reintegration
and rehabilitation. UNAVEM III was involved in the first stage, i.e. the quartering
                                                                                                                                           
693 Cornwell and Potgieter (1998), p. 5.
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Box 5.2: Demilitarisation II - Disarmament
There were two disarmament processes: a military disarmament that focused on UNITA and a civilian
disarmament that targeted the general population. The weapons collected from UNITA were few and
mostly unserviceable or of low quality. UNAVEM III was charged with supervising the military
disarmament process, but were not capable of forcing delivery of weapons to the storage sites.
The civilian disarmament process was in the hands of the government and the ANP. It became
increasingly one-sided and was accompanied by frequent human rights violations, particularly in
those areas in which the government had just assumed authority.
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and registration process, particularly in those aspects that tied in with disarmament,
but played no role in the release of former combatants.696 The civilian and
humanitarian character that was assigned to the demobilisation process was a
conscious choice and motivated by the belief that the transition of demobilised
soldiers into a ‘civilian context’ could not begin soon enough. 697 Other organisations
that were involved were UNDP, WHO, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, and the ILO.
Before quartering could begin, the 15 proposed sites had to be reconnoitred
and accepted by all parties, that is by UNAVEM III, UNITA, and the government.
The acceptance process was delayed due to the absence of UNITA and government
representatives from some of the reconnaissance missions. In UN fashion, progress
was described as “slow,” but “significant.”698 In Bosnia-Herzegovina where one
initially expected the entire implementation process to be completed within a year, a
year’s delay before quartering areas were even recognised by the parties, would have
been unacceptable. Apart from the much smaller peacekeeping presence, the attitude
towards delays in Angola was different, as the UN itself had been late in deploying. It
reflects the ambiguous stance towards deadlines, noted in the discussion of the Lusaka
Protocol. While the international community wished to be firm, it understood the need
to be flexible – to the extent that initial time tables rapidly became irrelevant. The fact
that quartering proceeded in fits and starts made it very difficult for the entire UN
operation to plan and implement and ran counter to the initial view that
demobilisation would be a relatively short-term process.699
In accordance with the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, Angola was scheduled to merge
100,000 government and 60,000 UNITA troops and to demobilise a total of 70,000
combatants.700 The initial intention was for integration to precede demobilisation.
However, as both processes proved difficult to get started, it was decided that the
processes would be parallel rather then sequential, in order to move ahead at all. In
practice, this meant that UNITA soldiers would have to proceed to quartering areas
for demobilisation, while the FAA initially retained its full strength. The threat that
this implied for UNITA was clearly underestimated and explains the movements’
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reluctance to demobilise fully before the fighting power of the FAA had been at least
partially reduced. Clearly, UNITA would have had more influence if FALA had been
incorporated globally into the FAA. When the first group of UNITA soldiers was
encamped in November 1995, a year had passed. Delays were due to “continued
distrust, incidental fighting and slow response from the international community to
requests for financial assistance.”701 The process accelerated in February 1996 when
thousands of UNITA troops registered and surrendered their arms. By early April,
UNAVEM III had registered 17,566 UNITA soldiers in their quartering areas, but this
still fell short of the requirements to the parties under the Lusaka Protocol.  702
In March 1997, there were close to 71,000 UNITA soldiers in quartering areas;
eleven thousand more than anticipated in the Lusaka Protocol. In the fall of the same
year, UNITA still had an estimated 35,000 soldiers in violation of the Lusaka
Protocol. This points to the difficulties in intelligence and reliable information, due to
lack of transparency and lack of co-operation by the parties. UNITA was called on to
quarter and demobilise their remaining forces and in an attempt to force compliance
the UN agreed on sanctions to become effective by 30 September 1997, including a
travel ban for all UNITA officials and the closure of UNITA offices abroad. In view
of some indications of progress, the UN postponed the implementation of sanctions
several times. They were finally put into effect in October 1997. By December 1997,
UNITA claimed that it merely had ten thousand armed personnel that made up the
Presidential Guard and the mining police, but experts suspected that Jonas Savimbi
still commanded twice that number and that they were heavily armed. Eyewitnesses
also maintained that UNITA was actively recruiting and arming young men at the
time.703
In contrast to the Bosnian peace process, the demobilisation of UNITA
soldiers also brought a large number of family members to the vicinity of the
quartering area. This was a reflection of the duration of the conflict and the degree to
which rebel life dominated social structures. It also posed substantial challenges to the
process of transferring former combatants to civilian life. The UN reported that in
addition to the close to 18,000 UNITA members that had registered at the quartering
                                                                                                                                           
700 The merger would have made the FAA the largest standing army in Africa. Lewis (1996), p. 92.
701 Kingma (1996), p. 2, 4; Saferworld (1996), p. 14.
702 Kingma (1996), p. 2f, 10; The Blue Helmets  (1996), p. 263.; “Police Confine 3,367 Men, UNITA
Confines 17,566,” 2 April 1996 (http://wnc.fedworld.gov); Reimer (1996).
703 Reimer (1997).
Section III Implementing the Lusaka Protocol
254
areas in March 1996, there were approximately ten thousand family members close
by. As life outside the camps offered few opportunities, the demobilised troops also
stayed in the areas longer than anticipated. When the number reached 62,000 UNITA
soldiers and 120,000 dependants by October of the same year, the humanitarian
challenge was clearly formidable. Although there was an acute shortage of supplies,
UCAH continued its food distribution, sanitation, and civic education programmes as
it could.704 UNAVEM III on the other hand considered these activities to be outside of
the realm of its security assignment.705
The process was also undermined, when demobilised soldiers were
immediately re-recruited by UNITA, and the food or cash reward which they had
received from the international community as an incentive for demobilisation and a
starting-point for reintegration, collected by the rebel movement. Rumours persisted
that UNITA forced uninvolved civilians to register for demobilisation with low
quality arms, in order to pocket the cash while avoiding the demobilisation of actual
soldiers. At the same time, UNITA was allegedly withdrawing its elite troops into its
strongholds.706 By the end of 1997, 15 sites were closed, when 40,000 out of a total of
79,000 had been registered. Of these 25,000 deserted and only eight thousand – from
both the government and UNITA – had been successfully demobilised and
reintegrated into society. 707 By this time, the UN operation was experiencing serious
funding difficulties. Official demobilisation was completed, but additional
opportunities for residual forces would be offered.708 The final toll in March 1998
recorded 48,000 registered out of an estimated 87,000 UNITA troops, of which
27,000 were absentees.709 In the course of 1998, a growing number of disenchanted
UNITA soldiers defected and fled across the Tanzanian border, but the number of
willing combatants still easily outweighed the number of deserters.710 As a result,
Savimbi’s army was only marginally smaller at the end of four years of
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demobilisation in late 1998 than it had been at the time the Lusaka Protocol was
signed.
Although the major burden of demobilising was on UNITA, the FAA was also
to reduce its strength by approximately 20-30,000 soldiers. The Bicesse experience
had left a deep mark on the trust between the parties. Dos Santos’ had in fact
demobilised in good faith in 1991/2; if not fully, but substantially. He drew the short
end of the stick, when the parties returned to war following the elections in 1992.
Once burnt, the government pursued a tactic similar to the one UNITA had chosen in
which demobilisation took place haltingly and superficially and troops were
repositioned rather than quartered. Whereas UNITA had reduced their armed force in
March 1998, the government had “yet to indicate the number of excess troops of the
Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and the time frame for their demobilisation” and both
sides had begun forceful recruiting again.711
The phenomenon of child soldiers was a tragic aspect of the war in Angola.
Even during the peace process, there were tenacious reports of continuing recruitment
of youths by both parties.712 They presented particular challenges to demobilisation
and reintegration. The recruitment of children indicates how broadly society was
actively drawn into the war, but also how deeply the war would remain ingrained in
the population’s mind for a long time to come. Impressionable young people were
bred into intolerant and uncompromising adults. For some the attraction consisted of
the job, the social structure, and the calling in life that both UNITA and the FAA
provided. Given the formidable size of the opposing armies, the government and
UNITA recruited ever younger soldiers, such as in August of 1998, when the
government reintroduced conscription for males aged between fifteen and thirty-four
in the face of rising tensions.713 The Secretary General pointed out that in order to
build confidence and trust at lower levels, the political will shown by the two parties
in the Lusaka Protocol had to be backed up by action on the ground.714 The
recruitment of child soldiers was just one example of how future reconciliation was
made almost impossible. Moreover, the issue of child soldiers in Angola tragically
underscored the case of demobilisation without reintegration
                                                                                                                                           
Cornwell (1998) Angola – At the Precipice (Occasional Paper No. 32, Institute for Security Studies:
Johannesburg, July 1998).
711 Potgieter and Cornwell (1998), p. 2; S/1998/236.VI.B.28.
712 See for example Amnesty International (1996), p. 5.
713 Vines (1998), p. 8.
Section III Implementing the Lusaka Protocol
256
Prisoners of war formed another special group that awaited demobilisation, in
the sense that it had to be transferred from a combat to a civilian role. The release and
return of prisoners of war in Angola was supervised by the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC). Similar to the demobilisation process as a whole, there were
also major delays in this area. However, by July 1996, both sides had released all
prisoners listed by the ICRC. Those not accounted for were assumed to have died in
‘custody.’715
In a volatile security situation, demobilisation meant vulnerability. Therefore,
Kingma argues, “[d]emobilisation also requires a clear and credible central authority
[to provide security for former combatants].”716 In the Angolan case, that authority
could have been executed by either the Angolan government or by UNAVEM III who
was responsible for promoting a secure environment in the former conflict area.
Kingma continues that if “it is the government, it should be able to guide and secure
the process; and its police force should be in the position to intervene if the security of
ex-combatants is threatened.”717 Clearly, the MPLA government had no such capacity
and arguably no willingness even if they had had it. In fact, the ANP was the source
of insecurity rather than the protector of demobilised soldiers. At the same time,
UNAVEM III was too small to effectively control the process and provide a credible
security guarantee to former combatants.
Reintegration
Demobilisation without adequate reintegration is a major instability factor. The latent
danger that lies in the unfulfilled expectations of former combatants that hoped to
profit from peace, is a virtual powder keg in any peace process. As Kingma points
out, “demobilization is closely linked to security issues; and the impact of
demobilization depends largely on whether ex-combatants are able to reintegrate.”718
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In Angola, the massive problems faced with respect to reintegration included the
dysfunctional economy and the large number of people awaiting reintegration. Major
groups were former UNITA combatants, a limited number of government soldiers and
approximately 1.5 million returning refugees and internally displaced. In order to
promote reconciliation and prevent envy, a shift towards community-based
reintegration took place.719 Also, reintegration support was tied to efforts by the
World Bank to stimulate to local economy through community-based initiatives.720
Reintegration meant managing the process of “releasing large numbers of
former soldiers into a severely depressed economy.”721 In contrast to Bosnia-
Herzegovina, a number of those that were to be reintegrated in Angola had never
known a “civilian” existence. Therefore, the combatants were arguably the ones with
the least prerequisites for reintegration. Their type of employment and social structure
had always been affected by the war. In that way, reintegration had to manage UNITA
members and their families, as well as replace the social network formerly provided
by UNITA. Moreover, many of the combatants in Angola had virtually no marketable
skills and had to compete with a number of professionals, such as carpenters or
teachers, for scarce jobs and limited financial support.722 Only a fraction of former
combatants on UNITA’s side had a future in the FAA or the ANP, unlike the Bosnian
police that was allowed to act as a temporary sponge for a significant share of the
demobilised soldiers. Obviously, UNITA’s strategy of forcing newly demobilised
soldiers to return to service in the rebel organisation exacerbated the problems of
reintegration.
Employment in the agricultural sector was only an option for few of the
former combatants. The percentage may have been slightly higher among rurally
recruited UNITA soldiers, but farmland had been systematically abused, denied, and
used as a political tool for years, rendering it an unattractive option for most.723 With
enough conflicts in the region in which former combatants could earn a livelihood, an
alternative occupation to unemployment, farming, or crime was to join a mercenary
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group.724 Although that removed some demobilised soldiers from the Angolan scene,
it further undermined stability in the region.
The quartering areas featured services that were to smoothen the transition
from demobilisation to reintegration, most notably civic education for demobilised
soldiers. The battle scars were somewhat deeper, however, and many ex-combatants
suffered from war-incited psychological problems that the government neither had the
capacity nor the willingness to address.
There was a hope that the responsibility for reintegration would be transferred
into local hands early on, but given the scope of the challenges, this was unrealistic.
The Angolan National Institute for the Professional and Social Reintegration of
Former Soldiers was established in 1995. But as reintegration progressed, it revealed
the weakness of the Angolan state and virtually non-existent recipient structures.
Lewis writes that “[m]ost serious of all was that national and international institutions
seemed unable to sustain a holistic and long-term approach toward investment and
planning for the socio-economic reintegration of soldiers.”725 She argues that the
situation in the wake of the Lusaka Protocol was simply not stable enough to launch a
comprehensive programme, particularly when it involved devolving funds away from
the central government to outlying areas.
Too often, funding for reintegration programmes is hopelessly inadequate,
particularly given the staggering demand for “financial, logistical, and technical
support” to much needed integration programmes.726 The lack of funding was a
serious problem for the UN’s ability to assist in the execution of the demobilisation
and reintegration plans called for in the Lusaka Protocol. In July 1995, the appeal for
financial assistance in this area had produced only 1% of the funding needed to carry
out the programmes. Funding improved but never exceeded more than half of what
was needed.727
More generally, demilitarisation as a whole, in its technical as well as its
psychological elements, suffered from lack of and oftentimes delays in funding. This
had to do with the sheer complexity of the tasks, but also with the fact that most
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international peace support operations grapple with financial constraints. It is
important to realise that the UN at the time was involved in a wide range of missions
that all craved their toll on the limited resources of the organisation. More
particularly, all of Europe was absorbed in the ongoing war in former Yugoslavia.728
In the period from late 1995 to late 1998 the funds flowing into the regeneration of
Bosnia-Herzegovina grew steadily. Although there is no clear evidence that Bosnia-
Herzegovina ‘stole’ funding from Angola, it is certainly clear that in the finite aid
world, funds to the regeneration of other societies, such as the Angolan one, were
wearing thinner.
A major factor unrelated to the demands of conflict management in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, was the slow progress in the Lusaka process and the donor fatigue that
set in for good during 1996. In part this was due to the fact that certain reconstruction
programmes depended on progress in other areas. When progress in demobilisation
faltered, reintegration, resettlement, and economic recovery programmes were
hamstrung as well. 729 Goals set were impossible to attain and programmes and
implementing agencies appeared extremely ineffective. Kingma underlines the
interdependency of the different components of the implementation process and
points out that “[p]ost-conflict demobilisation and efforts to support reintegration are
usually a part of a broader process of reconciliation, nation-building and the
strengthening of civil society.”730 Although significant funds were made available
they were simply used up, when the process took far longer than anticipated.
The donor fatigue in Angola was exacerbated by the fact that much of the
delay in implementation was due to the parties’ lack of willingness to move the peace
process forward which, in turn, led to growing frustration on the part of the third-party
actors. In his October 1996 report to the Security Council, the Secretary General
pointed out that “[a]t a time, when funds for peacekeeping are scarcer than ever and
all expenditures of the Organization are being closely scrutinized, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to generate international support for operations which do not
enjoy the full co-operation of the conflicting parties.”731 With rising tensions in the
course of 1998 and limited reintegration, humanitarian assistance was gradually
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diverted from reintegration to emergency relief, as large groups of people remained
entirely dependent on external assistance.732
5.1.3 Creating a National Armed Force
Those that were not scheduled for reintegration into civilian life, but were to continue
on a military path in the FAA had to undergo a military reform process. This was also
part of a wider reconciliation process in which the relations between the civilian
segments of society and the military needed to be improved.733 All four aspects of
military reform, that is reorganisation, vetting, re-education, and the establishment of
civilian control over the armed forces, were attempted in Angola; all of them with
very limited success.
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Box 5.3: Demilitarisation III - Demobilisation and Reintegration
The two processes were categorised as predominantly humanitarian in character and UCAH was
assigned the overall co-ordinating responsibility. UNAVEM III, the peacekeeping force, was limited to
overseeing quartering and registration. A number of other international organisations and NGOs were
involved in the release and reintegration of former combatants.
The initial plan to first integrate all forces into the FAA and then demobilise was abandoned early on.
As a result, UNITA had to demobilise on its own, which brought with it reluctance and deceit in the
absence of a credible security guarantee from either the government or UNAVEM III.
The more UNITA soldiers were registered, the more the residual force seemed to grow, indicating
that not only soldiers but random recruits were being sent to the quartering areas and that no
effective demobilisation was taking place.
The delays in demobilisation and reintegration and the large number of dependants at the quartering
areas depleted funds more rapidly than expected and placed a huge burden on the humanitarian
effort.
Despite comprehensive efforts at reintegration, results remained meagre, due to the severely
depressed Angolan economy, the lack of marketable skills among combatants, and the large number
of people to be reintegrated which also included returning refugees and internally displaced.
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The reorganisation process in Angola involved three elements: (1) the
reduction of the force to a sustainable level; (2) the merger of a portion of UNITA’s
army (FALA) with the FAA and concomitant restructuring; and (3) the abolition of
paramilitary forces. Reorganisation played a vital role and more particularly, “no
settlement, still less transition to democracy is possible unless the rival military forces
can be integrated and brought under some form of government control.”734
As early as January 1995, only six weeks after the cease-fire came into force,
the Chiefs of Staff of UNITA and the government met. By 20 April 1995, agreement
had been reached in the Joint Commission that UNITA soldiers would be generally
incorporated into the national armed forces and the FAA would then be subject to
demobilisation. In this way, one hoped to avoid discrimination in the demobilisation
process and to promote national reconciliation. According to the Lusaka Protocol,
UNITA forces were to be integrated into the Angolan forces, creating a force of over
160,000 which was then to be reduced to 90,000.735 One reason for the reduction of
forces is typically to free up scarce resources for other reconstruction and
development purposes.736 In contrast, planning to integrate before demobilising
indicated that the Angolan government considered “the financial costs of maintaining
a large army for a longer period of time [to be] lower than the social and political
costs of an expedited demobilisation.”737
When the decision was made to demobilise concurrently with the integration
of UNITA staff into the FAA, the reorganisation process changed fundamentally in
character. Rather than creating a joint armed force instantly that might have been
regarded as serving the needs of both parties, the FAA remained MPLA-dominated
until further notice. The original strategy was abandoned for a good reason. There was
obviously no political will among either party to surrender control over their
respective armed forces. Reform was particularly difficult to implement, because
“[t]he military had enjoyed immense political prestige in Angola and was still an
integral element of the party [in the early 1990s].”738 As Harding writes in
anticipation of the peace process, “it would have to reconcile itself to becoming a
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national army, without party privileges; or more accurately, one element of a national
army, since an end to the civil war would mean the integration of government and
UNITA fighters.”739 The number of alternative security forces, the high crime rate,
and the slow progress in military reform all pointed to a reluctance on the part of the
government’s and UNITA’s military establishments to relinquish their privileges. In
an assessment of Rwanda and Burundi that holds true for Angola as well, Adekanye
points out that “inability to institutionalise such a power-sharing arrangement
particularly as applied to the military and security forces, and to put in place
structures good and trusted enough to guarantee maximum human security for all, has
been a major cause for the continuing conflicts in the two countries.”740
Although another agreement was reached in January 1996 on a framework for
understanding for the formation of the merged FAA, critical issues on structure and
the allocation of posts remained unresolved.741 Putting agreements into action proved
equally difficult. There were delays in the arrival of UNITA generals; for a long time
nobody came to Luanda, and when they did, they did not include key figures.742
Clearly, releasing UNITA generals to join the FAA was fraught with two dangers for
Savimbi, both of which sprang from an absence of trust between the parties. On the
one hand, there was the physical danger to the officers, as UNITA often belaboured
the lack of security guarantees for its members travelling into ‘enemy’ territory.
Considering the purges undertaken by the government in the immediate wake of the
1992 elections in which thousands of UNITA members had been killed, UNITA’s
preoccupation with security arrangements was understandable.743 On the other hand,
there was the psychological danger of key UNITA officers joining the ‘enemy’ camp
and being seduced by the spoils of power in Luanda. But delays were also due to
logistic constraints and foot-dragging by the government.744
In the spring of 1997, some UNITA soldiers left quartering areas to join the
FAA, but did so in small numbers only. As it appeared that no more UNITA soldiers
would be forthcoming to be integrated into the FAA in March 1997, the selection
process was officially drawing to an end. At that point, approximately 17,000 had
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been selected and 7,500 already incorporated into the force.745 Integration did not
consist of much more than assigning the soldiers to a new unit, with further training
available only in the context of training provided for the FAA in general. The
integration process was formally completed on 10 July 1997 with a disappointing
10,900 UNITA troops incorporated into the FAA – as opposed to the scheduled
26,300 – and General Arlindo Pena ‘Ben Ben,’ Savimbi’s nephew and one of
UNITA’s most senior generals, as Deputy Chief of Staff. 746
In order for the incorporation process to advance it was essential that
communication links existed to UNAVEM III, which acted as the verifying party.
While these were fairly easily established with the government, links to UNITA
proved difficult.747
The demobilisation of UNITA and a few FAA staff constituted the first
massive post-war reduction. Reducing the force to a sustainable level would have
been the next step, had the integration of UNITA officers into the FAA succeeded.
The only restructuring that was planned in anticipation of or as a result of the
incorporation of new force members, was the establishment of a “4th Branch.” The
Branch was to be responsible for reconstruction and to take on some of the soldiers to
be integrated and keep them employed. Half of the eighteen generals in this branch
were to come from UNITA, but Savimbi almost immediately criticised the tasks
assigned to the branch and to his officers as undignified and ‘unmilitary’ activities. A
practical problem was obviously the cost of the branch that would comprise 70,000
soldiers. In mid-1996 the plan remained under discussion. 748
An essential component of the reorganisation process consisted of sorting out
the strands of existing security forces. In addition to the military forces on both sides,
each had at least one police force. Aside from official forces and official parties, “a
privatization of violence in the hands of armed groups beyond the control of the state”
often takes place in times of transition. 749 In theory, the process of disbanding
extraordinary security forces was to have been completed in the course of the
separation of forces and demobilisation. But the lack of trust among the parties and
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their reluctance to surrender their special forces meant that dismantling para-military
forces would feature prominently in the military reform process. The continued
existence of additional security agents affected both the structural and behavioural
aspects of military and police reform.
The vetting process in Angola mainly took place as part of the screening of
UNITA members that were to be integrated into the FAA. The government's
minimum standards for officers, such as age, reading and writing skills, and health
were an important factor for the initial delays in incorporation. To a degree the
minimum standards were also abused by both sides: UNITA could use them as an
excuse to delay dispatching officers, and the standards allowed the government to
impede the acceptance of former opponents into the FAA. Only when the
international community asked the government to abandon some of its strict
requirements, the process moved forward and UNITA sent officers and soldiers, as
well as members of its leadership to Luanda. Ironically, the promotion of standards
for policing and military officers is highly desirable in security sector reform. The aim
is not a highly educated military force, but one that has undergone basic training and
has obtained reading and writing skills. However, in the Angolan case, in order for the
peace process to move forward at all, lowering the standards became inevitable. Other
than the initial government standards, no systematic process of selection was
attempted.
The behaviour of the military forces on either side was horrific and a re-
education process was sorely needed. In the course of only a month from December
1996 to January 1997, the FAA was accused of burning 25 villages and soldiers from
both sides deliberately killed and tortured civilians.750 Since only a limited number of
UNITA soldiers were integrated into the FAA, it was difficult to distinguish between
‘regular’ training, such as any armed force conducts, and specific training that
targeted respect for human rights, reconciliation, multi-cultural co-operation etc.
Military training was offered by a variety of countries, including the United
States, Spain, Portugal, France, and Brazil, as well as foreign military advisors.751
Courses were held for both seasoned FAA staff and UNITA newcomers. They lasted
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for three months and predominantly tackled practical issues, such as resource
management. While these courses certainly contributed to the professionalisation of
the armed forces, as well as their credibility, impartiality, and transparency,
reconciliation was not directly addressed. And yet, maybe true enthusiasm for co-
operation was generated by members of the two sides absolving training and duties
together rather than through a lecture. Training was also provided by foreign military
advisors, such as South African Executive Outcomes and American Military
Resources Professional Inc. (MPRI). The United States threatened to withhold US
financial aid and forced the Angolan government to terminate their contract with
Executive Outcomes. Instead, they were to hire MPRI, whose task it would be to
continue retraining two elite paratrooper brigades and to assist in establishing a
military training academy for non-commissioned officers.752 With respect to training
received by the FAA, there did not seem to be a clear cut distinction of a pre- and a
post-Lusaka situation. Thus, training was a continuation of war-time assistance.
Throughout 1995, UNITA was also still recruiting mercenary services from several
countries to train its forces and intensified its own training activity in the course of
1998, reflecting the degeneration of the peace process.753
The demilitarisation process and the military reform process form the basis on
which civilian control may be implemented. Civilian control has a structural or
institutional and a behavioural or performance aspect. It is when the requirements for
both have been fulfilled that one arrives at democratic control over the security sector.
In the Angolan context, both were rendered unfeasible, due to the fact that a single
security sector with a uniform set of instruments never evolved. Luckham points out
that “[...] in most African countries, the military establishment and other repressive
apparatuses of the state continue to be the single most important obstacle to transition
to democracy. Even in retreat, they are formidably equipped to block political
reform.”754 The military security sector in Angola never got to the point where it
would have come under pressure to democratise. The government was far too
preoccupied with battling alternative security providers, that is UNITA’s military and
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police forces and other armed groups, in an attempt to reassert its legitimacy and
establish a monopoly on the use of force in Angola.
Nonetheless, the success of military reform and the creation of an integrated
force was dependent on the socio-economic and the political context.755 In Angola,
there was little national reconciliation and no economic development, apart from the
leadership’s exploitation of natural resources. The political climate was marked by
distrust and a lack of co-operative spirit. It is not surprising that the military reform
process withered away in such an uncompromising political context. Among other
things, this was also reflected in the authorities’ unwillingness to prosecute and
punish violations of the Protocol and more generally of human rights. As indicated
above, the human rights record of the armed forces on both sides was shocking. All
human rights abuses were subject to investigation by the UN civilian police monitors,
but the monitors were often hindered in carrying out that task. In an ideal situation,
the enforcement would be in the hands of Angolan authorities and there would be
internal control mechanisms for misbehaviour.
Another aspect of civilian control over the military is control over the force’s
budget. Due to a lack of external support and fiscal and balance of payment problems,
the general trend in Africa was towards military decline. In contrast, Angola
maintained a high level of military spending and ran its economy into the ground in
the process despite its wealth in natural resources.756 The government was extremely
dependent on oil exports, so that the fall in oil prices in 1998, created a large gap in
government budgets. In fact, Potgieter and Cornwell suggested in mid-1998 that the
government might be compelled to return to war to gain control of the inland
wealth. 757 A key aspect of democratic control was transparency in financing and the
need for sustainable military budgets/expenditures. The Angolan government only
paid its soldiers low or no salary at all.758 Moreover, the corruption and close ties
among the political and military leadership effectively foreclosed any democratic
civilian control of the armed forces. Obviously, the government was diverting much
needed funds from other reconstruction efforts, such as reintegration programmes or
economic reform measures, and was thereby undermining the consolidation of peace.
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5.1.4 Regional Stability and Arms Supplies
A Bilateral Cease-fire Modalities Timetable accompanied the Lusaka Protocol and
revalidated the “triple zero” provision of the Bicesse Accords. It was to regulate the
supply of weapons to both sides and thereby addressed the regional dimension of the
conflict. UNAVEM III’s designated role was limited to collecting and verifying
information on military forces, positions, and equipment. Similar to the situation in
the Balkans, the security in the Southern African region was clearly interconnected
and unless the flow of arms was curbed, the chances for consolidating peace in
Angola remained slim. In line with this realisation, the Special Representative of the
Secretary General Beye made efforts to involve neighbouring countries early on, so as
to build a stable and supportive regional backdrop for the peace process.759 Similar
efforts to disarm combatants and civilians had little value as long as structures for the
delivery of weapons remained in place. The challenge was therefore to develop a
“well-co-ordinated regional approach”760 that aimed at influencing supply and
demand.
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Box 5.4: Military Reform
When reorganisation changed from general integration of UNITA’s FALA and the FAA to selective
integration, the dynamic of the process shifted in favour of the government. The number and rank of
UNITA staff that was eventually incorporated into the FAA fell short of expectations.
The re-education of the military mostly came in the form of training from a variety of countries and
private companies. It did not specifically target reconciliation and thereby did not consolidate the
merger of UNITA and government troops.
No improvements were brought about with respect to establishing democratic civilian control over the
armed forces, due to defects in the political context for reform, such as corruption, ineffective political
institutions, and lack of political commitment. Attempts to carry out a military reform of the Angolan
armed forces failed.
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Clearly, neither party complied with the agreement and both continued to
purchase arms.761 Although an embargo to prevent arms deliveries to UNITA and the
MPLA government had been in place since 1992, its effect was limited. UNITA could
rely on supplies from a variety of sources throughout the peace process including
“across the porous Zaïrian border; from private sources in South Africa; from
captured weaponry; and finally, from existing arms stockpiles.”762 Also, the United
States and Russia had begun to supply arms to the Angolan government in 1993. The
international community accepted that the Angolan government had legitimate
security concerns and viewed its acquisition of weapons more benignly.763 The irony
of the international involvement in Angola was underlined by the fact that the Troika,
whose members were all major arms suppliers, was a key player in the pursuit of
peace.764
Christopher Smith claims that in 1996 the arms flow into the region had
virtually ceased – with the exception of Angola, as supply in most countries actually
outweighed demand.765 Although this may explain a reduced flow into the region, it
says nothing about the flow within the region which clearly increased in volume, with
the re-emergence of conflict in various parts of Central Africa. Weapons flowing out
of Angola, especially light weapons and small arms, also represented a significant
source of instability in the region, particularly for South Africa and Zambia.766 The
difficulty of handling the enormous flow of arms in the Southern African region was
reflected in two diametrically opposed views. Smith cites critics in Southern Africa
that argued “that a similar ‘success’ by UNAVEM III in Angola [as ONUMOZ in
Mozambique] will be exceptionally destabilising for the region.”767 Thus, arms
agreements in other former conflict areas simply diverted a wide range and large
quantity of arms to other markets.768 In contrast, others argued that the failure to carry
out programmes and to develop a regional approach, not only meant the non-
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implementation of certain provisions, but a direct contribution to the worsening
regional situation.
In the course of 1997, several significant changes took place that appeared to
harm UNITA the most. The changes affected support for UNITA from Angola’s
neighbouring countries on the one hand, and the international community, on the
other. In the spring of 1997, Mobutu Sese Seko fell for good in Zaïre, which brought
to power the MPLA-supported rebel leader Laurent Kabila to head the renamed
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).769 Later that year Sassou Nguesso a long time
supporter of UNITA was ousted in a coup in Congo-Brazzaville with the active
involvement of Angolan government forces. In both countries, both UNITA and the
Angolan government were engaged on respective sides in the upheavals, each fighting
for a support base. The loss of both helping hands dealt a severe blow to UNITA
which had been using those territories for training, stockpiling, and as supply routes.
Manning pinpoints the link between the various conflicts, when she writes that “the
Angolan government saw the fighting as battles joined to defeat long-time allies and
supporters of Jonas Savimbi.”770 The instability in the DRC also entailed an even
greater strain on Angola’s resources; both because of the military engagement and the
refugee flows into the country. 771
Approximately at the same time, the international community lost patience
with Savimbi’s high noon concessions and imposed further sanctions in an attempt to
isolate UNITA and prevent further arms acquisitions. Similar to the embargo, the
sanctions proved very difficult to implement at some of UNITA’s most important
strongholds abroad. Unfortunately, “whilst resulting in some reduction of revenue for
UNITA, the implementation of UNSC Res 1176 appears token at best.”772Overall the
sanctions proved ineffective, mostly because the international community lacked the
political will to implement them. 773
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Clearly, the loss of regional support for UNITA presented a window of
opportunity for the international community to put more pressure on UNITA and
exacerbate the movement’s isolation. The effect of the isolation remained limited as
increased diamond sales made up for the loss of support from the Unites States.774
Other factors that influenced the more unrelenting attitude were the fact that UNITA’s
attempts at manipulation were becoming undeniable, threatening to ridicule the
international community and the UN in particular. In addition, the new Secretary
General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, had taken office in early 1997 and
initiated his term by presenting a comprehensive reform package that placed
particular emphasis on cost-effectiveness and a thorough reassessment of ongoing
peacekeeping operations.
The Angolan government and in some instances also the South African and
Zambian governments tried to take more decisive action by shooting down planes that
violated Angolan, South African, or Zambian airspace. They also closed down smaller
airports that could not be checked and secured thoroughly to avoid their use by
sanction busters. But in general, local air forces were too weak to enforce sanctions
comprehensively. 775 Particularly the assistance provided by Zambia marked a
significant shift in regional support for UNITA. Although arms for UNITA continued
to arrive from and diamonds to be exported to Zambia, the Zambian government
officially supported the MPLA government. Relations between the two countries
worsened in the course of 1998, when the MPLA-government accused Zambia of not
taking enough actions to prevent the violation of sanctions from Zambian territory. 776
Another attempt to strangle the arms sources to UNITA focused on the
diamond trade, which had enabled Savimbi to make massive arms purchases.
Astonishingly, it did not occur to the international community to curb the diamond
trade until 1998, despite its obvious function as UNITA’s major source of income
with which to purchase supplies.777 The sanctions on the diamond trade might have
been effective, if the industry had been targeted sooner, but controlling the diamond
business was extremely difficult in any case.
                                                                                                                                           
operations into the hands of citizens of the host country. UNITA benefited greatly from its diaspora
support that could not only bust sanctions, but was also active in procuring arms for the organisation.
774 Saferworld (1996), p. 33.
775 S/1998/236.II.11; Cornwell and Potgieter (1998), p. 5.
776 Vines (1998), p. 15; Cornwell and Potgieter (1998), p. 6f.
777 Vines (1999a), Ch. I,  p. 4.
Section III Implementing the Lusaka Protocol
271
Although it was clear that a critical factor for the success of the peace process
would be to halt the procurement of weapons, all attempts failed. Where there was oil
or diamonds with which to buy weapons, there proved to be suppliers. The situation
never evolved to a state in which the parties did not feel threatened by each other and
in which they might have forsaken the military option in the context of arms
negotiations, such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5.2 Law and Order
As in most other peace processes building a credible and trustworthy police was also a
central issue in the Angolan case. Indeed, given the otherwise weak government
presence in the Angolan countryside, the police force acted very much as the
representative of the government in outlying areas and seriously undermined popular
trust in the authorities and in the viability of the peace process.
5.2.1 International Civilian Police Monitors
The UN Security Council authorised a civilian police component consisting of 260
monitors in all 18 provinces as part of UNAVEM III.778 In line with the general
delays in the deployment of UNAVEM III, the police component did not assume
significant proportions until July 1995. At that time 209 UN civilian police observers
from 19 countries were in place at 29 team sites throughout Angola.779 The number of
monitors and the number of team sites gradually increased, especially after the
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Box 5.5: Regional Stability
Security and stability in the Southern African region were interconnected because of arms and
refugee flows. International efforts to limit the purchase of arms by embargoes and sanctions were
ineffective. The riches that the natural resources endowed each party with enabled them to acquire
the means to continue the conflict. However, it was their respective security perceptions and the
complete absence of trust between them that provided them with the will to use those means.
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transition to MONUA, when the number of team sites rose to over fifty.780 At its
height in September 1998, MONUA comprised 388 civilian police monitors. In the
spring of 1998, the mood was decidedly hopeful, as UNITA had finally signed a
declaration stating its complete demobilisation and an agreement on the distribution
of earnings from the diamond business had been reached.
In Angola, as was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, international security
assistance in the areas of military and civilian security was provided in parallel
throughout the implementation process, but with most of the initial attention focused
on progress in demilitarisation, that is disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration.
When these tasks had officially been ‘completed,’ the attention moved to civilian
security issues and the civilian police component was strengthened. Initially, the
“civilian police component of UNAVEM III focused on monitoring the neutrality of
the Angolan National Police, the general law and order situation [...]. In addition, the
component verified and monitored the quartering of the rapid reaction police and
provided the quartered police with training. UNAVEM III also closely monitored the
activities of the Angolan National Police in providing security to UNITA leaders
residing in Luanda.”781
In the process of executing their mandate, it conducted “patrols, visits to police units,
prison cells and detention centres and [fostered] contacts with the local population.”782
When UNAVEM III was terminated and MONUA established in its place in mid-
1997, the civilian police component took over the remaining tasks of the
implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, such as the full extension of state
administration and overseeing civilian disarmament, and assumed “new and expanded
responsibilities.”783 Through increased size and thus presence, MONUA hoped to
instil popular confidence in the peace process and in the ANP as the population’s
guardian. Following the transition to MONUA, the UN CivPol component in Angola
moved closer to the way in which IPTF operated in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with joint
patrols and co-location with the ANP, particularly in former UNITA-held areas.784
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The police monitors were also mandated to receive complaints about human
rights violations and to investigate them.785 In order to do this more effectively, they
co-operated with and assisted a small Human Rights Unit under UNAVEM III. The
idea was for the Unit to consist of between ten and twenty human rights monitors that
could be distributed to all of Angola’s 18 provinces and promote confidence-building
and civic education. It was established to “deal with human rights issues and observe
implementation of the relevant provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.”786 The Human
Rights Unit was initially unclear about its goals in relation to the other elements of
UNAVEM III and was not integrated well into the UN’s overall approach. 787
Financed in part by the European Union, the Unit was a valuable addition to the
civilian police component of the peacekeeping force despite its minimal size.788
According to Human Rights Watch, their effort was diminished by the fact that they
did not make public accusations and made no “effort to establish accountability for
abuses.”789 The civilian police monitors could and did investigate and subsequently
reported violations to both the Joint Commission and the local authorities.
Enforcement was of course another matter entirely.
The human rights monitors suffered from being too closely affiliated with the
strategic component of UNAVEM III that was trying to maintain the precarious
balance between co-operation and pressure and was afraid that the human rights
monitors could ‘rock the boat.’ A change in policy began in late 1997 and was
confirmed in May 1998 by the arrival of a new head of the Human Rights Unit and
backed by the Special Representative Beye who had had a change of heart. Then, co-
operation with the civilian police monitors improved significantly and the HRU was
able to draw on civilian police resources.790 By that time, however, it was too late to
start building confidence among the Angolan population. 791
Compared to the two thousand monitors deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
number of civilian police monitors in Angola appeared rather modest, especially
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taking into account the size of the two countries. Clearly, civilian police staff was
spread thinly throughout Angola. The glaring mismatch between the limited physical
presence and the sweeping mandate became very obvious in the following description
in the UN Secretary General’s report to the Security Council in January 1996:
“The UNAVEM III civilian police observer component (CIVPOL), composed of 225
officers deployed to 33 team sites, has stepped up its monitoring of the neutrality of
the Angolan National Police, security arrangements for UNITA leaders in Luanda,
quartering of the rapid reaction police, free circulation of people and goods and the
general law and order situation in the country.”792
The relatively high number of civilian police monitors in Bosnia-Herzegovina
allowed them to be co-located at most police stations and to follow a large number of
local police patrols. In contrast, the UN monitors in Angola could at no point summon
the impression that they had comprehensive insight into the doings of the Angolan
police. Adding to that the heavy armament of the Angolan National Police (ANP), the
UN civilian police presence was dwarfed in comparison. Despite the fact that the
International Police Task Force (IPTF) was part of the UN mission to Bosnia-
Herzegovina and IFOR/SFOR were NATO-led, IPTF benefited hugely from its close
co-operation with SFOR. In UNAVEM III the military force and the civilian police
component were, of course, joined in one mission, which in theory might point
towards an even closer co-ordination between the two elements of security assistance.
While there was some co-location of and co-operation between military observers and
civilian police monitors, the peacekeepers seldom provided armed back-up, aside
from occasional escorts.
Naturally, one should not lose sight of a major difference between SFOR and
the peace-keepers of UNAVEM III which was that SFOR owed much of its
effectiveness to its muscularity. In contrast, even if the two components of UNAVEM
III had not operated fairly independently of one another in practice, the civilian police
component would not have gained much from a closer association with an equally
understaffed, thinly stretched, and not credible military peacekeeping force. A
drawback of conducting joint patrols with the military observers was that the civilian
police monitors’ separate identity was undermined, so that the Angolan population did
not have a clear understanding of the monitors’ role.
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Aside from its size, two additional factors impaired the effectiveness of the
civilian police monitors’ efforts at promoting civilian security sector reform. First, the
activity of the police that was to be observed far exceeded that of a ‘normal’ police
force. Besides the maintenance of law and order more generally, the ANP’s main task
consisted of civilian disarmament with whatever means necessary. Obviously,
disarmament on that scale assumed military proportions – rather than being typical
police work – and would be difficult to monitor even with a substantially larger
civilian police component. The problem was compounded by logistical constraints in
essential areas, such as a lack of vehicles, as well as by the level of destruction of
infrastructure throughout the Angolan countryside.
Second, despite consistent claims of close co-operation with the government,
the civilian police monitors met with more or less overt opposition from the
government throughout the peace process. Although local police officials were
relatively co-operative, such as the ANP police chief and the regional commanders,
the government was reluctant from the outset. A case in point is the government’s
unwillingness to grant unrestricted access to its Rapid Reaction Police in late 1995
and early 1996. Despite efforts to strengthen the civilian police component, it became
increasingly difficult for MONUA to exercise its tasks. Particularly towards the end
of 1998 the relationship between the international police monitors and the government
was degenerating to the point that the force was refused access to facilities and denied
freedom of movement.793 By September of 1998, the situation had deteriorated to the
degree that MONUA’s withdrawal was being discussed. Acknowledging the rising
level of tensions, the Secretary General pointed out that “MONUA would not be able
to remain in Angola in case of a major military confrontation.”794 MONUA’s mandate
finally ran out in February 1999.
Throughout the peace process, UNAVEM III emphasised progress and
conducted ceremonies to mark improvements. The more or less symbolic events were
intended to encourage the parties to co-operate further, as well as to generate hope
among the population that the transition from war to peace was indeed moving ahead.
As the key is the population’s sense of security, the value of symbolic acts should not
be underestimated, but with hindsight one wonders who the UN was deceiving.
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5.2.2 Police Reform
Due to the government’s inability to win an outright victory against UNITA and
assume power throughout Angola, “the myth of military power was comprehensively
undermined, along with that of a centralized, effective state, though with little as yet
to replace them.”795 In the process of establishing a new social contract between the
state and its population, the government faced a dilemma when reforming its security
apparatus. Especially in times of transition, it might appear as if “they cannot provide
the basic physical security on which the continuing survival of the state depends.”796
The Angolan National Police (ANP), as well as the government’s Rapid Reaction
Police (RRP), played an important role in the government’s exercise of authority over
Angolan territory. Both were far too effective tools for the government to give up
easily.
Whereas the FAA was indeed directed towards fighting UNITA, the ANP,
RRP, and similar forces had the additional function of being the government’s means
of controlling the population at large. Clearly, any attempts to remedy this situation
would be perceived as direct assaults on the government’s sovereignty. This was a
common phenomenon in Africa, where “[a]mong the most crucial of the support
structures of oppression have been Africa’s military establishments, police forces,
gendarmeries, secret services, paramilitary units and ‘special units’ of various
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Box 5.6: Civilian Police Component of UNAVEM III and MONUA
UNAVEM III was preoccupied with demilitarisation and the civilian police component was only a small
share of the force (260 of almost 8,000). After the transition to MONUA the emphasis within the
mission shifted and CivPol monitors made up almost half of the UN peacekeeping force. The main
tasks in civilian security were to monitor police behaviour, particularly human rights violations, the
quartering of the RRP, and later to oversee the transfer of territory and civilian disarmament.
There was a mismatch between the capacity and nature of the civilian police component of UNAVEM
III/MONUA and the police activity they were to monitor which was military in character. In addition,
the lack of co-operation by the government hindered the execution of the mandate. Being unarmed
the work of the civilian police and the human rights monitors was contingent on co-operation.
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descriptions.”797 The variety of security services reflects a weak government’s need to
project its capacity to govern. Given the complexity of the network of security
services in Angola, the call for a distinction between external and internal security
tasks and concomitant forces appeared difficult to meet. Moreover, Luckham points
out that “repressive governance and conflict became so deeply internalized in African
states and societies, that they are now far more difficult to eradicate, with or without
outside help, than they were in the years immediately following independence.”798
The task in the hands of the 260 civilian police and human rights monitors was
daunting. In order for a reform of the police to become self-sustaining and for the
police to become an impartial, effective, and democratic civilian security force, it had
to undergo fundamental structural and behavioural changes. The international security
assistance provided in support of these two components of reform are discussed in
turn below.
There are two main aspects of the structural reform process of the police force
that would ideally have to take place for the Angolan police to be an impartial internal
security force that serves the needs of the entire Angolan population. First, the
multitude of additional security forces on both the MPLA and the UNITA side needed
to either be quartered or disbanded or given clearly defined areas of responsibility and
placed under civilian control, such as that of the Government of Reconciliation and
National Unity (GURN). Second, the Angolan National Police (ANP) as the main
instrument for maintaining law and order had to undergo internal restructuring that
integrated UNITA members and provided the force with more of a community focus.
The main special security unit under the authority of the Angolan government
was the Rapid Reaction Police (RRP) which was created as a heavily armed elite
para-military force in 1992. Its confinement was explicitly determined in the Lusaka
Protocol and the supervision of this process dominated the civilian police monitors’
activity until mid-1996. The RRP was originally to be quartered only after UNITA
had been fully demilitarised, but because of the delays in implementing the military
security provisions, the processes of demilitarising UNITA and quartering the RRP
became concurrent. Due to initial foot-dragging by the government that held back
details on the strength and equipment of the RRP, the process did not get started until
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January 1996.799 However, when it did, quartering proceeded rather quickly,
compared to other aspects of the implementation process. By the end of March, 3,386
out of a declared 3,504 policemen had been confined, completing the first stage of the
quartering process; although no action had yet taken place at four of the quartering
sites. The credibility of government information on the size of RRP was called into
question, when the declared total was revised repeatedly in the course of the
quartering process. As a result, it was doubtful whether the RRP had in fact been
quartered in its entirety, when 5,222 of the official 5,385 had been confined by mid-
1996 and the process declared completed.800
Furthermore, progress was overshadowed by UNITA claims that, similar to
the quartering of the armed forces, the RRP was merely being repositioned for more
rapid and effective deployment in the future.801 In contrast, the government promoted
its co-operation as “proof of the government’s intention strictly and scrupulously to
abide by what was laid down in the accords, and to give our UNITA [...] brothers the
necessary confidence.”802 If truth be told, the UN civilian police monitors had little
influence and the various security forces proved illusive; slipping though the
international community’s fingers to re-establish themselves in new formats. The
government’s Civil Defence Corps (CDC) was a case in point. As the peace process
progressed, the CDC became more active and was increasingly accused of human
rights violations and violations of the cease-fire agreement, in addition to the fact that
they were an illegal para-military force.803
The same was true of the special security forces maintained by UNITA,
including the mining police, the Presidential Guard, and ‘regular’ UNITA police – all
of which were prohibited by the Lusaka Protocol. A number of demobilised soldiers
took on a police function after leaving the camps, be it as deserters or as former
combatants returning home to areas under UNITA control. Especially the mining
police grew, as the demobilisation of UNITA armed forces progressed.804 In the fall
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of 1997, 430 members of the mining police and 70 members of the Presidential Guard
were demobilised.805 But the bulk of UNITA’s extra-military security forces was
concentrated in its ‘regular’ police. Two years into the Lusaka process, that is in
November 1996, the demobilisation of ‘regular’ UNITA police began and by March
1997 4,900 out of a declared 5,000 had been registered at the quartering areas.806
However, given the fluid transition of men from the police, to para-military groups,
and to the military in both camps, it was unclear to what extent the international
community had indeed been able to dismantle the special security forces. The
international community was already witnessing a similar process, when estimates of
UNITA’s force strength had to be steadily adjusted with progressing demobilisation.
In the same way, the international community could never be entirely sure of the size
and degree of organisation if the special security forces, particularly given the limited
number of civilian police monitors that were assigned this task.
The call for the integration of UNITA police into the ANP reflects the
necessity of having a single, uniform police force that is subordinate to the civilian
authorities. In addition, in order for the police force to be perceived as impartial and
as serving all of the population’s needs indiscriminately, it was critical that UNITA
was represented in the ANP. Still, the parties only agreed on a plan for the
incorporation of UNITA police into the ANP on 29 October 1996.807 There were
essentially two parallel integration processes: First, former UNITA soldiers and
policemen were to be incorporated into the ANP. At the outset, it was determined that
5,500 UNITA personnel were to be integrated into the national police. The process
fell significantly short of expectations. In April 1997, approximately fifty UNITA
soldiers had joined the police force.808 Whereas this was seen as a positive sign,
particularly in light of the fact that the GURN was finally established at about the
same time, one has to keep in mind that two and a half years of the peace process had
already gone by. It was a long wait before this small step occurred. Integration of
UNITA members into the ANP was officially completed on 30 June 1997, with 524
selected of which 442 had actually been integrated and 165 had completed training.809
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Those that were integrated, actually functioned well and efforts were made to assign
them to former UNITA-held areas.
Given the large number of UNITA members under arms, they clearly could
not feel adequately represented in this force. Some minor setbacks can be attributed to
government selection criteria that caused initial delays. At the same time, selection
was voluntary and the fact that no more officers were willing to be incorporated,
indicates that the majority of UNITA supporters never recognised the ANP as an
independent, impartial, national police force and never believed that it had the
potential to become just that. It is yet another example of a vicious circle in the peace
process: when the process did not get underway swiftly, the police force remained
one-sided in its composition, lacking any moderating influences, and acted primarily
on behalf of one group. This, in turn, rendered the opposition even less willing to co-
operate and to provide officers for the force, thus slowing down the process of
establishing a universally representative non-partisan force.
Second, a far smaller number of UNITA personnel were to form part of a
special security unit of the ANP responsible for the protection of politicians and
diplomats. As UNITA had a particular interest in participating in this unit, the process
began much sooner than the general merger of the two police forces. Although no
specific appointments were made until June 1996, UNITA designated 212 security
personnel as early as December 1995.810 Again, excessively strict government criteria
caused some delays and training proceeded slowly, but in mid-1997 selection and
training of UNITA personnel for the special security unit under the ANP had been
completed.811
Since the FAA was to be focused exclusively on external security, the task of
handling the remainders of the conflict with UNITA officially fell to the Angolan
National Police (ANP). Although armament levels during daily policing duties were
not excessive, it was clear that large amounts of arms and heavy equipment were
being stowed away even after the official disarmament of the ANP had been
completed in mid-1997. UNITA complained openly of the excessive armament of the
Rapid Reaction Police (RRP), which they claimed led to their being unable to
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distinguish between the police and the Army. 812 In the process of fighting UNITA, an
activity that the Lusaka Protocol barred the government from pursuing with its armed
forces, the police force neglected its crucial task of relationship building at a local
level. Quite the contrary, the armament and activity of the ANP distanced it from the
population. As a result, the community did not regard the police as their local
protector, but as a partial and militarily active organisation.
An assessment of the disarmament of the civilian population provides critical
insight into behavioural reform aspects, as the execution of this task brought the
police into close daily contact with the population. Aside from its ‘regular policing,’
no other activity moulded the popular perception of the police and thereby the
population’s sense of security as did the manner in which the police force went about
disarmament. The symbolism of the act should not be underestimated either, as the
people of Angola were literally asked to place their security in the hands of the
government authority and its representatives, the police.
The police worked as the extended arm of the government in two ways: First,
bad police behaviour reflected back on the government and undermined its
legitimacy. Second, the government’s unwillingness to address the issue and punish
abuses further weakened its legitimacy. For example, the government inhibited in
depth investigations, particularly in areas newly under government control. 813 In the
worst case, the police forces became a political tool for the government. Thus, the
brutality of the police force particularly in former UNITA-held areas was extremely
detrimental to the peace process and triggered counterattacks on ANP policemen. In
order to exercise some influence over the process, UNAVEM III participated in
developing government plans for civilian disarmament, but these had few practical
ramifications for police behaviour.814
Towards the end of the period studied – which sadly proved to be the end of
the current peace process – the government placed the police in a dilemma. In a
tactical move, the government accepted UNITA’s claim that it had demilitarised. As a
result, all non-militarised elements encountered throughout Angola were by definition
bandits or criminals and could be persecuted as such. In practice, this meant that the
Angolan National Police was assigned the task of fighting UNITA for an extended
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period of time. Only when clashes became too frequent and obviously part of a
military campaign waged between the ANP and UNITA, the government called in the
military to assist the police in handling the armed groups ‘on the loose.’ The
government explicitly stated its policy in the following way:
“Many people call them roving gangs. We call them criminals. From the moment
[UNITA] stopped being an armed party and became a political party, it had to declare
it has no more weapons. We will now have to deal with people found with illegal
possession of weapons.”815
Recalling the plan for disarmament, the government thereby officially initiated the
third phase of the disarmament programme.
The ANP was also far from living up to standards of democratic policing in
the execution of their regular policing duties. The police force was in no way neutral,
as attacks were assumed to be under order from the government816 and did not abide
by internationally recognised standards, as was called for in the Lusaka Protocol. It
hindered free movement and incidents of harassment were frequent. Especially in the
context of civilian disarmament, the police force (ANP) was accused of using
excessive force and violating human rights.817 Although not all UNITA accusations
need have been true, other sources confirmed widespread human rights violations. In
the course of their duty, extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, rape, and torture by
the police were frequent,818 and clearly more expedient than formal judicial
proceedings. One should also keep in mind that the ANP received no salary for
months at a time and corruption was the natural consequence. One should also note
that the situation was no better in areas under UNITA control; the culprits merely
belonged to a different security force or police.
In the shadow of the ANP’s involvement in fighting UNITA, typical police
tasks such as combating crime and smuggling were obviously given a lower priority.
At the same time, Angola experienced a dramatic increase in crime rates starting in
1996 and accelerating in 1997 and 1998. There was clearly a link to civilian
                                                
815 Manning (1999), p. 210; “Police Recover Weapons from Cuanza Norte Civilians,” 13 April 1998
(http://wnc.fedworld.gov). The government repeatedly requested use of the RRP in the fight against
rampant crime. This was however not granted by the international community.
816 US Department of State (1998), p. 3.
817 UNITA reports for example that “[s]everal people have been assaulted and their property stolen.”
“UNITA Radio Reports Police, Army Activity in Uige, Benguela,” 12 January 1997
(http://wnc.fedworld.gov); see also “Police Reportedly Hindering Free Movement in Cuanza Sul,” 18
December 1996 (http://wnc.fedworld.gov).
818 US Department of State (1998), pp. 2, 4; Human Rights Watch (1996), p. 5.
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disarmament in that the rise in crime at least in part could be attributed to the large
number of arms in civilian hands and the ANP’s inability – and sometimes
unwillingness – to disarm the civilian population. Moreover, the extent of the crime
problem and its regional dimensions easily exceeded the police’ capacity to handle
them.
The international efforts to remedy the abysmal policing standards
concentrated on police and human rights training and monitoring, which was an
integral part of the behavioural reform in the Angolan National Police. In a train-the-
trainers type effort, the EU sponsored a UNAVEM III project that trained Angolan
nationals in human rights education. 819 When the number of complaints received by
UNAVEM III rose in late 1996, it was unclear whether this was due to more frequent
abuses or due to a greater awareness among the population. Vines is sceptical of the
achievements of the UN with respect to the promotion of human rights in Angola. He
writes that
“[t]he UN approach to human rights issues in the period November 1994 to May 1998
did little to create awareness of human rights issues or accountability for even the
gravest abuses. It achieved even less in advancing a culture of respect for human
rights in Angolan society.”820
The international community still pressed for additional training on internationally
accepted standards of democratic policing, because of consistent reports of human
rights violations and stressed need for long-term reform programmes.821 And while
international standards were generally accepted in content, their implementation
proved difficult, as the government resisted interference in the development of
policing doctrines. In general, continued and widespread human rights violations
undermined public confidence and diminished the respect for the international
community that seemed impotent to do anything about the violations. As many of
UNITA’s complaints arose in connection with the civilian disarmament process, the
UN finally asked the government to pause until the transfer of authority throughout
Angola had been completed.822
                                                
819 The Blue Helmets  (1996), p. 263. For example, “[o]n 27 February [1996], in implementation of [a
plan of action], UNAVEM III organized a seminar for law enforcement officers in Benguela province.”
S/1996/171.IV.21; The Blue Helmets (1996), p. 263.
820 Vines (1999a), Ch. X, p. 12.
821 S/1998/1110.V.21; S/1996/827.IV.25; S/1997/741.IV.9; S/1998/17.III.12; S/1998/236.20.
822 S/1998/17.III.13.
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When the government itself carried out training of its police forces, it tended
to gravitate towards military training, revealing rather sinister intentions of deploying
the police force in the armed struggle against UNITA. 823 The inadequacy of the
training corresponded with the government’s perception of its security concerns, but
also reflected a lack of experience in professional policing and of a genuine
understanding of the role of a democratic police force. UNITA also conducted
training for its police forces. This might be considered laudable in itself, had it not
distracted from the fact that there should not be a separate police force under UNITA
control. 824
Coupled with the constant accusations and counter-accusations that UNITA
and the government exchanged on force movements and preparations for war, the
aggressive and arbitrary behaviour of the Angolan National Police played a
substantial part in undermining the confidence-building process. Elementary security
or “[s]ecuring the countryside,” as Ng’ethe calls it, is a key task in peace building. In
part, this was due to the major instability arising with the large number of arms, but it
was also the countryside “where the inchoate state often meets the most resilient
forms of civil society, especially in an agricultural region such as Africa.”825
Both in structure and in behaviour the ANP had little chance to establish itself
as a credible, impartial, effective, and democratic police force. A factor was also that
the ANP had no experience in policing in a peaceful society, including the fact that it
did not have the professional outlook that many policemen in Bosnia-Herzegovina
had from their pre-war policing duties. Vines points to the political context of policing
and warns that “[a] culture of human rights is unlikely to take root as long as there is
acute insecurity and suspicion.”826
The performance of the police force can of course not be reviewed in isolation
from the other instruments of the civilian security sector. As Ohlson and Stedman
point out for Southern Africa, “[i]n much of the region the state itself has been the
biggest threat to individual security; in others that threat has been the absence of a
functioning state.”827 This is certainly true in Angola, where democracy had not been
                                                
823 S/1997/640.IV.20; Vines (1999a), Ch. V, p. 3.
824 “UNITA’s Valentim on Police Work, Disarmament,” 22 June 1995 (http://wnc.fed.gov).
825 Njuguna Ng’ethe (1995) “Strongmen, State Formation, Collapse, and Reconstruction in Africa,” in
Zartman (1995a), p. 260; I. William Zartman (1995) “Putting Things Back Together,” in Zartman
(1995a), p. 273.
826 Vines (1998), p. 27.
827 Ohlson and Stedman (1994), p. 12.
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consolidated and the judiciary was “weak and subject to manipulation.”828 Although
an acceptable body of criminal law had been in place since colonial times, the court
system lacked means, experience, and training and did not function in large areas of
the country. According to the US State Department, “where it functions, it is not
independent of the President and the MPLA.”829 As a result, there was no legal
redress for crime and especially for human rights violations. UNITA had its own court
system that claimed to follow a civil code similar to that used by the government, but
rival courts could obviously not be given legal standing, if a uniform system was to be
created for all of Angola. Judicial reform was called for early on by the UN Secretary
General, as well as by the Angolan government that requested assistance to the reform
process. Therefore, UNAVEM III took on the task of formulating a plan for judicial
reform.830 Despite some training, mainly conducted by the Human Rights Unit of
UNAVEM III and later MONUA, progress was limited and the need for a
“strengthening and modernization of the Angolan judicial system”831 was equally
pressing and equally unmet in 1998 as it had been three years earlier.
When considering the abhorrent conditions in both UNITA and government
prisons, it was clear that penal reform a was critical leg of the civilian security sector
reform. In contrast to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where penal reform initially received scant
attention, UNAVEM III was engaged in monitoring conditions in detention centres
from the outset. However, direct efforts to reform the system were more difficult to
bring about. Although a National Commission on Penal Reform was established as a
result of UN efforts since February 1997, there was little evidence that this had any
effect on the dysfunctional penal system. As with other reform efforts, the renewed
hostilities that began in late 1998 put a complete stop to attempts to reform the
civilian security sector, including the police, the courts, and the prisons.
                                                
828 Saferworld (1996), p. 21.
829 US Department of State (1998), p. 1, 5.
830 S/1996/75.IV.26; S/1996/827.IV.26.
831 S/1998/236.V.22.The consistent calls for a comprehensive security sector reform were reflected in
various reports to the Security Council. See for example S/1997/438.IV.19. S/1998/236.V.22.
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5.3 Supporting Security Tasks
In Angola, the humanitarian and the peacekeeping communities were closely
interwoven. This was the case with respect to the international assistance to the
demobilisation and reintegration process, but even more so in demining, repatriation,
and the security aspects of political reconciliation. All the following supporting tasks
had direct implications for security. At the same time, progress in these areas
fluctuated with the evolving security situation in Angola.
5.3.1 Demining
The Central Mine Action Office (CMAO) was established in August 1994 and was to
have co-ordination responsibility until local capacity had been built up sufficiently to
take over. The post-settlement efforts were a continuation of the work begun in 1994
even before the Lusaka Protocol was signed. The long negotiations at Lusaka enabled
planning to get off to a good start and to be comprehensive. However, planning
activities were confined to the humanitarian community and did not involve the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and thus UNAVEM, as the UN
technically did not have a mandate to begin planning and co-ordinating a
peacekeeping operation. The organisational restraints of the UN system entailed that
Box 5.7: Police Reform
With respect to the structural reform of the police, para-military forces were officially quartered, but
were illusive in practice, constantly reconstituting themselves. As very few UNITA soldiers were
integrated into the ANP, the force never relinquished its role as another arm of the government. The
human rights training that made up the most part of the behavioural reform appeared to have little
impact and continued violations had a devastating effect on the peace process.
Calls for judicial and penal reform were voiced from the outset, but reform plans never reached the
implementation stage. The dire need for reforms in all areas of the civilian security sector remained
unmet. The UN’s role was marginal, due to internal political constraints, but also because the concept of
civilian police and human rights monitors rested on the assumption of a minimum willingness to co-
operate and to submit to reform.
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the humanitarian and military components were at odds from the very beginning. As a
result, demining activities were plagued by the absence of a unified approach
throughout and available resources were not organised coherently and constructively.
The co-ordination problems were foreshadowed in the debate over whether the
Central Mine Action Office (CMAO) should report to the Special Representative of
the Secretary General (SRSG), the UNAVEM III Force Commander or UCAH. The
argument was finally settled in favour of UCAH. Arguably, this benefited the
operation, as the CMAO’s activities required close co-operation with a number of
humanitarian actors, particularly NGOs, that UCAH was dealing with anyway in the
course of its other activities in Angola. Still, disagreements continued to cause delays
in both capacity building and mine clearance. UCAH had the main responsibility for
strategic planning, that is for co-ordinating the activities of the government,
UNAVEM III, and the NGOs, in co-operation with UNDP and UNICEF.832
Aside from the UN family and large international organisations, such as the
ICRC, there were a host of non-governmental organisations, including Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA), Cap Anamur, the Halo Trust, the Mines Advisory Group
(MAG), and Mechem. In addition, SADC also launched a mine clearance programme
worth $2.2 million in support of the Angolan peace process. Clearly, all of these third-
party actors diverged substantially with regard to their approach to the conflict, their
target groups and local counterparts, their organisational structure, and financing
mechanisms. Accordingly, UCAH’s responsibility for co-ordination meant
reconciling the approaches of a large number of actors that operated on a variety of
levels.
A report by Saferworld, cites five main elements in UCAH’s strategy on
demining: (1) establishing local institutions; (2) demarcation of mined areas; (3)
conducting mine awareness campaigns; (4) training local demining staff; and (5) mine
clearance.833 By using UCAH’s five-pronged strategy as the starting-point, different
aspects of the demining support provided by third-parties are illustrated below.
(1) A pattern has evolved in peacekeeping operations according to which the
UN co-operates closely with NGOs and tries to involve local authorities as early on as
possible. The rationale of local ownership has an added dimension in the context of
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demining, as it invariably involves the danger or actual loss of life; a risk that external
actors should only bear where inevitable. In that way, ownership of demining most
clearly symbolises a recognition and an acceptance of blame by the parties’ for the
horrors of war. Involvement by the parties is a recurrent underlying theme in all the
elements of the demining process.
In Angola, there was a clear understanding of the need to build local capacity
and to co-ordinate the activity of the UN, the Angolan government, and NGOs from
the outset.834 A government authority, the Angolan National Institute for the Removal
of Explosive Ordinances (INAROE), was established in 1995 with the overall
responsibility for all aspects of demining. The plan was to transfer responsibility into
local hands, i.e. the INAROE, by January 1997, but delays occurred due to a lack of
political co-operation and a shortage of local personnel. In part, the delays in
developing indigenous capacity resulted from “poor communication and a strained
relationship”835 between the government and the Central Mine Action Office, which
proved unable to work with INAROE. The main problem was that the CMAO lacked
credibility because it “never had the expertise and resources necessary to provide the
type of leadership and co-ordination essential for the development of a mine action
programme in a war-torn country such as Angola.”836 The post-conflict situation did
not stabilise and conditions did not improve to the degree that the INAROE could
effectively fulfil its role. The government remained dependent on external funding
and often did not pay the local deminers.837
(2) The demarcation of mined areas and the development of a national
databank were ongoing processes from 1994 to 1998. Despite efforts to train UNITA
and government staff and thereby involve them in the process, both tasks proved
difficult due to the limited capacity of the international presence in relation to the
country’s size and the estimated number of landmines and due to the government and
UNITA’s reluctance to release information concerning the location and size of mine
fields.838
(3) Throughout the implementation process, mine awareness campaigns were
being conducted. In the early stages, NGO activity concentrated on carrying out
                                                
834 United Nations DHA (1997), para. 30, 40, 127.
835 United Nations DHA (1997), 128.
836 United Nations DHA (1997), 131.
837 S/1996/827.III.D.22; S/1997/248.III.14.
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awareness campaigns in quartering areas, in close co-operation with INAROE. 839 It
had the advantage of addressing an already assembled group, but was limited in reach
as few soldiers and their dependants travelled to the sites early on. In general, mine
awareness campaigns were innovative and intent on building local capacity to
disseminate information, but given the size of the target audience and the restrictions
on freedom of movement progress was bound to be slow. 840
(4) A critical aspect for transferring authority into local hands was the training
of Angolan deminers. The Central Mine Action Training School was established in
December 1995 and funded through UNAVEM III’s budget. The school was expected
to train 500 Angolan deminers by the end of 1996, and in fact managed to provide
training for 300 by October 1996.841 As part of the reintegration effort, former
combatants from both UNITA and the FAA underwent training. This part of the
programme worked rather well and a number of local teams were trained. In mid-June
1996, local authorities also took over the destruction of mine stock piles.
Unfortunately, when political resistance increased and funds ran out, sustaining the
local capacity became increasingly difficult, activities were curbed, and eventually
abandoned.842
(5) Finally, UCAH’s strategy included actual mine clearance in priority areas,
such as major roads. Thus, a distinction was made between high priority emergency
clearance and routine clearance, where the latter fell to NGOs and was more of a
long-term task. With the headstart gained in the final negotiation phase, demining
activities were in place and began work early on, but success was always modified by
the large number of mines and the lack of records. Clearing the major roads was
completed in 1997. As a result of the early clearing achievements and some
improvements in infrastructure, the international community was able to slightly scale
back humanitarian aid. The military contribution under UNAVEM III did not go
beyond the immediate needs of the force’s mission, i.e. similar to IFOR/SFOR’s part
in demining in Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNAVEM III’s military component only cleared
landmines that were in the immediate path of its operation. Its contribution was
further limited by the fact that it arrived in theatre much later than the humanitarian
                                                                                                                                           
838 It is likely that the parties simply did not have that information, as mine laying dated back 30 years.
Somerville (1995), p. 157.
839 S/1995/842.III.B.16.
840 United Nations/DHA/Demining (1997), Phase Two, para. 92-6.
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actors that had had a presence in Angola dating back to before the Lusaka Protocol
was signed.
Particularly during the first year, mine clearance was severely hampered by
extensive clashes and the delays in disengagement. The same was true of the other
elements in UCAH’s strategy which all experienced difficulties until the cease-fire
had been consolidated in the course of 1996. Aside from the cease-fire violations that
impaired the demining efforts in the beginning, lack of co-operation and outright
hostilities from both parties once again formed obstacles for the implementation of the
demining programme. Some progress was made until UNITA – first and then in late
1997 the government also – began laying mines again; by late 1998 neither party was
denying these activities.843 As hostilities grew more intense, the humanitarian
situation became more pressing and UCAH was forced to divert funds and attention
into direct emergency relief, rather than its long-term reconstruction efforts.
In addition, donor fatigue set in as early as 1995 and, in that year, response to
appeals for humanitarian aid raised only 3% of funds called for. In the area of
demining, lack of funding continued to be a problem throughout the peace process,
culminating in a cessation of training activities in the fall of 1998.844 A UN evaluation
recognised the dynamic concisely, explaining that “since Angola is a country rich
with diamonds and oil [...], donors and others wanted to see the government make a
strong commitment to tackle the problem of mines before soliciting support from the
international community.”845 A shortage of funds for programmes in the security
sector is common, but during the Lusaka peace process disagreements and wrangling
between all parties involved constantly delayed progress and further aggravated the
scarcity of funds.846 By late 1997, when funding problems had become pressing and
the parties had resumed laying mines, the following had been achieved in the
demining programme: “almost 50 per cent of the country’s territory had been
surveyed for mines, covering the areas where about 80 per cent of the Angolan
population lives. Out of an estimated 2,000 to 2,500 minefields, 1,800 minefields
have been identified. [...] So far, 700 square kilometres have been demined and
                                                                                                                                           
842 The Blue Helmets  (1996), p. 264; S/1996/171.III.D.15; S/1996/503.III.D.20.
843 Amnesty International (1996), p. 5; S/1997/640.III.A.13. Mine laying resumed despite the fact that
the Angolan government is a signatory to the Anti-Personnel-Mine Convention.
844 The Blue Helmets  (1996), p. 258; S/1997/248.III.15; S/1997/807.IV.C.30; S/1998/723.VI.C.28. In
1995 the Mine Action Program Appeal raised 24% of the requested $13 million, in 1996 the share had
decreased to 20% of the $5 million requested.
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approximately 10,000 mines out of an estimated total of 6 to 8 million have been
cleared.”847 Though commendable, the achievements in demining were a drop on a
hot stone.
5.3.2 Repatriation of Refugees and Internally Displaced
Repatriation has two main aspects that need to be addressed, if the peace process is to
be consolidated. On the one hand, successful repatriation symbolises the return to a
peaceful existence, as much as to a home, and is in that way largely psychological. On
the other hand, when repatriation is a question of survival and finding the means to
subsist, it becomes an economic issue. International security assistance is primarily
concerned with the organisational aspects of repatriation, but implicitly it must
convince the displaced population that it is safe and timely to return, for example by
providing physical protection to returnees. In spite of the daunting scale of the former
task, the bleak economic outlook also proved a formidable obstacle to rapid and
comprehensive return.
In the Lusaka process, the issues of demining, repatriation and reintegration
were clearly linked in that landmines were a “serious constraint for rehabilitation and
                                                                                                                                           
846 United Nations DHA (1997), 129.
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Box 5.8: Supporting Security Tasks I - Demining
Alleviating the threat from the enormous number of landmines was considered a humanitarian activity
and was consequently under the authority of UCAH. Due to the large number of actors involved at
different levels, including international organisations, NGOs, the Angolan government, and the UNITA
leadership, and discrepancies in the planning stages, the demining activities suffered from the lack of
a joint vision and effective co-ordination throughout the peace process.
Aside from the international community’s internal problems, demining was hampered by continued
clashes, lack of political co-operation from both parties, and the resumption of mine laying. All of
these amplified the existing donor fatigue and the scarcity of resources for demining programmes.
Given the scope of the landmine problem in Angola, it was not surprising that the international
community only managed to make a minor dent in the problem.
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resettlement.”848 The large group of refugees and internally displaced was swelled by
former combatants and their dependants that also awaited repatriation. Therefore,
delays in demobilisation and in reintegration programmes that targeted former
combatants, as well as returning refugees and internally displaced affected one
another. As these processes were interrelated, it was natural that most of the same
institutions would be involved. UNHCR and later the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) played the leading roles in repatriation, and co-operated with
UCAH, which co-ordinated emergency relief and was, of course, deeply involved in
the demobilisation process. But UNHCR and IOM also worked with UNDP, which
was engaged in the long-term reconstruction and economic development efforts, and
with the military, civilian police, and human rights components of UNAVEM III, that
were to safeguard the secure environment and handle investigations into harassment
and human rights violations. 849
Throughout 1995 priority was given to the repatriation of internally displaced
to their home areas. At the same time, preparations for the repatriation of refugees
from neighbouring countries were initiated. In June 1995, an agreement was reached
between the government and UNHCR that arranged for the voluntary repatriation of
refugees from neighbouring countries.850 Despite the efforts of the international
community in the first year of the Lusaka process, by December 1995 less than 10%
had returned. It was argued that the “slow pace [could] be attributed to political and
security factors,”851 such as continued clashes, harassment, and little progress in
demining. In the case of demobilised soldiers, UNITA also hindered repatriation by
directing flows to strategic locations.
In 1996, there were still 200,000 refugees in Zaïre, 96,000 in Zambia and
20,000 in the Congo. Repatriation was officially postponed in June 1996, because
conditions for return had not been met and there was no freedom of movement.
Among the conditions for return were the restoration of security, the availability of
practical assistance, the revival of the rural economy, and landmine awareness.852 As
major roads were demined, repatriation also accelerated. In the course of 1997, one
fifth of the 1.2 million IDPs and one third of the 325,000 refugees had returned.
                                                
848 Kingma (1996), p. 5.
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850 Amnesty International (1996), p. 7.
851 Saferworld (1996), p. 23; S/1995/1012.V.29.
852 Saferworld (1996), p. 30, 31, 48.
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Sadly, the positive trends of 1997 were offset by new displacements triggered by
continued hostilities.853 When tensions rose in the course of 1998, so did the number
of refugees and internally displaced. From March 1998, the number of IDPs increased
from 900,000 to over 1.3 million in August 1998.854 Four years of repatriation had
effectively been reversed and the number of displaced in late 1998 was higher than it
had been in the immediate wake of the Lusaka Protocol.
The preoccupation of refugees with their security had been intensified as a
result of the Bicesse process, the collapse of which dampened popular confidence in
the subsequent peace process. Again, international security assistance could have
bridged the gap and provided a secure environment in which trust could have emerged
gradually. But the international presence was not capable of generating enough
confidence in the peace process to accelerate the return of the displaced, particularly
when daily life involved harassment and eventually open armed conflict. The large
number of landmines coupled with the absence of an entrepreneurial tradition and the
almost total destruction of infrastructure, deepened the Angolan population’s reliance
on food aid and dimmed hopes for a speedy recovery. 855 The internal flow of
returnees was directed towards areas around Luanda and other cities, as refugees
flocked to those areas in which there was a minimum of infrastructure, leaving vast
parts of the Angolan countryside empty.
Similar to the inadequate recipient structures for other forms of assistance, the
rate of return depended on external assistance to the Angolan government. This
heightened the reliance on outside funding. When UNHCR’s appeals for assistance to
repatriation programmes in Angola raised only a minor share of the funds requested in
both 1996 and 1997, it was obvious that repatriation would suffer.856
                                                
853 US Department of State (1998), p. 8; S/1997/807.IV.A.22.
854 In March 1998, there were also 160,000 refugees, in addition to the IDPs. S/1998/236.V.A.24;
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5.3.3 Power-sharing and Propaganda
The political context was critical for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. The
current section focuses on those political aspects that were of interest to the
assessment of security assistance. It briefly discusses the presidential elections, the
power-sharing arrangements, and the security of UNITA officials, as the most
important aspects of the political sphere that have direct implications for security. The
three aspects were closely related as they all affected the overall balance of power.
Progress in one area was usually achieved by disconnecting it from the other two.
The second round of presidential elections was originally scheduled for 1997,
but in July 1995 “the National Assembly voted to postpone the elections indefinitely
in the interest of national reconciliation.”857 Parliamentary elections that were
originally scheduled for 1996 were also postponed for two to four years. In both
cases, it was left up to the UN to determine when the conditions for holding
presidential elections would be present. This was in line with the international
community’s view and its “[d]esire to see that an electoral contest would only follow
a transition period of reconciliation and power-sharing.”858 Ottaway cites Angola as
an example of a country “where attempted democratization accelerated the process of
disintegration, making state collapse more imminent and the long-term prospects for
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BOX 5.9: Supporting Security Tasks II - Repatriation
The Angolan case clearly demonstrated how difficult it was to build a self-sufficient existence in a war-
ravaged country with a completely dysfunctional economy. However, it was equally challenging to
instil confidence in the displaced population, so that it would return and begin to build a peaceful
existence.
Of the refugees, internally displaced and demobilised soldiers that were awaiting repatriation, only a
minor share returned to their homes. When tensions rose in the course of 1998, even the meagre
successes were reversed through hostilities and harassment. At the end of the peace process in late
1998, the number of displaced was higher than it had been in the immediate wake of the Lusaka
Protocol.
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democracy dimmer.”859 Against the disastrous backdrop of the 1992 elections and
their aftermath, the instability that could arise with elections was to be avoided in the
Lusaka process until peace had been consolidated to a greater degree. More
fundamentally, the situation was simply not stable and secure enough for the elections
to be free and fair. Thus, at the same time as elections fell victim to instability, they
also entailed a destabilising effect and represented a threat to security. One should
also keep in mind that a government had been elected into office in the 1992 elections
which had been recognised by the international community as free and fair, the results
of which had been confirmed in the Lusaka Protocol.
As the UN and the international community more generally were increasingly
seen as partial towards the government, a postponement of the elections which placed
UNITA outside of the immediate political competition could not have been
particularly satisfactory to Savimbi. Moreover, under the Lusaka Protocol it was
determined that the outstanding second round of the presidential elections was not to
be held until UNITA's military capacity had been dissolved and the organisation had
begun to operate as a political party. Although UNITA was eventually declared
demilitarised, the situation soon deteriorated again and the movement did not manage
the comprehensive transition to an existence as a political party. Obviously, the
postponement of elections, coupled with the demilitarisation requirement, placed
UNITA in a vulnerable position, despite the fact that the offer of government posts
went beyond what the government was obligated to do in accordance with the
outcome of the 1992 elections. As a result, the status of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi
and UNITA’s participation in government became ever more critical points after the
postponement of the elections.
In the absence of elections, power-sharing moved to centre stage. The
arrangements were not necessarily democratic in a strict sense, but arose out of the
realisation that power-sharing was a necessary precondition for peace.860 On the
surface, there was broad agreement that power was to be distributed; the need for
negotiation and clarification concerned how power was to be shared. According to
Adekanye, the degree to which power-sharing and the rules of the game were
accepted and by whom, would only become clear in the course of implementation. 861
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More particularly, power-sharing involved the establishment of the
Government of National Reconciliation (GURN), the status of Savimbi, and the
extension of state administration.862 Power-sharing not only implied sharing the right
to rule, but also sharing the responsibility for conducting policy. Joint responsibility
would also enhance the development of a sense of common fate. In the same way,
federalism is not only about power-sharing, but also about “attracting loyalty to and
support for state-building and nation-building.”863 Zartman points to participation as a
basis for sustainable leadership and argues that third-party actors may be called upon
to provide security for participation in the government’s legitimisation process.864 The
security guarantee offered by the UN presence was obviously not sufficient to
convince UNITA that their goals could be aptly and safely pursued in a non-violent
political arena.
Establishing the Government of National Reconciliation (GURN) involved
distributing government posts at a variety of levels ranging from ministerial posts to
positions as community administrators. It was established far behind schedule. Key
issues that caused the delays were the status of Savimbi and the security of UNITA
officials. In August 1996, Savimbi finally rejected the offer of vice-presidency. It had
been offered to him personally rather than to UNITA as an organisation and Savimbi
cited UNITA’s displeasure with the arrangement as the reason for his non-acceptance.
Instead, he agreed to the position as head of the opposition. Only when the UN
separated Savimbi’s status from the establishment of the joint government was
progress made and the GURN finally inaugurated on 11 April 1997. In addition to the
UN influence, the events in the DRC added pressure on UNITA and urged
compliance.865 The GURN included representatives of the MPLA, the Democratic
Party of Angola (PDA), and UNITA. In fact, UNITA contributed over 60 deputies,
but just as at the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, Savimbi did not travel to Luanda for
the inauguration. 866 Although he retained the status as leader of the largest opposition
party, he did not actually take on his duties in parliament in practice. In September of
the same year, Jonas Savimbi’s special status was revoked, following the split in
UNITA and the creation of UNITA-Renovada which was instantly recognised by the
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government as the legitimate and more welcome representative of UNITA. Clearly,
the government strategy of integrating and neutralising Savimbi had failed.867
Security arrangements for UNITA officials were an important part of the
political context in which the Lusaka Protocol was to be implemented. In this
question, all the implicit security concerns that plagued the other issues in the
distribution of power became explicit. Throughout the peace process, the security of
UNITA members in Luanda remained a sticking point that repeatedly caused delays,
such as in the inauguration of the GURN which took place in April rather than in
February of 1997 for just that reason. 868 While it was a valid concern for UNITA, the
issue of security was also consistently used by Savimbi to avoid coming to Luanda
and to display only half-hearted commitment to the peace process.
The media also played a part in the security perceptions of both parties. It
exacerbated the dismal level of trust between the parties through continuous hostile
propaganda, such as accusing the other side of committing atrocities.869 Most media
was government owned or controlled and both the government and UNITA took
disciplinary action against critical journalists.870 Obviously, the atmosphere was in no
way conducive to free speech. For the peace process this also meant that media
support was unpredictable, fluctuating with UNITA or government enthusiasm and
subjective interpretations of the ups and downs of the peace process. Propaganda
issued by the parties was directed at each other, but also at the international presence.
Especially towards the end of the Lusaka process, hostile propaganda increasingly
targeted international staff, raising the question of whether there was indeed sufficient
consent for the UN to remain in Angola.871
In the absence of independent media, the parties’ media outlets determined the
popular perception of the peace process. The pivotal role that media would play in
contributing to national reconciliation and to moulding the population’s perception of
progress and the degree to which the transition from war to peace was in fact taking
place, was recognised early on. Aside from the more general human rights work, this
was reflected in the requirement to transform Vorgan, UNITA’s radio station, into a
                                                                                                                                           
866 Vines (1998), p. 8.
867 US Department of State (1998), p. 9; Reimer (1996).
868 Vines (1998), p. 8.
869 Reimer (1997).
870 Saferworld (1996), p. 24, 42; Amnesty International (1996), p. 5; US Department of State (1998), p.
7.
871 S/1997/640.II.11.
Section III Implementing the Lusaka Protocol
298
commercial station. After long delays, Vorgan finally ceased broadcasting on 1 April
1998. The UN’s own attempts at disseminating information about the international
presence and the peace process were based on SCRes 976 (1995) which included only
a brief mention of the issue to the effect that UNAVEM III was to have an “effective
information capability.”872 Efforts towards this goal were constantly hampered by the
government and no significant progress was made towards establishing a UN radio
station. The issue was given low priority among the UN’s work in Angola, despite the
realisation, as described by Margaret Anstee, that “an independent radio station [was
a] critical ingredient [...] for a success in Angola.”873 The government’s offer of more
time on their radio station was not desirable, as it would have compromised the UN’s
impartiality, not to mention exposing the UN’s information to government censorship.
Still, in the end, time on government controlled media was what the UN had to settle
for, seriously discrediting them in UNITA’s eyes through an ever closer association
with the Angolan government. This was clearly one of the UN’s central lost
opportunities. Vines writes that an “independent non-partisan radio station which
could have broadcast across country was of critical importance in breaking the
monopoly of control of information by both sides.”874
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Box 5.10: Supporting Security Tasks Elections and Power-Sharing
Presidential and parliamentary elections were postponed because conditions for free and fair
elections did not exist and the international community was concerned about the instability that early
elections would bring. For Savimbi and UNITA the struggle then became one to maximise their
advantage in the formation of the GURN and the status of Savimbi himself.
All the aspects that concerned the distribution of power were coloured by the level of trust between
the parties. The concern for the security of UNITA officials in Luanda exemplifies that. The media fed
into the distrust and severely undermined the popular sense of security and confidence in the peace
process.
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5.4 Conclusions on the Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol
· Demilitarisation and Military Reform : The peace process was marked by a
continuously high level of tension and cease-fire violations. Accusations of
repositioning rather than withdrawal and quartering proved true with respect to
both sides. International security assistance consisted of monitoring
demilitarisation and military reform and could not create an environment
sufficiently secure to build confidence between the parties. As a result, the critical
process of downsizing and reforming the military apparati on both sides was
sketchy at best; at once a product of distrust and shoring up under mutual
suspicions.
· Law and Order: The militarisation of society continued in the ANP. Whereas the
lack of progress in demilitarisation and military reform fed into the parties lack of
trust towards each other, the absence of noticeable improvements in the behaviour
and constitution of the police force undermined any confidence that the general
population might have developed in the peace process. The civilian police and the
human rights monitors were incapable of doing much more than registering
abuses and misbehaviour.
· Supportive Security: The close links between humanitarian aid and international
security assistance chrystallised in the implementation of demining and
repatriation. Both activities were impaired by continued clashes and later rising
levels of tension and corresponding degrees of political co-operation. The struggle
for security also carried over into the struggle for political power and hampered
progress with respect to the implementation of power-sharing arrangements.
· At the end of the peace process in late 1998, the parties had consolidated their
respective hold on power and their coercive security structures, i.e. military and
police forces. Add to that the continuous and extensive arms deliveries, financed
by the diamond and the oil business, and the stage was set for yet another full-
scale war.
· The peace process was hamstrung by the parties’ preoccupation with security.
Throughout they felt the need to maintain a core security force for their protection.
This was simultaneously an obstacle to progress in the peace process and a
symbol of the lack of confidence between the parties. Throughout the peace
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process, the attitude of UNITA and the government was more reminiscent of
hedging during a temporary cease-fire than of a genuine desire to give peace a
chance. This was particularly apparent with respect to their perception of territory
and their control over it. The UN was unable to provide the parties’ leadership
with a ‘sense of security’ that would persuade them to abandon their respective
excessive security networks.
6 Issues in Co-ordination and Co-operation
The analysis of the implementation process of the Lusaka Protocol has already
revealed the most important co-ordination challenges. In the current chapter, three
remaining issues are brought into focus: (1) the major co-ordinating bodies; (2) civil-
military relations on the interface between the military and police component of
UNAVEM III and the humanitarian community, and (3) the instruments and attempts
to force compliance in the light of co-ordination.
6.1 Co-ordinating Bodies
Co-ordination took place among the third-party actors and between the external actors
and the local parties. With respect to the co-ordination within the international
community, the UN structure dominated the arrangements (see also Figure 4.1). Co-
ordination with local counterparts was centred around the Joint Commission and a
number of subsidiary bodies.
The head of the UN family in Angola was the Special Representative who
“was in overall charge while UCAH was responsible for day-to-day coordination of
humanitarian activities,” including mine action activities.875 In that way, the SRSG
personified the entirety of UNAVEM III, and the personality of the office holder
moulded the parties’ perception of the UN presence. Maître Alioune Blondin Beye
had been the Special Representative to Angola since 1993 and was respected by the
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parties. He was a tireless negotiator, but his influence was weakened by the lack of
political commitment and unity with which the international community could have
backed up his position to a greater extent. 876The role of personality in the position of
the SRSG became even clearer, when Issa Diallo was appointed, following the tragic
death of Maître Beye in the summer of 1998. He did not enjoy the same respect from
the parties and was unable to mitigate an increasingly hostile and tense situation. 877
Co-ordination within UNAVEM III, including UCAH, was further impeded by the
lack of transparency and limited exchange of information on activities, goals, and
progress reports, as well as by the absence of an overall strategy. 878
The co-ordination of international security assistance with other international
actors, such as international organisations or NGOs, was in the hands of UCAH. This
took the shape of a variety of minor co-ordination groups, such as one established to
oversee progress in the registration areas, with the goal to enhance internal co-
ordination and decision-making in the mission. 879 However, the reintegration and
demobilisation programmes were examples of UCAH’s efforts in Angola and were
characterised by poor co-ordination among many actors. Co-operation suffered from
competition between different agencies, inefficiency, and an outlook that was short-
term.880
The short-term perspective was reflected in the underlying aim of the
international efforts to transfer authority into local hands as soon as possible. This was
attempted long before the government had the capacity to take over, but was
promoted by third-party actors that were feeling the pressure of funding shortage.881
INAROE, the community referral service, and the national reintegration institute are
examples of local bodies that were to carry the process in the long run, but did not
attain the necessary capacity in the course of the Lusaka Process.882
In addition to its primary role of supervising the implementation of the Lusaka
Protocol, the Joint Commission was the main forum for co-ordination between the
international community and the parties. The Secretary General underlined the value
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of the Joint Commission and reported that it “proved to be a vital conflict resolution
and implementation mechanism.”883 Besides revealing the difficulty of Savimbi and
dos Santos in dealing directly with one another, the tortuous nature of talks in the
Joint Commission also indicated that the negotiations and decisions in this forum
were not taken lightly. It was the only body that survived for continued
communication when tensions rose in late 1997.884 In the Joint Commission the
parties retained a minimum of legitimacy and were able to keep up the charade of
support for the peace process, as long as they appeared to be communicating in that
forum. The body was finally incapacitated, when the split in UNITA occurred in
September 1998 and conflicting claims to representation were forwarded.
The Joint Commission was also brought directly into the implementation
activity of the UN, for example when the Human Rights Unit of UNAVEM III
reported to the Joint Commission. In this way, it was to be motivated to take active
part in the peace process, but there were few indications that the formal inclusion or
ownership acted as an incentive and that reports were actually investigated. Instead,
Vines argues that “the commission became a depository for human rights and military
violation reports but there was little inclination by the UN to investigate or publicise
these incidents.”885
Other bodies that sought to bring together the parties and the international
actors had specific tasks, such as the Conflict Prevention Group. It was located at
UNAVEM III headquarters in Luanda and included senior military officers from both
parties that were to defuse tense situations and prevent escalation. Overall the body
was relatively effective, until the return to war became undeniable and disagreements
exceeded the capacity of the Group.886 In addition there was the Humanitarian Co-
ordination Group (HCG), co-chaired by the Minister of Social Affairs and the
Director of UCAH, also including representatives of UNITA, other UN Agencies,
observer and donor countries, the ICRC, and other NGOs. The HCG was deemed an
“important step towards building confidence and facilitating the provision of
humanitarian assistance,” but had traditionally been regarded as a short-term measure
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only.887 Attempts to establish contacts with local NGOs that might have provided
inroads in to Angolan society and assisted in the confidence-building process, lacked
vision and generally failed.888
6.2 Civil-Military Co-operation
The peace implementation mission in Angola was clearly one in which both the
military and the civilian components had a weighty role. As became clear in the
context of demobilisation or reintegration, the successful implementation of security
assistance programmes required close co-operation between the civilian and military
communities. In the Lusaka process the civil-military divide was slightly different
from the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whereas the distinction was truly between
predominantly civilian and predominantly military actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
implementers in Angola were separated into humanitarian actors on the one hand and
peacekeepers on the other. This was especially important for the civilian police and
human rights monitors that were part of the ‘military’ organisation in Angola, in
contrast to their classification as civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was due to
their all being engaged in a variety of monitoring tasks in related areas. Regardless,
civil-military co-operation entailed balancing the need for a distinct identity against
the need for co-ordination. As the humanitarian situation was perhaps more egregious
in Angola and more of the aid provided was in fact emergency relief, UCAH felt a
stronger need to separate humanitarian activities from the political-military strategy
pursued by the Special Representative of the Secretary General and the Troika.889
Besides the issues of identity, the organisational cleft between ‘humanitarians’
and peacekeepers had begun to be established in the mission’s planning stages. As
UCAH was independent of the Security Council and had been involved in Angola
throughout the latest stage of the civil war from 1992-4, it was able to begin planning
before being mandated by a Security Council resolution, in contrast to the
peacekeepers in UNAVEM III. Ball and Campbell highlight the advantage that the
humanitarian component enjoyed because of this: “It was fortunate that while the
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peacekeeping mission waited for a new mandate, DHA was able on humanitarian
grounds to move forward with planning for mine action through UCAH.”890
In combination, identity and organisation also created problems in the course
of the peace process. Although both had lasting peace and the relief of human
suffering at heart as the overall goal of their mission, UCAH perceived UNAVEM III
as pursuing only short-term pacification. In part this was due to the closer affiliation
of the peacekeepers with the political and strategic side of the mission that in turn was
subject to the fluctuating commitment of the international community and pressures
of international politics. The result of the discrepancies were that the measures chosen
by the two components to implement the Lusaka Protocol were often at odds. The
UN’s own description of the relationship between UCAH and UNAVEM III in
demining is a case in point:
“Given UCAH’s need to maintain a humanitarian identity and the importance
of focusing beyond the political timeframe of the UNAVEM mission there
were often contrasting perspectives between the “military UN” and the
“humanitarian UN” on the management modalities needed to address the
problem of mines in Angola.”891
The co-ordination problems did not only have internal repercussions, but
affected the perception of the UN presence by local counterparts. A compelling
argument in favour of close co-operation between the humanitarian actors and the
peacekeepers was the desire to present a united front to the government and UNITA
in order to maximise their influence and not work at cross-purposes. Ball and
Campbell point out that the “[l]ack of clarity as to the nature of the relationship,
particularly between the Humanitarian Coordinator, and UN peacekeeping forces, led
at times to misunderstanding and ill-will in Angola.”892 In an attempt to bridge the
gap in demining and other security efforts, field advisors were deployed to promote
“strategic planning, negotiating access, collecting and analysing information, and
liasing between the humanitarian community, the peace-keepers, the authorities and
the local community.”893
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6.3 Co-ordinating to Force Compliance
The lack of co-ordination affected the co-operation within the group of external actors
but more importantly the international community’s ability to exercise pressure on the
parties. The two tools with which the third-party actors attempted to force compliance
were conditionality and sanctions.
In the present context, conditionality refers to the effort by donors to tie
conditions to their aid.894 The bulk of the aid at stake in the Lusaka process was quite
simply the UN presence. Emergency relief to the population could hardly be held
back and the lack of funding appeared to cause greater headaches for the international
community than for the parties – that after all had independent financing in their oil
and diamond resources. Vines points to the limited effect of conditionality due to
Angola’s riches. Donor co-ordination that might have resulted in pressure on the
parties was also offset by business interests.895 Saferworld argues that economic
incentives were ineffective, because both “political leaders [...] place the defence or
pursuit of power before their country’s economic recovery.”896
The UN’s record was blemished with the very first attempt at conditionality,
when preconditions were attached to UNAVEM III’s deployment. The conditions
could not be upheld and the UN’s misjudgement of the situation was exposed. In the
course of the peace process, attempts were also made to make political concessions
conditional upon commitments in the military sphere being honoured, in order to
persuade UNITA to give up its military strategy for a political one.897 This too met
with little success.
And yet, the UN continued to use its presence as a bargaining tool, using the
threat of withdrawal as a particular form of conditionality. UNAVEM III’s mandate
was only extended for very short periods of time, at worst only a month or a fortnight.
The first mandate was only for six months and was tied to the condition that the
cessation of hostilities was effective. The next six months were linked to the safety of
humanitarian personnel.898 The contradictory goals underlying this strategy
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contributed to its failure: The UN warned that they would not stay unless there was
progress, while pushing for minimum fulfilment of the Lusaka provisions in order to
withdraw and to proclaim the mission a success. In that way, similar to the problems
that arose from the initial insistence on an end date in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the short
mandates of UNAVEM III also undermined attempts to increase pressure. In part, the
short extensions of the force’s mandate were a product of “international frustration
over peacekeeping” and pressure particularly from the United States “not to allow the
operation to drag on indefinitely.”899 In the end, the situation was the exact opposite
of the desired outcome. Rather than determining conditions on the ground through the
threat of withdrawal, the pace of withdrawal was in fact set by the actual security
situation on the ground.
Co-ordinating to force compliance was thus never thoroughly attempted in
Angola, including a joint strategy among the third-party actors and a common
understanding of the instruments available to apply pressure. The Angolan peace
process could not muster the same enthusiasm and determination to succeed that
characterised the international efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Measures taken in the
face of non-compliance from the parties and even more so threats thereof could only
have been productive had the third party’s willingness to make good on threats been
demonstrable. Although some influence was brought to bear in the beginning of the
peace process, by early 1998 “neither side was any longer susceptible to UN or
outside pressure.”900
The other major effort to apply pressure was through sanctions. The sanctions
followed the lines of the arms embargo that had been in effect since 1993. They were
first imposed on UNITA in late 1997, because of non-compliance, and gradually
tightened. Rather than forcing UNITA’s compliance the immediate effect was that the
movement severed all ties to the government and the UN within three weeks.901
Another step was the embargo on the unofficial export of diamonds which came into
force on 1 July 1998. However, the international community and the UN, more
particularly, failed to ensure that member states were rigorously implementing the
embargo on illegal diamonds from Angola.902 Sanctions were of course difficult to
                                                
899 Vines (1998), p. 18; see also Sibanda (1999a), p. 122.
900 Vines (1999a), Ch. X, p. 2.
901 Vines (1999a), Ch. IV, p. 3, 7.
902 “Diamond Trade and War,” APIC , 15 Dec 1998. Specific sanctions on the diamond trade were
imposed by S/RES/1173 (1998), 12 June 1998.
Section III Implementing the Lusaka Protocol
307
implement due to geographical aspects, such as vast territory, no effective border
control, and international support networks. Still, a more important factor was the
nature of the diamond trade which lacked transparency and accountability. In part,
this had to do with the fact that the international community faced a formidable
challenge in attempting to control private interests pursued by sub-state actors or
multinational corporations. In the end, sanctions were no more than a moral statement
and the “failure of the UN member states and the diamond industry to fully implement
the embargo has meant that UNITA have been able to restock munitions and supplies
and this has fatally undermined the peace process.”903
6.4 Conclusions on Co-ordination
· On the part of the international presence, the co-ordination of the operation in its
entirety was assigned to the SRSG who also provided political and strategic
leadership and to a large extent functioned as the voice of the international
community. His success was limited by two factors: (1) The commitment of the
international community was obviously not constant and derived the SRSG of
some of his authority. (2) The civil-military divide, which in Angola ran between
the humanitarian and the peacekeeping actors, was so pronounced that it cracked
the image of the international community standing as one in pursuit of the same
goals. Co-ordination did improve between the two sides of UNAVEM III, but
never entirely found a common denominator.
· Co-ordination in itself was thus rather unsuccessful as a means of applying
pressure, but other measures to force compliance were attempted. Neither threats
of withdrawal, nor sanctions had any significant effect on the parties. Sanctions in
particular would have benefited from greater co-ordination between the UN, the
Troika and with other regional actors. Unfortunately, the financial gains for a
number of regional, but also Western countries were far too great for them to have
any interest in enforcing a sanctions regime.
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7 Conclusions
In assessing the international security assistance provided to the implementation of
the Lusaka Protocol, one should distinguish between the context and actual
implementation. The context harboured some fundamental truths that the international
effort had to take into account. They included a high level of tension and continued
clashes throughout the peace process; the complete absence of trust between the
parties; and the business interests that drove the conflict. Against this background,
implementation represented a formidable challenge. As for the implementation of
Lusaka’s security tasks, its evaluation centres around the core issues of the
demilitarisation of UNITA with all its constituent elements, on the one hand, and the
performance of the external actors, in particular the UN, on the other.
7.1 The Context for International Security Assistance
The most significant effect of the continuously high level of tensions was that the
population could not develop a sense of security and thus begin the transition from
war to peace. The feeling of insecurity was heightened by the fact that those that were
intended to protect the population were in fact behind many of the clashes. Moreover,
clashes not only concerned organised members of the two opposing parties, but were
directed against the general population which was subject to harassment and serious
human rights violations throughout the four years of the peace process. In that way,
“[t]he impunity with which rights were abused eroded confidence in the peace process
and created a vicious cycle of rights abuses that steadily worsened.”904 In addition to
preventing the Angolan people from engaging in a process of national reconciliation,
the volatile situation slowed the practical processes of reintegration and repatriation
that were crucial steps in regenerating a post-war society.
For the leadership of the parties, the high level of tensions was more of a
symptom than a cause in itself. Surely, clashes contributed to the lack of
rapprochement between the party leaders, but even more so they demonstrated the
lack of trust between the parties and their view that the political process was an
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inadequate tool in the pursuit of each party’s goals. In order to enhance the
understanding of the context of implementation, the absence of trust should have been
taken into account to a greater extent. The heavy reliance on the concept of ownership
was ill-considered given the relationship between the parties at the time the Lusaka
Protocol was signed. The parties’ responsibility for the implementation process
should have been qualified in the light of their persistent security concerns. This does
not invalidate the concept of ownership on the whole, as a peace process can never be
forced upon the parties, but the third-party presence should have been given the
means to apply some pressure in the case of non-compliance. Neither the UN agencies
nor other major external actors engaged in Angola from 1994-8 were willing or able
to provide the political and economic resources to take a credible and firm stand.
Clearly, only a sustained and substantial effort that involved both African countries
and extra-regional support would have been able to effect any kind of progress
towards peace in Angola.905
The regional dimension was critical to the Angolan peace process. On the one
hand, it affected each party’s security perceptions, due to the degree of support that
was forthcoming from regional actors and organisations. In that way, the crisis in the
DRC had a major impact on the internal dynamic of the Angolan conflict. On the
other hand, and perhaps even more importantly for the chances for peace in Angola,
the regional supply routes ensured both parties continuous arms deliveries. Perhaps
the UN peacekeeping force could have done more to enforce the sanctions regime, but
in reality success also turned on the degree to which neighbouring states would be
willing to establish effective controls. The earnings from the arms trade and diamond
smuggling were too great to be counteracted by the moral compulsion to bring about
peace in Angola.
Besides the disruptions that originated within the region, the Angolan peace
process was plagued by internal and external spoilers. The latter included both
European states and the United States, as well as private security companies; all of
which benefited financially from sustained tension and were extremely difficult to
handle. As mentioned, the embargo and sanctions regimes were ineffective. The
strategy of ‘buying over’ and integrating the moderate spoilers went far beyond the
financial capacity and commitment of the international community. Economic
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incentives drowned in the profits from the diamond, oil, and private security
businesses. The government pursued such a strategy with some success with respect
to the UNITA members that joined the GURN or the FAA. However, the strategy
failed when it came to the most central spoiler, namely Savimbi himself. From his
perspective, the security concerns continued to outweigh the political benefits of
joining the government, particularly given the continuous military support that was
forthcoming from external spoilers.
7.2 The Role of International Security Assistance
Clearly, both parties had weighty security concerns that were magnified by the
absence of trust between them. The MPLA government had been democratically
elected, enjoyed the recognition of the international community and was thus
considered the legitimate ruler of Angola. In that capacity, it was officially in charge
of the coercive means of the state, including the military, the police, and potential
other security services. As a result, the lion’s share of demilitarisation fell on UNITA.
Efforts to tie UNITA into the political process through power-sharing arrangements
were insufficient to alleviate the movement’s security concerns. At the same time, it is
unclear what offers might have induced more co-operation. The degree to which
UNITA perceived its security as threatened, was revealed in its demilitarisation and
its commitment to transfer territorial strongholds to government authority. Despite the
rightful legitimacy of the government, more attention should have been paid to the
vulnerable position in which UNITA was placed. This was particularly true following
the decision to demobilise UNITA’s army, FALA, in parallel with the incorporation
of UNITA officers into the FAA. In practice this meant abolishing UNITA’s military
arm, while leaving that of the government intact. It follows naturally that the
movement would also be reluctant to give up its territorial base, as the other major
component of its military capacity besides its armed forces.
There is no excuse for UNITA’s lack of compliance and its successful
endeavour to debilitate the peace process, but the movement’s security perceptions
and the uneven demilitarisation process can to some extent explain their ambiguity.
Moreover, the lack of ‘compassion’ for UNITA’s security dilemma, reinforced the
movement’s impression that the international presence was partial towards the
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government. This was clearly exploited by those in UNITA’s midst that stood to gain
from continued or renewed hostilities.
The government’s main contribution to the overall demilitarisation under the
Lusaka process consisted of civilian disarmament and the reform of its civilian
security sector. The latter focused on the quartering and dismantling of irregular
security forces, the integration of UNITA members into the Angolan National Police
(ANP) and substantial improvements of the police’s human rights record.
Disarmament and civilian security sector reform were closely linked in that it was the
ANP that was assigned the task of disarming the civilian population. As this task was
performed rather unevenly, applying significantly more pressure on areas that had
until recently been under UNITA control, and with excessive violence, civilian
disarmament was counterproductive to its function in the Lusaka process. Rather than
contributing to a general pacification and reconciliation of society, it served to
heighten UNITA’s security concerns and its concomitant reluctance to demilitarise
and to hand over territory.
The view of the third-party actors as partial was strengthened by the
international community’s policy of not publicising the military violations and human
rights abuses committed by the government. It was desperately trying to maintain a
precarious balance between co-operation and bringing about compliance. The
dependence on co-operation led the UN and the international community more
generally into a blind ally, where, according to Lewis, “too much emphasis was
placed upon appeasing political officials rather than protecting people.”906 By the
fourth year of the peace process, it finally dawned on the international presence that
the balance had tipped much too far towards appeasing the government. At that point,
however, it had gambled away its potential leverage with both the government and
UNITA.
As has been witnessed in a number of UN missions and was true of the peace
process and the involvement of the UN in Angola, the organisation had a remarkable
inability or unwillingness to face facts. The organisational checks, a shortage of funds
and staff, and even the political constraints that all international organisations operate
under, were understandable obstacles. But the UN’s tendency to paint far too rosy a
picture undermined its credibility and influence. The following assessment of July
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1995, when the peace process can hardly be said to have begun, is a case in point. The
Secretary General reported that events “give grounds for hope that the most difficult
stage of implementation of the Lusaka Protocol might now be over.”907
Essential questions are what the international community might have done
differently in their delivery of security assistance to the peace process in Angola and,
more specifically, how the security guarantee could have been strengthened. Laying
aside the political constraints they were subject to, UNAVEM III and MONUA would
have been incapable of providing an effective security guarantee against a
government or UNITA offensive. They were only effective as temporary buffers
between the parties, not able to disarm effectively and impotent with respect to
stopping arms deliveries.908 Overall, the external actors were unable to promote a
culture of peace and conflict management by non-violent means.
However, before criticising UNAVEM III for its weaknesses, one should keep
in mind that the force authorised to assist in the implementation of the Lusaka
Protocol was considered large at the time it was mandated. It was approximately
equivalent to ONUMOZ in Mozambique in 1992-4, the largest force in Africa since
Somalia in 1993, and more than ten times the strength of UNAVEM II. At this stage,
no one could envision the type of NATO-led force, that would be deployed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina a year later. In fact, as of 29 March 1996, UNAVEM III was the largest
UN peacekeeping operation in existence with around seven thousand troops.
Nonetheless, UNAVEM III could have been strengthened in other ways than
mere numbers. In particular, it would have benefited immensely from a stronger air
capacity. Air support is an example of a force multiplier that UNAVEM III was in
dire need of. Despite the fact that air capacity is cost- and personnel-intensive, Angola
is a case in which it could have played a vital role. More solid air support would have
enhanced the UN force’s effectiveness and efficiency with respect to projecting its
presence, transporting itself and other international actors, and to surveying and
controlling Angolan air space. In addition, UNAVEM III would have benefited
greatly from a stronger intelligence gathering and analysis capability, that could draw
on both Western and African intelligence sources.
In the absence of such force multipliers and of the political commitment to use
the available means effectively, the UN’s role was marginal; reflected in Vines’
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description of UNAVEM III as “underfunded and overstretched.”909 Usually, such
shortcomings are counteracted by the said balance between sustained international
engagement and local ownership. But as became clear above, the parties’ willingness
to co-operate was variable at best. One must not give in to what Lewis describes as
the “dangerous habit of placing the responsibility for peace on outsiders.”910 Given
the threat perceptions of the parties, their lack of trust, and their economic interest in
continued tensions, the peace process might well have collapsed regardless of the
strength of the UN presence. Still, what is clear, is that the third-party presence was
unable to provide a sufficient security guarantee that might have mollified UNITA
and the government and made them more willing to consider a peaceful track.
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Acronyms - Angola
ACAS Association of Surviving Angolans
ACRF African Crisis Response Force
ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative
ANP Angolan National Police
CAP Consolidated Interagency Appeal (UN)
CDC Civil Defence Corps
CMAO Central Mine Action Office
DRO Demobilization and Reintegration Office
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaïre)
EO Executive Outcomes
FAA Armed Forces of Angola (Forças Armadas Angolanas)
FALA UNITA armed forces
FLEC Front for the Liberation of the Cabindan Enclave
FNLA National Front for the Liberation of Angola
GURN Government of Unity and National Reconciliation
HRU UNAVEM/MONUA Human Rights Unit
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP Internally Displaced Person
INAROE Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Explosives
IOM International Organization for Migration
JPMC Joint Political and Military Commission/Comissao Conjunta
LP Lusaka Protocol
MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular
de Liberação de Angola)
MONUA UN Observer Mission in Angola/Missão de Observação das Nações
Unidas am Angola
NGO Non-governmental organisation
OAU Organisation of African Unity
ONUMOZ United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique
PDA Democratic Party of Angola
RRP Rapid Reaction Police
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SADC South African Development Community
SCRes Security Council Resolution
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General
UCAH United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Unit
UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional
para a Independência Total de Angola)
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USAID United States Agency for International Development
Vorgan Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel
WFP World Food Programme
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SECTION IV: COMPARING BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND
ANGOLA
1 Introduction
Having undertaken an in-depth analysis of the two case studies, the time has come to
compare them directly. The comparison of international security assistance to the
peace implementation processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Angola again follows the
structure established in the analytical framework and consists of two main parts: the
starting-point for implementation and the implementation process itself, including the
co-ordination of international security assistance.
2 The Starting-Point
The starting-point for the comparison of international security assistance in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Angola is the political context and the societal setting in which it is
to be delivered. The situation has three major components: the immediate post-
settlement setting; the premises for implementation provided by the agreement itself;
and the third-party actors involved in providing assistance.
2.1 Threats to Security in a Post-Settlement Society
As indicated above, the gap between the population’s expectations and the central
authority’s performance, or more specifically, the areas in which the local government
is incapable of or unwilling to provide military and civilian security provide the
opening for international involvement. Naturally, the degree of subsequent
international involvement depends on several other factors, aside from the size and
character of the gap. First, there is the objective need, i.e. the degree of destruction,
social disintegration and militarisation of society caused by the conflict. Second, there
is the willingness of the parties to receive help and to accept the international
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presence. In part, this is reflected in the provisions of the peace agreement. Third, the
engagement will be contingent upon the international community’s willingness and
ability to assist.
In both cases the peace implementation phase was preceded by an all-out civil
war in which an international peacekeeping force was deployed but hopelessly
overstretched. Both predecessors were mandated by the UN as forces that
presupposed basic consent from the parties, and were rendered inoperable by
worsening conditions. Whereas UNAVEM II withdrew to a few main locations fairly
quickly, UNPROFOR continued to attempt the execution of its mandate under
impossible circumstances. However, both forces were in country which allowed for
rapid deployment of some monitors in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the
Dayton Agreement and the Lusaka Protocol respectively. And both required
substantial enforcement with UNAVEM II increasing from 475 to over 7,000 in
UNAVEM III and UNPROFOR growing from 31,000 to 60,000 in IFOR. 911 In
contrast to UNPROFOR whose official mandate was made ever more extensive,
UNAVEM II was limited in the scope of its mandate, but took on a number of tasks in
the implementation of the Bicesse Accords despite its limited formal authorisation. 912
The predecessors in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Angola are relevant in that the
international community believed to have learned valuable lessons that were instantly
put into practice in the peace processes that followed the Dayton Agreement and the
Lusaka Protocol. As a result of UNPROFOR’s misfortune, the UN was excluded from
and the United States were included in the military component of the peace mission.
In designing IFOR, an attempt was made to match the force’s strength and equipment
with the requirements inherent in the mandate. Unfortunately, the ‘lessons’ from
UNPROFOR also entailed that IFOR/SFOR tended to interpret its mandate narrowly
and excessively so. It took a while for the force to realise that ‘mission creep’ was the
only meaningful option in the Bosnian peace process. Similarly, the international
                                                
911 UNPROFOR’s strength was approximately 31,000 in August 1995. At the time of withdrawal (31
December 1995), there were a mere 2,800, but many of the ‘missing’ 28,000 initially transferred into
IFOR. Espen Barth Eide and Per Erik Solli (1995) From Blue to Green. The Transition from
UNPROFOR to IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (NUPI Working Paper No. 539, December 1995,
Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI): Oslo), p. 30.
912 The United Nations describe the force’s role during 1992-4 in the following manner: “As a neutral
body, UNAVEM II was an indispensable channel for communications and repeatedly drew the warring
parties back to the negotiating process while fulfilling other vital functions, such as its support for
humanitarian activities.” United Nations (1996)  The Blue Helmets (United Nations: New York, NY), p.
255.
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community believed to be remedying all their mistakes in the transition from
UNAVEM II to UNAVEM III by enlarging the force substantially, by defining its
role more clearly in the agreement, and by assigning it more direct responsibility in
the supervision of the parties’ compliance. Although these were clearly steps in the
right direction, the main problem of third-party commitment remained unaddressed.
Thus, the international community appeared to be retracting instantly in early 1995,
when tying conditions to the force’s deployment rather than taking an assertive stand
itself. In that way, any faith the parties and the Angolan population might have had in
the political commitment of the external actors was undermined before the first
contingent of UNAVEM III had arrived in theatre.
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that the settlement in Angola
was preceded by a far longer period of war, with all the implications that has for
social structures, levels of armament, and the degree to which a culture of violence
was ingrained in every day life. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, communism had at least
provided a stable and peaceful society, if discriminatory, repressive, and unjust. Still,
the legacy of the socialist system entailed that profound restructuring of Bosnian
society and economy would have to take place which the international community had
to address in the context of its implementation efforts. With respect to areas in which
international security assistance was provided, this presented particular challenges in
the reform of the police and the judicial system as part of the civilian security sector
reform. More generally, it haunted reconstruction and reconciliation through political
cronyism, corruption, and lack of economic entrepreneurship.
Most importantly, though, the Dayton Agreement and the Lusaka Protocol
were to be implemented in extremely weak states, where the legitimacy and reach of
the government were limited. Thus, in both Angola and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
international community was unintentionally faced with restructuring a state and its
society, rather than simply putting an agreement into practice. This in itself, is not the
crux of the problem, but the fact that external actors did not realise the degree to
which they would be involved in such an all-encompassing process of change.913 If
they did realise it, they did not internalise it and structure their international security
assistance accordingly. Especially the tendency in both cases to place the
                                                
913 Spear warns that international actors implementing a peace agreement often have an inadequate
understanding of the peace agreement’s implications and the cultural context of implementation.
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responsibility for the peace process in the hands of the local government reflects the
desire to maintain the image of a hands-off approach. Of course, it is critical that the
local counterparts have ownership of the process, but their lack of capacity was not
taken sufficiently into account.
In order to gain greater insight into the role and function of international
security assistance, it is helpful to consider specific issues or areas in which security
was inadequate or threatened in both the military and in the civilian sphere. Meeting
the military and civilian security deficit differed greatly in nature. The Bosnian case is
a prime example of military security gaps that were more obvious than unmet civilian
security needs, and more rapidly filled. In contrast, the civilian security tasks proved
more persistent over time and tended to increasingly dominate thinking the further the
implementation process moved along. Although the reform of the Angolan National
Police (ANP) was on the agenda from the start, it did not become the area of
concentration until the transition to MONUA and when the demilitarisation of
UNITA had officially been completed. In other words, when the third-party actors
deemed the military security gap sufficiently filled, they turned to filling the civilian
security gap, not realising that they were essentially the same in practice.
Remedying the military situation in the wake of the war involves dealing with
disputed territory, foreign forces, and a highly mobilised population. Establishing
military security requires, for example, monitoring a cease-fire, withdrawal of foreign
forces, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, as well
as negotiations on a future regional security order. The peace processes in both
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Angola involved decisions in all these areas, but with a
varying degree of international involvement in supervising and enforcing decisions
reached.
With respect to law and order or civilian security in the post-settlement
society, threats in both cases primarily stemmed from the availability of arms and the
existence of militias and armed groups. The population was faced with a
psychological transition from a revolutionary war mentality to a society where discord
was handled through non-violent conflict management mechanisms. The challenge
lay not only in convincing the population that these mechanisms would indeed
effectively and impartially fulfil the citizens’ security needs, but also in gaining the
                                                                                                                                           
Joanna Spear (1999) “The Disarmament and Demobilisation of Warring Factions in the Aftermath of
Civil Wars: Key Implementation Issues,” Civil Wars 2(2), p. 15.
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consent of all armed factions to cease their armed operations and respect peace
accords, and reduce the scale and impact of their armed actions to a minimum.
It is important to remember that few parties are entirely homogeneous. Instead,
they consist of factions with varying degrees of support for the peace process. In order
to qualify as rejectionists or so-called spoilers, the factions need to be organised to a
certain degree. Some rejectionist factions, simply do not see the minimum political
aims of their party met under the reigning conditions, and make up one group of
spoilers that pose a threat to the successful transition from war to peace.914 Another
potentially more damaging group of spoilers comprises those that have a direct
financial, economic, or power-related stake in a continuation of conflict.915 Spoilers in
general have a destructive impact on the peace process beyond their actual popular
support and must be a factor in all considerations related to the delivery of
international security assistance. For that reason the issue of spoilers recurs
throughout the analysis of the peace implementation process. Closely linked to the
issue of spoilers is the bloated security sector typical of a post-settlement society,
comprising a number of actors, ranging from military officers to local police or militia
chiefs, who are unwilling to relinquish their inflated power.
The most prominent and most powerful spoilers in Bosnia-Herzegovina were
among the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat – and to a lesser extent the Bosnian
Muslim – leadership, which reflected down into the lower tiers of local political
leaders. By virtue of the official power they held, national and local leaders had to be
considered inside the peace process where they perpetuated the ethnic divisions on
which their power rested. The same was true in Angola, especially among UNITA
military staff, which had little to look forward to once demobilised and reintegrated
into ‘civilian’ society. In both cases, political and military leaders frequently further
strengthened their positions through links into the criminal sphere, be it through direct
participation in black market activity or through corruption.
The high crime rates represented a further threat to security and paralysed
economic reconstruction and civilian confidence-building. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and
                                                
914 Stephen J. Stedman (1997) “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22(2), pp.
5-53. The international commitment was central for the support of the leaderships which were taking
on the risk of peace. They were in danger of being branded as traitors by hard-liners, being betrayed by
their former opponents or by the opponent’s irregular forces. Thomas Ohlson and Stephen J. Stedman
(1994) The New is Not Yet Born. Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa (The Brookings Institution:
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in Angola, the threat from rampant crime was matched by ineffective and unreliable
police forces and security structures which were often the main violators of human
rights and/or in bed with the criminals and thus completely lacked credibility.
In both cases, the war was preserved in a set of societal features, that were
both a product of and reinforced the continued absence of security for all. Especially
the mobilisation of the majority of the male population into the armed forces, the
extensive displacement and the resulting ethnic divisions, that forced virtually
everyone to ‘choose sides’ in the conflict, introduced insecurity. In addition, there was
little freedom of movement for a long time in Bosnia-Herzegovina and even less in
Angola, literally millions of land mines, and widespread destruction of infrastructure,
inhibiting reconciliation and economic reconstruction.
2.2 The Peace Agreement's Content and Character
Whereas the post-settlement setting is the practical starting-point, the peace
agreement is the legal one. The agreement does not necessarily transform the conflict
itself, but serves as a reference point for the parties and the external actors in shaping
new rules of behaviour in the post-settlement period. The most important of these new
rules is that conflicts are to be resolved through political negotiations rather than
military means. Ideally, peace agreements should represent a common position of the
opponents “on the appropriate strategies for the future.”916
Another important insight is that a peace settlement is the very fundament of
the peace implementation process, but it is seldom – probably never – seen by the
parties as the ideal recipe for reconciliation and the achievement of a lasting peace. In
most cases in which a settlement rather than an outright victory on the battlefield has
been reached, some manoeuvring for further advantages will continue.917 Most peace
agreements are bound to be met with vehement resistance and much criticism by the
parties, which in turn usually face strong internal opposition from rejectionist groups
                                                                                                                                           
915 See for example Mats Berdal and David Keen (1997) “Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil
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916 Fred Tanner (1998) “Bargains for Peace – Security Cooperation During Post-War Peace-Building”
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or spoilers who portray the peace settlement as a betrayal, treason to the national
cause or a surrender doomed to failure. This opposition will be expressed not only
through obstructionism and passive resistance, but in some cases through political
violence and armed resistance. Devising “a spoiler management strategy,” for
example co-optation or marginalisation, for the implementation period became an
important task for third-party actors in both cases studied. Stedman distinguishes
between spoilers that are located inside and those outside of the peace process. The
latter often rejects the agreement unconditionally, sometimes because outside spoilers
were not made part of the peace agreement, sometimes because they disagree too
violently with the terms of the agreement.918 It is particularly the inside spoilers that
the international community must manage as part of the delivery of international
security assistance. It is important that the third-party actors make use of the fact that
the parties would not have entered the agreement if it did not offer some benefit for
them and that they will continue the peace process, although acting obstructionist at
times, as long as they still believe that they will gain from it. Thus, the international
community can directly affect the parties’ assessment of the costs and benefits of
compliance.
Peace agreements vary indefinitely, but the two cases can nonetheless be
compared with regard to some basic characteristics, namely the degree of conflict
resolution and the inclusion of security tasks; the legitimacy of the agreement and the
degree of external pressure; and the mandate for third-party involvement.
(1) The degree of conflict resolution refers to how many central issues in
dispute have been left unresolved in the peace agreements, and to the degree to which
security tasks in support of structural war-to-peace transition processes have been
identified in the agreement.919
Crocker and Hampson stress the normative power of comprehensive
settlements and argue that full-blown, detailed settlement plans have a greater chance
                                                                                                                                           
917 Still, Betts points out that “the terms of diplomatic settlements usually reflect results on the
battlefield.” Richard K Betts (1994) “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 73(6), p.
22.
918 Stedman (1997), p. 8f.
919 Structural war-to-peace processes encompass physical measures taken to facilitate the transition to
peace, such as the establishment of a cease-fire and buffer zones, transfer of territory, removal of
foreign troops, disarmament, negotiations on arms control, demobilisation and reintegration, security
sector reform, release and return of POWs, security for returning refugees and displaced persons.
Whereas the military tasks were clearly defined in the Dayton Agreement, the ‘soft’ civilian tasks were
insufficiently mapped out. The example also illustrates that some tasks defy clear delineation, as they
are not apparent or cannot be identified at the early stage in which the agreement is drafted.
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of successful implementation. 920 However, in many protracted conflicts, the issue of
comprehensiveness is irrelevant as long as the parties can only agree to the most
vague and ambiguous compromise formula. Peace agreements will always be an
exercise in ambiguity: the interpretation of the Dayton Agreement ranged from a
“cover for effective partition” to “a starting point for a workable integration of former
enemies into a single state.” Again, this demonstrates that a peace agreement must
necessarily be ambiguous to obtain the signatures of the parties. Likewise, Dayton
“was possible precisely because it remained ambiguous on the core issue of Bosnia’s
identity.”921
Establishing timetables is another important dimension in peace agreements. It
has become common wisdom to warn against premature elections in the immediate
post-settlement period when moderate leaders will be defeated easily by more
nationalist agitators and warlords in an election campaign. Experience from Bosnia-
Herzegovina on the one hand and Angola on the other showed that timetables were
indeed difficult to keep. As the fulfilment of pre-determined timetables was far too
often used to measure the success of an operation, the fact that one did not manage to
execute all tasks on time was regarded as detrimental to the peace process. In reality,
delays in the implementation of the peace agreement’s provisions are not necessarily
counterproductive, but can allow for the necessary changes to take place on the
ground. The organisation of free and democratic elections in the immediate post-
settlement society, which poses tremendous practical and psychological problems,
such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is a case in point.
Timetables also harbour a practical dilemma in that they are usually the
product of an awareness of donor pressure to devise specific action plans. Thus,
despite the recognition that flexibility is critical in the “fog of peacemaking,”922
deadlines are set to satisfy calls for accountability and progress from donors. When
delays occur, such as in demobilisation and reintegration in Angola, funds run out and
programmes are accused of failing, further undermining financial contributions rather
than triggering a more differentiated assessment of challenges and countermeasures.
                                                
920 Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson (1996) “Making Peace Settlements Work,” Foreign
Policy 104/1996, pp. 54-71.
921 Ivo Daalder (1997) “Bosnia after SFOR: Options for continued US engagement,” Survival 39(4), p.
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922 Term suggested by Stedman (1997), p. 17.
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Although strict timetables are often unproductive, there is a clear need to
understand the links between different activities, with respect to both primacy and
chronology. Thus, at times it is important to hold fast to a deadline or to insist on the
completion of one task prior to the initiation of another. Timetables can be linked to
conditions, such as the holding of the second round of presidential elections in
Angola. Other links in the Angolan peace process were not obeyed as rigorously. The
web of activities that was created in the Lusaka Protocol collapsed early on and all the
links between demobilisation, transfer of territory, integration into the ANP to name
but a few proved to be paper tigers only. The development culminated in the
recognition of UNITA as demilitarised, when in reality the large-scale retention of
arms and troops was suspected by most observers.
At a strategic level, end dates set for the international presence affect the
parties’ willingness to move to the next stage of the peace process. The end date
dynamic was the same in both cases, when all the parties concerned initially put the
conflict on hold. As a result, the credibility of the security guarantee provided by
third-party actors was severely undermined. The difficulty was recognised in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the international community’s stance gradually became firmer and
was no longer tied to a specific deadline. In contrast, the external actors in Angola
revealed more and more weaknesses in their commitment, while simultaneously
threatening withdrawal, despite the fact that that threat had proved ineffective early
on.
Peace settlements concluded after protracted civil war almost invariably
include an interim transitional period during which confidence-building and
reconciliation is to eventually change perceptions and enemy images sufficiently to
facilitate the resolution of outstanding issues. The Dayton Agreement made the
assumption that one party’s position and views of the others would be sufficiently
changed in the course of a five year interim period to allow for a phasing out of the
international involvement and a final settlement that could not be achieved at the time
the peace agreement was concluded.923 After three and four years respectively of the
Dayton and the Lusaka process, there were strong reasons to assume that the
reconciliation process in both cases would take more time than five years. This again
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points to the importance of sustained international follow-up rather than abiding
strictly by the letter of the agreement.
Finally, the importance of “symbols of peace” in the immediate post-
settlement situation has increasingly been acknowledged. There have to be some
changes on the ground, albeit small and insignificant, to demonstrate the beginning of
a new era. The introduction of new common license plates in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a
case in point.924 In contrast, all efforts to mark improvements in the security situation
in Angola were outshone by daily harassment and human rights violations. Similarly,
a major damper on the international efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the reality for
minority returnees that were met by threats and abuse and that third-party actors had
not managed to counteract effectively in the first three years of the Dayton process.
Bringing about peace is very much about changing perceptions, and no peace
agreement can change those perceptions without establishing clear and unambiguous
signs on the ground that a transition period to peace has begun.
(2) The legitimacy of the peace accords in the international community as well
as among the parties is an important factor for successful implementation. With
respect to the stage of conflict at which the agreement was reached, the parties viewed
the war as unfinished business in both Angola and Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was
considerable pressure to sign in both cases and as Ivo Daalder noted on Bosnia-
Herzegovina “each of the parties felt that the final agreement was to some extent
imposed upon them.”925 In part, the external pressure led to a strong rejectionist block
in the early implementation period in both cases. At best, the peace agreements
obtained conditional support among the parties in the absence of better alternatives.
A major difference with respect to the legitimacy of the agreement that swayed
the Bosnian parties to at least initiate the peace process was the incorporation of the
parties’ security concerns. Thus, responsibility for security was delegated down to the
Entity level and the most immediate needs were met. Although this might prove
counterproductive in the long-run, it has created a relatively stable military situation
for the time being, during which rapprochement can take place. Whatever assurances
                                                                                                                                           
International Assistance for the Enhancement of Security (FFI-Report 98/01711, Forsvarets
forskningsinstitutt: Kjeller, Norway), p. 22f.
924 The fact that substantial international pressure was necessary to bring this measure about only
detracts marginally from the symbolic and practical effect for the Bosnian population.
925 Daalder (1997), p. 7
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the international community did give to the Angolan parties, their limited value was
revealed rather quickly in the indecisive stance of the UN on deployment.
Both the Lusaka Protocol and the Dayton Agreement were criticised by
decision-makers and politicians inside and outside Bosnia-Herzegovina and Angola
for its failures, flaws, inconsistencies, and weaknesses. Moreover, both agreements
incurred the wrath of powerful opposition groups on both sides, and have faced
challenges such as widespread political violence and passive obstructionism and non-
compliance to frustrate the peace process during the first years of the implementation.
Reaching the agreements also meant dealing with the perpetrators and wartime
leaders. No exchange of leadership took place in either case and in both cases the
signatories did not necessarily reflect the parties. In both cases, it was rather
optimistic to suspect that the leaders would fundamentally change their mindset by
simply signing a document. Still, in most peace processes one has to acknowledge the
necessity of striking deals with the ‘villains.’ In Bosnia-Herzegovina one attempted to
find a partial solution by indicting a number of political and military leaders as war
criminals, but it did not address the question of other mischievous players, such as
President Slobodan Miloševic. In Angola, no such attempts were undertaken and
given the power that President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas
Savimbi had over their respective organisations, it is unlikely that it would have been
possible to effectively marginalise either of them, if desired. In the end, it is a
question of consistency. The international community’s strategy to deal with the
leaders as spoilers fluctuated and was not assertive, allowing the spoilers among the
leaders in both cases to manipulate the third-party actors involved in delivering
international security assistance. This was more extreme in the Angolan case and
robbed the international presence of virtually all credibility.
(3) It has been recommended that the role and the mandate of peace missions
should be part of the negotiated settlement.926 Clearly, if peace agreements contain no
mandate for external actors in monitoring and supporting a demilitarisation process,
the process of providing international security assistance will be much more difficult.
There is little doubt that the international community will be hesitant to offer
peacekeeping troops and extensive international security assistance packages in the
absence of a peace agreement. Thus, if the involvement of external actors in
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consolidating peace is clearly defined in the agreement, the chances for a successful
outcome appear to be greater. Moreover, if peace agreements define co-ordinating
mechanisms and structures for the involvement of international bodies, donors,
organisations offering international security assistance, there may be less chance of
rivalries and competition among external actors. Tasks should also be defined as
realistically as possible, although it is not always possible to see what the realistic
options are at the outset of an implementation process.
It is fair to say that the mere size of the international community’s
involvement in the Dayton process, both politically, militarily, and financially, was
unparalleled in post-war history. The peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
closely scrutinised, monitored, and supported by the United States and its European
partners in co-operation with a wide range of local and regional actors in areas
ranging from direct military presence and assistance to extensive development aid
packages and police assistance programmes. Although similar with respect to the
tasks on the agenda, the Angolan peace process could not measure up in terms of
commitment to succeed. The Bosnian peace process became a laboratory for the
development of new guidelines and lessons learned for international involvement in
supporting the resolution of internal conflicts.
Given the difficult starting-point for both peace processes, it appears that
“external third-party involvement in all phases of the peace process does indeed
matter to political outcomes and that success and failure are indeed linked to the
quality and level of support given by third parties to the peace process, especially
during implementation of an agreement.”927 Thus, crises need not necessarily end in
renewed violence and derail the peace process, if external parties are determined to
push the parties back to the negotiating table. In this context, the crucial role of a
broad coalition supporting the peace process, including both regional powers, the US,
and international organisations should be underlined. There is a wide spectrum
between a hypothesis that claims that an enforced agreement is better than an
unenforced one to a statement that identifies external involvement as the single most
important factor.928 The truth lies somewhere in between the two extremes and based
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928 Charles King has questioned the strong emphasis on external support for the peace process and
argues that “a bad settlement well-enforced is still a bad settlement.” Charles King (1998) “Transition
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on the peace processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Angola, the role of international
security assistance is indeed crucial.
The role of third parties in enhancing security in the Dayton Agreement was
not so different from that in the Lusaka Protocol. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the mandate
of IFOR/SFOR to “assist in the implementation of the territorial and other military
related provisions of the agreement” and to “ensure compliance.” Moreover, the
International Police Task Force (IPTF) had an extensive mandate to assist the Parties
in maintaining “civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with
internationally recognised human rights standards.”929 This included the IPTF
Assistance Programme operating at the levels of the police forces, the courts, and
political-judicial authorities. Similar tasks were sketched out for UNAVEM III and its
components in the Lusaka process, but the key difference lay in IFOR/SFOR’s
mandate and capability to “use the necessary force.”930
There is clearly a dilemma of striking the balance between empowering the
parties versus retaining sufficient influence to prevent the resumption of armed
conflict. Thus, an overwhelming third-party presence can sometimes be
counterproductive in the sense that it removes the threat of a return to war, and
thereby also removes a major incentive for the parties to move forward with the peace
process. The parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina used the extensive external pressure as an
excuse in the face of internal critics that would have regarded agreeing to a
compromise as treason. 931 Similarly, the opposite strategy of relying on the party’s
willingness to comply in Angola was not productive. Instead, it is imperative that the
international community finds a fruitful balance that fosters indigenous capacity. A
balance between pressure and dialogue has to be maintained in which pressure can
nonetheless be applied to influence the direction of the development and ensure that it
reflects the values that induce peaceful coexistence.932
                                                                                                                                           
from War to peace: Principal Issues and Challenges” (Paper prepared for Transition from War to Peace
in the Post-Cold War Era , Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 28-9 September 1998).
929 Dayton Agreement, Annex 10.
930 Stedman identifies the supposition of “good faith” as a typical UN mistake. Stedman (1997), p. 49.
931 Experience from the Oslo peace process, demonstrates the role of low intensity conflicts as a
catalyst for progress in the peace process, the so-called “creative crises” logic. Lia (1998), pp. 27-28.
932 In order to mould a political framework that will reflect the developments in the security sector,
power-sharing arrangements in post-settlement situations are central. (See for example J. ‘Bayo
Adekanye (1996) “The Two Faces (Phases) of Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Society” (Paper
prepared for International Workshop on Disarming Ethnic Guerrillas Project, Peace Research Institute
Oslo: Oslo, 17-18 February 1996). As power-sharing arrangements fall outside of my focus, I would
just like to mention a few aspects here: Winner-takes-all formulas, which do not provide any security
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2.3 Third-Party Actors
In many ways, the international community is regarded as the representative of
international order, that is of international law and humanity. In the context of this
thesis, I have reviewed which specific actors take on that role in the security field.
The case studies revealed that a web of interests underlay each third-party actor’s
rationale for participating in the peace process or refraining from doing so. Even
actors, such as NATO and the UN agencies whose basic raison d'être was to build
international peace and security base their decision on whether and how to get
involved on a host of other motivations. For any of the third-party actors, costs and
resources are an important concern for the delivery of international security assistance
and naturally play into their interest in participating, particularly where the benefits
are less tangible gains such as regional peace and stability. How long third parties
intend to stay is another issue that often impacts the decision to get involved. And yet,
the impact is not as immediate and obvious as it used to be. The discussion of an end
date versus an end state in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a case in point which illustrates the
shift in thinking that has taken place from focusing on the length of an operation to a
more differentiated assessment of progress towards long-term goals.
In part, the actors involved in delivering international security assistance
reflect the constellation of actors engaged in the negotiation phase. Thus, in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the role of the United States was comprehensive both within and outside
of NATO and the role of the UN was limited. In the same way, the United States and
the United Nations were central actors during the negotiations leading up to the
Lusaka Protocol. However, it became clear in both cases that not only did the United
States have a particular interest in, but it also provided the strategic leadership that
was crucial to progress in the peace process. In some ways international involvement
                                                                                                                                           
for the rebel movements, have proven unfortunate. The Western Sahara situation is a case in point
where there are few security guarantees for Polisario after the referendum. Angola after Bicesse is
another example of the disastrous consequences of a winner-takes-all formula. However, UNITA and
the MPLA insisted on this formula, as they were both convinced that they would emerge as the winner.
In addition, provisions for the strengthening of inter-ethnic and non-ethnic identities and loyalties
should complement power-sharing mechanisms such as a balance of ethnic representation in state
institutions. Charles King warns that without encouraging cross-cutting forms of identity and solidarity
that might have existed before the war, power-sharing arrangements “are likely to enhance precisely
the undesirable divisions that sustained the conflict itself.” (King (1998), p.7.) This became clear in the
formation of government institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where quota systems tended to strengthen
a representative’s identification as a member of the group whose quota he filled, rather than as an
impartial member of a governing body.
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is self-reinforcing. As international actors become more involved, their stake in the
process increases – both with respect to reputation and to financial investments – and
the need for continued and expanded engagement rises. The Bosnian case reflects this,
due to the larger implications for the European security architecture that were implicit
in the outcome of the peace process. Angola followed a different logic, where the
regressive development of the Lusaka process caused frustration and contributed to
undermining international commitment. The difference in commitment in the two
cases was also reflected in the international policy towards the peace processes, which
– in Bosnia-Herzegovina – was regularly re-assessed and consequently re-formulated.
Few such well-grounded adjustments were made in Angola, where policy formulation
appeared more haphazard and based on the minimum that was considered achievable
rather than on an ‘ideal’ outcome.
The following discussion evaluates the main third-party actors involved in the
delivery of international security assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Angola,
ranging from the various bodies of the United Nations, to regional organisations,
individual actors, and NGOs.
The role of the United Nations family was scaled down at the outset of the
peace implementation process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were not trusted with the
overall responsibility for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, especially not
its military provisions, due to United States’ opposition, which in part resulted from
their perception of UNPROFOR’s track record. Angola reflected the traditional
structure of peacekeeping operations, with different UN agencies in charge of
virtually the entire implementation effort. The Security Council remained the prime
legitimising body for international intervention and formally set the strategic plan of
action and goals in both cases. Moreover, a more differentiated view of the
organisation strengthened other constituting agencies, such as the Civilian Police Unit
(UNCivPol) and the recently reorganised United Nations Office for the Co-ordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Both have played significant parts in the Dayton
and Lusaka peace processes, even more so when the focus shifted to the provision of
civilian security in the course of implementation. In addition, the increasing emphasis
on good governance, the rule of law, and institution building has led to a reorientation
of UN development bodies, including the World Bank, towards security sector
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reform, and towards international security assistance.933 This was more apparent in
Bosnia-Herzegovina than in Angola, where the civilian security sector reform never
progressed sufficiently to take on meaningful proportions.
The spectrum of regional organisations involved in peace implementation
ranges from security and defence organisations to organisations that primarily have an
economic focus. Only the Bosnian case featured significant contributions from
regional bodies, where NATO, the OSCE, and the EU emerged as the most important
regional third-party actors involved in providing international security assistance.
With respect to NATO’s participation, the desire to promote the organisation’s
international prestige and credibility were a significant factor, which also influenced
individual NATO and PfP member’s decision to contribute and prove their worth as
allies. The broad participation in IFOR and SFOR also mirrored individual states’
allegiance to the regional alliance and international obligations, and a number of small
states’ struggle to maintain a preferred status among the great powers. NATO’s
involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina is an example of how a host of other - unrelated -
motivations aside from promoting peace and stability could determine an
organisation’s participation.
In its struggle to defend its place in the community of international
organisation’s, the OSCE was also wary to decline when it was allotted
responsibilities at the outset of the Dayton peace process; despite the fact that it had
neither the resources nor the experience, nor was it consulted as to its role. Although
it was not among those bodies initially outlined in the Dayton Agreement, the
European Union became a substantial contributor in the implementation process, in
the role as a ‘cash cow’ that financed a large number of projects in a variety of fields.
Increasingly the EU also provided political guidance through its choice of projects to
fund. Financially the organisation was also one of the main actors in Angola,
alongside the United States, but did not provide any political leadership. Neither the
OAU nor SADC could play a role beyond public statements.
What ad-hoc coalitions of states, Friends of the Peace Process (FPPs), and
donor countries and individual states have in common, is that they provide
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etc. See World Bank (1997) A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction
(World Bank: Washington D.C., May 1997).
Section IV Comparing Bosnia-Herzegovina and Angola
333
international security assistance outside of the global network of institutions and
organisations. Many of these have a special interest in the settlement and their
personal and historical ties to the parties as well as their international standing may
give them influence and leverage that the UN and regional organisations lack.934 In
this context, the notions of strategic leadership and multilateralism become relevant.
Strategic leadership takes different forms and is driven by different
motivations. Whereas some states act on the basis of philanthropy, others pursue
specific national or economic interests.935 In order to be accepted as the leader by the
parties and the other third-party actors, a country can prove its particular interest by
contributing massive resources and/or personnel or by continuing sustained
engagement over a long period of time. In part, the size of a state determines whether
and in what form strategic leadership is taken on. Accordingly, the United States’
involvement in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Angola is an example of resource-
intensive, national interest driven strategic leadership. In the Angolan case, the
economic advantages for the United States were explicit. In Bosnia-Herzegovina they
were implicit in NATO’s success. One might argue that outright economic interest is
a constant factor as opposed to fickle philanthropy. 936 Depending on the motives for
involvement, strategic leadership can undermine the neutrality of international
security assistance. This is particularly true of those states that take on the leadership
position in the pursuit of national interests. The goal of ensuring peace and stability
may be paid lip service, but is often a secondary concern. In order to deflect the
weakening of neutrality caused by strong national interests, impartiality was linked
back to the fulfilment of the peace agreement’s provisions in both cases. And yet, the
United States could not hide their preference for the Bosnian Muslims.
Betts points out that impartiality can do more harm than good, when it
prevents decisive action. He writes that a “middle course in intervention [...] is likely
to do little but muddy both sides’ calculations.” Instead, he argues one should accept
the responsibility that comes with intervention and realise that “[m]aking peace means
                                                
934 Steven Ratner (1995) The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the
Cold War (Macmillan: Basingstoke), p. 84.
935 More specifically, there is international consensus on three conditions in which  the philanthropic
trigger is usually activated: (1) threats to international peace and order; (2) large-scale suffering among
civilian populations; and (3) flagrant violations of human rights. See Milton J. Esman and Shibley
Telhami (eds)(1995) International Organisations and Ethnic Conflict  (Cornell University Press: Ithaca,
New York), p. 12.
936 Smaller nations are less likely to have specific national or strategic interests at stake.
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determining how the war ends.”937 Even when the international community tries to tie
its presence to the provisions of a peace agreement or neutral moral standards, it
cannot protect itself against being perceived as partial. Savimbi’s condemnation of the
international involvement, when the external actors turned against him, due to lack of
compliance on his part, is a case in point.
The influence of third-party actors was determined by the parties’ dependence
on external assistance. Although the Angolan conflict was certainly fed by external
involvement throughout the Cold War, it appeared that the parties were acting more
independently in the peace process from 1994-8. The parties were no longer as
dependent on the United States and the Soviet Union and later Russia for arms
deliveries, as weapons came from any number of sources, as long as both parties had
the cash to pay for them. As a result, the international community’s ability to
influence the process by exercising pressure was limited. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, all
parties but especially the Bosnian Muslims were dependent on international support.
The Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs were so to a slightly lesser degree due to
their support bases in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia respectively. In
a situation, such as in Angola, where the lion’s share of funds still went to meeting the
most fundamental needs in the population, rather than to special perks for a select
group, incentives were simply not as tempting as in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
States attempt to safeguard their impartiality by embedding their contribution
in a multilateral effort. Tony Smith points out that “[w]hile leadership may require
unilateral action on occasion, multilateral alliances and institutions are the most
effective way to address ethnic, nationalist, and religious hatreds.”938 As will become
clear below, this is particularly true the deeper external actors intervene in internal
security affairs of the parties and thus curtail their sovereignty. Aside from gains in
terms of legitimacy and ethics, the benefits of distributing responsibility and costs in a
multilateral operation, be it under UN auspices or ad hoc, are commonly
acknowledged. Nonetheless, the need for visible strategic leadership among a
multitude of actors and organisations has also become very apparent. It is ironic that
in a time in which the demands and costs of peace support operations, in particular in
the post-settlement stage, are constantly rising and should therefore be cushioned in
comprehensive international participation, international involvement becomes more
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contingent upon the leadership of one or a few countries. And yet, both cases
underline that while strategic leadership is a necessary it is not a sufficient condition
for success. Among other things, co-ordination in planning and implementation are
essential.
International security assistance delivered in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a case in
point in the discussion of multilateralism: it was a vast undertaking and involved a
multitude of organisations, but the coherence necessary to make everyone work
together effectively derived mainly from the pressure exercised by the United States.
In contrast, despite the obvious interests of the United States in the success of the
Lusaka process, the approach was not co-ordinated and lacked backing. Stedman
underlines the role of a body in which policy can be co-ordinated and that can assume
a leading role in the peace process.939 Although the peace process in Angola finally
collapsed, the Troika, consisting of representatives of the United States, Russia, and
Portugal, was instrumental in putting pressure on the process when it stalled – with
steadily decreasing effect. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Peace Implementation Council
emerged as a strong body that enabled the international community to speak with one
voice and develop a joint understanding of critical issues and priorities for
implementation. Its major drawback was of course the lack of enforcement capability
which rendered it continuously dependent on – again – the strategic leadership of the
United States in implementation.
The distinction between Friends of the Peace Process (FPPs) and the Coalition
of the Willing reflects the relevance of multilateralism. Whereas assistance from FPPs
takes the shape of bilateral support efforts, the states that make up a Coalition of the
Willing attempt to reap the benefits of multilateralism by involving a larger group of
states. In addition to special interests, the FPPs may be marginalised in the
international community to a degree that actually necessitates a ‘go-it-alone,’ such as
Iran felt compelled to undertake in the Bosnian peace process. Despite the benefits of
fellowship, one should keep in mind that the more actors an operation is composed of,
the greater the challenges of co-ordination are.
The role of NGOs in either case should not be underestimated. There is
certainly a significant difference between more established NGOs and those that have
mushroomed in post-settlement areas, where there is substantial funding as in Bosnia-
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Herzegovina and to a lesser extent in Angola. In the field of international security
assistance, the NGOs’ role in human rights monitoring has been the most important,
and in many cases they have filled a vacuum created by the lack of monitoring
mechanisms in a peace agreement.
A final word on relevant actors must be dedicated to the local counterparts. In
both cases, the international community was faced with the challenge of building
common security perceptions among former opponents. The Dayton Agreement
acknowledged the discrepancies by establishing two entities. However, rather than
bridging the gap between contrasting security perceptions, the creation of two entities
and the quota arrangements that pervaded almost all aspects of the peace process,
served to consolidate the division into three ethnic groups. In Angola, the merger of
UNITA and the MPLA in the contexts of the FAA, the ANP, and the GURN was
intended to meet both parties security concerns by invalidating the division.
Unfortunately, here too practice proved different. When integration and
demobilisation strategies were adjusted, they heightened rather than alleviated
security concerns, particularly on the part of UNITA. Obviously, this fundamental
short-coming of the international approach to the two peace processes and the parties
involved in them, created an extremely difficult starting-point for international
security assistance.
3 Peace Implementation
To recall, the goal of international security assistance is to contribute to a heightened
sense of security and to facilitate the long-term transition from war to peace. It is
delivered in two predominant areas that coincide with the distinction into military and
civilian security. In the following, international security assistance towards building
military security will be discussed first, then the establishment of civilian security and
the maintenance of law and order is addressed.
In both the fields of military and civilian security, a security sector reform is a
critical element towards consolidating the peace process. Broadly defined, the security
sector comprises the actors and structures that control the coercive power of the state.
In particular, it includes the armed forces and police forces, as well as courts and
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prisons. In the wake of a conflict, where these actors and structures are ill-defined or
have extended the scope of their activity into other areas and the government or
central authority is struggling to establish or maintain its legitimacy, a reform is
essential to define spheres of responsibility and affirm civilian control over the
security forces and structures.940
There are two underlying assumptions for international engagement: that
structural changes need to take place in order to consolidate peace in the long run and
that the international community can act as a catalyst in order to facilitate the
implementation of change.941 And yet, it is important to keep in mind throughout that
all activities are essentially political when they are being put into practice.
3.1 Building Military Security
Two major categories of tasks are relevant with respect to enhancing military security
in the former conflict area: (1) demilitarisation, arms control and regional stability and
(2) military reform. Although the underlying aim in both categories is moving the
military option further out of the parties’ reach by building confidence and increasing
transparency, the activities differ widely in terms of their time perspective.
3.1.1 Demilitarisation
In the present study, demilitarisation is used as a superordinate concept that consists
of the range of tasks discussed below. There are two predominant aspects of
demilitarisation: First, there are the more or less specific tasks involved in
demilitarisation, such as supervising a cease-fire or preventing outbreaks of violence,
monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces, demobilisation and reintegration, and
disarmament and arms control. Second, demilitarisation refers to reversing the process
of psychological militarisation that has taken place during the war or conflict. It
entails moving away from a culture in which the threshold for violence is low and
more concretely removing the economic and power incentives for continued war or
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conflict. The role of direct international security assistance to the psychological
process is limited, but the international community can nonetheless support the
transition through other development efforts, such as reconstruction of houses and
infrastructure. The psychological process will also be promoted through the
confidence-building inherent in demilitarisation. In both cases this transition was
crucial for the population and the leaders in whom the war experience had instilled
deep distrust.
Declaring a cease-fire is usually a formal prerequisite for signing a peace
agreement. As mentioned above, at the very least there must be an absence of open
fighting to even begin to speak of moving towards a state of peace. For the
population, it is the first tangible indication of peace. Compared with Angola, the
cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina was in place for much longer before the agreement
was signed. In neither case had cease-fires been a durable phenomenon. The peace
agreements were necessary to confirm the ‘good faith’ of the parties, but the parties’
performance throughout the implementation phase remained the decisive element.
In practice, a cease-fire declaration is not clear-cut. On the surface the cease-
fire can be uni-, bi- or multilateral, all depending on who agreed to the cease-fire, but
in practice most peace processes involve a number of smaller groupings and spoilers
that do not consider themselves subject to the cease-fire agreement. It is also
unrealistic to attempt to include all factions, but it is important to identify the most
pivotal ones and consider what effect their being left out of an official agreement may
have on their support for the peace process. And yet, it is far from certain that all
parties and factions wish to be included, as some may be unwilling to waive their
right to use force where necessary to protect their security interests. Logically, the
fewer factions the actual cease-fire encompasses, the less effective it will be.
Moreover, the less effective the cease-fire or the more frequent the outbreaks of
violence, the less secure the population feels and the slower the psychological
transition from war to peace progresses. The international presence will have to take
the degree of inclusiveness into account and adopt strategies that will limit the
damage done by “outside” spoilers or excluded factions and/or integrate them into the
peace process in other ways.
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In a comparison of the conflicts in Angola and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the limits
of the term post-conflict become clear. In fact, the Bosnian case is probably an
exceptional one, in that violence largely ceased in the wake of the Dayton Agreement.
To a significant degree, this was the initial work of IFOR, the force’s credibility and
actual capacity. Although the all-out civil war was suspended after the Lusaka
Protocol was signed, the situation in Angola was still characterised by frequent
outbreaks of violence. International security assistance was comparatively more
successful in Bosnia-Herzegovina than in Angola, if only, as some argue, with respect
to the fact that a relapse into war was avoided.942 This achievement should not be
underestimated as it provides the necessary breathing space for the parties to make the
arduous and excruciatingly slow progress towards consolidating peace. Add to that
growing freedom of movement, and the population had a chance to settle into a
peaceful existence and begin to build a post-war life. This was an important factor for
why Bosnia-Herzegovina did not slide back into war during the period studied, but it
must also be qualified by the lack of progress on the return of refugees which made
peace a hollow promise for a large share of the Bosnian population. 943
International security assistance can contribute to widening the sphere of the
cease-fire’s application by acting as an impartial monitor that evenly registers and
reports cease-fire violations. However, there is also the danger of generating
excessive expectations with respect to the effectiveness of the monitoring force. In
most cases, the force will either be consensual or not sufficiently large to act
completely independently. Even IFOR at full strength could not guarantee absolute
security. As a result, their activities could be curbed by the parties in order to
manipulate the degree to which the force could actually impact the security situation.
The initial period was critical for success: the overall assertiveness of IFOR rendered
later use of force unnecessary. In contrast, the peacekeepers in Angola got off on the
wrong foot, when they made deployment conditional on the prior cessation of
hostilities. In that way, they missed the window of opportunity and tarnished their
image for the duration of the operation.
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A cease-fire is also more difficult to monitor, the more intricate the territorial
distribution of contested territories. Clearly, the IEBL was far easier to patrol than
monitoring the expanse of Angolan territory. As absolute control by the international
community is impossible and maybe not even desirable, third-party actors must act
decisively and consistently, where violations are observed and must do so impartially,
creating a presence where there is no actual physical presence and creating
expectations of a response. Actions must become calculable to the degree that spoilers
will not wish to challenge the international presence. Cease-fires in civil wars are
often accompanied by an amnesty for members of the insurgent movements. This is
an especially important confidence-building measure in peace processes where the
international presence is insufficient to deter a resumption of violence.944 No such
arrangements were suggested in the Angolan case.
With respect to the transfer of territory and the withdrawal of foreign forces, it
is important to keep in mind that these are often gradual processes in which authority
is handed over bit by bit and that continue long after the immediate post-settlement
phase. Although partition was politically excluded as an option in both Angola and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is important to recognise that ethnic divisions and an inability
to fulfil its responsibility on the part of the central government is a dangerous mix.
Enriquez argues that “[s]tates with diverse national groups or extreme regional
divisions will not necessarily split, but the trend is in this direction, particularly for
those that cannot deliver economic and personal security.”945 Similar to the control of
security forces, control over territory is a powerful tool and therefore an extremely
sensitive issue. Particularly in peace processes that entail a significant amount of
negotiation in the implementation process, parties will be unwilling to relinquish their
hold over disputed territory and give up a potential ace in future talks. Although
territorial questions were largely settled in both the Dayton Agreement and the Lusaka
Protocol, territory remained a pressing issue. In Angola, the dispute was of course
explicit and linked to political control. With the exception of Brcko, the struggle over
territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina continued implicitly in the arduous process of
repatriation and minority return. In the same way, Brcko functioned as a major
bargaining tool for the international community vis-à-vis the parties in Bosnia-
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Herzegovina. International security assistance to the transfer of territory has to make
an effort to thoroughly grasp the role of territory and recognise its implications for the
parties’ security. In most cases, territory is also a centre of gravity for the parties and
should be used as such to a greater extent to apply pressure in cases of non-
compliance.
Demobilisation and reintegration are possibly the greatest challenge in
demilitarisation and the two cannot be reviewed in isolation from each other.
Demobilisation involves a clear risk to the warring parties’ that are asked to dismantle
their military organisation in times of insecurity. In that sense, “[d]emobilization after
armed conflict is usually as much a political as a technical exercise.”946 Different
measures and assistance from the international community can mitigate the fears of
the parties. Nevertheless, as Walters points out “demobilization can be postponed or it
can be implemented incrementally and reciprocally, but it cannot be avoided.”947 In
Bosnia-Herzegovina cuts were achieved evenly and early on, but a longer-term
reduction process would continue for years to come. In Angola, demobilisation
became increasingly uneven, following the change of strategy that forced UNITA to
undertake one-sided cuts. In both cases, the willingness to demobilise both reflects
and is a product of the security environment and the level of trust between the parties.
Once quartered, the task is to successfully transfer former combatants from
their war existence into civilian life. Despite the difficulties, reintegration is crucial
and the destabilising effect of demobilisation without reintegration increases over
time, as patience runs out and disillusionment with a better peaceful future sets in.
Reintegration needs to take place in at least two areas, in the economy and in society.
In countries, such as Angola, where war had affected more than one generation of
Angolans and the population suffered great poverty, it was understandably difficult to
reintegrate the large number of demobilised soldiers into society. The fabric of society
had suffered greatly under the influence of the war and was unlikely to stand much
social or economic strain. The Bosnian economy was no stronger and the society’s
openness was to a large extent conditioned by ethnic affiliation of the returnees or
former combatants, reflected in the small number of minority returns.
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Essentially, all peace processes face similar challenges of reintegration. Since
reintegration is such a comprehensive task and is dependent upon progress in other
areas such as economic reconstruction and political and social reconciliation, it is
difficult to pinpoint the role of international security assistance.948 Still, it is worth
pointing out that demobilisation and reintegration are usually more easily achieved
when included in a peace agreement. In those cases, the challenge of defining the
force strength necessary to meet each party’s security needs, has been tackled before
the implementation process begins, removing a potentially disruptive issue from
further negotiations. The more active the international community is in supporting
reintegration efforts addressing the needs of former combatants, the lesser the chances
for extremist factions to re-attract them into paramilitary or other spoiler groups. The
recommended follow-up does not necessarily lie within the realm of international
security assistance, but other international efforts need to take over seamlessly. Once
again, Angola demonstrates how easily soldiers were re-recruited by UNITA, shortly
after registering as demobilised, when no immediate way forward into a peaceful
existence emerged for the former combatants. Similarly, the Bosnian case indicates
that reintegration can be temporary and conditional in anticipation of future
developments, with frustration straining the fragile balance below the surface.
Both Angola and Bosnia-Herzegovina were plagued by blurred distinctions
between military and civilian security forces and the existence of a wide range of
official and unofficial para-military groups. Diverting military security forces into
police or unofficial forces’ ranks was common in both cases as a means to avoid full
demobilisation. Although the situation differed slightly in the two countries with
respect to the degree that the forces were official and uniformed organisations, they
remained on the payroll and loyal to their political leaders in both cases.
In some conflicts it may be hard to identify the group that should be targeted
for demobilisation and reintegration, encompassing outright combatants, members of
paramilitary forces, former detainees and prisoners, returning refugees and displaced
persons, in short, many of which are easily lured back into renewed fighting. 949 For
the more or less “civilian” population that is not to be demobilised, the demobilisation
and reintegration of the “forces of war” symbolise the end of open hostilities, the
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referral to non-violent conflict management mechanisms and the transformation of the
war machine or armed opposition force into a reduced peace time organisation. In
Angola, it also entailed rampant criminal gangs that in turn underscored the incapacity
of the police.
The rationale for disarmament is the exchange of arms for political benefits.
The speed of disarmament both in absolute terms and relative to the other tasks in
implementation has been much discussed, particularly with respect to the instability
that can easily arise with rapid disarmament. On the one hand, there is obviously a
need to reduce the number of arms available as soon as possible following the
agreement. On the other hand, removing the population’s and the armed factions’
security fallback before government institutions are capable of protecting them,
introduces insecurity and instability and increases the chances of outbreaks of
violence occurring.950 Thus, premature disarmament can be dangerous, when the
parties cannot retain fail-safe or residual forces during the transitional period as an
insurance policy should the peace process fail.
A similar point has been raised by Fred Tanner who argues that instead of
mandating immediate demilitarisation and demobilisation, the peace arrangements
should strive towards a controlled and transparent military adjustment process that
allows the various parties to retain fail-safe or residual forces during the transition
period.951 The peace accords should preferably include a number of CBMs and
reassurance measures short of disarmament, as integral parts of the peace settlement,
and external parties should provide security guarantees and encourage the opponents
about their future.
Although helpful in understanding the challenges of disarmament, the debate
skirts another issue. The level of arms will to a certain extent be irrelevant, as long as
there is a genuine interest in peace and as long as the parties feel secure and confident
in the process, so that they will not feel the need to fight. Moreover, it is impossible to
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disarm completely and in one fell swoop, and to control the flow of arms in small
spoiler groups. Similarly, it has generally been accepted that arms are the symptoms,
not causes of conflict. Arms, however, are the instruments of waging wars and they
can fuel conflicts once they are made available. Instead of solely relying on
disarmament by external actors, local mechanisms must be developed to deal with the
presence of weapons in society, both in spoiler and in criminal circles, such as
establishing an effective local police force and developing a local consensus to
disarm. Spear also points to the socio-cultural role of guns in different societies,
which calls for sensitivity, and she indicates that complete disarmament cannot be an
absolute requirement.952 A tradition for carrying arms in the Balkans is a case in point.
In both cases the economic value of arms was an important factor and
reflected the extent of achievements in confidence-building. Whereas the peace
process in Angola never progressed to the point where the benefits of peace
outweighed the value of the weapon in the perception of the former combatants, the
Bosnian population was to some extent willing to relinquish their arms and the short-
term cash benefit for stability and security in the long-term. Still, even in Bosnia-
Herzegovina small arms remained widespread, particularly in the growing criminal
sector.
The above reservation does not disqualify all efforts to disarm or the utility of
disarmament as an integral part of demilitarisation. Moreover, when one party retains
arms, as an insurance policy, it can trigger a security dilemma that almost inevitably
leads to renewed hostilities. When disarmament can be carried out successfully, it can
indirectly enhance the local law enforcement capacity, and reduce the business aspect
of arms and the financial gain from possessing and dealing in arms, which — apart
from contributing to the individual’s lack of security in general — often undermines
buy back programmes and weapons amnesties. Disarmament is simultaneously a
product of and a catalyst for confidence-building. As with other security assistance
programmes, disarmament must be a self-sustainable process, driven by local forces,
supported by a local consensus. External actors can support this process through
various activities that increase transparency, as well as provide practical assistance.953
For example by disarming former warring factions, external actors remove significant
pressure from the parties themselves. They, in turn, must justify any deconstruction of
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their own security network, such as surrendering arms, to their constituencies and to
the rejectionists in their ranks. Another area for third-party actors is the use of
intelligence agencies to monitor local disarmament efforts.954 But again, the long-term
control of arms, especially small arms, must come as a result of local efforts.
Arms control and regional stability differ from disarmament in that the latter
usually has a shorter time perspective and involves a narrower set of actors than the
former. It should also be distinguished from the concept of military reform which
aims at restructuring the personnel aspect of the armed forces, unlike arms control
which concentrates on military equipment. Although arms control is seldom a part of
the peace agreement that is to be implemented, it is always a part of the context of
implementation. Both cases, but particularly the Lusaka process, have demonstrated
that disarmament is futile unless parallel regional arrangements to control the arms
flow are established.955 Reaching agreement on arms control measures and regional
security arrangements is critical for the long-term consolidation of a peace process, in
that it promotes confidence between the parties and confidence in the peace process.
In addition, arms control talks draw in neighbouring states that are not necessarily
signatories to the peace agreement between the parties to the conflict, creating a
regional setting that is characterised by stability and transparency. Moreover, should
tensions rise within the wider area of conflict, the temptation to return to open conflict
will be reduced at lower and equal arms levels that render no party obviously
superior. Similarly, even arms constraints are easier to bear when all parties are
subjected to them equally.
Third-party actors can facilitate the arms control process by offering mediation
in a negotiation process, assist with technical assistance for the creation of security
control regimes, offer security guarantees for a certain regional order, and promote
military co-operation between former adversaries. In this study, the concept of
international security assistance was distinguished from traditional notions of security
assistance, such as provided to insurgent guerrilla movements, but the traditional
notion is not obsolete. On the contrary, Bosnia-Herzegovina and much more so
Angola have received significant amounts of traditional military support, in the shape
of cash, arms, and military training. The failure to control the regional context also
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allowed the economic aspects of the arms flow to flourish. 956 Thus, international
security assistance can be counterproductive, when it takes the form of supplying
weapons to one or more parties to the conflict. While this may also serve to build a
framework for an arms control regime by creating a balance of power between the
parties and by linking the parties’ military forces to external parties and agreements,
the damaging effect of a continued inflow of arms clearly outweighs the potential
benefits.957
It is also a risky strategy in that it will be difficult for the international
community to control the process. Instead, it is likely to and did develop its own
dynamic in the Angolan case, with powerful spoilers emerging in the arms trade. The
inability of the international presence to enforce the embargoes effectively and
undercut the arms deliveries to the parties rendered peace unsustainable in the end.
Although no agreement was reached on the sub-regional arms control regime in the
Balkans, Bosnia-Herzegovina attained a level of transparency in the military realm
that somewhat mitigated the potential threat that arose with another party’s military
capability. In contrast, a regional solution was not systematically pursued in Angola.
The MPLA and UNITA were engaged in a continuous arms race in which all
international security assistance was ineffective in countering the threat perception, as
it did not have the capacity and credibility to measure up to the level of distrust
between the two parties. Therefore, it could not provide the necessary security
guarantees to halt the arms race which essentially spiralled out of control and
contributed to the resumption of hostilities by late 1998.
Bosnia-Herzegovina exemplifies the scope of international security assistance
to the establishment and fulfilment of an arms control agreement very well. The
international community was instrumental in bringing about agreements and
functioned as the guarantor for the other parties’ compliance. The latter form of
international security assistance required a substantial military contribution to provide
intelligence support, to supervise and exercise pressure, and to actually destroy
equipment. Aside from a significant increase in confidence between the parties, the
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process in Bosnia-Herzegovina actually signified substantial respect for and trust in
the powers of the international community and their willingness to use them. It is
impossible to assess how susceptible the country would have been, had it been equally
rich in resources as Angola.
Despite the remaining instability in the region, the value of the negotiation
process or the dialogue in itself and its contribution to transparency and confidence
should not be underestimated in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And yet, both cases underline
the need for more progress in resolving the core political conflict before a regional
security order can be established.
Working towards greater freedom of movement is another crucial aspect of
demilitarisation. In contrast to tasks such as transfer of territory or the withdrawal of
foreign forces for which specific time tables may be set, freedom of movement has no
set deadline. Given that the promotion of freedom of movement covers an indefinite
time span, it appears advisable to transfer the responsibility into local hands. Yet, the
potential for the parties themselves to abuse their control became abundantly clear in
both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Angola. Manipulation took place at very local levels at
individual check points in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although violence may not have been
used as strategically in Angola as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was more widespread and
random violence and put a severe damper on freedom of movement. In both cases,
changes in and manipulation of freedom of movement affected economic activity; not
to mention the repatriation of refugees. International security assistance to supervise
that freedom of movement is observed proved largely effective in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, where illegal checkpoints were relentlessly removed, but not so in
Angola, where the landmine plague added to the problem of outright hostilities. The
discussion of freedom of movement also indicates the limitations of international
security assistance. Despite the relatively effective international supervision in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, instances of harassment where they did occur had a
disproportionately large impact on the population’s sense of security.
The need to focus on the entire range of tasks to enhance demilitarisation early
on in the peace process is pressing. In addition to the military necessity of supervising
the flow of arms and personnel, it has a symbolic value in that it demonstrates to the
population that a transition to a more peaceful society is taking place and thus
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increases their confidence in the peace process. The need to begin this process early
does not necessarily mean that it will be completed early on. Particularly the
supervision of military activity and reintegration will continue far into the peace
process, albeit at a far lower and, ideally, at a steadily decreasing level of international
activity. The international presence is valuable when it can represent an impartial
judge on progress and compliance. Particularly in the immediate aftermath of the war,
it serves to overcome the barriers created by a complete absence of trust between the
parties and to highlight progress where changes are marginal and steps hardly visible.
3.1.2 Military Reform
In contrast to some tasks within demilitarisation, military reform is a long-term
process. It is dependent on the provisions of a peace agreement as well as on the
military power structures at the time the agreement was reached. Given that the peace
agreement allows for a reconstituted armed force, the military reform process can be
sub-divided into four constituting processes: reorganisation, vetting, re-education, and
submission to civilian control. All four processes are equally important and mutually
dependent on one another. Still, one or more of the processes may be paid especial
attention; all contingent upon the nature of the conflict and the parties’ military
apparati.
(1) The reorganisation process aims at transforming armed forces from a war-
to a peacetime organisation. This involves the reduction of forces, as well as
restructuring. This is especially relevant in societies that have suffered an internal
war, where the opposing forces are to be integrated into one joint structure, such as in
Angola and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Still, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a mixed bag in
that there was both the formation of a joint Federation force and the reform of the
Bosnian Serb force. In general, the reduction of forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
progressing, but the military forces and budget was still inflated, tying up funds that
could otherwise be used in reconstruction. Characteristically, the reorganisation
process also attempted to distribute commanding staff positions among members of
the former contestants. In Angola, that integration tended to be temporary with
generals pulling out of the joint force, whenever the conflict revived. As a result, no
real merger of forces took place. Similarly, despite increased understanding among
officers within the Bosnian Federation, co-operation was tenuous at best and, as of
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late 1998, a working uniform staff and a force that could conduct joint operations had
not been created.
In the context of reorganisation, international security assistance can take the
shape of good offices to support reaching agreements on force levels and composition
and of direct planning assistance. Furthermore, in both Angola and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the international community served as an impartial observer that
verified compliance with restructuring plans.
(2) The so-called vetting process is a long-term selection process which in
some ways can be regarded as a continuation of the demobilisation process. In the
vetting process, either the force itself or international actors providing security
assistance systematically review the quality of the armed forces’ staff. The criteria for
the “new and improved” force should also be reflected in criteria for the selection or
recruitment of new staff members. The predominant role for the international
community in support of the vetting process consists in advice on the criteria of
qualification and, in extreme cases such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, also in the actual
assessment of individual candidates.
(3) The re-education process is directed towards promoting a mindset of co-
operation and particularly of multi-ethnic consciousness. Again, this is particularly
true of re-education in the wake of an internal conflict, but overcoming the war
mentality and re-defining the ‘enemy’ is critical to developing an armed force that
serves peace rather than individual power holders’ propaganda and is relevant in the
aftermath of any conflict. The re-education process consists of developing new
doctrines and staging courses for officers, on human rights or quite simply on military
strategy. Aside from the content of the re-education efforts, the act of undergoing the
process in itself, promoted understanding and co-operation among military officers in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and furthered multi-ethnic coexistence. In Angola, the MPLA
was extremely concerned about infringements of its sovereignty which presented a
difficult starting-point for the international effort. Still, there was a clear opportunity
to take a moral stand and establish standards of legitimacy for Angolan security
forces, that the third-party actors could have pursued more forcefully.
(4) Placing the armed forces under civilian control is crucial to building lasting
peace. Luckham argues that “there can be no transition to, still less consolidation of,
democracy [...] unless military and security establishments are brought under some
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kind of democratic control.”958 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, placing the military force
under civilian control was made an obligation under the Dayton Agreement, which
resulted in the establishment of the Standing Committee on Military Matters
(SCMM), the co-ordinating mechanism of the presidency and the joint forum for the
two Bosnian armed forces. Although creating the necessary institutional structures
was a first and essential step, the bodies’ effectiveness remained contingent upon both
how ‘orderly’ conditions were on the ground, as well as on the political climate in the
government institutions, to whom the forces were to be loyal. Similarly, the SCMM in
Bosnia-Herzegovina was too dependent on practical or ‘operative’ conditions to be
overly effective. Still, civilian control contributed to increased transparency,
confidence-building, and thus co-operation across Entity borders. As well as being a
matter of necessity, the processes of political integration in the GURN and military
integration in the FAA were deliberately linked in Angola. Similarly, both parties tied
concessions in one area to progress in the other. Although the need for a legitimate
and ‘multi-ethnic’ government was undeniable in the process of establishing effective
civilian control over security forces, the insistence on linkage also acted as a ball and
chain for the peace process as a whole.
In a peaceful society, discord is managed through non-violent mechanisms. In
a war-torn society, the population may be hesitant to submit to these mechanisms
from the outset. Moreover, the referral of disputes to non-violent conflict management
mechanisms will only succeed, when the military is independent of the different sides
to the dispute and not susceptible to escalating the quarrel into open fighting on behalf
of one of the parties. If it is not, the result is a split into opposing factions, reversing
the integration process and leading to the return to full-blown civil war.
Here, the role of international security assistance is limited as the effective
placement of the armed forces under civilian control is so dependent on the political
context. The international community can assist in designing and establishing
structures that ensure civilian control, such as training civilians in overseeing the
military sector, establishing parliamentary control of the military budgets etc., but the
success of these measures, i.e. effective civilian control, can only truly be assessed on
the basis of performance over time. There is a window of opportunity in the
immediate aftermath of the agreement to excise lasting change in the military forces
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of the opposing parties, when third-party actors have the potential to oversee and
inspire reform. Multilateralism in this context strengthens the belief in the impartiality
of the international presence and in the universal validity of the values it promotes. In
that way, it is critical as security and the shape and control over security functions are
seen as vital concerns by the parties.
3.2 Establishing Civilian Security
A neglected but crucial part of peace processes around the world is a reform of the
civilian security sector, frequently labelled “rule of law”-programmes. There has often
been a tendency to treat the civilian security sector reform as a largely technical task
and to sideline its political implications. However, reforming the rule of law is an
inherently political process that is crucially dependent on the political context, and a
firm commitment on the part of the political authorities if it is to succeed. The case
studies in this thesis demonstrated that the tasks and the overall political setting have
profound implications for the civilian security sector. Both were characterised by
public endorsement, but little action. Especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina it proved
difficult to break the ethnic mould that all structures at the political level reinforced,
despite the overall goal of multi-ethnic coexistence. In Angola, control was more one-
sided, in that there was one official civilian security sector, in addition to the informal
one in UNITA-held territories, whose existence was essentially not acknowledged nor
explicitly targeted for reform.
Civilian security sector reform has three component processes: a structural
reform and a behavioural reform of the police and security forces, and a reform of the
judicial and penal system.  959 The police perhaps has the most immediate impact on
the public perception of law and order, but judicial and penal reform are equally
important for the sustainability of the system.
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(1) The structural reform process is similar to the reorganisation process in the
area of military security, in the sense that the police and internal security apparatus
are to be reduced to a sustainable and appropriate level. In other peace processes, such
as Haiti and Gaza and the West Bank, a brand new police and security apparatus was
to be created. In all cases, the security sector should ideally be placed under civilian
and democratic control, a task which is extremely difficult since control of the police
and the internal security apparatus is one of the most important means of coercive
power of the state. The experience from Angola and Bosnia-Herzegovina underlines
another aspect of structural reform that is relevant in a variety of cases, namely the
need for a single uniform police force rather than a range of paramilitary
organisations with varying allegiances. Popular confidence in the security apparatus
presupposes a certain amount of predictability in the actions of the security forces and
thus requires their allegiance to the general public rather than any one party. In this
connection, one should keep in mind the need for continuous dialogue, combined with
diplomatic pressure on the political authorities, to facilitate the reform process
through democratisation. Several cases demonstrate the futility of rule of law and
human rights programmes as long as the structural issues of division of power
between the legal, executive and legislative branches and civilian democratic control
of the state’s coercive powers are left in abeyance.
There is a direct link between the military and the civilian security sector,
particularly regarding the demobilisation and reintegration processes, as many former
combatants and army officers join the police forces, as was the case in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and in Angola and in most other peace processes. Moreover, the
Angolan National Police acted and was equipped along the lines of a military force,
further weakening the distinction between civilian and military security forces in
Angola. The crossover features of the Angolan police were insufficiently taken into
account by the international community, when designing the reform programme in the
civilian security sector. Instead, it was simply accepted that the ANP was a police
force, although – in practice – it was so in name only. The presence of large numbers
of former combatants, many of whom may have been involved in war crimes or
human rights abuses during the civil war, seriously undermined the population’s
perception of the police force as a “public service institution” in both Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Angola. Instead, the police was still viewed as a representative of
the government in Angola and the protector of a given ethnic group in Bosnia-
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Herzegovina. The link between military and civilian security sector reform was also
apparent in the increasingly close co-operation between SFOR and the IPTF in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where SFOR provided IPTF with technical assistance on check-
points, and furnished IPTF with information, surveillance, support, and protection. In
addition to conducting joint inspection of police stations to confiscate illegal arms,
IPTF and SFOR also co-operated in dismantling Special Police Forces in Republika
Srpska.
Again, drawing comparisons to the military reform process the police force
must also undergo a profound vetting process in which unqualified or undesirable
officers are removed from the force. Moreover, the experience in both Palestine and
Haiti has shown the difficulty of building a new police force from the ground up,
where the absence of a layer of experienced officers, that might otherwise have
provided role models, had negative effects on newly-educated young officers that
lacked on-the-job guidance. Although the ANP had existed for a considerable length
of time, it had not acted as a civilian police force and lacked the same kind of
experience. When too many former military personnel are incorporated into the police
force, there is also a danger of a “militarisation” of the police in outlook, tactics,
training, equipment, and self-image. Although the international community can take
on an extensive role in the selection of officers, as in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
the internalisation of new doctrines and their instinctive translation into active police
culture and work takes time and may well require an entire generation of “naturally
grown” officers which, in turn, depends on future recruitment practices. In this
context, the role of local and international NGOs in monitoring the performance of the
new security sector, especially in the field of human rights becomes increasingly
important.
(2) In line with the re-education of the armed forces, behavioural reform in the
civilian security sector is directed towards developing respect for human rights within
the police force which in turn is crucial for inspiring the population’s confidence in
their personal security and thereby for consolidating peace. Only when the people
have once again learned to surrender the protection of their personal security into
government hands, such as trusting the local police force, will a peace process take
root.
The difference between these component processes becomes clear when one
reviews the performance of ethnically mixed patrols in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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Although the structural reform, i.e. placing policemen of various ethnic backgrounds
in the same police car, was a manageable challenge, getting the policemen to interfere
against members of their own ethnic group, i.e. the behavioural reform, proved far
more difficult. A complicating factor were the informal ethnic command structures
that provided a parallel disciplinary system that was at odds with the democratic
standards of policing promoted by the international community.
The range of security assistance to the reconstruction or the establishment of a
police force is wide. The most frequent assistance on the ground is the provision of
civilian police monitors that, in different peace operations, have mandates that allow
for varying degrees of involvement. The civilian police monitors in Bosnia-
Herzegovina joined local police patrols, gave advice, assisted in the development of
doctrines and police academy curricula, and supervised the execution of police duties
to the extent that arrests, police reports and similar processes were closely surveyed.
In contrast, the role of police advisors in Angola was largely limited to a monitoring
role. Even after the transition to MONUA, training appeared somewhat futile, while
the bulk of the police force was off conducting military campaigns.
When international monitors are unarmed, which is usually the case, a curious
dynamic develops in their relationship with the local counterparts. The manner in
which the international monitors execute their tasks, leaves the sovereignty of the
local police officers in tact on the surface and thus makes it easier for them to accept
both advice and practical security assistance from the international community.
However, as the Angolan experience showed, there was another pitfall that had to be
avoided: By not condemning the ANP’s activities to a greater extent, the external
actors compromised their own moral message and damaged their credibility.
In addition to the external assistance that is directed towards improving the
performance of the local police force through training, the international community
has provided invaluable support to the establishment process by supplying uniforms,
vehicles, means of communication, various police equipment and has sponsored
educational facilities. On the one hand, this contributes to the air of professionalism
that the local police depends on to establish their authority. On the other hand,
uniforms, vehicles, police equipment, forensic science laboratories, etc. enhance the
ability of the police forces to undertake their tasks in accordance with international
recognised human rights norms, as it improves the police’s ability to produce
technical evidence and lessens their dependence on producing a confession from
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suspects. The international community also supported the reform process by
developing a transitional international payment mechanism for police salaries, such as
for the Palestinian Police Force (PPF), in order to avoid a breeding ground for
corruption and to increase the accountability of donor funding. In Haiti, the
international community supported the government in drafting sustainable budgets for
the security sector.
(3) The reform of the judicial and penal system is the counterpart to the reform
of the police force and a critical component of the civilian security sector and the
maintenance of law and order. For a long time, assistance to the judicial and the penal
system were regarded as separate from the establishment of a police force, a view that
was reflected in the manner in which the international community approached civilian
security sector reform. Accordingly, the legal assistance that was provided in post-
settlement reconstruction tended to be the result of unilateral initiatives and was
seldom linked to the civilian police monitors that were dispatched under UN auspices.
This has changed, however, and the rule of law has become one of the buzz words in
peace implementation. Its application and popularity in the context of post-conflict
and other transitional societies was triggered in part by the experience of the UN
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and led to the proposal of a UN
“justice package” to accompany peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building
operations.”960 Cases such as Haiti, El Salvador, and to a lesser degree Bosnia-
Herzegovina – where work on the court system almost appears to be an afterthought
in civilian security sector reform, have contributed to the realisation that police,
judicial, and penal reform are closely interrelated. The judicial systems in both
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Angola were plagued by a myriad of problems. The situation
in Bosnia-Herzegovina had finally stabilised to the degree that more comprehensive
judicial reform programmes could be initiated, but in Angola there were too many
fundamental needs to be met and too little excess capacity to get extensive judicial
reform programmes off the ground.
International security assistance in this area often includes a supervisory and
advisory role, such as monitoring court activity, surveying prisons, following legal
procedures to ensure their correctness and fairness, and advising local members of the
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legal profession. Due to the fact that the legal teams in a mission are often sent by
professional organisations rather than by an international organisation along the lines
of the UN, it is difficult to extend their mandate beyond the said advisory role.
However, this appears to be changing as a wide range of international actors,
including UN agencies, the OSCE, the EU, the OAS, the OAU, the World Bank and
aid agencies such as USAID, CIDA and international NGOs are increasingly devoting
more attention and resources to rule of law programmes in the context of post-conflict
peace building.961 In an effort to counteract a potential lack of legitimacy in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and also to benefit from IPTF’s intimate knowledge of the civilian
security sector, the UN civilian police monitors were assigned the tasks of reviewing
court activity, by merely reinterpreting their UN-mandate. As with the unarmed
civilian police monitors, the non-threatening stance of the legal advisory teams
allowed them to exercise influence beyond their actual authority. Despite the fact that
the number of actors has risen, particularly among NGOs, sponsors of judicial reform
programmes are still few and efforts at civilian security sector reform remain short of
funds in virtually all peace support operations; where they are included.
Assistance to penal system reform is an even more sensitive issue than aid to
reform police forces, and the criticism that has been levelled against aid programmes
for improving prison conditions in Rwanda and Cambodia may have been a deterrent
for donor countries in this field. In the West Bank and Gaza only one donor country,
Norway, was willing to support reform efforts in this sector.962 Clearly, in conflict
areas where the standard of living is low, where the prisons are filled with war
criminals and collaborators, there may be little local support for aid efforts aiming at
improving conditions for inmates. From a human rights viewpoint, however, prison
reforms are vital for the simple reason that prisons usually are one of the main stages
for human rights abuses, and such abuses undermine the tedious process of building
confidence in the post-settlement society. The horrendous prison situation in Angola
is a case in point, where a mental transition towards regarding prisons as a legitimate
tool of the state – on behalf of society – will be a long time coming.
Above all, security sector reform needs to be comprehensive and co-ordinated
through a coherent strategy for structural, technical, and behavioural reforms. It must
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be closely tailored to the political negotiation process in the post-settlement period;
rule of law assistance and security sector reform programmes will be futile without a
political and legal framework, including a clear and unambiguous commitment on the
part of the political leadership to democratic and power-sharing rule. As long as each
of the competing parties had an own ethnic informal security structure, as in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Angola, they had no need to develop a nation-wide alternative. This
argument is self-defeating in a multi-ethnic society-to-be. It is a major challenge for
third-party actors to sell civilian security sector reform and to influence the parties’
perception of their costs and benefits. Therefore, programmes also have to be tailored
to the specific needs of the society in question. Extensive one-size-fits-all strategies
are bound to fail as the needs and absorptive capacity vary indefinitely among cases.
4 Co-ordinating International Security Assistance
Despite the challenges of co-ordination that increase proportionately with the growing
number and type of actors involved, it must be emphasised that division of labour and
the distribution of costs onto several shoulders is a good thing. Control over the
security sector is a pivotal part of a state’s sovereignty. As a result, external
intervention in this sensitive area greatly benefits from multilateralism and the
distribution of responsibility. Indeed, the more profound the international involvement
in the reorganisation of the security sector, the greater the need for multilateralism.
Whereas the demilitarisation component of international security assistance, ranging
from cease-fire monitoring to disarmament and demobilisation, are likely to be placed
in the hands of large organisations, such as the UN in Angola or NATO in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, military and civilian security sector reform has witnessed the advent of
a host of new actors. The most prominent among these are NGOs and bilateral
arrangements, as well as private security companies.
However, two caveats arise with the involvement of multiple actors: the
organisations or actors need to be suitable for the tasks they take on, in terms of
resources and organisational capacity, and they need to co-ordinate their activities.
The implications of inadequate co-ordination, such as the fact that some measures
may duplicate, overlap or counteract each other, are all too obvious, and yet,
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considerations of these implications are sadly absent in the planning stage of most
peace support operations. Thus, the challenge in contemporary post-settlement
missions not only lies in the sheer number of actors involved, but in the fact that roles
are not clearly defined at the outset.963 With regard to the relationship between the
military and civilian bodies, Goodman has argued that the military should not engage
in activities that might just as well be executed by other, civilian groups. The same
may be argued with respect to international security assistance.964 Similar thinking
marked external assistance to demobilisation and reintegration in Angola, where it
was argued that the transition to civilian life would be accelerated by allowing civilian
organisations to take the lead.
That is not to say that each of these actors did not contribute to the peace
process, but it is crucial that their actions be co-ordinated. Apart from the obvious
concern of optimal use of limited financial and personnel resources, co-ordination
aims at avoiding abuse by the parties to the peace process. In contrast, effective co-
ordination increases the third parties’ ability to exercise pressure on parties, for
example by requiring multi-ethnic co-operation as a precondition for aid. Co-
ordination is critical in spoiler management, where the predictability and consistency
among external actors is a major factor in rendering pressure effective. Ideally, co-
ordination reduces costs and increases effectiveness due to greater complementariness
of individual actors’ contributions and due to the increase in credibility that is a result
of the international community speaking with one voice. Especially with regard to
security guarantees, Walters argues that a “guarantee will only be as effective as the
political will of its backers.”965
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was initially little co-ordination and local parties
exploited the lack of co-ordination. In the course of implementation, however, the
international community arrived at patterns of co-ordination in which a credible threat
could be made in cases of non-compliance. To an increasing extent, third-party actors
stood as one in late 1998, with the same professed goals, the same approaches, and the
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under wraps in order to be able to acquire the funds necessary to initiate or maintain it.
964 Louis W. Goodman (1996) “Military Roles Past and Present,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Platter
(eds)(1996) Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore,
Maryland), p. 38f.
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same standards. This was particularly true of the improved co-ordination of civilian
and military tasks in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.
As any peace process’ fundamental limitation lies in the parties’ lack of
willingness to co-operate, co-ordinating international security assistance in a way that
enables the international community to exercise significant pressure on the parties,
can promote the peace process. In addition to improved co-ordination, the execution
of these threats, such as withholding funds or imposing security restrictions,
contributes to the credibility and the effectiveness of measures adopted by the
international community.
In Angola, there had to be more reliance on the parties’ responsibilities, as
external actors could not project power into the Angolan countryside in the same way
that IFOR was doing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Particularly the initial military security
gap was credibly filled by IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but not so by UNAVEM III
in Angola. Aside from its capabilities, this was due to the fact that IFOR had been
charged with executive rather than supervisory tasks, in contrast to Angola, where the
responsibility was in the hands of the government. As a result, the international
presence was more dependent on political co-operation in Angola.
The situation differed in the civilian security sector, where the population
expected the civilian police components in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Angola to
carry out executive police duties, despite the fact that this was never envisioned nor
pronounced as one of the monitors’ tasks. Nonetheless, the disappointment of popular
expectations sobered the population in both countries in their enthusiasm for the
external presence. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, this meant taking away from IFOR’s
credibility; even in late 1998 credibility remained dependent on SFOR’s
determination to force compliance. In Angola, on the other hand, the lack of effective
intervention by the civilian police monitors simply confirmed the perception of
external actors as untrustworthy.
Significant international pressure can be an excuse for parties to comply with
unpopular measures that are difficult to sell to the more extremist or rejectionist
constituencies. Although the international community can absorb some of the blame,
the parties should not be led to rely on that buffer in the long run. Third-party actors
also run into the danger of undermining local support for their own presence by
appearing too much of a bully. Their effectiveness also depends on where the most
powerful spoilers are located, more particularly whether they are the leaders or
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factions within a party. In recognition of the fact that ethnic loyalties would prevail
initially, the international community was to preside over most common institutions in
Bosnia-Herzegovina for the first years. The degree to which external pressure was
holding peace alive is difficult to determine and will probably only become clear
when the international community pulls out of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In both cases the threat of withdrawal was used by the external presence to
hasten the development towards peace. In both cases the strategy failed. Whereas the
international community recognised that the Dayton Agreement would not be fully
implemented by the end of IFOR’s mandate and eventually moved to open-ended
alternatives, the United Nations’ attempts to exercise pressure on the parties in
Angola by granting only short mandate extensions only served to further weaken the
operation’s credibility. Stedman points out that the greatest difficulty with using
withdrawal as a threat is that it tends to hurt the forces of peace and play into the
hands of the spoilers who aim at derailing the peace process.966
Co-ordination between civilian and military actors involved in peace
implementation is particularly important.967 In part due to a legacy of bad co-
operation and few common interests during the open conflict stage, the road is often
bumpy early on in the peace process, where the organisational and differences in
perspective between the two are most apparent. The potential for co-operation does
increase after a cease-fire, since the unarmed civilian organisations are not equally
dependent upon maintaining their impartiality as they were during open hostilities.
One should distinguish between a military peacekeeping force working with large
international organisations and with small NGOs. Whereas the former are more used
to the need for some command structure even though not as established as in the
military force, the latter are less susceptible to yielding to military authority. While it
is crucial to see the potential for co-operation and for non-traditional roles, there are
also limitations of civil-military co-operation (CIMIC), stemming from the NGOs’
need for close community relations, supporting constituencies and fund-raising,
different organisational cultures etc.
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967 For a more detailed account on civil-military co-ordination (CIMIC) in peace support operations,
see Brynjar Lia and Annika S. Hansen (1998) Sivilt-militært samarbeid og koordinering i
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However, as civil-military co-ordination (CIMIC) has been acknowledged as
an increasingly important dimension of peace support operations, the IFOR/SFOR
operation contributed to a greatly improved understanding among military as well as
civilian actors of the delineation of roles and responsibilities as well as differences in
culture and organisations. In Angola, the dynamic was somewhat different in that the
civilian and especially the humanitarian actors had been in theatre for a longer period
of time and had been more extensively involved prior to the signing of the Lusaka
Protocol. They were therefore even more reluctant to submit to the authority of the
military component of UNAVEM III. More generally, the operation was hamstrung
by lack of co-ordination at both planning and implementation stages and did not
improve significantly in the course of the operation. Although, the SRSG in Angola
had longer standing than the newly-invented High Representative in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the latter proved to be more powerful than the former. The fact that the
differences between the two positions were marginal on paper, but considerable in
practice points to the influence of other factors and especially the degree of
obstructionism exercised by different sets of spoilers.
In the delivery of international security assistance, the need for co-ordination
is particularly great between the military peacekeeping force and the civilian police
monitors and advisors. As the civilian police monitors are unarmed and rely on co-
operation with their local counterparts, the military force can provide invaluable
support by having access to the use of force. Where co-ordination is good and visible,
the police monitors will be challenged in their authority to a lesser degree. The
Bosnian case demonstrated that there are a number of tasks in the grey zone between
police and military activity. It has been suggested that the challenges in the grey zone
can be met by an extension of powers to either the peace-keeping force, i.e. give them
increased policing duties, or to the civilian police monitors, i.e. arm them. However,
both are problematic options, which would undermine the work of both the military
force and the civilian monitors in all their duties outside of the grey zone. Instead, the
close co-operation between IFOR/SFOR and IPTF rendered any such distortion of
their mandate unnecessary. The creation of the Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU)
under SFOR was an attempt to address tasks in the grey zone, but in practice the MSU
did not add any new tasks to SFOR’s portfolio. A similar unit in Angola would have
been unlikely to have made a difference, as the challenges that broke UNAVEM III’s
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back were much more fundamental than a lack of capacity to take on tasks, such as
crowd control.
Given the amount of assistance provided and the clout that they can bring to
bear on the parties, common co-ordination mechanisms at a strategic level are
especially important. The notion of the Contact Group in Bosnia-Herzegovina was in
part developed to serve the purpose of co-ordinating the efforts of the major actors
involved.968 Although co-ordination in this body was mainly conducted during the
negotiation phase leading up to the Dayton Agreement, the concept remained a valid
one. The international efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina benefited tremendously from the
co-ordination of policy and resulting moral authority of the Peace Implementation
Council (PIC). The Troika in Angola was less effective, in part because it was less
inclusive, but also because it clearly did not have the same commitment to the
process, as the PIC did in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
When conducted at the planning stages, co-ordination enhances the speed of
delivery, which may be essential for the parties’ ability to comply with their
obligations under the agreement and to deal with rejectionists within their ranks. More
specifically, the establishment of the rule of law including its constituent institutions
is in critical need of rapid support, in order to combat spoilers and extensive criminal
activity. The more elaborate the co-ordination network, the fewer non-public channels
are available for diverting aid into diverse projects and organisations where neither
transparency nor accountability are ensured. Thus, co-ordination contributes to
maintaining some influence over the fledging police force, the courts and prison
system, so that, for instance, requirements for the protection of human rights can be
incorporated into a system for the co-ordinated delivery of international security
assistance.
In those cases, where planning at early stages is impossible or is simply left
out, the question becomes how co-ordination can improve planning and management
of assistance during the implementation process. Rapid establishment of different
types of co-ordinating bodies locally and at a strategic level is critical, as is
partnership with local forces. However, a major obstacle often occurs as the
recipients’ capacity to receive and absorb international security assistance is weak in
the immediate post-settlement stage. Yet as the ultimate aim is to make the peace
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process autonomous, the challenge of co-ordination is to develop partnerships with
the recipient which enhance the parties’ ability to assume responsibility and fulfil
their obligations under the peace agreement. In both cases, efforts were made to
establish local bodies to take over a share of the implementation duties. In both, the
bodies largely remained financially dependent on third parties and subject to local
political control.
In some ways, the issue of co-ordination can be interpreted as the international
community’s desire to maximise control over the implementation process. Control, in
turn, can be of the outcome or the flow of international security assistance.969 The
structure of the co-ordinating bodies, the number of actors and their specific interests,
and the international society’s willingness to exert pressure to ensure compliance, are
all important factors in the final outcome. Still, the parties’ willingness or
unwillingness to continue the peace process is the ultimate determinant of progress
and is influenced by a host of factors beyond the reach of the international
community.
The commitment and willingness of the international community to make use of
those levers that are available, brings us to the financial and practical links between
the two cases. It is important to understand that the costs of a peacekeeping operation
are never entirely covered by available funding. Whereas this does not affect the
military component of an operation to any great extent once it is up and running, lack
of financial resources can lead to the cancellation of civilian security programmes.
This was felt more immediately in Angola, but also occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Donor fatigue was certainly an issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it was combated and
suppressed by the will to see the peace process through to a successful outcome,
regardless of the cost. Too much prestige hung in the balance for the external parties
involved. Clearly, this was not the case in Angola, where a failure to secure peace
would have no serious consequences for the international community, aside from
witnessing renewed suffering which one had seen before and which could be put
down to the parties’ recalcitrance.
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The two cases differ in the parties’ relation to the international community.
Bosnia-Herzegovina was more susceptible to external influence for several reasons.
First, the parties were aware of how much was at stake for the international
community and that the concomitant necessity to succeed brought a substantial level
of commitment with it. In this sense, the relation to the international community
changed somewhat in the course of implementation, as the three ethnic groups tested
the true commitment of the third-party presence in different areas. Second, the
international presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina provided a guarantee against threats to
national security of which especially the Bosnian Muslims had to be sensitive. This is
less true of the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs that cultivated their ties to the
potential ‘aggressors’ Croatia and FRY respectively. Third, the international
community actually had more attractive incentives to offer in Bosnia-Herzegovina
than they had in Angola. Aside from the more credible and more substantial promises
of aid, the long-term gains for Bosnia-Herzegovina should the country continue on a
peaceful path were deeper integration into the European community of states.
In contrast, both the Angolan government and UNITA recognised rather quickly
that although UNAVEM III represented the greatest commitment to Angola to date, it
did not have the backing to apply the necessary pressure, particularly because the
scarce resources available to the external actors were easily outweighed by the
sources of income in the hands of the parties. Therefore, it was difficult to devise
incentives that might tempt the leadership of the MPLA and that of UNITA. In
addition, the predominant threat in the security perceptions of the parties derived from
an internal rather than an external source and – again – UNAVEM III could not
provide a secure environment in Angola, as IFOR and SFOR had done in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
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International Security Assistance Bosnia-Herzegovina Angola
Precursors · Weak states, limited government legitimacy and reach: international community did not realise the degree to which it would be involved in
restructuring the state.
· Preceded by all-out war and prior UN involvement. War considered unfinished business; conditional support for peace agreement.
· Some 'lessons' appeared to be translated into practice in the new missions:
IFOR/UNMIBH:
(1) Exclusion of UN from military operation.
(2) Narrowly defined mandate for IFOR.
(3) IFOR larger and more heavily equipped.
UNAVEM III:
(1) UNAVEM III substantially larger.
(2) Role more clearly defined in Lusaka Protocol.
(3) More direct responsibility in supervising compliance.
Demilitarisation
Monitoring the cease-fire, separation of
forces, withdrawal of foreign forces,
transfer of territory
· Cease-fire almost universally upheld, in large part due to IFOR's
muscular presence. Freedom of movement is gradually enforced.
· Struggle over territorial control continued in the issue of
repatriation.
· Continued low level violence undermined popular confidence in peace
process and government's ability to provide individual security.
UNAVEM III could not make up for the security deficit and create a safe
environment.
· Security guarantee was not sufficiently credible to induce UNITA to
transfer all territory.
Demobilisation and reintegration · Initial reductions achieved quickly; long-term reductions ongoing.
· Slow economic reconstruction and continued ethnic tensions
retarded reintegration.
· Increasingly uneven, exposing UNITA to an ever greater extent.
Reintegration extremely difficult, due to severely depressed economy and
the fact that the war had raged for over a generation and placed heavy
strain on the social fabric.
· Reintegration included both demobilised soldiers and returning refugees and had to be viewed against the background of economic
reconstruction and political and social reconciliation. Reintegration was an example of a task where international security assistance could
improve the conditions for reintegration, but could not directly bring it about. Lack of reintegration harboured a danger of instability and was a
breeding ground for rejectionists.
Disarmament and regional stability · Initial military disarmament proceeded according to schedule and
was complemented by a long-term regional approach. Civilian
disarmament did not gain momentum until peace process had been
underway for over 2 years.
· Disarmament and the quest for regional stability were partially
undermined by one-sided programmes to train and equip.
· Official demilitarisation of UNITA, including demobilisation and
disarmament completed in early 1997, but when tensions rose and the
movement's security ‘fallback’ was revealed, the undiminished lack of
trust was underlined.
· Attempts to curb the arms flow at the regional level were fumbling and
wholly unsuccessful, undermining all domestic efforts to disarm.
· As much as disarmament was a practical necessity, the willingness to surrender arms indicated the sense of security and the general trust in the
peace process. The economic value of the gun was overlooked; both as tool for subsistence and with respect to its cash value. This was all the
more true for the vested interest that the international arms trade had in perpetuating conflict.
· International security assistance can promote disarmament and regional stability through good offices, sanctions, technical assistance, and
through providing security guarantees.
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Military Reform
Reorganisation/integration · Joint Federation force created, but not operative as one force.
Immediate reductions took place with demobilisation; long-term
adjustments of force strength to defence budgets remained to be
undertaken.
· Joint force included only limited UNITA representation and did not
emerge as the one military force for Angola. Therefore, no long-term
strategies for force size were developed.
Re-education · Military training promoted co-operation and understanding among
military staff.
· Government weary of infringements. Training was mainly provided
through bilateral arrangements and private contracts.
Civilian control · Appropriate structures established in the Standing Committee on
Military Matters, but political context and lack of co-operation
impeded its effectiveness.
· Political and military integration processes linked, stalling in each process
hampered the other.
· Role of international security assistance is limited, as structural changes are contingent upon parallel political processes of reconciliation and co-
operation that make ‘civilian control’ meaningful.
Civilian Security Sector Reform
Restructuring and behavioural reform of
police force
· Police was significantly reduced and reorganised. Still, ethnic
divisions persisted and too often police action was based on ethnic
affiliation.
· Formal adjustments in weaponry, but activity and equipment remained
reminiscent of a military force. Integration of former UNITA soldiers into
police force was minimal. The ANP continued to commit gross violations
of human rights.
· Whereas in Bosnia-Herzegovina each citizen’s sense of security depended on his ethnic background, the entire population’s sense of security was
undermined by the activity of the ANP in Angola.
Reform of judicial and penal system · Judicial and penal reform were afterthoughts and were only
pursued when the bulk of structural police reform had been carried
out.
· Conditions never stabilised to the degree that a comprehensive reform
could be attempted, despite persistent calls for judicial and penal reform
by the international community.
· Reforming the rule of law was an inherently political process, went to the heart of the states’ power. It was difficult to overcome ridge between
the parties and to create a uniform system that answered to the concerns of the entire population.
Co-ordination
· Difficult start, but much improved in the course of the peace
process. Not the least because of strategic leadership that enabled
the international community to speak with one voice and apply
pressure on the parties.
· Major rift between the humanitarian and the military/security actors. The
lack of co-ordination was most damaging with respect to the absence of
common goals. There was a lack of international political commitment
that might have given the peace process the necessary strategic direction.
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CONCLUSIONS – THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
Much of the debate about the nature of internal conflicts and the role of third parties
in their termination, inevitably seeks to answer questions about what makes some
peace settlements fail and others succeed. In a comparative study of five different
peace processes, Fen Osler Hampson presents three possible explanations. First, the
“ripeness” of the conflict; second, the “substantive provisions of the peace accords
[…] its design and its ability to anticipate or deter new challenges;” and finally the
role of external powers and regional actors, i.e. the external pressures and influences
that are exerted on the parties at the international level. Hampson argues that the third
aspect is the single most important factor in the equation. He writes that “[w]here
there was a unified and sustained third-party involvement in both the negotiation and
the implementation of the agreement, settlements were more durable than in those
cases where settlements were orphaned and third-party intervention was sporadic or
limited to a few poorly defined roles.”970
Hampson’s conclusions appear to coincide with those of the present study,
which has looked more closely at the delivery of international security assistance to
peace processes. Having developed the concept theoretically and built an analytical
framework that was then applied to two case studies, the time has come to draw more
general conclusions. The key issues in peace implementation that determine the
conditions for international security assistance as they have chrystallised in the case
studies and in the comparison are spoiler management, international security
guarantees, and the population’s sense of security. The third aspect differs slightly
from the first two, in that it is a product of the peace process rather than a feature of
international security assistance. Moreover, the population’s sense of security is
determined by independent indigenous processes in addition to the international
efforts. Still, the development of a popular sense of security is essential to the
consolidation of a peaceful society, and success in this respect has to be re-evaluated
at the “end” of the peace processes studied here. In the current section, conclusions
                                                
970 Fen Osler Hampson (1996) Nurturing Peace: Why Settlements Succeed or Fail (United States
Institute of Peace: Washington D.C.), p. 207. Hampson’s conclusions are confirmed by Walters’
quantitative study of various factors that contribute to the success or failure of peace agreements. See
Barbara F. Walters (1997) “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization
51(3), pp. 335-64.
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will be discussed in two stages. An initial assessment returns to the criteria of
effectiveness suggested in the analytical framework, before moving to some final
thoughts on the opportunities and limitations of international security assistance to the
implementation of peace agreements.
1 Criteria of Effectiveness
In the analytical framework, five criteria were suggested that might assist in assessing
how effective international security assistance had been in enhancing security and in
that way accelerating the transition from war to peace. Two more criteria have
emerged from the case studies. While it is important to have a general idea of what to
strive towards, there is no sense in providing a list on which items might be ticked off.
In other words, it is the road towards a peaceful state, i.e. the implementation process
itself, rather than the fulfilment of any particular end state that is important. And still,
running through the criteria is useful for adjusting expectations to the process and in
underlining which areas are the least – or even the most – susceptible to being
assessed with the help of milestones.
Thus, international security assistance was deemed to have been effective
when it had
(1) assisted in fulfilling specific provisions of the peace agreement: Naturally,
one would want the parties to fulfil their obligations under the agreement, not the least
in order to serve mutual trust and transparency, but the need for flexibility in a peace
agreement is also prevalent. At the same time, one should also guard oneself against
the opposite extreme where the parties perceive nothing in the agreement to be fixed
and rob the process of all its sorely needed predictability and stability.
(2) contributed to increasing support for the moderate pro-peace factions, i.e.
increased the legitimacy of the peace agreement: It has become abundantly clear that
so-called “spoilers” and those that benefit from continued hostilities and how they are
handled both by external and by local actors play a crucial part in the success of a
peace process. One of the most effective ways in which the international community
can undermine support for rejectionist factions is by devising a spoiler management
strategy in co-operation with the parties for example by providing assistance to the
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establishment of capable and trustworthy local security structures, and co-opting
and/or excluding spoiler elements. This is a typical milestone that will take a long
time to reach and where progress along the way is just as important as arriving at an
end state.
(3) increased security on the ground in the perception of the population: The
occurrence of clashes and the level of violence in the wake of the agreement is an
obvious indicator of progress in the transition from war to peace. Again, establishing
a sense of security and of community in the population is a fundamental precondition
for the normalisation process and the transition from war to peace and possibly the
most powerful tool to enhance the legitimacy of the peace agreement and process.
(4) provided a sufficient security environment for speedy post-settlement
reconstruction and development: Although it appears to be obvious that economic
upswings presuppose a minimum of security, security does not necessarily bring
development with it. In addition, as was pointed out in the section on demilitarisation,
sufficient security need not be a technical question of arms availability, which is
something international security assistance can address, but a much less tangible one
of the people’s willingness to use them. Thus, a secure environment can only be the
first step in the long-term consolidation of peace.
(5) executed a comprehensive reform of the security sector: With respect to the
reform of the security sector, including both the military and the police, we again
encounter two basic components: the organisational/institutional element that
resurrects a system for the monopoly on the use of force, internally and externally,
and the psychological component that points to the more illusive concept of the
population’s trust in the security forces and the protection of human rights. Again,
while reform measures may be executed or supported through international security
assistance, it is the political context of the reform that gives it meaning.
(6) given rise to security co-operation between the parties to the conflict: The
parties’ realisation that everybody is concerned about security, is the first but
considerable step towards addressing common concerns and possibly adopting joint
measures. It is unlikely for security co-operation between the parties to occur early on
in the implementation process. Instead, it presupposes a substantial amount of trust
between the parties and an acknowledgement of the peace process as irreversible.
Confidence must be fairly well advanced if true co-operation is to take place between
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the opposing parties, in particular where security continues to be the prime item on
the agenda.
(7) promoted the integration of the post-settlement state(s) into a regional
security network: Although not useful as a milestone, the final criteria provides a
valuable pointer to progress within the wider region. Participation by neighbouring
states in forming a stable and secure context, lends legitimacy to the peace process.
2 Limitations of International Security Assistance
When reviewing the entire spectrum of international security assistance, it is
impossible to identify one task as more important than the rest. Instead, all have their
place in an implementation process and all have their appropriate point in time. And
yet, among all the sets of tasks the reform of the military and civilian security sector
has emerged as a key element of peace implementation.
It is crucial for the peace process that the transition to non-violent conflict
management mechanisms is reflected in the security forces, that they display respect
for human rights and are subject to civilian control. Effective security functions,
including professional police performance, are especially important to the legitimacy
of the post-settlement government. The prioritisation of human rights varies with the
government’s ability and willingness which in turn affects the perception and the
progress of the peace process. As noted earlier, control over the security sector,
including military forces, police forces, courts and prisons, is a tremendously
powerful tool and the struggle between the parties for that control is one of the gravest
threats to a peace process. In order to reduce the stakes involved in the struggle,
power-sharing in the security sector can be an option, albeit a dangerous one. Given
that the monopoly on the use of force is perhaps the most fundamental prerogative of
a state, the international community needs to be aware of the implications for the
sovereignty of the state should they attempt to dilute the monopoly.971
                                                
971 The Bosnian case illustrates the dilemma of how to reconcile maintaining a monopoly on the use of
force with the parties’ contending claims to that monopoly. At a national level, the military was headed
by the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but consisted of two separate forces. It remained to be seen
whether acknowledging the demands of the Bosnian Serbs and the Federation for control over military
security, while at the same time not recognising the Bosnian Croats claim, was a viable option in the
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Factors Implications for International Security Assistance
Comprehensiveness of effort · There is a need to recognise the links and mutual dependence between tasks, with
regard to chronology and priority.
· Coalitions and co-ordination between military and civilian providers of
international security assistance are essential.
· There is tension between the need for flexible time-tables and funding limitations
and donor calls for accountability and progress. The focus has shifted towards
aiming at a given endstate rather than an enddate.
International political
commitment
· Outside engagement is the single most important factor for successful peace
implementation.
· Commitment is reflected in the scope and duration of international security
assistance, as well as in the amount of political and financial support that is
forthcoming.
· Broad coalitions/multilateral arrangements, strategic leadership, and regional
support are all critical. There is also a need for a strategic level body in which
policy can be co-ordinated, in order for the international community to speak with
one voice.
· A balance needs to be struck between sustained outside engagement and local
responsibility.
Security guarantee · Durable solutions to the security concerns of the parties need to be devised and
common security perceptions built. In the transition period, the security guarantee
provided through international security assistance is essential for confidence-
building in an atmosphere of distrust.
· Aside from operational issues, the lack of commitment and the threat of
withdrawal on the part of the international community weaken the security
guarantee.
Spoiler management · Spoilers thrive on distrust and tensions and are present in all walks of post-
settlement life. Often groups of spoilers in the political, military, and
economic/criminal realm, are linked and extremely powerful.
· A common spoiler management strategy which targets the parties' assessment of
the costs and benefits of compliance is crucial. The strategy must be consistent and
assertive and aim at either marginalising or integrating spoilers.
National political compliance · International security assistance is highly political. It is important that the
international community is aware of this and consciously fosters consent
throughout the peace process. Security guarantees are one instrument for
increasing co-operation.
· Compliance will also be a function of how dependent parties are on international
assistance.
Popular sense of security · Sense of security is an illusive but no less important concept. For a transition from
war to peace to occur, a normalisation process must take place in which the
population develops a belief in peace and confidence in their security.
Table 2.2 Decisive Factors for the Success of International Security Assistance
Nevertheless, there is a point in averting a situation in which the security
sector is dominated by one of the parties. This is another characteristic of the new and
improved security sector that will take some time to become ingrained. In the
meantime, international security assistance allows third-party actors to provide
                                                                                                                                           
long run. The outlook was rather bleak. Either hostilities would resurface and the policy of a separate
force for each entity become Bosnia-Herzegovina’s death warrant, or the country would indeed manage
to return to its peaceful multi-ethnic nature and feel no need for two separate forces. It would be many
years before assessments could be made on the viability of the Bosnian solution.
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security guarantees that free up the parties to the conflict, so that they can each loosen
their grip on the security functions and develop lasting solutions. It is important to
remember that even in post-conflict societies where the security sector is virtually
non-existent, there will never be a security vacuum. As every member of society is
intent upon her own security, small-scale mechanisms for the management of
conflicts naturally emerge. The challenge is to persuade the population to trust in the
newly established or reformed security sector for their protection and for justice.
As has become clear throughout, there is a powerful group of actors that profit
from preventing the development of long-term stable solutions. Spoilers are
particularly damaging when they collude across different sections of society, i.e.
across military, economic, and political spheres. For example, spoilers will become
increasingly difficult to handle the more political power also entails economic gain.
Managing spoilers is a crucial task for the international community, as they quite
often have the power to derail the peace process and upset the achievements of
international security assistance. Spoilers have a staying power that usually exceeds
that of third parties, which enables them to retain powerful positions and a relatively
low profile until the time that the international community withdraws. Therefore, the
key to spoiler management is early detection and a conscious decision on the part of
external actors to devise a strategy for handling spoilers. Moreover, the strategy needs
to be followed by assertive and co-ordinated action. 972
This is also closely linked to the security guarantee provided by the
international community, in that spoilers thrive on the lack of trust between parties –
whether they themselves are among the parties or not – and will benefit from
discrediting international security assistance. Therefore, the security guarantee can
only be credible when it is issued in the context of sustained third-party engagement
and when it has solid and vocal international political backing. Thus, the international
community must “feel that they have a stake in the success of the implementation
process.”973 Walters points out that”[o]utside powers can play a critical role in the
resolution of civil wars, but only if they are willing to make a solid commitment and
bear the necessary costs.”974 In that sense, it has become clear that the commitment of
                                                
972 Stephen J. Stedman (1997) “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22(2), p.
52f.
5 Joanna Spear (1999) “The Disarmament and Demobilisation of Warring Factions in the Aftermath of
Civil Wars: Key Implementation Issues,” Civil Wars 2(2), p. 15.
974 Walters (1997), p. 362f.
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the international community is equally important as the local political willingness to
comply with and support the peace process. Still, a balance must be found between
local responsibility and comprehensive and sustained international engagement. At
the same time as the third-party actors are being called upon to be more forceful, such
as was the case in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Angola, local dependency on
external assistance grows. The precise content of the balance is less important than the
fact that it rests on a strategy that – similar to the more specific issue of spoiler
management – must be co-ordinated, assertive, and as impartial as possible. Unless
the costs of non-compliance become predictable, spoilers are unlikely to adjust their
behaviour to the international efforts.
The contribution that international security assistance makes to peace
processes cannot be underestimated and there can be no doubt that it serves to
enhance security in the former conflict area. Still, there are a number of limitations to
its effectiveness. Most importantly, the political implications of who has control of the
security sector and its concomitant security forces often make impartial delivery of
assistance difficult. This, in turn, increases the hesitancy of the donor community.
Unfortunately, the need for security assistance to be delivered rapidly is at odds with
the reluctance of the international community to fund the reform of the security
sector. Thus, the lead-on time necessary to overcome the scruples involved in
providing international security assistance can adversely impact their ability to
influence the security situation. One way in which the reluctance may be modified is
through multilateral operations, and even more so through improved co-ordination
among the actors involved which can significantly advance accountability and
compliance.
There is also a question as to whether aid is in cash or in kind. Whereas the
transparency that comes with earmarked funding or specific in kind deliveries usually
serves to increase the donor community’s willingness to deliver it, it often puts a
damper on the recipient’s enthusiasm, due to the conditions attached to the assistance.
Accordingly, not only the aid itself and who receives it, but the manner in which
assistance is provided, may be politically loaded. Walters underlines the delicacy of
delivering assistance to the security sector, arguing that “nonmilitary intervention,
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although politically more acceptable and financially less costly, is unlikely to
accomplish much.”975
Similarly, there is a thin line that separates civilian security assistance and
civilian assistance. As security is so critical to the transition from war to peace, almost
any task has security implications. In the attempt to understand the function and
effectiveness of international security assistance, a definition that casts the net too
wide is not fruitful. There are tasks that are humanitarian in nature, or that aim at the
consolidation of political institutions or at economic development, which should not
be considered international security assistance. International actors need to understand
where the line between security assistance and civilian aid is drawn, who is the most
suitable to take on a given task, and whom to co-operate with in order to handle both
positive and negative spill-over effects into other areas of implementation.
The difficulty in separating security from civilian assistance points to the fact
that there are several interwoven processes that constitute a peace process. The most
straightforward is a process of structural change, in which institutions are created or
re-established. Then, there is a parallel political process which must take place in
support of the structural reform of the security sector and other international security
assistance. In other words, the political context must be supportive of the new reforms
and doctrines. No amount of preaching on multi-ethnic coexistence will have an
impact as long as the political leadership propagates the opposite. In some cases, the
international community will be able to gain co-operation from political authorities by
making clear that the reform of the military and civilian security actually allows them
to govern more effectively. Thus, “[i]nstead of being seen as an issue of international
interference in internal affairs, the reform process can be presented as an international
effort to support the establishment of real sovereign authority over the territory held
by the state.”976
In addition to the structural changes and political adjustment, the population
must undergo a normalisation process that eventually leads them to a belief in peace
and confidence in their security. This constituent process can hardly be described as
parallel to the other two, instead it pervades everything else and is often even the
indirect target for international security assistance, whether the providers of the
                                                
975 Walters (1997), p. 362f.
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assistance are aware of this or not. And still, the process of developing peace in the
minds of the people evades direct manipulation by third parties. Although the
international community can prepare the ground by issuing threats and rewards, it is
quite simply a process of reconciliation and rapprochement that must take place
before peace is consolidated. Too often the international community has provided
security assistance in the misplaced hope of remedying an inadequate security
situation by supporting technical solutions, such as can be addressed through more
training and better equipment. Although such forms of assistance are necessary
elements in the whole web of tasks and types of assistance, they are insufficient
unless the underlying political and, most importantly, psychological situation is also
addressed.
                                                                                                                                           
976 Espen Barth Eide, Annika S. Hansen, and Brynjar Lia (1999) Security Sector Reform as a
Development Issue (Room Doc. #7, OECD/DAC Task Force for International Peace and Development,
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